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ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to measure the technical efficiency performance of Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises over the period 2000 to 2008. It also aims to identify
and measure firm-specific and business environment factors which significantly
impact on the technical efficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises. Unbalanced panel data for 178 Thai listed manufacturing enterprises
over the period 2000 to 2008 is compiled and used to conduct an empirical analysis
employing both parametric (Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)) and non-parametric
(Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)) approaches. This provides a robust check of the
empirical results to analyse technical efficiency performance as well as significant
factors influencing the efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, including
sub-manufacturing sectors.
The empirical results of this study reveal that the mean technical efficiency
scores of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises obtained from the SFA and DEA
approaches are found to be quite consistent, given by 0.812 and 0.887 respectively,
indicating that they operated at a high level of technical efficiency. Even though their
technical efficiency performance is high, the empirical evidence from both
estimation approaches confirm that they had operated under decreasing returns to
scale over the period 2000 to 2008. More specifically, the SFA approach reveals the
existence of decreasing returns to scale for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
Similarly, the DEA approach suggests that approximately 86 percent of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, on average, operate under decreasing returns to scale. The
empirical results from the SFA approach also highlight that the production of Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises is mainly contributed by intermediate inputs and
labour input, but capital is found to be the least important input. Similarly, the
empirical evidence from an estimated Translog production function confirm the
existence of labour-using and capital-saving technical progress for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, indicating that their technical progress relied on labour
input over the period 2000 to 2008. Moreover, the rate of technical progress is found
to be 0.0205 for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, indicating that the rate of
technical change only increased by 2.05 percent per year. As a result they must attain
a higher production frontier to enhance their future technical efficiency performance.
The empirical evidence from both the SFA and DEA approaches also reveal
that financial constraints (leverage) have a significant and positive association with
the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. To confirm this
empirical evidence the empirical results from both estimation approaches reveal that
liquidity has a significant and positive impact on their technical efficiency
performance. In addition, the empirical evidence from both estimation approaches
indicate that both external and internal financing are found to have a negative
association with the technical efficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises, but only the empirical evidence from the SFA approach is found to be
statistically significant. External financing, however, does not exert a significant
impact on their technical efficiency due to the very small magnitude of the estimated
coefficients. The empirical results from both estimation approaches also reveal that
research and development (R&D) has a significant and negative association with the
xiv

technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. The empirical results
from both estimation approaches, however, reveal that controlling ownership has a
positive association with the technical efficiency performance of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, but only the SFA approach produces a significant result.
There is strong evidence from both estimation approaches that managerial ownership
has a significant and positive impact on the technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises. Both estimation approaches also strongly confirm that
executive remuneration has a significant and positive influence on their technical
efficiency performance. Focusing on different types of firm ownership there is strong
evidence from both estimation approaches that foreign and family ownership exerts a
significant and positive effect on the technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises. According to the magnitude of the estimated coefficients
of each type of firm ownership, there is strong evidence from both estimation
approaches that foreign-owned firms perform best, followed by family-owned firms,
hybrid-owned firms and domestic-owned firms, given joint-owned firms as the base
category. There is strong evidence of a learning-by-exporting hypothesis from both
estimation approaches, indicating exporting exerts a significant and positive effect on
the technical efficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. Vice
versa, there is evidence of the self-selection hypothesis that a firm’s technical
efficiency predicted by the SFA approach has a significant and positive impact on the
export participation of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. A positive result is also
found from the DEA approach, but is not statistically significant.
Finally, the robust results from this study can be used to provide empirically
based policy implications and recommendations which are useful to both policymakers and entrepreneurs to enhance the long-term efficiency and competitiveness of
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Background to the study
In recent years, Thailand has faced a real challenge of sustaining its growth

and escaping from its middle income trap1 (World Bank Office -Thailand, 2008). For
Thailand to transition to higher income and growth in the long term, measures to
improve productivity and competitiveness over the long term in all sectors
(agriculture, industry, and services) are urgently needed. According to Thailand’s
Industry Master Plan (2010-2014) Thai manufacturing firms remain heavily
dependent for their comparative advantage upon cheap labour and foreign direct
investment, without enhancing their productivity. Therefore, a low level of
productivity has been observed in this sector, since they lack (i) new technology, (ii)
product and process innovation, (iii) financial access, (iv) skilled labour, (v) raw
materials, (vi) high-value added production, and (vii) managerial skills (Ministry of
Industry, 2009).
In particular, measures to increase the efficiency performance and
competitiveness of firms in the manufacturing sector, as the main sector in Thailand
accounting for 38 percent of Thai GDP in 1992 and 40.1 percent of Thai GDP in
2008 (Bank of Thailand, 2009b: Ministry of Industry, 2009), are very important. The
manufacturing sector has been one of the most important sectors in the East and
Southeast Asian countries. A significant contribution to economic growth in this
region since the early 1980s has arisen from the rapid expansion in manufacturing
exports (Jongwanich, 2007). In the case of Thailand a significant contribution to

1

Thailand moved rapidly from a low-income country to a middle-income country during the period
between the 1970s to mid-1990s. This resulted from the rapid growth in per capita income during that
period. In recent years, real GDP growth has slowed and is now lower than that of other developing
countries in East Asia. Despite intensifying global competition and higher commodity prices Thailand
remains a heavily labour-intensive country, relying on unskilled labour and low value adding
activities. These problems cause a real challenge for Thailand in sustaining its growth and to it
becoming a higher income country (World Bank Office-Thailand, 2008, p2).
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economic growth has also been generated from export-oriented large enterprises
(Ministry of Industry, 2009).
Thailand’s economic expansion before the Asian financial crisis was also
underpinned by rapid growth in exports 2 (Athukorala and Suphachalasai, 2004). The
major exported goods were mainly agricultural and processed food during the period
1981 to 1985, which accounted for almost 50 percent of total annual average export
value (see Table 2.11, Chapter 2). However, a substantial shift from traditional
agricultural exports 3 towards manufactured exports emerged during the period 1991
to 1995. After 1996 the upward trend of Thailand’s manufactured exports also
continued, accounting for 87 percent of total export value (see Figure 2.12, Chapter
2). Thailand is in a difficult competitive position as it cannot continue to depend on
cheap labour for its competitiveness, and, therefore, must move up the technology
spectrum and improve the efficiency and productivity of its enterprises. Fried et al.
(2008, p11) also suggested that macro performance depends on micro performance,
and, therefore, the same reasoning also applies to the study of economic growth. It is
also necessary, therefore, to conduct a firm level analysis to analyse how best to
increase Thailand’s efficiency performance and competitiveness, since firms are the
engines of economic growth. Thai listed enterprises make a significant contribution
to the Thai economy. The average market capitalization of Thai listed enterprises
accounted for approximately 55 percent of Thai GDP at current price over the period
2000 to 2008. More specifically, the average revenue of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises 4 , accounted for approximately 12.9 percent of GDP at current price over
the period 2000 to 2008 (Bank of Thailand, 2009; The Stock Exchange of Thailand,
2009).
Moreover, measuring efficiency and sources affecting firm inefficiency can
be used to identify and separate controllable and uncontrollable sources of
2

A number of empirical studies of the region, however, fail to find a statistically significant
relationship between trade/export and economic growth (Sinha, 1999; Ekanayake, 1999).
3
Even though manufacturing contributed most to this development, agricultural products still
accounted for a fairly important share of exports, but its relative importance was diminishing
significantly (Lombaerde, 2008, p250).
4

The resources sector has the highest average revenue, over the period 2000 to 2008, followed by the
manufacturing sector, the services sector, the financial sector, and other sectors (see Table 2.4,
Chapter 2).
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performance variation, and, therefore, assist in the design of appropriate government
policies and recommendations (Fried et al., 2008). For most firms the ultimate
measure used to evaluate their business performance is a financial variable, but, in
fact, it is just the bottom-line performance indicator as it is influenced by the
efficiency and productivity performance of firms and price changes (e.g., input and
product prices) (Fried et al., 2008). Therefore, a firm’s efficiency and productivity
performance is at the core of its financial achievement. Kalirajan and Shand (1999, p
149) suggest that the quantification of an efficiency measurement is useful in three
ways: (i) measuring efficiency facilitates comparisons across similar economic units,
(ii) where measurement indicates variations in efficiencies among economic units,
further analysis can be conducted to identify the sources causing such variations, and
(iii) the results of such analyses can be used for policy aimed at improving
efficiency. Measuring the efficiency and inefficiency sources of firms will be
emphasised in the context of this study as it is important to examine how firms can
enhance their efficiency performance which has a direct impact on the overall growth
of the economy. This is the fundamental objective of this thesis for the case of
Thailand.
The major problems causing firm-level inefficiency could be obviously
observed from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The Crisis highlighted problems of
lack of transparency in corporate governance and a corrupt and mismanaged banking
system (e.g., excessive lending to non-productive assets, lack of adequate debt
monitoring) among the crisis-affected countries in South East Asia as well as
Thailand. The problem of weak corporate governance was related to, for example,
the dominance of controlling shareholders, the separation of voting and cash flow
rights (or the disparity between control and ownership), and the limited protection of
minority rights (Claessens et al., 2000; East Asia Analytical Unit, 2000). Moreover
Not only did these inefficient business environment factors cause
manufacturing inefficiency in Thailand, but firm-specific factors (i.e., inadequate
firm size, lack of business experience, lack of research and development (R&D)
investment, inefficient managerial skills, lack of internal competition, and lack of
external competition or lack of learning-by-exporting experience) also affected the
inefficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing firms. After the 1997 Asian
3

financial crisis the Thai corporate governance system has been strengthened through
(i) enhancing the institutional framework for best accounting and auditing practices
and improving the disclosure practice of listed companies, (ii) encouraging best
practices for directors of listed companies, and (iii) relaxing foreign ownership
controls 5 (East Asia Analytical Unit, 2000; Talerngsri and Vonkhorporn, 2005;
Sally, 2007). Minority shareholders’ rights through protection measures (e.g., market
regulation and enforcement, trading and settlement system reliability, information
disclosure, quality accessibility, and securities investor production funds (SIPF))
have also been addressed. According to World Bank (2005), even though corporate
governance in Thailand has made a significant improvement since the 1997 Asian
financial crisis, further enhancing Thailand’s corporate governance is still needed to
be it into line with international standards (see Section 2.6, Chapter 2).
However, the relative significance of business environment and firm-specific
factors affecting firm inefficiency have not been empirically examined for listed
manufacturing enterprises in Thailand after the 1997 financial crisis. In this context,
this thesis conducts a quantitative analysis to measure the technical efficiency
performance, and factors affecting technical efficiency, of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises. The key factors of this thesis cover (i) financial factors (e.g., financial
constraints, sources of financing), (ii) research and development (R&D), (iii)
ownership structure (e.g., controlling (concentrated) ownership, managerial
ownership, types of owned firms (e.g., family and foreign owned firms), (iv)
executive remuneration, and (v) exporting (learning by exporting and self-selection
hypotheses). In addition, other firm-specific and business environment factors (e.g.,
firm age, firm size, government assistance, and foreign cooperation) are also
included in this thesis.
Eight unique hypotheses covering the key factors mentioned above are
developed from a review of the literature in Chapter 3. These have not been
empirically examined before for the case of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises
and are measured by employing the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and Data

5

After the 1997 crisis the 1999 Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (FBA) was enacted, allowing foreign
ownership of up to 100 percent in most manufacturing activities, subject to specific requirements from
the Board of Investment of Thailand (BOI).
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Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approaches. More importantly, most of these
hypotheses provide a significant contribution to the existing finance literature (see
Section 1.3). This thesis also constructs a comprehensive firm-level data series 6 for
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises using raw data (electronic reports) obtained
from the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), covering the period 2000 to 2008. This
ensures the unique contribution of this thesis (see Section 1.3). Empirically based
policy implications and recommendations are also provided for policy makers and
entrepreneurs of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
1.2

Research objectives and research questions
This thesis aims to examine the performance of Thai listed manufacturing

enterprises, covering the period 2000 to 2008. The specific purposes of the thesis are
as follows:
(i)

To measure the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises;

(ii)

To identify and measure firm-specific and business environment
factors which significantly affect the inefficiency performance 7 of
Thai listed manufacturing firms; and

(iii)

To provide evidence based policy implications and recommendations
to enhance the efficiency and competitiveness of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises.

The following research questions are addressed subject to the above
objectives. These questions also link to the key hypotheses to be addressed in this
thesis.

6

Firm-level survey data for Thai listed enterprises is not available.
The term, “technical inefficiency” is used here due to the specific characteristic of an inefficiency
effects model obtained from the Battese and Coelli (1995) model as analysed by FRONTIER 4.1.This
thesis also alternatively uses the term, “technical efficiency” for simplification purposes, but the
interpretation of this term will be in the opposite direction.
7
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Main research questions
(i)

How do Thai listed manufacturing enterprises perform in terms of
technical efficiency?

(ii)

Which factors significantly contribute to the technical efficiency
performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises?

(iii)

How can the overall technical efficiency performance of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises be enhanced?

From the main research questions above, a number of sub-research questions
can be derived from the literature on this issue as follows:
(1)

How do “financial constraints (leverage) and liquidity” impact on the
technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises?

(2)

Which types of “source of finance” (internal or external financing)
significantly

affect

the

technical

efficiency

of

Thai

listed

manufacturing enterprises?
(3)

How does “research and development” (R&D) affect the technical
efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises?

(4)

How does “controlling ownership” (concentrated ownership)
influence the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises?

(5)

How does “managerial ownership” impact on the technical efficiency
of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises?

(6)

What is the impact of “executive remuneration” on the technical
efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises?
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(7)

Which “types of owned firms” (types of ownership) are more
technically efficient?

(8)

How

does

“exporting”

influence

the

technical

efficiency

performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises?
(9)

What is the impact of “technical efficiency” on the export
participation of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises?

(10)

How do other firm-specific variables such as (i) government
assistance, (ii) firm size, (iii) firm age, and (iv) foreign cooperation 8
influence the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises?

(11)

How can policies initiated by the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET)
and the government, directly or via other government agencies, be
made to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises?

1.3

Contribution and significance of the research
According to the research objectives and research questions presented above,

this thesis will make a significant contribution in several areas as follows:
First, this thesis is the first to identify and measure firm-specific and business
environment factors that significantly impact on the technical efficiency performance
of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, covering the period 2000 to 2008. Focusing
on the measurement of listed firm performance, most previous studies have measured
firm performance by a firm’s profitability and financial ratios (McConnell and
Servaes, 1990; Smith, 1990; Cho, 1998; Xu and Wang, 1999; Claessens et al., 2000;
Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Joh, 2003; Chang and Shin, 2007; Lee, 2008). In
Thailand, some empirical studies have also measured firm performance based on the
8

This includes (i) technical assistance from foreign partners and (ii) assistance from foreign partners
in exporting to new foreign markets.
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profitability and financial ratios of Thai listed enterprises (Wiwattanakantang, 2001;
Yammeesri and Lodh, 2003). None of these empirical studies, however, have
measured the performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises in terms of
technical efficiency. For most firms, especially listed enterprises, financial indicators
(e.g., return on assets and return on equity) are used to evaluate their financial
performance, but, in fact, the root of their financial performance growth is their
efficiency and productivity improvement and price variations (e.g., input and product
prices) (Fried et al., 2008, p11). Therefore, efficiency and productivity 9 measures are
key indicators of the development of firm performance, as suggested by Fried
(2008).
A firm’s technical efficiency measures the ability to produce the maximum
output from a given set of inputs and production technology (Coelli et al., 2005,
p51). Technical efficiency is a relative concept, since a firm’s production
performance is compared to a best-practice input-output association (Alauddin et al.,
1993). In other words, the efficiency of a firm refers to a comparison between
observed and optimal values of its output and input (e.g., a comparison of observed
output to maximum output obtainable from the input, or a comparison between
observed and optimal values of its input required to produce the output, or some
combination of the two) (Fried et al., 2008). The “optimum” term refers to a
production frontier (or best-practice performance) where a firm is technically
efficient.
More importantly, this thesis indentifies firm-specific and business
environment factors and measures their impact on technical efficiency, which has not
been previously addressed for the case of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
More specifically, eight unique hypotheses are developed from a review of the
literature (Chapter 3). Hypotheses 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 provide a significant
contribution to the literature, since the measurement of a firm’s performance in the
literature has extensively been based on its profitability and financial ratios (financial
performance). The following hypotheses are identified and examined in this thesis as
follows:

9

The concept of productivity and efficiency are different (see Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, Chapter 3).
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Hypothesis 1: Financial constraints (leverage) have a significant and positive
relationship with the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
Vice versa, the more liquidity the lower is the technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises.
Several empirical studies have investigated the impact of financial constraints
(leverage) on a firm’s performance as measured by accounting or financial ratios (see
Section 3.4.2, Chapter 3). Few empirical studies, however, have examined the effect
of financial constraints (leverage) on a firm’s technical efficiency (Dilling-Hansen et
al., 2003; Sena, 2006; Mok et al., 2007; Weill, 2008). No empirical study conducted
for other countries has investigated the effects of both leverage and liquidity on a
firm’s technical efficiency. More importantly, this hypothesis has not been examined
for the case of Thailand using either the SFA or two-stage DEA approach, or even
applying both estimation approaches.
Hypothesis 2: External financing has a significant and positive relationship with a
firm’s technical efficiency for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. Vice versa,
internal financing has a significant and negative effect on a firm’s technical
efficiency for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
This hypothesis aims to examine the effects of external and internal financing
on a firm’s technical efficiency as discussed in the literature review (see Section
3.4.3, Chapter 3). More importantly, from the perspective of this study, this
hypothesis has not been examined in any empirical studies focusing on Thailand,
especially for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises using either the SFA or twostage DEA approach, or even applying both estimation approaches.
Hypothesis 3: Research and development (R&D) has a significant and positive
relationship with the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
As discussed in the literature review in Section 3.6 of Chapter 3, a number of
empirical studies have investigated the effect of research and development (R&D) on
a firm’s technical efficiency (Aw and Batra, 1998; Dilling-Hansen et al., 2003; Kim,
2003; Sheu and Yang, 2005). This hypothesis, however, has not been investigated
9

before for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises using either the SFA or two-stage
DEA approach, or even applying both estimation approaches.
Hypothesis 4: Controlling ownership has a significant and positive effect on the
technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
As discussed in Section 3.5.1 of Chapter 3, several empirical studies have
investigated the effect of controlling ownership (concentrated ownership) on a firm’s
performance based on accounting or financial measures (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985;
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Leech and Leahy, 1991; Wiwattanakantang, 2001;
Yammeesri and Lodh, 2003; Zeitun and Tian, 2007). None of these empirical studies
conducted for other countries have examined this hypothesis, and especially in
applying both the SFA and two-stage DEA approaches. More importantly, this
hypothesis has not been examined before for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises
using either of these estimation approaches.
Hypothesis 5: Managerial ownership has a significant and positive effect on the
technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
According to Section 3.5.3 of Chapter 3, empirical studies have studied the
effect of managerial ownership on firm performance, as measured by financial
profitability (McConnell and John, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Wiwattanakantang,
2001; Yammeesri and Lodh, 2003). Very few empirical studies, however, have
examined the effect of managerial ownership on a firm’s technical efficiency (Liao et
al., 2010). None of these empirical studies conducted for other countries have used
both the SFA and the two-stage DEA approaches to test this hypothesis. More
importantly, this hypothesis has not been examined before for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises.
Hypothesis 6: Executive remuneration has a significant and positive effect on the
technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
Several empirical studies in the finance and accounting literature have
examined the effect of executive remuneration on a firm’s performance based on
10

accounting or financial measures (see Section 3.7, Chapter 3). None of the empirical
studies conducted for other countries have employed both estimation techniques,
especially for the case of listed manufacturing firms. This hypothesis, however, has
not been investigated before for Thai listed manufacturing firms using either the SFA
or two-stage DEA approach, or even applying both estimation approaches.
Hypothesis 7: Foreign and family ownership 10 have a significant and positive effect
on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises; foreign-owned
firms perform best in terms of technical efficiency relative to other ownership types
for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
Many empirical studies have investigated the effect of foreign ownership on a
firm’s performance, as measured by accounting or financial measures (Zhang et al.,
2001; Takii, 2004; Choi and Yoo, 2006; Aydin et al., 2007; Kimura and Kiyota,
2007; Greenaway et al., 2008) (See Section 3.5.2, Chapter 3). Similarly, a number of
empirical studies have also examined the relationship between foreign ownership and
a firm’s technical efficiency (Fukuyama et al., 1999; Goldar et al., 2003; Bottasso
and Sembenelli, 2004). While information on family ownership has been extensively
discussed in the finance literature (see Section 3.5.2, Chapter 3), few studies have
linked family ownership with a firm’s technical efficiency (Lauterbach and
Vaninsky, 1999). In the case of Thailand, Wiwattanakantang (2001) and Yammeesri
and Lodh (2003) studied the effect of family ownership on a firm’s performance
based on accounting or financial measures. This hypothesis, therefore, has not been
examined for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises as well as listed manufacturing
enterprises in other countries, using either the SFA or two-stage DEA approach, or
even applying both estimation approaches.
Hypothesis 8: A firm’s exports have a significant and positive association with its
technical efficiency (the learning by exporting hypothesis exists); A firm’s technical
efficiency has a significant and positive effect on the export participation (the self
selection hypothesis exists) of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.

10

This refers to majority foreign and family ownership using a cut-off shareholding level of 25
percent.
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Several empirical studies have examined the effect of a firm’s export
performance on its productivity (see Table 3.3, Section 3.8, Chapter 3). Few
empirical studies have investigated the learning-by-exporting hypothesis in which a
firm’s performance is measured by technical efficiency (Dilling-Hansen et al., 2003;
Kim, 2003; Granér and Isaksson, 2007). Very few studies have examined the selfselection hypothesis using technical efficiency as the measurement of firm
performance (see Table 3.3, Section 3.8, Chapter 3). More importantly, this
hypothesis examines the existence of both learning-by-exporting and the selfselection hypotheses on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises. This has not been previously conducted using either the SFA or twostage DEA approach, or even applying both estimation approaches.
Second, this thesis is the first to employ both parametric (Stochastic and
Frontier Analysis (SFA) and non-parametric (two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA)) approaches for a robustness checking, as suggested by a number of
contributions in the efficiency literature (Bauer et al., 1998; Stone, 2002; Jacobs et
al., 2006; Miranda et al., 2010). This thesis also predicts a firm’s technical efficiency
(scores) 11 , and then examines the effects of firm-specific and business environment
variables, which have been previously discussed, on a firm’s technical inefficiency.
In Thailand, Sirasoontorn (2004) applied both approaches in estimating the technical
efficiency of Thai electricity generation under public ownership However, none of
these empirical studies have conducted an empirical analysis employing either the
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), or the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
approach, or even applied both estimation approaches for the case of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises. These two approaches 12 can be specifically used to
evaluate firm performance based on technical efficiency, and investigate the sources
affecting the technical inefficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. More
importantly, applying both SFA and DEA approaches can facilitate a comparison of
the empirical evidence obtained in this thesis.

11

For the two-stage DEA approach technical efficiency scores predicted by DEAP Version 2.1 are
changed to technical inefficiency scores by subtracting them from “unity” so as to be consistent with
an inefficiency effects model used for the SFA approach, which focuses on factors affecting firm
technical inefficiency (see Sirasoontorn, 2004).
12
The programs, FRONTIER 4.1 and DEAP 2.1 are used to conduct the empirical analysis for the
SFA and DEA approaches, respectively (see Chapters 4 and 6).
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Third, this thesis does not utilise any firm-level survey data for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises 13 , due to the unavailability of such data. A specific firmlevel dataset focusing upon Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, however, has been
compiled by the author using raw data (electronic reports) obtained from the Stock
Exchange of Thailand (SET), covering the period 2000 to 2008 14 , such as (i)
consolidated financial reports, (ii) annual reports (Form 56-1), and (iii) the list of
board of directors and major shareholders. This ensures the uniqueness of the thesis
and the empirical results obtained. This thesis also provides empirically based policy
recommendations to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises. The empirical evidence obtained from this thesis will be
useful for both policy-makers and entrepreneurs of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises, aimed at enhancing their efficiency, competitiveness, and development.
All of the policy implications and recommendations of this thesis are provided in
more detail in Chapter 7.
In conclusion, this thesis provides a unique study of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, and makes (i) a significant contribution to the existing
finance and economic literature, and (ii) applies estimation techniques which have
not been used before in the context of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. More
specifically, most hypotheses 15 also make a significant contribution to the study of
listed manufacturing enterprises in other countries, especially employing both the
SFA and DEA approaches for their analysis. Even though some hypotheses 16 have
been previously examined for other countries, none of them has examined these
hypotheses (e.g., (i) the effects of external and internal financing on firm technical
efficiency (see hypothesis 2), and (ii) the existence of learning by exporting and selfselection hypotheses (see hypothesis 8)) by adopting both estimation approaches.
Focusing on the estimation techniques in measuring technical efficiency and the

13

The 1997 and 2007 Thai Industry Censuses, including Thai Industry Surveys, are also available,
which can be used to measure the technical efficiency performance of Thai manufacturing firms.
However, the 1997 and 2007 Thai Industry Censuses, including Thai Industry Surveys have been used
to study the technical efficiency of Thai manufacturing enterprises (see Arunsawadiwong, 2007) and
Thai small and medium sized enterprises (see Charoenrat and Harvie, 2011). The use of these Thai
census and survey data have limitation in analyzing firm-level panel data. However, this thesis uses
firm-level panel data over the period 2000 to 2008, which leads to the uniqueness of the study.
14
See Section 8.3, Chapter 8 for the data limitation.
15
See hypotheses 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 in Chapter 5 for more details.
16
See hypotheses 2 and 8 in Chapter 5 for more details.
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factors causing firm inefficiency, this thesis also makes a significant contribution by
applying both the SFA and DEA estimation techniques to cross check the results for
each hypothesis. This has not been conducted for other empirical studies focusing
upon other countries, particularly listed manufacturing enterprises.
1.4

Methodology
To achieve the above objectives this thesis will employ different

methodologies, and consists of five steps. The first step (chapter 2) is to (1) provide a
country overview which consists of four main parts. The first part provides an
economic overview of Thailand, including a discussion of the 1997 financial crisis.
The second part provides an overview of financial markets in Thailand, including
their structure and development. In the second part, Thai listed enterprises’
performance and their ownership structure is also provided. The third part focuses on
an overview of information on corporate governance in Thailand, including
directors’ rules and responsibilities, accounting standards, and shareholder
protection. Thailand’s export performance as well as manufacturing exports and its
output capacity, and net flow of foreign direct investment (FDI), are also provided in
the last part.
The second step (chapter 3) is to conduct a literature review focusing on
different measurements of firm performance. A review of the literature regarding
firm-specific and business environment factors that can significantly affect the listed
enterprises’ performance is also provided. These factors include, for example, (i)
financial factors (e.g., financial leverage, sources of financing), (ii) ownership
structure (e.g., types of ownership, controlling ownership, and managerial
ownership), (iii) research and development (R&D), and (iv) executive remuneration.
A review of the literature focusing upon other factors (e.g., government assistance,
networking, foreign cooperation, geographical diversification, firm size, and firm
age) is also provided.
The third step (chapter 4) is to survey the theoretical and empirical issues
related to firm efficiency measurement concepts. The survey also covers different
estimation approaches which can be used to predict the technical efficiency of Thai
listed manufacturing firms, and also measure the factors causing their technical
14

inefficiency. More specifically, two competing approaches the parametric (Stochastic
Frontier Analysis) and non-parametric (Data Envelopment Analysis) efficiency
methods are reviewed. The survey also indicates specific software used to conduct
the empirical analysis for both estimation techniques. These two estimation
approaches are also compared in terms of their advantages and disadvantages. It
suggests that there is no reason to favour one estimation approach over the other, and
it is reasonable to cross check the results from both estimation approaches (see
Chapter 4).
The fourth step (Chapters 5 and 6) is to identify the hypotheses and variables
to be used to conduct the empirical analysis, using the Stochastic Frontier Analysis
(SFA) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approaches. For the SFA approach the
Battese and Coelli (1995) model is applied to (i) predict the technical efficiency of
all Thai listed manufacturing enterprises including its sub manufacturing sectors
through an estimated stochastic frontier production function, and (ii) to measure the
inefficiency effects model which examines the significant factors impacting on the
technical inefficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises simultaneously.
For the DEA approach the two-stage DEA model is applied. In the first step,
technical inefficiency scores 17 are predicted by applying variable returns to scale
(VRS) linear programming as analysed by DEAP Version 2.1. In the second stage
the maximum likelihood Tobit model is used, in which technical inefficiency scores
are regressed with firm-specific and business environment variables. In addition, the
maximum likelihood Probit model is also applied when examining the self-selection
hypothesis as part of hypothesis 8. The empirical results obtained from both
estimation approaches are interpreted, discussed, and compared for a robustness
checking of these results.
The final step (Chapter 7) is to provide policy implications and
recommendations based on the empirical results obtained in Chapter 6. These policy
implications and recommendations are developed to enhance the performance and
competitiveness of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. In conclusion, different

17

See footnote 11.
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methodologies, as previously described, are conducted to ensure that the research
objectives and research questions of this thesis are adequately addressed. By
collecting all available data sources (e.g., financial reports, annual reports, and the
list of board of directors and shareholders), conducting a comprehensive dataset for
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, covering the period 2000 to 2008, and
applying both parametric SFA and non-parametric DEA approaches, this thesis
provides robust results leading to significant evidence based policy implications and
recommendations.
1.5

Research scope
This thesis mainly examines the significant firm-specific and business

environment factors influencing the technical efficiency performance of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, covering the period 2000 to 2008. However, the SET
classifies listed enterprises into eight industrial sectors based upon their core business
operations, such as (i) Agro and Food Industry, (ii) Consumer Products, (iii)
Financials, (iv) Industrials, (v) Property and Construction, (vi) Resources, (vii)
Services, and (viii) Technology. By employing the International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC), some listed enterprises which are not classified as
manufacturing enterprises are excluded from the study. As a result 178 listed
manufacturing firms over the period 2000 to 2008 are used to conduct the empirical
analysis of this thesis (see Section 5.3.2, Chapter 5).
Moreover, non-listed manufacturing enterprises are not considered in this
thesis. This thesis also uses available data sources (electronic reports) obtained from
the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) as discussed in Section 1.3. Finally, figures
which are related to the hypotheses and variables discussed in Chapter 5 (Hypothesis
and Data Description) are selected from these data sources in order to form a new
firm-level data set used for the empirical analysis (Chapter 6).
1.6

Organization of the thesis
The structure of this thesis consists of eight chapters which are briefly

outlined as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of (i) the economy of Thailand,
(ii) financial markets in Thailand focusing on the economic significance and
development of the Thai equity (capital) market, (iii) the business performance and
16

ownership structure of listed manufacturing firms in the Stock Exchange of Thailand
(SET), (iv) corporate governance in Thailand, which includes directors’ rules and
responsibilities, accounting standards, and shareholder protections, and (v) economic
integration of Thailand including Thailand’s export performance as well as
manufacturing exports and its output capacity, and the flow of foreign direct
investment (FDI).
Chapter 3 reviews the literature starting with different measurements of firm
performance, and then focusing on key firm-specific and business environment
factors which significantly affect the performance of publicly listed firms. These
include, for example, (i) financial factors (e.g., financial leverage, sources of
financing), (ii) ownership structure (e.g., types of ownership (e.g., family owned
firms and foreign owned firms), controlling ownership (concentrated ownership), and
managerial ownership), (iii) research and development (R&D), and (iv) executive
remuneration. In addition, the literature review also focuses upon other factors that
may affect technical efficiency such as government assistance, networking, foreign
cooperation, geographical diversification, firm size and firm age.
Chapter 4 presents a review of firm efficiency measurement concepts, which
includes (i) technical efficiency, (ii) allocative efficiency, (iii) scale efficiency, and
(iv) cost and revenue efficiencies. This chapter also explains two competing
approaches, “Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)” and “Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA)”, which can be used to estimate firm technical efficiency and investigate
factors that affect it. For SFA the development stages of the stochastic production
frontier is also provided starting from (i) the deterministic parametric frontier, (ii) the
stochastic production frontier, and (iii) the stochastic production frontier with panel
data, respectively. The selected stochastic frontier production function including its
estimation is also explained in Chapter 6. Focusing on DEA, a description of the
DEA approach including its estimation used in the conduct of an empirical analysis
in Chapter 6 is also provided. The problem of “slacks” when dealing with the DEA
approach is also discussed, and the methods which can be used to solve this problem
are also discussed and selected. More importantly, this chapter also discusses the
strengths and weaknesses of these two estimation approaches.
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Chapter 5 identifies the hypotheses and variables used to conduct the
empirical analysis in Chapter 6. More specifically, there are eight hypotheses
focusing upon factors impacting upon the technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, such as (i) finance (leverage and liquidity; internal
financing and external financing), (ii) research and development (R&D), (iii)
ownership structure (controlling and managerial ownership), (iv) executive
remuneration, (v) types of owned-firms (foreign and family-owned firms), and (vi)
exporting (learning by exporting and self-selection hypotheses). Other variables such
as (i) firm size, (ii) firm age, (iii) government assistance, and (iv) foreign cooperation
are also identified. This chapter discusses possible input and output variables to be
used in predicting technical inefficiency (scores) through the selected stochastic
frontier production function for the SFA, and also the first step of the two-stage
DEA. Firm-specific and business environment variables, which are related to each
hypothesis, are also explained and used in the conduct of an inefficiency effects
model for the SFA approach, and also in the second step of the two-stage DEA
approach.
Chapter 6 conducts an empirical analysis related to the hypotheses discussed
in Chapter 5. This chapter also employs both the SFA and DEA approaches for 178
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, covering the period 2000 to 2008. There is no
obvious reason to favour one estimation technique over the other due to perceived
advantages and disadvantages as discussed in Chapter 4. For the SFA approach the
Battese and Coelli (1995) model is applied by estimating a stochastic frontier
production function and inefficiency effects model simultaneously using FRONTIER
Version 4.1. In addition, a number of null hypotheses such as (i) the validation of the
Cobb-Douglas production function, (ii) the absence of technical progress, (iii) the
absence of neutral technical progress, (iv) the absence of inefficiency effects, (v) the
absence of stochastic frontier inefficiency effects, and (vi) the insignificance of joint
inefficiency variables are also conducted. For the DEA approach the two-stage DEA
approach is applied for this study. The first stage is to predict technical inefficiency
scores applying variable returns to scale (VRS) linear programming as analysed by
DEAP Version 2.1. In the second stage the maximum likelihood Tobit model is used,
in which technical inefficiency scores are regressed with firm-specific and business
environment variables. As part of hypothesis 8 the self-selection hypothesis is tested
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by employing the maximum likelihood Probit model. The empirical results obtained
from both estimation approaches are compared for a robustness checking.
Chapter 7 provides evidence-based policy implications and recommendations
to enhance the efficiency performance and competitiveness of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises. Policy implications and recommendations are addressed
based upon the empirical evidence of each hypothesis, including the empirical results
of other selected firm-specific and business environment variables. Focusing upon
the empirical evidence for each hypothesis and how these could be improved, this
chapter also addresses measures which have been currently implemented for Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises and how these could be improved. This chapter also
makes recommendations on current measures and policies, and further suggests
policies to enhance the technical efficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises.
Chapter 8 provides a summary and conclusions from the thesis. Finally, the
limitations of this study are also outlined and future research possibilities are
suggested at the end of this chapter.
1.7

Conclusions
This chapter has overviewed the overall thesis background to enlighten and

prepare for the subsequent chapters of this thesis. It firstly provided the background
of the study including research problems, outlined the main research objectives of the
thesis, and described research questions and sub-research questions to be examined
in this thesis. It also highlighted the contributions of the thesis to the existing
literature and empirical studies related to the factors affecting firm performance. The
chapter also illustrated a number of methodologies necessarily used to accomplish
the research objectives of this thesis. Furthermore, the research scope of this thesis
was discussed at the end of this chapter. Issues identified in this chapter will be
discussed in more detail in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 2
Financial Markets, Business Performance and Ownership
Structure, Corporate Governance, and Economic
Integration in Thailand
2.1

Introduction
This chapter aims to provide background knowledge which is very important

for laying the foundation for subsequent chapters in this thesis. The following
information such as (i) financial markets in Thailand focusing on the equity (capital)
market, (ii) business performance and ownership structure of listed enterprises in the
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), and (iii) corporate governance in Thailand are
necessary and useful, since this thesis focuses on the technical efficiency
performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises as well as the effects of
business environment and firm-specific factors which significantly impact on their
technical efficiency performance. In addition, the following issues, such as (i)
economic integration of Thailand, (ii) the export performance, and (iii) the flow of
FDI, have become increasingly important for Thailand’s economic growth, since
Thailand has moved towards an open economy. Economic integration has become an
important factor in promoting the productivity of factors among cooperative
countries. Thailand’s export performance and foreign direct investment are also
worthy of being discussed, since exporting enterprises benefit from their learning-byexporting experience. Thai firms also gain benefits, such as new technology and
access to finance from foreign investors or companies. These factors, therefore, are
very crucial for the enhancement of Thailand’s economic growth, including the
efficiency and competitiveness of Thai manufacturing enterprises.
This chapter, therefore, consists of eight sections as follows: Section 2.2
provides an economic overview of Thailand, including the 1997 financial crisis.
Section 2.3 provides an overview of the financial sector in Thailand including its
structure and development. Section 2.4 provides an overview of the capital market in
Thailand, emphasising its economic significance and development (e.g., the
establishment of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) and Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC)). Section 2.5 provides an overview of business performance and
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ownership structure of corporate enterprises listed in the SET. Section 2.6 provides
an overview of information on corporate governance in Thailand, which includes
directors’ rules and responsibilities, accounting standards, and shareholder
protection. Section 2.7 provides information on economic integration in Thailand,
which includes the country’s export performance as well as manufacturing exports
and its investment promotion and trade policy regimes, and net flow of foreign direct
investment (FDI). Finally, section 2.8 provides the major conclusions from this
chapter.
2.2

An economic overview of Thailand
From the 1970s to the mid 1990s, Thailand rapidly moved from a low-income

country to a middle-income country (World Bank-Thailand, 2008). In recent years,
Thailand, however, has confronted the problem in maintaining its growth and
escaping from its “middle income trap”. Therefore, measures to enhance Thailand’s
productivity and competitiveness in all sectors (agriculture, industry, and services)
are urgently required to transit the country to a higher income and sustain its growth
over the long run (World Bank-Thailand, 2008). Figure 2.1 demonstrates that the
Thai economy experienced steady growth in the first half of the 1980s, but a more
rapid increase in the second half of the 1980s.
Figure 2.1: Thailand’s GDP growth (constant 1988 prices), 1979-2008
GDP Growth (% change)
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Source: The Bank of Thailand (2009c)

GDP growth reached an historical maximum of 13.2 percent in 1988. From
1987 to 1995 GDP growth averaged 9.9 percent annually, but started to slow down
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from 5.9 percent at the beginning of 1996 to its historical minimum of -10.5 percent
in 1998. The causes of such a dramatic slowdown of GDP growth were due to a
decline in export growth, tight monetary policy, and political and financial
instabilities (Lombaerde, 2008). In 1999, GDP growth recovered to 4.45 percent, and
achieved an annual average rate of 5 percent during 1999 to 2007. In 2008 GDP
growth slowed to 2.6 percent, much lower than that of other developing countries in
the region such as China (9 percent), Indonesia (6.1 percent), Malaysia (4.6 percent),
and the Philippines (4.6 percent) (Bank of Thailand, 2009b). The reduction in Thai
economic growth in 2008 was mainly due to high oil and food prices, and
particularly in the fourth quarter, internal political unrest and the global economic
downturn adversely affecting Thai export demand, manufacturing production, and
tourism (World Bank-Thailand, 2008; Bank of Thailand, 2009d). The main sectors
contributing to Thai GDP in 2008 were the manufacturing sector (40.10 percent) and
other services including the financial sector, education, hotels, and restaurants (37.2
percent) (Bank of Thailand, 2009b).
The 1997 financial crisis
The Asian financial crisis saw the largest financial bailout packages offered
by the IMF in history, and the sharpest financial shock to hit developing countries
since the 1982 debt crisis (Radelet and Sachs, 1999). Thailand and Indonesia were the
two hardest hit economies by the crisis (Rosengard, 2004). The main reasons for this

crisis were due to the corrupt and mismanaged banking systems, investment in non
productive assets, exchange rate policy (e.g., the maintenance of pegged exchange
rate regimes for too long), lack of transparency in corporate governance,
macroeconomic mismanagement, an excessive reliance on short term debt and
shortcomings of state-managed capitalism (Fischer, 1998; Radelet and Sachs, 1998;
Radelet and Sachs, 1999). Interestingly, there was little sign of deterioration before
the crisis since the conventional macroeconomic fundamentals within Asian
economies had been outstanding for decades, but signs of excess debt and rising
current account deficits had emerged (Radelet and Sachs, 1998).
Thailand had enjoyed high economic growth for a decade under the
framework of a fixed exchange rate regime, and had embarked on a liberalization of
financial markets since 1990 that brought greater competition among financial
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institutions, but lacked appropriate supervisory and regulatory measures. The first
(1990-1992) and second (1993-1995) three-year financial system development plans
announced and implemented by the Thai government, substantially liberalized
financial capital flows and foreign exchange transactions. Thailand agreed to adopt
Article 8 of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement in 1990, removing foreign exchange
restrictions on current-account-related transactions (Kawai and Takayasu, 1999). The
Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) was established in 1993 as part of
the second financial system development plan (1993-1995), aimed at playing an
essential role in expanding international bank loans. The BIBF contributed to a
dramatic expansion of foreign loans, particularly short-term loans into Thailand. The
foreign liabilities of banks and financial institutions in Thailand increased from 5
percent of GDP in 1990 to 28 percent of GDP in 1995 (Radelet and Sachs, 1999).
However, a resilient financial system focused on cautious management of assets and
liabilities, trustworthy information disclosure, generally accepted accounting
standards, and effective supervision and prudential regulation was not established in
conjunction with this development (Kawai and Takayasu, 1999).
The Thai economy started to experience major economic difficulties by mid
1996. Thailand’s export growth, one of the key driving forces for the country’s
economic growth, decreased by 1.3 percent in 1996, and the current account deficit
increased to 7.9 percent of nominal GDP (Kawai and Takayasu, 1999). During the
first half of 1997, an unsustainable current account deficit, a significant appreciation
of the real effective exchange rate, a rise in short-term foreign liabilities, a
deterioration of the fiscal balance and rapidly visible financial sector shortcomings
emerged (Lindgren et al., 1999). After the Baht devaluation on 2nd July 1997, the
Thai economy declined further. Corporate borrowers’ repayment liabilities to banks
in foreign currency expanded rapidly. In order to protect capital flight a high-interest
rate policy was proposed to secure the value of the Baht, leading to a slow down of
the Thai economy, further decline in the real estate and stock markets, and a
contagion effect to other regional economies (Kawai and Takayasu, 1999).
Furthermore, the IMF initially viewed the 1997 crisis as a serious and
traditional balance of payments crisis. An early stage policy of the Thai government,
suggested by the IMF to deal with the crisis, therefore, focused upon an austerity
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approach, such as implementing tight fiscal and monetary policies and the rapid
closing of 56 nonviable financial institutions in 1997 (Kawai and Takayasu, 1999;
Radelet and Sachs, 1999; Jansen, 2001). The panic of investors, depositors, and
creditors, however, increased dramatically, deepening the Thai economic
contraction. International creditor banks started to cut lending and refused to roll
over their cross-border loans, which threatened financial market stability. The
exchange rate and the stock market collapsed, most financial institutions were closed
down, and the recapitalisation of all financial institutions emerged (Menkhoff and
Suwnaporn, 2007). These domino effects led to a credit crunch and the economy’s
GDP experienced a sharp contraction by 10.5 percent in 1998. From early 1998
several financial remedies were addressed, including the consolidation of nonviable
finance companies and banks with viable ones (Kawai and Takayasu, 1999; Bank of
Thailand, 2002). After the 1997 crisis, Thailand sustained its prudent fiscal policies,
maintaining relatively small budget deficits and managing its debt burden effectively
(Rosengard, 2004). Financial institutions and entrepreneurs in Thailand have monitored
their external vulnerabilities and limited exposure to contingent liabilities. In other
words, they have become more risk averse after the crisis. More importantly, Thailand’s
corporate governance has improved after the crisis (see Section 2.6).

By mid 2000, restructuring in the banking and corporate sectors included the
introduction of more competition, including from foreigners. The government
explicitly encouraged foreign banks to takeover local banks in stabilizing the Thai
financial sector, and also promoting technological upgrading (Okuda and
Rungsomboon, 2005). An emergency Decree was issued to amend the Commercial
Banking Act B.E. 2505 (1962) (No. 2). This helped relax restrictions on the foreign
ownership of commercial banks by allowing foreign investors to own the shares of
Thai commercial banks up to 100%, subject to certain conditions (Bank of Thailand,
2000). The Thai economy started to recover strongly in mid 2000. At this time it
could be seen that fiscal expenditure and exports were expanding. Furthermore,
strengthening institutions, enhancing human resources, and tackling infrastructure
weaknesses became essential to increasing Thailand’s long term growth (East Asia
Analytical Unit, 2000).
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2.3

The financial sector in Thailand
The financial market is an important part of the Thai economic system, where

potential borrowers (issuers) can meet lenders (investors) to negotiate and conduct a
number of financial agreements (Bank of Thailand, 2009a). The aim of financial
market development is, therefore, to improve its capability in terms of allocation of
financial resources as an intermediary. To promote the Thai financial market there
should be a sizable demand for investment from different kinds of investors, a wide
range of financial instruments, and diversified investors and issuers. A highly
efficient financial market can accommodate large and varied issuance of financial
instruments, with a minimum price effect enabling financial instruments to be
promptly exchanged at reasonable cost (Bank of Thailand, 2009a).
2.3.1

Financial sector development in Thailand
Comprehensive liberalization of the Thai financial system was implemented

according to two Financial System Development Plans (Kawai and Takayasu, 1999);
(1) the first Financial System Development Plan (1990 to 1992) and (2) the second
Financial System Development Plan (1993 to 1995). The aims of the first Financial
System Development Plan were as follows: (1) To deregulate and liberalize interest
rates, and foreign exchange transactions; (2) To develop new financial instruments
and financial infrastructure; (3) To enhance supervision and examination of financial
institutions; (4) To improve payment systems. Furthermore, the main objectives of
the second Financial System Development Plan were as follows: (1) To improve
financial market efficiency; (2) To establish the Bangkok International Banking
Facility (BIBF) as an offshore banking centre; (3) To mobilize domestic savings
through pension systems and other means (Kawai and Takayasu, 1999). Due to the
second Financial System Development Plan the BIBF contributed to a dramatic
expansion of foreign loans, particularly short term loans into Thailand, without
adequate financial institution supervision (Kawai and Takayasu, 1999).
The Thai financial sector has been progressively changed since the 1997
Asian financial crisis. Risk management, improved customer service, and lending
based on cash flow and credit analysis, have been progressively encouraged in the
Thai financial sector (East Asia Analytical Unit, 2000). In 1998, the Thai
government allowed foreigners to own up to 100 percent of the shares in banking,
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securities, and foreign companies. In addition, the Thai Cabinet approved an increase
in foreign ownership in insurance companies from 25 to 49 percent. As a result,
relaxing foreign ownership restrictions expanded these financial institutions’ capital,
management expertise, and technology (East Asia Analytical Unit, 2000). The
Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP), proposed by the Ministry of Finance and then
approved by the Council of Ministers in January 2004, was implemented to establish
the further development of the Thai financial sector. The FSMP has three important
visions, as follows: (1) Vision 1: To provide financial services to all economically
viable users; (2) Vision 2: To increase the efficiency of the Thai Financial Sector; (3)
Vision 3: To set up measures to improve consumer protection (The Federation of
Thai Capital Market Organization, 2006).
As part of the FSMP, for the capital market, the Federation of Thai Capital
Market Organizations (FeTCO), and related government agencies, proposed a second
phase master plan for the Thai capital market (2006 - 2010), and this was approved
by the Ministry of Finance in 2006. This plan emphasised seven principal measures
to strengthen the Thai capital market, including the equity, bond, and derivative
markets (The Federation of Thai Capital Market Organization, 2006). As for the
equity market the plan emphasised the need to increase market size and the supply of
corporate equity, promoting SMEs to be listed in the Market for Alternative
Investment (MAI), as well as increasing the proportion of institutional investors 18
from 10 percent to 20 percent of the total value of share trading. As for the bond
market the plan focused upon encouraging its growth to the same volume as the
money market. Derivative instruments and securitization have also been encouraged
to develop as stated in this plan, since it can reduce the risk exposure of
entrepreneurs and investors in the capital market. Furthermore, an increase in the
number of listed companies has been encouraged aimed at improving their corporate
governance and competitiveness. The plan also aims to increase financial literacy
across the country, and the SEC and the SET would be promoted to develop and
supervise the Thai capital market (The Federation of Thai Capital Market
Organization, 2006). On 25 March 2008 the Government established the Thai Capital
Market Development Supervisory Committee, chaired by the Minister of
18

“Institutional investors” means (i) institutional investors, as defined according to the SEC, (ii)
foreign securities companies, and (iii) other juristic persons as prescribed by the SET.
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Finance. They will be responsible for the formulation of a Capital Market
Development Plan and allocated tasks from relevant authorities (Bank of Thailand,
2009a).
Consequently, the Thai financial market has developed at a steady pace after
the 1997 Asian financial crisis. According to the Bank of Thailand (2009a) it can be
seen that there have been several parties in the public and private sectors involved in
the development of the Thai financial market, such as (i) the Public Debt
Management Office (PDMO), (ii) the Fiscal Policy Office (FPO), (iii) the Revenue
Department, (iv) the Office of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), (v) the
Office of Insurance Commission (OIC), (vi) the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET),
(vii) the Thai Bond Market Association (ThaiBMA), (viii) the Thai Bankers’
Association (TBA), (iv) the Foreign Banks’ Association (FBA), (v) the Federation of
Accounting Professionals (FAP), (vi) the Bank of Thailand (BOT), (vii) the
Federation of Thai Capital Market Organization (FeTCO), (viii) Ministry of Finance
(MOF) as well as academics and market professionals (Bank of Thailand, 2009a).
The authorities, as mentioned above, have comprehensively established and
improved financial market infrastructures in Thailand such as improving the clearing
and settlement system, easing and introducing some supervisory regulations,
encouraging new types of financial instruments, enhancing the tax system and
accounting standards, preparing codes of conduct and market practices, setting up
financial market associations to gather and disclose information to the public, and
standardizing market practices (Bank of Thailand, 2009a).
2.3.2

Structure of the Thai financial market
The Thai financial market consists of (i) the foreign exchange market, (ii) the

money market, (iii) the debt market, and (iv) the derivatives market. These markets
are highly related to one another (Bank of Thailand, 2009a). The foreign exchange
market is also known as an Over the Counter (OTC) market where commercial banks
have authorization from the BOT in conducting FX transactions, and are the main
traders (Bank of Thailand, 2009a). The money market is a market for short-term
borrowing and lending (liquidity management), normally within a 1 year period
(Bank of Thailand, 2009). Most transactions in the money market are in unsecured
interbank borrowing (clean loan), trading of short-term papers (e.g., Treasury Bills,
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BOT securities, Promissory Notes, and Bills of Exchange), and Repurchase
Agreements (Repo) and debt instruments are traded in the debt market (Bank of
Thailand, 2009a). The bond market has become a significant market for alternative
lending after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. This market helps reduce the
dependence on domestic and foreign bank lending (East Asia Analytical Unit, 2000).
Complex financial instruments whose value is derived from the value of underlying
assets are also traded in the derivative market (Bank of Thailand, 2009a). The equity
market (capital market) is a market for long-term funding for business units.
Shareholders have the ownership power over the firms in which securities are issued.
Shareholders will obtain a return in the form of a dividend and capital gain.
Table 2.1: Share of Thai financial markets from 2002-2007 as measured by
transaction volume (%)
Financial Markets
2002
2003
2004
FX Market
44.2
47.8
27.1
Money Market*
48.2
40.6
57.4
Bond Market
3.9
4.1
5.7
Derivatives Market
Nil
Nil
Nil
Equity Market
3.7
7.5
9.8
(SET and MAI)
Total
100
100
100
Source: The Bank of Thailand (2009a)
Note: *Inclusive of Interbank Clean Loan, BOT Repo, Private Repo,
2007), and Sell and Buy Back transactions

2005
28.4
59.4
5.9
Nil
6.2

2006
29.6
59.9
5.5
Nil
5.1

2007
21.3
61.7
12.1
Nil
4.9

100

100

100

Bilateral Repo (during 2004-

According to Table 2.1 the money market has been the most active market in
the Thai financial market, with its share in the financial market rising from 48.2
percent in 2002 to 61.7 percent in 2007. The foreign exchange (FX) market has the
second highest share of the financial market, but its share has decreased from 44.2
percent in 2002 to 21.3 percent in 2007. The bond market has experienced substantial
growth since 2002. It contributed 12.1 percent of total shares to the Thai financial
market in 2007. The equity market (SET and MAI), however, has the lowest ranking
in the financial market, with a market share of only 4.9 percent.
2.4

Capital market in Thailand
The equity market in Thailand is supervised by the Office of Securities and

Exchange Commission (SEC) and operated by the Stock Exchange of Thailand
(SET) under the Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535 (1992) (The Stock
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Exchange of Thailand, 2009a). The securities can be traded through the Stock
Exchange of Thailand (SET) and Market for Alternative Investment (MAI). Growth
of the Thai capital market is considered to be a crucial source of funds for medium to
long-term investment by firms. It assists enterprises or entrepreneurs who require
substantial funds for their business operations in obtaining direct funds from the
public by issuing and offering their securities (Securities and Exchange Commission,
2009). Issuing securities through the mechanism of the capital market allows
enterprises to raise funds at lower cost compared with the conventional medium
through loans from domestic and foreign financial institutions (Securities and
Exchange Commission, 2009). The improvement of the Thai capital market, hence,
plays an important role in developing, as well as strengthening, the stability of the
Thai economic system.
2.4.1

Economic significance of the equity market (capital market)
An open capital market can reduce the cost of capital and increase market

efficiency. The capital market plays a crucial role within an economy in providing
large-scale direct finance to productive firms as well as facilitating a secondary
market for equity holders to buy and sell securities (Naughton, 1999). The following
figures indicate the importance of the Thai capital market to the Thai economy, as
well as its importance relative to other Asian countries.
Figure 2.2: Number of listed firms, new listed firms, and delisted firms in
Thailand (1975 – 2008)
New listed firms

500

30

400

25
20

300

15

200

10

100

5

0

0

Number of Firms

Number of Firms

Number of listed firms
Delisted firms

2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975

Year

Source: The Stock Exchange of Thailand (2009g)
Note: Both vertical axes represent the number of firms. The total number of listed firms refers to the
left vertical axis. The number of newly listed firms and delisted firms refers to the right vertical axis.
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Figure 2.2 shows that the number of listed firms gradually increased from 21
in 1975 as its first trading year to 89 in 1986. There was a sharp increase in the
number of listed firms from 104 in 1987 to 454 in 1996. The increasing number of
new listed firms reached an historical maximum of 61 in 1991. In 1997, the Asian
financial crisis began and adversely affected the growth of the Thai Economy.
During this year, some 28 listed firms were delisted from the Exchange. There were,
however, only 5 new firms listed in the Exchange at the end of 1997 compared with
40 new firms previously listed in 1996. The decrease in numbers of listed firms
continued for four years during 1997 to 2000. In particular, 26 firms were delisted
from the Exchange, with no new firms listed on the Exchange, from 1999. The
number of listed firms started to increase again from 382 firms in 2001 to 468 firms
in 2005. During the period 2005 to 2008, new listed firms annually averaged 10
firms.
Figure 2.3: Market capitalization and the value of share trading in Thailand
(1975 -2008)
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Source: The Stock Exchange of Thailand (2009g)

From Figure 2.3 it can be seen that the size of Thai listed enterprises was
quite small during the period 1975 to 1988, since market capitalization as a measure
of corporate or economic size slowly increased from 5,394 million baht in 1975 to
223,645 million baht in 1988. Nevertheless, there was a substantial increase in
market capitalization from 659,493 million baht in 1989 to 3,564,569 million baht in
1995. The trend of market capitalization had been downward starting from a 1995
value of 3,564,569 million baht to a 2000 value of 1,279,224 million baht.
Subsequently, market capitalization recovered again after 2000, and reached an
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historical peak at 6,636,069 million baht in 2007. In 2008, market capitalization
suddenly decreased by 46.23 percent relative to 2007 due to the global economic
downturn and domestic political instability. Similarly, the value of share trading
slowly increased from 559 million baht in 1975 to 156,445 million baht in 1988. It
followed the same growth pattern as market capitalization during 1989 to 2004. The
highest value of share trading was 5,024,399 million baht in 2004. The value of share
trading, however, dropped from 5,024,399 million baht in 2004 to 4,031,240 million
baht in 2005, and remained stable during 2005 to 2008 due to the global economic
downturn as well as domestic political unrest.

Percentage(%)

Figure 2.4: The size of market capitalization relative to Thai GDP (%)
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Source: The Bank of Thailand (2009c) and the Stock Exchange of Thailand (2009g)

The measurement of corporate size can be expressed by market capitalization,
and also compared with GDP to measure its importance to the economy. From
Figure 2.4 it can be seen that the size of market capitalization relative to GDP was
relatively high after 1989. It substantially increased from 35.52 percent in 1989 to an
historical peak of 105.06 percent in 1993. Nevertheless, it dramatically dropped after
1993, which could be seen from a downturn from 90.95 percent in 1994 to 24.50
percent in 1998. During 1999 to 2002 it gradually started to increase again, and went
on a substantially increasing trend from 36.35 percent in 2002 to 78.13 percent in
2007. After 2007 there was a sudden drop, and remained at only 39.20 percent in
2008 due to the global economic downturn as well as domestic political unrest.
The value of share trading is the summation of both the selling and buying
value of share trading. Figure 2.5 shows the value of share trading classified by type
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of investor, which are domestic and foreign investors. It can be seen that foreign
investors are the major investors in the SET, since their share trading has exceeded
that of domestic investors during most of the period from 1995 to 2008, with the
exception of 2003 and 2004. The share trading value of domestic investors reached
an historical maximum of 1,541,521 million baht in 2004.
Figure 2.5: Value of share trading by type of investor in the SET (1995 - 2008)
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Source: the Stock Exchange of Thailand (2009g)

Nevertheless, foreign investors remained the most active investors during
2005 to 2008, with their share of total trading value being 55.78 percent in 2005,
67.75 percent in 2006, 65.90 percent in 2007, and 59.07 percent in 2008.
Table 2.2: The average value of share trading in Asian countries (1995-2008) (In
million USD)
Stock Exchange

1995-1997 1998-2000 2001-2003

2004-2006 2007-2008

1995-2008

3,065,590 3,353,356 2,428,975
Tokyo SE
367,488
525,352
561,242
Hong Kong Exchanges
136,228
189,694
236,278
Korea Exchange
234,000
294,868
311,081
Taiwan SE Corp
140,335
149,879
122,465
Singapore Exchange
206,713
116,208
134,281
Bursa Malaysia
97,560
40,171
66,791
Thailand SE
63,204
37,645
35,908
Indonesia SE
57,309
33,903
20,665
Philippine SE
1,989
1,454
1,908
Colombo SE
Source: World Federation of Exchange (2009b)

4,248,215 3,723,363
1,210,472 1,991,592
647,296
796,702
504,038
510,213
286,415
402,076
199,241
257,265
126,479
150,129
97,855
155,227
45,563
77,442
5,715
5,920

3,363,900
931,229
401,240
370,840
220,234
182,742
96,226
77,968
46,976
3,397
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Table 2.2 indicates that the average value of share trading in Thailand is
relatively low compared with other Asian Exchanges, except the Indonesia Stock
Exchange, the Philippine Stock Exchange, and Colombo Stock Exchange. The
Tokyo Stock Exchange had the highest value of share trading in market
capitalization on average over the period 1995 to 2008, followed by the Hong Kong
Stock Exchanges and Clearing Limited, and the Korea Exchange, the Taiwan Stock
Exchange Corporation, and the Singapore Exchange, Bursa Malaysia, the Stock
Exchange of Thailand, the Indonesia Stock Exchange, the Philippine Stock
Exchange, and Colombo Stock Exchange.
Table 2.3: The average market capitalization in Asian countries (1995 – 2008)
(In million USD)
Stock Exchange
Tokyo SE

1995-1997 1998-2000 2001-2003 2004-2006

2007-2008 1995-2008

2,905,684 3,353,356 2,428,975 4,248,215

3,723,363 3,331,919

Hong Kong Exchanges

388,749

525,352

561,242 1,210,472

1,991,592

935,481

Korea Exchange

120,986

189,694

236,278

647,296

796,702

398,191

Taiwan SE Corp

249,598

294,868

311,081

504,038

510,213

373,960

Singapore Exchange

136,794

149,879

122,465

286,415

402,076

219,526

Bursa Malaysia

204,365

116,208

134,281

199,241

257,265

182,272

Thailand SE

84,822

40,171

66,791

126,479

150,129

93,678

Indonesia SE

62,120

37,645

35,908

97,855

155,227

77,751

Philippine SE

56,818

33,903

20,665

45,563

77,442

46,878

Colombo SE

1,986

1,454

1,908

5,715

5,920

3,397

Source: Word Federation of Exchanges (2009a)

In addition, Table 2.3 indicates that the size of the Thai capital market,
expressed in terms of the average market capitalization, is still low compared to other
stock exchanges in Asia. The Tokyo Stock Exchange had the highest value of market
capitalization on average over the period 1995 to 2008, followed by the Hong Kong
Exchanges and Clearing Limited, the Korea Exchange, the Taiwan Stock Exchange
Corporation, the Singapore Exchange, Bursa Malaysia, the Stock Exchange of
Thailand, the Indonesia Stock Exchange, the Philippine Stock Exchange, and
Colombo Stock Exchange.
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2.4.2

Development of the Thai capital market
The Thai Capital Market has been developing since the 1960s. The first five -

year National Economic and Social Development Plan (1963-1966) was
implemented in 1961 to support the development of the Thai economy and its
stability, as well as the standard of living in Thailand. In addition, the Second
National Economic and Social Development Plan (1967-1971) also mentioned the
underdevelopment of the Thai capital market and measures required to facilitate its
development as proposed in chapter five of this plan. The capital market was not
successful in raising funds, since only 500 million baht was raised through the Stock
Exchange during the period 1966 to 1971 (The National Economic and Social
Development Board, 1967). Furthermore, inefficient securities trading, lack of
regulated securities agencies, and a lack of investor confidence in the management of
companies were seen to be the causes slowing down the development of the Thai
capital market. In this regard, the establishment of an orderly securities market was,
for the first time, suggested by the Second National Economic and Social
Development Plan (1967-1971). The settlement of this market aimed at providing
appropriate facilities and procedures for securities trading (The Stock Exchange of
Thailand, 2009a). Hence, the development of the Thai capital market officially
started in 1969 when the Thai government, with the support of the World Bank,
initiated a study aimed at developing the capital market in Thailand and which
resulted in the establishment of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). Currently,
the Second Capital Master Plan (2006 - 2010) is being implemented, focusing upon
seven principal measures to strengthen the Thai capital market including the equity,
bond, and derivative markets as mentioned in section 2.4.1 (The Federation of Thai
Capital Market Organization, 2006).
Stages of development of the stock exchange in Thailand
There have been two stages in the development of the Thai Stock Exchange.
Before establishing the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) in 1975 the Bangkok
Stock Exchange (BSE), which was privately owned by a group of foreigners, began
operation in 1963.
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Establishment of the Bangkok stock exchange
Prior to the establishment of the SET the development of the Thai capital
market was initiated by a private group (in the form of a mutual fund). They
established an investment company called “IBEC” in 1960 (The Stock Exchange of
Thailand, 2005). In July 1962, they established an organised stock exchange as a
limited partnership, which was later transferred to a limited company. Its name was
changed to the “Bangkok Stock Exchange Co., Ltd.”(BSE) in 1963 (The Stock
Exchange of Thailand, 2009a). However, the operation of BSE was not successful
and became rather inactive. Its annual turnover decreased from 160 million baht in
1968 to 114 million baht in 1969, and its trading volumes also continued to decrease
dramatically thereafter from 46 million baht in 1970 to 28 million baht in 1971. In
1972, the turnover in debentures was valued at 87 million baht, but stocks started to
perform poorly with a low turnover of only 26 million baht. Finally, the BSE stopped
its operations in the early 1970s (The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2009a). The
failure of BSE’s operation was mainly due to the lack of official government support
and insufficient investor knowledge of the equity market.
Establishment of the stock exchange of Thailand
Although the operation of BSE was not successful the Thai capital market
was still supported by the Thai government, due to one of the objectives of the
Second National Economic and Social Development Plan (1967-1971) being to
promote the country’s capital market. Hence, the development of the Thai capital
market was officially supported by the Government with the recommendation of the
World Bank in 1969. In April 1970, a study conducted by Professor Sidney M.
Robbins was presented to the Bank of Thailand suggesting that securities trading
should be operated at only one place, so that investors would perceive the securities’
prices equally (The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2009a). The report also suggested
that the Government must initiate and support the restructuring of capital markets in
Thailand. The Bank of Thailand, therefore, proposed to the Ministry of Finance the
establishment of a working group on capital market development aimed at
establishing a stock market in Thailand (The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2009a).
In 1972, the "Announcement of the Executive Council No. 58 on the Control
of Commercial Undertakings Affecting Public Safety and Welfare" was amended by
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the government. The operations of finance and securities institutions, therefore, was
controlled under the government’s regulation (The Stock Exchange of Thailand,
2009a). "The Securities Exchange of Thailand" (SET) was enacted and stated in the
Special Degree No. 91 on 20th May 1974. The Revenue Code was revised at the end
of 1974, which allowed the investment of savings in the capital market. "The
Securities Exchange of Thailand" officially started trading on April 30, 1975. Its
name was formally changed to "The Stock Exchange of Thailand" (SET) on January
1, 1991 (The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2009a).
Establishment of the securities exchange commission (SEC)
The SEC has been established since 1992 under the promulgation of the
Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535 (1992) or “the SEC Act” which was enacted
on March 16th, 1992 (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2009). The SEC is an
independent state agency, and has the responsibility to supervise and develop the
Thai capital market under the direction and supervision of the Board of the SEC. The
current strategic plan (2010 to 2012) of the SEC is to sustain orderly market, to
ensure investor protection, to support business innovation, and to enhance
competition (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2010). In addition, the
Derivatives Act B.E. 2546 (2003) was declared on July 3rd, 2003 and came into force
on January 6, 2004. This Derivatives Act provides a regulatory framework for the
derivatives market and intermediaries, which allows the SEC to supervise the
financial integrity of the market and control to impede adverse systemic effects
(Securities and Exchange Commission, 2009).
2.5

Business performance and ownership structure of listed enterprises
Focusing on the growth rate of SET industrial sectors’ performance, Table

2.4 indicates that the growth rate of listed firms’ gross and net profits decreased by
27.49 percent and 4.75 percent, respectively, from the period 2003-2005 to 20062008.
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Table 2.4: Business performance of listed firms by sector (2000-2008)
(In million baht)

Source: The Stock Exchange of Thailand (2009g) (compiled by the author)
1/ The manufacturing sector consists of all listed firms in the agro and food industry, industrials, and
consumer products sectors, and some listed firms that are classified as manufacturing firms in
property and construction and technology sectors. 2/ Includes some firms that are in sub-industrial
sectors, which cannot be grouped in the manufacturing sector (e.g., property development, property
fund, and information and communication technology).

With respect to individual industrial sectors the Market for Alternative
Investment (MAI) has achieved the highest growth rate on its returns, since the
growth rate of net profits increased by 153.92 percent for the period 2003-2005 to
2006 - 2008, followed by the resources sector (78.24 percent), the financials sector
(42.23 percent), the other sectors (39.58 percent), the manufacturing sector (10.90
percent), and the services sector (7.71 percent).
In addition, the resources sector, which consists of energy, utilities and
mining, has the highest sales revenue, with an average of 1,480,631 million baht
during the period 2000 to 2008, followed by the manufacturing sector, whose sales
revenue averaged 1,200,629 million baht during the period 2000 to 2008. Moreover,
the resources sector achieved the highest net profits followed by the manufacturing,
financials, services, others, MAI, and rehabco (rehabilitation companies) sectors,
respectively. The size of the SET’s manufacturing sector, as indicated by its
averaged sales revue over the period 2000 to 2008, is approximately 17.88 percent of
Thai GDP at current prices.
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Figure 2.6: Return on equity ratio of listed firms by sector (2000-2008)
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From Figures 2.6 and 2.7 it can be seen that the resources sector performed
better than other sectors, as shown by the highest return on equity (ROE) and return
on assets (ROA) ratios at 0.23 and 0.09, respectively, during the period 2000 to 2008,
followed by the manufacturing sector at 0.13 and 0.06, respectively. The rehabco
(rehabilitation companies) sector, however, showed a poor performance, as indicated
by the negative return on equity (ROE) ratio at 1.20 during the period 2000 to 2008,
and also gave the lowest return on assets (ROA) at 0.02 compared with the other
sectors.
Figure 2.7: Return on assets ratio of listed firms by sector (2000-2008)
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Figure 2.8: Debt to equity ratio of listed firms by sector (2000-2008)
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Figure 2.9: Debt to asset ratio of listed firms by sector (2000-2008)
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In addition, from Figures 2.8 and 2.9, it can be seen that the manufacturing
sector has the lowest risk for investment as shown by its debt to equity ratio (D/E
ratio) and debt to asset ratio (D/A ratio) at 1.15 and 0.51, respectively, followed by
the Market for Alternative Investment (MAI) at 1.24 and 0.53, and the services
sector at 1.66 and 0.61, and the resources sector at 1.70 and 0.59. The financials
sector, however, showed the highest D/E ratio at 11.42 over the period 2000 to 2008.
The higher D/E ratio of the financials sector compared with other sectors is not
surprising, since the nature of each financial institution is to borrow funds from
depositors, as indicated by the high level of its debt compared with listed firms in
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other sectors. It earns a profit margin from (i) the interest rate that it receives from
borrowers minus (ii) the interest rate that it pays to depositors and the costs of its
operation.
Ownership structure of listed firms
After the 1997 crisis the old 1972 Alien Business Law was replaced by the
1999 Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (FBA), allowing foreign investors to have
ownership of up to 75 percent or 100 percent in most manufacturing activities subject
to specific requirements from the Board of Investment (BOI) of Thailand (Talerngsri
and Vonkhorporn, 2005; Sally, 2007). The services sector is highly restricted for
foreign ownership compared with other sectors. In the financial sector, foreign
investors can have ownership of up to 100 percent in banking and securities (East
Asia Analytical Unit, 2000). The retail, transport, construction and health-care
sectors, however, are tightly restricted (Sally, 2007).
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Figure 2.10: Types of major shareholder of listed firms1 (1994-2008)
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Source: The Stock Exchange of Thailand (2009g) (compiled by the author)
1/ Includes securities of all listed firms

From Figure 2.10 it can be seen that domestic corporations and individuals
were the major shareholders of listed firms, accounting for 46.5 percent and 33.1
percent of total shares of listed firms respectively, during the period 1994 to 2001.
Foreign individuals, however, became active shareholders in the SET after 2001 due
to an increase in their ownership of listed securities from 2.4 percent in 2001 to 25.61
40

percent of total shares in 2008. Foreign corporations have also remained active major
shareholders of securities listed in the SET, since their ownership has increased from
17.07 percent in 1994 to 31.61 percent of total shares in 2008. From 2002 to 2008 the
ownership of foreign corporations and individuals averaged 50.94 percent for all
securities of SET listed firms.
Figure 2.11: Minor shareholders (free float) of listed firms (2000-2008)
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The increased number of minor shareholders is very crucial to a security,
since it enables listed firms to raise funds successfully. Minor shareholders are
defined to be ordinary shareholders of a firm not classified as “strategic
shareholders”, where “strategic shareholders” refer to persons with a controlling
influence over a firm (The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2009d). From Figure 2.11,
the number of minor shareholders has increased from 946,057 shareholders (37.38
percent of total shares) in 2002 to 1,624,200 shareholders (38.90 percent of total
shares) in 2008. The increased number of minor shareholders, therefore, increases
the capability of listed firms in raising funds.
The top 10 best and least performing manufacturing firms, including submanufacturing sectors, in 2008 were identified by ranking their technical efficiency
scores predicted by the SFA approach (see Appendices 1.1 and 1.2). The
characteristics of selected firm-specific and business environment factors 19 for the

19

Firm-specific and business environment factors will be discussed more in Chapter 3 (Literature
Review) and Chapter 5 (Hypotheses and Data Description).
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top 10 best and least performing manufacturing enterprises, are (i) type of firm
ownership 20 , (ii) the percent of executive remuneration relative to total labour
expenditure, (iii) the percentage of controlling ownership, (iv) the percentage of
managerial ownership, (v) firm leverage and liquidity ratios, (vi) the percentage of
firm exports, (vii) the percentage of foreign direct investment, were also provided for
all Thai listed manufacturing firms as well as manufacturing sub-sectors.
Comparing the top 10 best and least performing manufacturing firms,
executive remuneration relative to total labour expenditure for the top 10 best
performing manufacturing firms was approximately 20.01 percent on average in
2008, but 15.57 percent on average in 2008 was found for the top 10 least performing
manufacturing firms. Controlling and managerial ownership for the top 10 best
performing manufacturing firms was found to be 68.86 percent and 23.38 percent on
average in 2008, respectively, but was 60.50 percent and 16.81 percent on average in
2008 for the top 10 least performing manufacturing firms. In addition, foreign direct
investment in 2008 was 22.13 percent on average for the top 10 best performing
manufacturing firms, but was 16.81 percent on average in 2008 for the top 10 least
performing manufacturing firms.
The leverage ratio (debt to asset ratio) in 2008 was 0.48 on average for the 10
best performing manufacturing firms, but 0.11 on average for the 10 least
performing manufacturing firms. Both estimated ratios for the Thai manufacturing
sector are relatively low compared with the debt to asset ratio in other industries. The
higher value of the leverage ratio of the 10 best performing manufacturing firms may
indicate that they engage in higher levels of investment compared with the 10 least
performing manufacturing firms.
Finally, major shareholders of the 10 best and least performing manufacturing
firms, including sub-manufacturing firms, are provided in Appendices 3.1, 3.2, 3.3,
3.4, and 3.5.

20

Types of firm ownership will be discussed more in Chapter 3 (Literature Review) and Chapter 5
(Hypothesis and Data Description).
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2.6

Corporate governance in Thailand
Weakness in corporate governance and risk management in Thailand was one

of the major causes of the 1997 financial crisis. Prior to the crisis most Thai
companies were operated by family members or a single shareholder. Concentrated
family ownership decreased the quality of the country’s corporate governance (East
Asia Analytical Unit, 2000). This problem slowed down improvement of corporate
governance in Thailand. Moreover, cross shareholding among major shareholders
and their affiliates also decreased transparency and increased illicit assets (East Asia
Analytical Unit, 2000). Major improvement of corporate governance started after the
1997 financial crisis. The institutional framework for accounting and auditing
practices has been strengthened to improve the quality and reliability of corporate
financial and non-financial information, especially for SET listed firms. The rules
and responsibilities of board of directors have also been strengthened.
The SET began a study of the roles of audit committees in 1995 prior to the
crisis. After the 1997 financial crisis the SET announced, in early 1998, that all listed
companies were required to obtain an audit committee before 1999 (The Stock
Exchange of Thailand, 2009f). In 1999 the SET also issued a guideline for best
practices for directors of listed companies, namely the "Code of Best Practices for
Directors of Listed Companies". This guideline is currently applied to all directors of
listed companies in the SET (The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2009f). In 2001 the
Good Corporate Governance Committee, which consists of representatives from
different groups of professionals and organizations, disseminated a report on
corporate governance.
This report aimed at enhancing good corporate governance systems and
practices used by organizations in the Thai capital market. In 2002, the Thai
Government established the National Corporate Governance Committee (NCGC).
The SET also introduced fifteen principles of good corporate governance for listed
enterprises to implement (The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2009f). Listed
companies are required to disclose their implementation of these principles to the
public (by mentioning this in their annual registration statement (Form 56-1) and
annual reports) since 2002.
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Moreover, under the SEC’s regulations any listed company is required to
disclose the name of its top 10 shareholders. In a case where one of the top 10 shareholders
of the listed company is itself a company which has related transactions with the listed
company, the shareholders of that company must also be disclosed (World Bank, 2005, p3).

In July 2002 the Corporate Governance Centre was established by the SET to
help listed companies develop their corporate governance system. This Centre
provides consulting services regarding good corporate governance practices for
directors and executives of listed companies, as well as for firms which are preparing
to be listed in the Exchange (The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2009f). In September
2008 securities companies have been required by the SEC to include the company’s
corporate governance performance according to the Corporate Governance Report
(CGR) organised by the Thai Institute of Directors Association (IOD) in their
securities analysis reports. Hence, good corporate governance will be more widely
considered by investors. This requirement should encourage listed firms to enhance
their corporate governance to attract long term investors, since it will be explicitly
disclosed on their securities analysis reports (Thai Institute of Directors Association,
2008).
2.6.1

Directors’ rules and responsibilities
As part of ongoing improvements to Thai corporate governance the SET

issued a guideline for best practices for directors of listed companies, namely the
"Code of Best Practices for Directors of Listed Companies" in 1999. The Code of
Best Practice for the Directors of Listed Companies is not a legal requirement, but it
is considered as a guideline for all board members concerning their behaviour while
holding such appointments. The Code aims at enhancing the confidence of
shareholders, investors and other related parties in the management of the listed
companies (The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2009h). In addition, the Thai Institute
of Directors Association (IOD) has been established since 1999 with the support
from the SEC, SET, BOT, and World Bank. The IOD has been promoting good
governance practices in Thai companies by developing professional standards of
directorship, and providing best practice guidelines for directors to perform their
duties effectively (Thai Institute of Directors Association, 2008). Kouwenberg
(2006) examined the effect of the voluntary adoption of a code of good governance
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practices on the value of 320 firms. He found that a one standard deviation increase
in the firm-level code addition index led to a 10 percent increase in firm value during
the period 2003 to 2005.
However, the World Bank (2005, p3) argued that even though the concepts of trustee
duty, duty of care and duty of loyalty are embedded within the Public Limited Company Act
(PCA), in practice directors

have only a limited understanding of their roles and

responsibilities. McGee (2009) compiled 10 reports for the World Bank on the Observance
of Standards and Codes (ROSC) of corporate governance for 10 Asian countries, and
summarized the findings using 5 categories, such as (i) rights of shareholders, (ii) equitable
treatment of shareholders, (iii) role of stakeholders in corporate governance, (iv) disclosure
and transparency, and (v) responsibility of the board of committee.

Figure 2.12: A comparative study of the responsibilities of the board of
committee in Asia (30 points = the maximum score)
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Figure 2.12 shows that India had the best score (25 points) regarding the
board of committee’s responsibilities, followed by Malaysia (22 points), Pakistan
and Nepal (21 points), Korea and Thailand (20 points), the Philippines (19 points),
Indonesia and Bhutan (18 points), and Vietnam (14 points).
2.6.2

Shareholder protection
According to World Bank (2005) basic shareholder protection has been

strengthened in Thailand. For example, investors can freely transfer their shares and
the registration of listed companies’ shares has been securely improved. As part of
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recent corporate governance reforms the SET has initiated a number of protection
measures through market regulation and enforcement, trading and settlement system
reliability, information disclosure and equal accessibility. For instance, the SET has
inspected and gathered evidence on suspicious securities trading practices to protect
shareholders from controlling shareholder self-dealing, fraud, and insider trading
(East Asia Analytical Unit, 2000). In addition, the SEC has allowed the SET to
blacklist persons who have caused companies serious damage. In addition, the
Securities Investor Protection Fund (SIPF) was established in October 2004 to
enhance investor confidence and contribute to market growth (The Stock Exchange
of Thailand, 2009e). However, the World Bank (2005, p3) argued that even though
shareholders are able to receive all necessary information from Thai listed
companies, and are eligible to attend and vote in annual general meetings (AGMs),
they still find difficulty in proposing their own agenda at AGMs due to the
concentrated control of Thai listed companies.
Figure 2.13: A comparative study of the equitable treatment of shareholders in
Asia (15 points = the maximum score)
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Figure 2.13 indicates that Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand had the highest
score (11 points) in equitable treatment of shareholders, followed by Korea (10
points). Bhutan, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines were in a tie for third place (9
points), followed by Nepal (7 points), and Vietnam (6 points).
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Figure 2.14: A comparative study of the role of shareholders in Asia
(20 points = the maximum score)
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Focusing on the role of shareholders in corporate governance for 10 Asian
countries, as indicated in Figure 2.14, shows that India is in first place, followed by
Korea and Pakistan (17 points), Malaysia and Thailand (16 points), Nepal and the
Philippines (13 points) and Indonesia (12 points). Bhutan and Vietnam had the
lowest score (11 points) for role of shareholders in corporate governance.

2.6.3

Accounting standards
Tower et al. (1999, p293) mention that accounting standards have economic

outcomes that has a direct impact on share prices. Accounting standards can also
cause the following impacts: (i) increasing volatility in the net income figure and (ii)
changing financial ratios and possible violations of debt covenant agreements. The
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) has played an important role
in developing International Accounting Standards (IAS). Thai Accounting Standards
(TAS) initially followed the UK and US standards. International Accounting
Standards (IAS) has been used for TAS as its platform since 1997 (Ball et al., 2003;
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2008).
Tower et al. (1999) also state that International Accounting Standards were
adopted as the basis for the development of national accounting standards in
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Thai Accounting Standards (TAS) are influenced
from a number of sources by the Accounting Professions Act B.E. 2547 (2004),
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International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), U.S. GAAP, and other
regulatory agencies (e.g., the Thai revenue Department, Securities Exchange of
Thailand (SEC), Bank of Thailand, the Office of Insurance Commission) (Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu, 2008). Furthermore, Thai Accounting Standards (TAS) are
currently issued by the Federation of Accounting Professions (FAP). Before the
establishment of the FAP, Thai Accounting Standards (TAS) were issued by the
Institute of Certified Accountants and Auditors of Thailand (ICAAT) (Tower et al.,
1999).
As for listed firms the SET has played a leading role in controlling the
financial reporting quality of listed firms. As the crisis unfolded in 1998 and 1999 the
SET strengthened corporate governance by raising requirements for listed firms to
disclose complete and accurate information. The consolidated financial statements
must reveal all external and off-balance sheet liabilities. By the end of 1998 the
financial statements of listed firms had to meet TAS (East Asia Analytical Unit,
2000). In addition, auditors of the financial reports of listed firms must be approved
by the SEC. However, according to the World Bank (2005, p3) Thai Accounting
Standards (TAS) are not fully consistent with international accounting standards, and
it is not certain that the Federation of Professional Accountants (FPA) can help
improve the quality of auditors in Thailand.
Figure 2.15: A comparative study of disclosure and transparency in Asia
(20 points = the maximum score)
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With regard to disclosure and transparency among 10 Asian countries, Figure
2.15 indicates that Malaysia performs the best (17 points), followed by Korea and
Pakistan (16 points), India and Thailand (15 points), the Philippines (13 points),
Indonesia (12 points), Bhutan and Vietnam (11 points), and Nepal (9 points).
Figure 2.16: A comparative study of the corporate governance performance in
Asia (115 points = the maximum score)
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Overall, Thailand has made a significant improvement in corporate
governance, as discussed earlier. From Figure 2.16 it can be seen that the overall
score of Thailand’s corporate governance was 84 points out of 115 points. Among
the 10 Asian countries in terms of corporate governance, Thailand ranked as the 5th
best performing country.
The World Bank (2005, pp3-6) also proposed a number of policy
recommendations for Thailand’s corporate governance improvement, as follows: (i)
strengthening the legislative and regulatory framework, such as strengthening
minority shareholder rights by amending the Securities and Exchange Act (SEC) and
the Public Company Act (PCA); (ii) increasing the accountability of directors and
management and the clarity of the fiduciary duty of directors such as introducing
board evaluation procedures and clarifying audit committees; (iii) improving the
quality and reliability of financial information and disclosures provided by Thai
listed companies, and (iv) establishing corporate governance enforcement priorities,
such as strengthening the independence of the SEC and enhancing enforcement for
violation of the law.
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2.7

Thailand’s economic integration, export performance, and foreign direct
investment
Besides the reviews in earlier sections (e.g., financial markets in Thailand,

business performance and ownership structure of the SET’s listed companies,
Thailand’s corporate governance), this section illustrates the importance of economic
integration, export performance, and foreign direct investment, as these factors can
significantly impact on Thailand’s economic development. Economic integration of
Thailand has become increasingly important for its economic development, as this
can lead to the productivity enhancement of factors among cooperative nations as
suggested by Lloyd (2008). Exports also play an important role in promoting
Thailand’s economic growth, especially for the manufacturing sector, as exporting
firms can benefit from their learning-by-exporting experience, leading to higher
efficiency and competitiveness. Foreign direct investment, via the form of foreign
ownership, has also become increasingly crucial, as it brings new technology, foreign
network, know-how, financial support, and managerial expertise to local firms. As a
result, it is very interesting to link these factors with the technical efficiency
performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, and, therefore, they are worthy
of being discussed as follows:
2.7.1

Thailand’s economic integration
The main idea of economic integration is to remove all forms of government

measures which discriminate against foreign goods and services, foreign capital
inflows, and foreign labour (Lloyd, 2008). Economic integration, therefore, is
crucial, since it can increase the productivity of factors among cooperative countries,
leading to an increase in the real income of these countries (Lloyd, 2008). The World
Trade Organization (WTO) is a global multi-lateral trading group which aims to
liberalize trade through tariff reductions in merchandise goods, covering other
measures such as anti-dumping, non-tariff measures and trade in services (Hoa,
2008). The WTO, however, has a number of its own difficulties such as its slow
negotiation progress in successive rounds in the past, in conjunction with rapid
developments in the Asian economies (Hoa, 2008). Bilateral or multilateral free trade
agreements (RTAs), therefore, have become an alternative trading platform.
Regional Trading Agreements (RTAs) (e.g., the European Union (EU), North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Closer Economic Relations (CER),
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the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR), ASEAN, ASEAN-China,
ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA)),
therefore, have become an important catalyst in promoting regional economic
integration (see Table 2.5).
Moreover, regional economic integration has recently changed to become
more outward oriented, to focus on “deep integration” arrangements (e.g., trade
facilitation measures, investment and competitive policies, and intellectual property
rights) besides intra-regional trade, to link both developed and developing countries
together (e.g., NAFTA, the EU-Mexico FTA, and EU enlargement) (Harvie, 2008).
Thailand’s trade policy also shifted from import-substitution to export-orientation in
1972 when the Industrial Promotion Act took place (Talerngsri and Vonkhorporn,
2005; Sally, 2007). This caused the Thai economy to become rapidly open and
globally-integrated, characterised by strong unilateral liberalization in the 1980s and
1990s, especially in the manufacturing sector (Sally, 2007, p1594). In 1996, Thailand
also started to implement a much more outward oriented trade policy (World Trade
Organization, 1999).
Thailand has also decided to expand the scope of its bilateral, regional and
multilateral economic arrangements as a vehicle of commercial policy, since bilateral
or regional trade arrangements are complementary to the multilateral trade objectives
towards free trade (Thanapornpun, 2008). According to the WTO trade policy review
in 2008, Thailand’s trade policy not only focuses upon its immediate neighbours, but
also the wider Asian region through free-trade agreements (FTAs) (World Trade
Organization, 2008). Some of Thailand’s trading commitments with other trading
partners include, for example, the Uruguay Round (UR) obligations, voluntary trade
within APEC, regional liberalization within ASEAN, bilateral regional trading
agreements (Talerngsri and Vonkhorporn, 2005). Regional integration through FTAs
has notably increased for Thailand after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. For
example, expanding Intra-ASEAN FTAs, participating in the Bangladesh-IndiaMyanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) FTAs, and
joining in ASEAN agreements with third countries (e.g., ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand, ASEAN-Japan, and ASEAN-Korea) were successfully negotiated (see
Table 2.10) (World Trade Organization, 2008).
51

Table 2.5: Thailand’s trade agreements
Type of Cooperation
Regional Trade Agreement
APEC

Economic cooperation

ASEM

Economic cooperation

AFTA

Free trade area (in force from 1992)

ASEAN + 3

Free trade area (to be negotiated by 2012)

ASEAN + 6

Free trade area (under study CEPEA Phase II)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand

Free trade area (negotiation completed: 27 Feb 2009; in force: 12 March 2010 (Thailand))

ASEAN-CHINA

Free trade area (negotiation completed for all members: 29 November 2004; in force: 1 October
2003 (Thailand); Investment Agreement completed: 9 November 2009)

ASEAN-Japan

Comprehensive economic partnership (FTA) (negotiation completed : 11 April 2008; in force: 1

ASEAN-India
ASEAN-Korea

Free trade area (negotiation completed: 13 August 2009; in force: 1 January 2010 (Thailand))
Economic cooperation (negotiation completed: 27 February 2009; in force: 1 January

BIMSTEC

2010(Thailand))
Economic cooperation (Agreement on Trade in Goods was completed in 2006)

June 2009 (Thailand))

Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic cooperation
Indonesia - Malaysia - Thailand
Growth Triangle (IMT-GT)
Thailand-EU

Economic cooperation
Free trade area (under study: public rehearsal)
Thailand’s Bilateral Trade Agreement

Australia

Free trade agreement (in force : 1 Jan 2005)

Bahrain

Free trade agreement (negotiation is temporarily pending since 2005)

China

Free trade agreement (in force : 1 October 2003)

EFTA

Free trade agreement (under negotiation)

India

Free trade agreement (in force : 1 December 2004))

Japan

Free trade agreement (in force : 1 November 2007)

New Zealand

Free trade agreement (in force : 1 July 2005)

Peru

Free trade agreement (negotiation completed: 19 November 2005)

US

Free trade agreement (negotiation is temporarily pending since 2006)

Bangladesh

Free trade agreement

Chile

Free trade agreement

Mexico

Free trade agreement

Pakistan

Free trade agreement

South Africa

Free trade agreement

Sri Lanka

Free trade agreement

Thailand’s Bilateral Trade Agreement under Consideration

Source: Author (information obtained from Department of Trade Negotiations, Thailand, 2010)

In addition, Thailand has agreed on bilateral preferential trading
arrangements with several trading partners (e.g., India and Peru) (Department of
Trade Negotiations, 2009) (see Table 2.5). One of the most significant bilateral
agreements is the Thailand - China FTA, which was concluded in October 2003. This
will promote a zero rate of tariffs on general commodities in 2010, and sensitive
items for the ASEAN-6 will be attained in 2015. The negotiation of an ASEAN52

China FTA has also inspired other ASEAN trading negotiations with other countries,
which include ASEAN-Japan and ASEAN-India (Puntasen et al., 2008).
A number of empirical studies have also examined the effects of FTAs on
Thai exporting firms as well as other exporting firms in Asia. Kohpaiboon and
Jongwanich (2006) revealed that the overall FTA utilization rates in 2005 for the
manufacturing sector in Australia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia were
relatively low, accounting for 38.7 percent on average. In addition, FTA export
creation was not significant in the Thai manufacturing sector, since it was limited to
a certain group of manufactured goods (e.g., completely-built-up (CBU) vehicles).
Wignaraja et al. (2010) conducted a survey of 221 exporters in 2008 for
leading

manufacturing

sub-sectors

(e.g.,

textile/garments,

electronics,

and

automobiles/automotive parts). The results suggest that (i) 24.9 percent of exporting
respondents utilized FTAs in 2007 and 2008; (2) 45.9 percent of exporting
respondents claimed that their business plans were influenced by the provisions of
Thailand’s FTAs; (3) 62 percent of exporting respondents consulted with
government and business associations regarding FTAs; (4) 26.2 percent of exporting
respondents were concerned that dealing with multiple rules of origin caused by
FTAs increased their business costs. Overall, the awareness of exporting respondents
of FTAs and the use of government agencies (e.g., Ministry of Commerce, Ministry
of Industry, Customs Department, and Department of Trade Negotiations) and
business support institutions (e.g., Thai Chamber of Commerce, Thai Export
Association, and Federation of Thai Industries) for their business adjustment to FTAs
was low.
2.7.2

Thailand’s export performance
Economic expansion in Thailand before the 1997 financial crisis was

underpinned by rapid growth in exports. During 1981-1985 the major exported goods
were mainly agricultural and processed food, accounting for almost 50 percent of the
total average export value (Talerngsri and Vonkhorporn, 2005).
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Table 2.6: Thailand’s trade value by sectors (1979 - 2008) (In million baht)
1981-1985 1986-1990

1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2001-2008

Exports

165,561

408,587

1,006,009

2,091,228

3,489,331

5,344,321

Food

82,645

137,664

221,626

348,812

454,852

617,692

1,912

1,735

3,897

6,219

8,563

13,550

Beverages and tobacco
Crude materials

17,326

30,424

51,068

88,923

168,571

295,892

Mineral fuel and lubricant

593

3,121

8,489

45,706

115,011

286,143

Animal and vegetable oils and fats

363

207

309

2,117

6,047

13,783

1,749

5,507

23,355

100,271

239,596

424,475

Manufactured goods

28,916

76,144

175,711

243,197

419,154

677,172

Machinery

10,650

69,375

306,654

843,963

1,517,561

2,347,832

Miscellaneous manufactured goods

16,696

79,176

203,151

345,485

470,763

569,354

Miscellaneous transactions and commodities

1752

4,018

9,756

61,851

83,198

93,966

Re-exports

2,958

1,215

1,993

4,683

6,015

4,461

229,259

519,162

1,510,508

1,986,541

3,444,211

5,252,372

6,862

22,931

45,175

76,326

125,171

185,365

Chemicals

Imports
Food
Beverages and tobacco

1,824

3,029

5,946

7,240

10,367

11,728

Crude materials

14,220

34,927

73,735

84,186

132,778

175,116

Mineral fuel and lubricant

59,400

50,705

92,948

193,472

480,239

1,036,588

749

421

1,155

2,141

3,343

4,858

Chemicals

30,052

62,624

124,074

212,240

374,009

564,488

Manufactured goods

37,038

110,853

266,786

351,484

609,870

975,776

Machinery

62,355

197,254

578,024

898,587

1,435,426

1,824,483

Miscellaneous manufactured goods

13,141

22,039

36,268

117,797

194,468

333,638

3,592

12,392

27,441

28,681

33,746

29,851

26

1,986

6,707

14,386

44,793

110,480

63,699 - 110,575 - 252,249

104,686

45,121

91,949

Animal and vegetable oils and fats

Miscellaneous transactions and commodities
Gold
Net Trade (Exports - Imports)

-

Source: Customs Department (compiled by Bank of Thailand (2009e)) and Talerngsri and
Vonkhorporn (2005)

Moreover, the main imported items were mineral fuel and lubricants, and
machinery, accounting for 25.9 percent and 27.2 percent of the total average import
value respectively (see Table 2.6). A substantial shift from traditional agricultural
exports

towards

manufactured

exports

emerged

during

1991-1995.

The

manufacturing sector has been one of the most crucial sectors in the East and
Southeast Asian countries. Economic growth in this region since the early 1980s has
increased primarily from the rapid expansion in manufacturing exports 21
(Jongwanich, 2007). The trend of Thailand’s manufactured exports after 1996 has
also continued, accounting for 87 percent of total export value (see Figure 2.17).
Although manufacturing contributes most to total exports, agricultural products still
counted for a fairly important share of exports but its relative importance was
diminishing significantly (Lombaerde, 2008).
21

This statement might be controversial, as a number of empirical studies of the region have found no
statistically significant association between trade/export and economic growth (Sinha, 1999;
Ekanayake, 1999).
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Figure 2.17: Exports by sector (1996 - 2008)

1,396 Million Baht
; 0%

Agriculture

41,027 Million Baht;
1%

Fishery
Forestry

79,527 Million Baht;
2%

Mining

268,391 Million Baht;
8%

Manufacturing

4,946 Million Baht;
0%

Samples & other
unclassified goods
Re-exports

2,790,669 Million
Baht; 87%

52,764 Million Baht;
2%

Source: Customs Department (Compiled by the Bank of Thailand (2009e))

Figure 2.18: Exports by manufactured products (1996 - 2008)
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Source: Customs Department (compiled by the Bank of Thailand (2009e))
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Figure 2.19: The export values of Thai listed manufacturing firms (2000-2008)
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643,263

679,984

754,775

1,439,912

1,144,289

852,679

233,003

244,448

281,930

323,035

2000

2001

2002

2003

389,841

440,422

2004

2005

497,963

2006

563,609

2007

641,515

2008

Sales Revenue

643,263

679,984

754,775

852,679

1,056,5

1,144,2

1,360,9

1,439,9

1,612,1

Exports Revenue

233,003

244,448

281,930

323,035

389,841

440,422

497,963

563,609

641,515

Exports/Sales (%)

36.22%

35.95%

37.35%

37.88%

36.90%

38.49%

36.59%

39.14%

39.79%

Source: Author’s estimates (compiled from annual reports and financial reports of Thai listed
manufacturing firms).
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With regard to manufactured products, high-tech products were the most
important exports, accounting for 692,614 million baht (or 59 percent of the total
value of manufactured products) (see Figure 2.18). However, there were trade
deficits during the period 1981-1985, 1986-1990, and 1991-1995, averaging 63,699,
110,575, and 252,249 million baht respectively, since the value of Thai imports grew
faster than those of Thai exports (see Table 2.6). The pre-crisis export contraction in
Thailand was mainly due to a sharp decline in international competitiveness as well
as a deterioration in its terms of trade (Athukorala and Suphachalasai, 2004). This
resulted from some of Thailand’s macroeconomic factors such as (i) an appreciation
of the real exchange rate due to large foreign capital inflows as well as strengthening
of the US dollar to which the Baht was tied, (ii) capital market liberalization, and (iii)
labour market tightening and real wage growth (Warr, 2000).
Terms of trade deterioration is also one of the factors contributing towards the
pre-crisis export contraction. Furthermore, a series of tariff reductions were
introduced in the early 1990s, along with an overvalued exchange rate and a relaxing
of capital outflows and inflows (Jansen, 2001). As a result, very high rates of import
growth appeared. The trade deficit during 1991 -1995 was almost fourfold larger
than that for the 1981-1985 period, and more than double that for the 1986 -1990
period.
Focusing on Thai listed manufacturing enterprises’ exports, Figure 2.19 also
indicates that foreign markets have been a major source of revenue for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, accounting for 36.22 percent on average in 2000 to 39.79
percent on average in 2008. According to the Ministry of Industry (2009) a
significant contribution to Thai economic growth has arisen from export-oriented
large enterprises, even though large enterprises account for only 1 percent of Thai
business establishments. The increase in Thai listed manufacturing firms’ exports has
possibly resulted from regional integration through FTAs after the Asian financial
crisis of 1997 (see Section 2.7.1).
According to the direction of trade, Thailand mainly exported to NAFTA
(mainly to the United States), the European Union (EU), and Japan during the 1980s
and the mid 1990s (Talerngsri and Vonkhorporn, 2005). Thailand also mostly
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imported goods from Japan during the period 1981 to 2008, followed by ASEAN,
EU, and NAFTA (see Table 2.7).
Table 2.7: Thailand’s merchandise trade value by countries (1981 - 2008)
(In million baht)
1981-1985

1986-1990

1991-1995

1996-2000

2001-2005

2006-2008

Exports
Japan
22,871
66,317
173,060
307,578
496,639
635,192
NAFTA
27,574
91,533
221,385
468,389
663,797
764,792
EU 1/
35,115
85,221
169,807
356,877
525,446
729,956
ASEAN 2/
25,650
51,682
163,516
410,831
730,646 1,155,885
Rest of the World
54,351
113,833
278,241
547,553
1,072,803 2,058,495
Total exports
165,561
408,586
1,006,009
2,091,228
3,489,331 5,344,321
Imports
Japan
59,202
151,914
377,916
502,144
791,299 1,028,604
NAFTA
32,701
70,320
159,226
274,584
328,910
393,018
EU 1/
29,986
75,269
179,129
256,403
360,321
441,081
ASEAN 2/
34,036
70,160
161,475
295,267
589,061
925,730
Rest of the World
73,335
151,499
380,512
658,144
1,374,620 2,463,940
Total imports
229,260
519,162
1,258,258
1,986,541
3,444,211 5,252,372
Source: Customs Department (compiled by the Bank of Thailand (2009e)) and Talerngsri and
Vonkhorporn (2005)
1/ Since May 2004, the EU comprised 25 countries, including also Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Poland and Slovenia. Since Jan 2007, the EU comprised
27 countries, including also Bulgaria and Romania.
2/ Prior to 1999, ASEAN did not include Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam.

Nevertheless, ASEAN has become an active trading partner of Thailand in
the post-1997 crisis period. After the 1997 financial crisis exports substantially
increased due to the depreciation of the baht, the easing of labour pressure, and
reversal of persistent real wage growth experienced before the crisis (Lombaerde,
2008). The trade deficit disappeared after 1997, averaging surpluses of 104,686
million baht, 45,121 million baht, and 91,949 million baht during 1996-2000, 20012005, and 2006-2008 respectively. In 2008, the country’s trade balance, however,
moved into deficit at 90,379 million baht as a consequence of the decline in world
demand, resulting from the financial crises in the US, Europe, and Asia, contributing
to a contraction of Thailand’s export value. Moreover, industries that have been the
main source of Thai export growth in recent years, such as the electronics and
vehicle industries, were particularly impacted upon by the sharp global contraction
(Bank of Thailand, 2009d).
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Figure 2.20: The size of trade volume relative to Thai GDP (%)
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Source: The Bank of Thailand (2009e)

Comparing Thailand’s trade volume with its GDP, Thailand’s trade volume
relative to its GDP has gradually increased during the period 1995 to 2008. More
specifically, Thailand’s trade volume relative to its GDP during the period 19951999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2008 averaged 80.16 percent, 109.78 percent, and
126.06 percent, respectively (see Figure 2.20).
Investment promotion and trade policy regimes in Thailand
The government has adopted trade and investment promotion policy regimes
to influence the allocation of the private sector’s resources (Kohpaiboon, 2006).
Trade and investment promotion policy regimes began when the government
introduced an import-substitution policy in the 1960s, which provided an incentive
for enterprises to produce products for the domestic market. With respect to the trade
policy regime, tariffs have played an important role as a trade instrument to protect
local industries. To support the import-substitution policy, as set by the government,
investment promotion schemes were also introduced, resulting in the establishment
of the Board of Investment (BOI) in 1959. The BOI 22 is an independent government

22

Besides the BOI, there are a number of government agencies which can facilitate Thai
manufacturing firms, such as (i) Ministry of Commerce which can control the import and export of
certain goods, as well as ban those goods’ imports and exports and (ii) Ministry of Industry which can
issue licences to build factories, regulate business conduct, and enforce zoning laws (Rock, 2000, p
185).
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agency which has the authority to provide investment promotion privileges for firms
under the Investment Promotion Act (1960) 23 (Kohpaiboon, 2006).
The introduction of investment promotion privileges aimed to support the
restrictive trade regime for promoting import-substituting industries 24 , leading to
increased numbers of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Thailand and especially
during the late 1960s and 1970s in the consumer-import-substituting industries
(Kohpaiboon, 2006). In addition, import-substituting industries were aggressively
promoted in the late 1970s due to the 1977 Investment Promotion Act which allowed
the BOI to protect locally promoted industries in agriculture, mining and services by
imposing import surcharges. With regard to the trade policy regime, tariffs on
imported inputs, such as machinery and equipment for both agricultural and
industrial sectors, were reduced to 10 percent in 1974. This was to protect local
industries, and prevent inflationary pressure caused by the world oil price hike
(Kohpaiboon, 2006). During the import-substitution (IS) industrialization period
(1960-1985), the Thai manufacturing sector rapidly expanded, especially in textiles
and clothing, transport equipment, basic metal industries, and chemical products
(Kohpaiboon, 2006, p98). This IS industrialization period, however, distorted the
domestic incentive structure in the country.
Import-substituting activities, however, shifted to export promotion since the
early 1980s. To comply with this change the BOI introduced tariff exemptions for
imported raw materials as an additional privilege for export-oriented firms. Focusing
on the trade policy regime the escalating tariff structure also caused inefficiency in
allocating domestic resources during the early 1980s. This was because a large
number of local firms entered into the production of highly protected finished goods
(Kohpaiboon, 2006). During the export-promotion industrialization period (1986 present), there were massive flows of FDI to the Thai manufacturing sector, resulting
in a rapid expansion of Thai manufacturing exports during the period 1986 to 1995.

23

The Investment Promotion Act (1960) was amended in 1965, 1968, and 1972, when there were
minor revisions in the promotion privileges (Kohpaiboon, 2006, p54).
24
The tariff structure has been used to promote import-substituting industries in Thailand since 1964
(Kohpaiboon, 2006, p58).
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Thai manufacturing exports increased from 21.7 percent of total exports during the
period 1970 to 1985 to 72.2 percent in the 1990s (Kohpaiboon, 2006, p102).
Due to consecutive budget balance deficits, high levels of public debt, and
inflationary pressures from the oil price crisis in the late 1970s, trade liberalisation
reform stagnated during the early 1980s (Kohpaiboon, 2006, p58). However, both the
trade and investment regimes have gradually moved towards liberalization. With
regard to the trade policy regime an escalation of the tariff structure was observed
until the late 1980s. The simple average applied tariff rate dramatically decreased
from 40 percent during the period 1985-1994 to 17 percent in 1997 (Kohpaiboon,
2006, p63). In the mid 1980s the rapid growth in manufacturing exports also resulted
in a rapid growth in manufacturing output. In addition, the overall nominal rate of
protection (NRP) and the overall effective rate of protection (ERP) were reduced
from 22.90 percent in 1985 to 13.80 percent in 2003, and from 65.0 percent to 18.20
percent in 2003, respectively. Focusing on the investment promotion policy regime,
it started to become more neutral since the mid 1980s due to the industrial
decentralization in the country. Three promoted zones 25 have been established to
support this industrial decentralization policy. From the mid 1980s, Thai
manufacturing outputs rapidly increased due to the rapid growth in manufacturing
exports.
After the 1997 financial crisis the BOI’s promotion criteria were slightly
adjusted as follows: (i) privileges granted to promoted export-oriented activities were
no longer available in order to be in line with the WTO commitment to the traderelated investment measures (TRIMs) agreement; (ii) foreign ownership was relaxed
up to 49 percent for promoted activities in Zone 1 and 2 (Kohpaiboon, 2006, p55).
According to the Board of Investment (2010a), at least 51 percent of the registered
capital must be held by Thai investors in the following industries under List One of
the Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542: (i) agriculture, (ii) animal husbandry, (iii)

25

Zone 1 consists of six provinces such as Bangkok, Nakhon Pathom, Nonthaburi, Pathoum Thani,
Samut Prakan, and Samut Sakhon; Zone 2 consists of 12 provinces in the central and eastern parts of
Thailand such as Ang Thong, Ayutthaya, Chachoengsao, Chon Buri, Kanchanaburi, Nakorn Nayok,
Ratchaburi, Samut Songkhram, Saraburi, Supanburi, Phuket and Rayong; Zone 3 consists of the
remaining provinces (The Board of Investment, 2011a).
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fisheries, (iv) mineral exploration, and (v) mining and service businesses. However,
for manufacturing projects there are no equity restrictions for foreign investors (The
Board of Investment, 2010a).
Kohpaiboon (2006, p57) also concluded that domestic and foreign investors
are treated equally. The effectiveness of investment promotion privileges, however,
remains unclear, since most firms which intend to have a long-term investment do
not become profitable. The imposition of import surcharges to protect promoted
industries distorts the incentive structure, and the use of this measure has been
limited and applied only on a temporary basis since the late 1980s. Focusing on the
Trade policy regime, average tariff rates were significantly reduced during the mid
1990s. The escalating tariff structure, however, still remained, since the tariff
reduction was mainly on intermediate products (Kohpaiboon, 2006, pp61-63). The
BOI has implemented its new investment promotion policies since 23 April, 2010,
such as measures to promote the improvement of production efficiency and energy
conservation, and measures to solve environment problems. These measures aim to
promote the country’s sustainable development (The Board of Investment, 2010a).
Manufacturing production and its exports
This part aims to provide the linkages between Thai manufacturing products
and export intensity classified by (i) exporting by less than 30 percent of total
production, (ii) exporting between 30 percent to 60 percent of total production, and
(iii) exporting more than 60 percent of total production.
Table 2.8 indicates that the group of Thai manufacturing products where
exports are less than 30 percent of total production had the highest production over
the period 1995 to 2008, followed by the group of manufacturing products where
exports are more than 60 percent of total production, and manufacturing products
where exports are between 30 percent to 60 percent of total production. In addition,
liquors, hard disk drives, shampoos, computers, and commercial cars are the top five
manufacturing goods produced (see Table 2.8).
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Table 2.8: Manufacturing production index (base year 2000) by export origin
and major export manufactured products
1995-1997 1998-2000 2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2008 2000 -2008
Export less than 30% of total production
Liquor
Shampoo

101.17

99.72

124.39

157.23

172.01

119.44

811.32

765.60

412.25

595.25

561.28

591.72

n.a.

100.00

161.72

289.70

329.26

211.28

284.41

219.17

97.77

42.65

0.00

128.80

n.a.

100.00

122.52

214.05

241.39

159.25

129.68

69.27

198.00

300.45

369.06

188.69

84.64

88.46

113.70

140.08

145.37

104.76

Fans

264.92

97.98

133.23

129.16

116.17

140.55

Commercial car

113.11

73.66

128.13

250.64

312.22

154.74

Refrigerators

105.45

80.47

131.69

192.17

231.34

132.80

Cement

143.60

96.18

120.43

147.60

132.01

119.16

76.15

98.41

109.88

116.86

117.76

95.96

76.00

86.36

104.63

166.12

233.67

117.78

Hard Disk Drive

n.a.

100.00

134.59

394.26

763.38

321.33

Computer

n.a.

100.00

140.87

289.15

205.68

180.14

Rubber glove

n.a.

100.00

124.85

164.28

203.79

137.50

Leather Footwear

n.a.

100.00

107.37

126.89

161.15

112.51

Wood furniture

n.a.

100.00

132.07

123.23

72.36

101.06

Radio and tape recorders
Concrete Products
Passenger car
Export between 30% to 60% of total production

Printing & Writing paper
Export more than 60% of total production

Source: The Bank of Thailand (2009e)

Table 2.9: Industrial capacity utilization by export origin (1995 - 2008)
1995-1997
Export less than 30% of total production

77.54

1998-2000
66.38

2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2008 1995-2008
66.96

77.20

75.70

72.55

Downstream petrochemical

112.47

85.90

91.94

93.28

92.70

95.44

Zinc metal

86.57

91.38

94.16

89.17

97.34

91.32

Pulp

83.65

93.52

93.86

85.05

82.36

88.07

n.a.

74.93

76.60

91.23

87.40

83.69

89.15

83.99

76.25

85.97

82.62

83.67

Craft paper
Petroleum products
Export between 30% to 60% of total production
Printing & writing paper

66.61

51.95

63.08

71.74

67.10

63.88

n.a.

94.16

102.04

103.48

93.21

99.68

Synthetic fiber

81.36

93.81

97.93

92.62

72.51

88.72

Tyre

85.48

83.64

86.42

88.98

87.86

86.38

Intermediate petrochemical

60.62

80.07

94.72

98.36

93.55

84.89

Rice cooker

89.18

77.58

72.29

66.10

65.70

74.77

75.02

69.22

66.99

67.46

64.96

69.00

n.a.

81.01

87.64

98.26

79.09

88.54

Export more than 60% of total production
Rubber glove
Washing machines
Hard disk drive
Integrated circuits
Glass sheet
Overall industrial capacity utilization

69.80

78.90

83.07

89.03

101.25

83.21

n.a.

85.61

93.73

72.71

78.40

82.41

83.19

83.80

51.26

83.98

86.99

77.19

80.65

67.48

74.86

73.36

71.04

73.65

74.45

64.30

66.24

72.51

70.05

69.47

Source: The Bank of Thailand (2009e)
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Similarly, the group of industrial products which exports less than 30 percent
of total production show the highest level of capacity utilization, followed by the
group of industrial products which export more than 60 percent of total production,
and the group of industrial products which exports between 30 to 60 percent of total
production (see Table 2.9).
Table 2.10: Industrial capacity utilization by product group (1995 - 2008)
Product
1

Printing & writing paper

2
3

1995-1997

1998-2000 2001-2003

2004-2006

2007-2008 1995-2008

n.a.

94.16

102.04

103.48

93.21

99.68

Downstream petrochemical

112.47

85.90

91.94

93.28

92.70

95.44

Zinc metals

86.57

91.38

94.16

89.17

97.34

91.32

4

Chemical products

86.54

84.39

92.76

94.72

92.20

89.97

5

Synthetic fibres

81.36

93.81

97.93

92.62

72.51

88.72

6

Rubber glove

81.01

87.64

98.26

79.09

88.54

7

Pulp

83.65

93.52

93.86

85.05

82.36

88.07

8

Paper & paper products

83.65

89.97

87.86

90.57

85.88

87.71

9

Tyre

85.48

83.64

86.42

88.98

87.86

86.38

10

Intermediate petrochemical

60.62

80.07

94.72

98.36

93.55

84.89

Total

74.45

64.30

66.24

72.51

70.04

69.47

Total (exclude liquor)

74.41

64.26

66.38

72.62

70.15

69.52

Capacity utilization

Source: The Bank of Thailand (2009e)

In addition, printing and writing paper, downstream petrochemicals, zinc
metals, chemical products, synthetic fibres, rubber gloves, pulp, paper and paper
products, tyre, and intermediate petrochemicals are the top ten industrial products,
which have the highest utilized capacity respectively (see Table 2.10).

2.7.3

Net flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Thailand
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the result of a firm’s commitment to

diversify all or some operational activities across countries (Khopaiboon, 2006, p9).
There are at least three channels for FDI spillovers 26 as follows (Khopaiboon, 2006,
p11): (i) a demonstration effect enables local enterprises to adopt the superior
technologies, marketing and managerial practices of foreign firms. (ii) linkage effects
indicate where foreign investors are tied to both backward (upstream) and forward

26

There are also non-FDI channels such as (i) technology licensing, (ii) international subcontracting,
and (iii) MNE buyer (Khopaiboon, 2006, p18).
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(downstream) linkages in host countries (invested countries). Foreign investors can
create a demand for inputs from local suppliers in upstream industries. This interfirm relationship can improve the productivity of local supplies, since they are forced
to supply high quality and reliable raw materials on a timely basis. The creation of
forward linkages also refers to the usage of other industries’ outputs as an industry’s
inputs. (iii) Labour mobility indicates that local labour can be trained or educated
through foreign firms’ technologies and production methods. This occurs when
foreign employees are assigned to work in host countries where they can share their
previous working experience learned in their home countries with local employers
and employees.
FDI has played an important role in the Thai economy since the size of net
FDI flow relative to Thai GDP has been on an upward trend during the period 1981
to 2008 (see Figure 2.16). More specifically, net flows of FDI relative to Thai GDP
during the period 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 20062008 averaged 7.29 percent, 17.04 percent, and 14.88 percent, 27.03 percent, 34.93
percent, 42.45 percent, respectively (see Figure 2.21).
Figure 2.21: The size of net FDI flow relative to Thai GDP (%)
Net flows of FDI/GDP at current price

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%

Source: The Bank of Thailand (2009e)

From Table 2.11 the net flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Thailand
increased during the 1980s and 1990s. Net flows of FDI during the period 19811985, 1986-1990, and 1991-1995 averaged 6,602 million baht, 30,862 million baht,
and 46,404 million baht respectively. The main investors were Japan, the United
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States of America, Hong Kong, and the EU during the period 1981-1995. The largest
recipient of FDI during the period 1981-1985, 1986-1990, and 1991-1995 was the
industry sector, which accounted for 33 percent, 49 percent, and 31 percent of total
net flows of FDI respectively. As mentioned previously, after the 1997 crisis the
1999 Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (FBA) was enacted, allowing foreign
ownership of up to 75 percent or 100 percent in most manufacturing activities subject
to specific requirements from the Board of Investment (BOI) of Thailand (Talerngsri
and Vonkhorporn, 2005; Sally, 2007). In the financial sector, foreign investors were
allowed ownership of up to 100 percent in the banking and securities sector (East
Asia Analytical Unit, 2000).
In addition, the Trade Competition Act of 1999 has been enacted, which
includes anti-competitive practices such as (i) abuse of dominant market positions,
(ii) unfair trade practices, (iii) mergers which may result in “monopoly” or unfair
competition, and (iv) cartel agreements which may restrict competition (Sally, 2007,
p1599). This helps increase free and fair competition between domestic and foreign
firms.
Table 2.11: Net flow of foreign direct investment by country (1981-2008) (In
million baht)
Country
Japan
ASEAN 1/

1981-1985

1986-1990

1991-1995

1996-2000

2001-2005

2006-2008

1,799

13,524

9,791

34,030

98,284

96,720

304

2,407

4,885

16,066

50,604

116,046

EU 2/

1,082

2,473

5,037

25,090

14,253

36,975

United States of America

2,123

3,534

7,065

27,644

18,390

20,599

Hong Kong

556

3,458

9,193

11,810

8,232

6,591

Taiwan

51

3,236

2,138

4,608

4,122

848

Malaysia

44

112

54

699

1,647

5,020

Korea, South

4

215

312

876

2,441

3,412

Australia

58

89

621

1,563

1,049

2,002

China

20

105

23

51

418

2,236

Others

478

1,029

6,579

2,728

7,098

59,868

6,601.92

30,861.68

46,404

126,987

209,514

356,604

Total

Source: The Bank of Thailand (2009e) and Talerngsri and Vonkhorporn (2005)
1/ Prior to 1999 ASEAN was comprised of 5 countries: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore.
Since 1999, ASEAN has comprised of 9 countries, including also Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. 2/ Prior to May
2004, the EU comprised 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. Since May 2004, the EU comprised 25 countries, including also
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Poland and Slovenia. Since Jan 2007, the EU
comprised 27 countries, including also Bulgaria and Romania.
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As a result FDI was relatively unaffected by the financial crisis, increasing
rapidly from 46,404 million baht during the period 1991-1995 to 126,687 million
baht during the period 1996-2000. ASEAN has become the major investor after the
crisis (see Table 2.11). In addition, the net flow of FDI has continued to increase,
amounting to 356,604 million baht during the period 2006-2008. Most of the FDI is
still concentrated in the industry sector, accounting for almost 40 percent of total FDI
during the period 2006-2008 (see Table 2.12). Furthermore, machinery and transport
equipment, electrical appliances, and metal & non metallic products are the major
sub - industrials that have attracted FDI, accounting for almost 60 percent of total
FDI in the industry sector during the period 2006 to 2008.
Table 2.12: Net flow of foreign direct investment by sector (1981 - 2008)
(In million baht)
Sector

1981-1985

1986-1990

1991-1995

1996-2000

2001-2005

2006-2008

2,167

15,179

14,303

57,783

120,170

141,956

Food & sugar

122

1,071

1,173

3,689

6,263

5,481

Textiles

183

931

838

1,651

2,775

1,498

Metal & non metallic

255

1,621

1,950

6,005

13,373

15,729

Electrical appliances

602

5,521

5,157

14,587

27,033

21,082

Machinery & transport

186

871

1,769

16,777

37,414

47,961

Chemicals

275

1,910

2,750

7,410

13,775

4,663

Petroleum products

410

520

-1,140

1,796

1,480

14,844

1 Industry

Construction materials

17

27

277

832

740

649

117

2,707

1,529

5,036

17,317

30,048

18

2,181

3,167

10,916

13,106

75,331

3 Trade

1,169

5,250

8,008

26,375

26,080

28,921

4 Construction

1,081

2,330

4,870

1,991

1,369

-940

5 Mining & quarrying

1,441

524

2,221

-2,097

10,906

19,855

43

434

170

42

368

194

Others
2 Financial institutions

6 Agriculture
7 Services

454

1,235

1,573

12,124

15,823

29,838

8 Investment

0

0

301

8,218

-3,255

21,630

9 Real estate

228

3,503

12,804

6,406

-137

30,855

0

225

-1,013

5,230

25,084

8,964

6,602

30,862

46,404

126,987

209,514

356,604

10 Others
Total

Source: The Bank of Thailand (2009e)

Even though Thailand has attracted FDI, the progress on liberalisation and
regulatory reform has been slow, especially in telecommunications services which
are filled with several unresolved issues (e.g., the privatisation of state-owned

66

enterprises) (Sally, 2007). Thai institutional weaknesses can also be a barrier to
market access for foreign-owned firms as well as competition in the domestic market
(Sally, 2007). This is because the government policy changes, such as tariff changes,
granting investment incentives, and relaxing legislative restrictions on foreign
ownership are unpredictable and incoherent, subject to case-by-case decisions, and
often made by ministerial announcement without forewarning or clear explanation
(Sally, 2007, p1599).
Figure 2.22: The average percentage of FDI in Thai listed manufacturing firms
(2000-2008)
19.00
18.50
18.00
17.50
17.00
16.50
16.00
15.50
15.00
14.50

% of FDI

18.46

18.41

18.12

17.63

17.38

17.14

16.19

16.34
15.87

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Source: Author

Finally, Figure 2.22 also shows that foreign direct investment in Thai listed
manufacturing firms was 18.41 percent on average in 2000 and 15.87 percent on
average in 2008, averaging 17.28 percent during the period 2000 to 2008. In 2004,
the FDI in Thai listed manufacturing firms was relatively low, accounting for 16.19
due to several negative factors affecting investment conditions, such as (i) oil price
hikes in the world market, (ii) increasing interest rates in the world market, and (iii)
the bird flu outbreak (The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2004). In 2008, the percent
of FDI reached its lowest level due to the global recession and political unrest in
Thailand (The Stock Exchange of Thailand).
2.8

Conclusions
The Thai capital market, where corporate listed firms have been trading their

securities in the SET since 1977, has contributed significantly to the development of
the Thai economy. The size of the capital market, as measured by market
capitalization, has been more than half of Thai GDP during 1992 to 1996 and during
67

2003 to 2007. Compared with other Asian Exchanges its size, however, is relatively
small, and hence the Thai capital market needs to develop further before it can
become a significant source of funding for firms (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3).
According to the business performance of listed enterprises in the SET,
manufacturing listed firms had a strong financial performance during the period 2000
to 2008, since their gross and net profits averaged 209,433 and 308,297 million baht
respectively, accounting for 24.29 percent of total gross profits and 24.09 percent of
total net profits (see Table 2.4). In addition, their ROE and ROA averaged 0.13 and
0.06, respectively over the period 2000 to 2008, which ranked as the second highest
performing sector besides the resources sector (see Figures 2.6 and 2.7). More
importantly the D/E and D/A ratios of the manufacturing sector averaged 1.15 and
0.51, which remains the lowest compared with other sectors, suggesting that the
manufacturing sector is one of the better sectors for investment (see Figures 2.8 and
2.9).
Before the 1997 financial crisis the Thai economy performed well for a
decade. Economic growth in Thailand was steady and high throughout the 1980s.
During the first half of the 1990s Thailand’s growth rate remained significantly high,
with an annual average real GDP growth rate of 9 percent. The economic expansion
in Thailand before the 1997 Asian financial crisis was supported by rapid growth in
exports, accompanied by a substantial shift from traditional agricultural exports
towards manufactured exports (Athukorala and Suphachalasai, 2004). In addition,
the Thai financial sector had been developing progressively due to comprehensive
liberalization of the Thai financial system in the first half of the 1990s. However, a
resilient financial system based on cautious management of assets and liabilities,
trustworthy information disclosure, generally accepted accounting standards, and
effective supervision and prudential regulation, was lacking (Kawai and Takayasu,
1999).
The major problems causing firm-level inefficiency became apparent as a
result of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Weaknesses in the corporate governance
and risk management of Thai firms were key causes of the 1997 financial crisis. The
crisis highlighted, for example, problems of lack of transparency in corporate
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governance and an inefficient and mismanaged banking system (i.e., excessive
lending to non-productive assets and a lack of adequate debt monitoring) among the
crisis-affected countries in South East Asia as well as Thailand. The problem of
weak corporate governance was related to, for example, the dominance of controlling
shareholders, the separation of voting and cash flow rights (or the disparity between
control and ownership), and the limited protection of minority rights (Claessens et
al., 2000). A major change of the financial market in Thailand can be observed since
the 1997 financial crisis. As part of the Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) the
second capital master plan (2006 - 2010) was implemented, focusing upon seven
principal measures to strengthen the Thai capital market, including the equity
(capital), bond, and derivative markets.
After the 1997 Asian financial crisis the corporate governance system has
been strengthened in Thai capital markets, such as through enhancing the
institutional framework for accounting and auditing practices, improving the
disclosure practice of listed companies (see Section 2.6.3), encouraging best
practices for directors of listed companies (see Section 2.6.1), and relaxing foreign
ownership controls (East Asia Analytical Unit, 2000; Talerngsri and Vonkhorporn,
2005; Sally, 2007). Minority shareholder rights through protection measures, such as
market regulation and enforcement, trading and settlement system reliability,
information disclosure, quality accessibility and also securities investor protection
funds (SIPF), have been improved (see Section 2.6.2). The World Bank (2005, pp34), however, suggested that Thailand still needs to further focus on (i) enhancing
legal enforcement (e.g., more strict fines and imprisonment for corporate fraud), (ii)
implementing the legislation and regulation, (iii) improving financial reporting and
disclosure to meet international standards, and (iv) promoting business ethics and
good practices.
Domestic corporations and individuals were the major shareholders of Thai
listed enterprises, accounting for 46.5 percent and 33.10 percent of total shares,
respectively, over the period 1994 to 2001. After the Crisis the old 1972 Alien
Business Law was replaced by the 1999 Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (FBA),
relaxing foreign ownership limitation up to 75 percent or 100 percent in most of
manufacturing activities subject to specific requirements from the Board of
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Investment (BOI) of Thailand. Foreign individual investors, however, have become
active shareholders after 2001 due to an increase in their ownership of listed
securities from 2.4 percent in 2001 to 25.61 percent of total shares in major
shareholders in 2008. Foreign corporations have also remained active major
shareholders of securities listed in the SET, since their ownership has increased from
17.07 percent in 1994 to 31.61 percent of total shares in major shareholders in 2008.
From 2002 to 2008 the ownership of foreign corporations and individuals averaged
50.94 percent for all SET securities of listed firms (see Figure 2.10). However,
regulatory reform has been slow due to Thai institutional weaknesses (see Section
2.7.3).
Regional economic integration has become an important development in
increasing the productivity of factors and real income among cooperating countries
(Lloyd, 2008). Thailand’s trade policy has also become more outward oriented.
Thailand has successfully agreed bilateral preferential trading arrangements with
several trading partners (e.g., Australia, China, New Zealand, Korea, and Japan) (see
Table 2.3). Thailand mainly exported to NAFTA (mainly to United States), the
European Union (EU), and Japan during the 1980s and the mid 1990s. ASEAN,
however, has become an active trading partner of Thailand after the 1997 crisis.
However, a number of studies found that the FTAs export creation is not significant
for Thai manufacturing sector. The awareness of Thai manufacturing exporters on
FTAs, the use of government agencies and business support institutions for their
business adjustment to FTA is still low (see Section 2.7.1).
As discussed in Section 2.2, Thailand has recently confronted a problem of
sustaining its growth and escaping from its “middle income trap” (World Bank
Office-Thailand, 2008). Therefore, measures to improve productivity and
competitiveness over the long term in all sectors are urgently needed for Thailand to
transition to higher income and growth, especially for the manufacturing sector as the
main sector in Thailand, accounting for 40.10 percent of Thai GDP in 2008. In
addition, traditional agricultural exports have shifted towards manufactured exports
(see Table 2.16). The upward trend of Thailand’s manufactured exports after 1996
has also continued, accounting for 87 percent of total export value (see Figure 2.17).
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Even though Thai listed manufacturing firms have also played an important
role in promoting the overall growth of the economy, none of the measures to
improve their long-term efficiency performance has been conducted. More
specifically, the relative significance of firm-specific and business environment
factors affecting firm inefficiency have not been empirically investigated for Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises after the 1997 financial crisis. As a result, empirical
results obtained from this thesis can help improve their long-run performance and
also promote the overall growth of the Thai economy.
In the next chapter, a review of the literature with respect to factors that
significantly affect the performance of publicly listed firms is conducted. These
factors include (i) financial factors (e.g., financial constraints, sources of finance),
(ii) ownership structure (e.g., types of firm ownership, controlling ownership, and
managerial ownership), and (iii) research and development (R&D) and innovation.
Other factors that affect a firm’s performance are also discussed. A review of the
literature regarding the two-way relationship between a firm’s performance and its
export participation (the self-selection and learning-by-exporting hypotheses) is also
conducted.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a basic understanding of the key

factors that significantly affect the performance of publicly listed firms. These
factors include (i) financial factors (e.g., financial constraints (leverage), sources of
finance), (ii) ownership structure (e.g., types of ownership, controlling ownership,
and managerial ownership), (iii) research and development (R&D), and (iv)
executive remuneration. Other factors that affect a firm’s performance are also
discussed. This chapter also aims at examining the two-way relationship between a
firm’s performance and its export participation (the self-selection and learning-byexporting hypotheses). These business environment and firm-specific factors will be
used in subsequent chapters to conduct an empirical analysis. An overview of these
is summarized in the form of a schematic diagram as indicated in Figure 3.1.
Several methods used to measure a firm’s performance are, firstly, discussed
in section 3.2, which cover financial performance, efficiency, productivity, growth,
and other measurements of firm performance. Section 3.3 starts with a review of the
literature that uses “financial variables” to investigate their effects on, for example, a
firm’s growth, investment, and technical efficiency (see Table 3.1). This section also
provides the concepts of liquidity, leverage and sources of finance. A review of the
literature regarding the effects of financial factors (e.g., liquidity, financial
constraints (leverage), and sources of finance) on a firm’s performance is also
discussed in this section. Section 3.4 focuses upon explanations regarding agency
problems and asymmetric information problems, which are related to the topics of
ownership structure and sources of finance. Section 3.5 provides explanations of
ownership structure, which include (i) ownership concentration, (ii) types of
ownership for listed enterprises, and (iii) managerial ownership, as well as a review
of the literature with regard to the effect of ownership structure on a firm’s
performance. Section 3.6 provides a review of the literature with respect to the
effects of innovation and research and development (R&D) on a firm’s performance.
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Section 3.7 provides a review of the literature regarding the effect of executive
remuneration on a firm’s performance. Section 3.8 provides a review of the literature
on the two-way effect between firm performance and its export performance (the
self-selection and the learning-by-exporting hypotheses respectively). Section 3.9
discusses other factors that also affect a firm’s performance, which include (i)
government assistance, (ii) networking, (iii) foreign cooperation, (iv) geographical
diversification, (v) firm size, and (vi) firm age. Section 3.10 presents a summary of
the major conclusions from this chapter.
3.2

Measurements of firm performance
There are a number of methods to measure a firm’s performance, such as

financial performance, efficiency, productivity, growth, employment, exports, and
market share. From the finance and accounting literature financial ratios are widely
used to reflect the firm’s financial performance, such as profitability measures,
market value measures, efficiency measures, capital structure measures (financial
leverage), and liquidity (cash flow) as shown in Figure 3.2. From an economics
perspective key economic concepts, such as productivity, efficiency, and growth can
also be used to measure a firm’s performance, as well as employment, exports, and
market share (see Figure 3.2). Each of these will be discussed in turn.

3.2.1

Financial performance

Profitability measures
Profitability can measure how efficiently a firm uses its assets to manage its
operations. Financial ratios that indicate how well a firm is performing include, for
example, profit margin, return on assets (ROA), return on investment, and return on
equity (ROE). Some empirical studies find that a firm’s profitability is positively
associated with the firm’s stock price, and also technical efficiency (Cho and Pucik,
2005; Mok et al., 2007). Cho and Pucik (2005) find that a firm’s profitability has a
significant and positive effect on its market value for US firms, since the firm’s
profitability can directly reflect investors’ confidence and in turn increase its stock
price. Mok et al. (2007) find that a firm’s profitability has a positive effect on its
technical efficiency based on a sample of 238 of the largest foreign-invested toy
manufacturing firms in southern China in 2002.
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Market Value Measures
Market value can be used to measure the performance of publicly listed firms,
since it requires information on current stock prices. These ratios include, for
example, the price to earnings (P/E) ratio and market-to-book value ratio (Ross et al.,
2007). A number of empirical studies have used these ratios to represent the firm
performance of publicly listed enterprises (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Smith,
1990; Cho, 1998; Xu and Wang, 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Dewenter and
Malatesta, 2001; Joh, 2003; Yammeesri and Lodh, 2003; Cho and Pucik, 2005;
Chang and Shin, 2007; Lee, 2008).
Efficiency measures (Asset management)
Asset management measures demonstrate how efficiently management uses a
firm’s assets to generate sales over a certain period of time. Asset management
ratios (asset utilisation ratios) show how efficiently and intensively assets are used to
create sales efficiently and intensively. These ratios include, for example, inventory
turnover, receivables turnover and asset turnover (Ross et al., 2007). Lang et al.
(1995) argue that firms that sell assets to increase their operating efficiency are
typically poor performers. Firms are likely to sell their own assets if they find that
alternative funding is too expensive.
Capital structure measures (financial leverage)
There are two types of leverage, which include (i) operating leverage and (ii)
financial leverage. Operating leverage refers to the rate at which earnings rise as
sales volume increases (Asaf, 2004). A firm that has a higher operating leverage is
likely to face greater risk (Quiry et al., 2005). Financial leverage is a capital structure
measure, and reflects a firm’s ability to meet its long-run obligations (Ross et al.,
2007). The debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) can be used to measure financial leverage. In
other words, it refers to the use of debt, financial leases, and preference shares in a
firm’s capital structure to increase returns to equity shareholders (Petty et al., 2006;
Beal et al., 2008).
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Figure 3.1: Summary of factors that contribute to firm performance from the literature
A: Ownership structure
Ownership concentration
- Controlling ownership
- Managerial ownership
2. Types of ownership
Listed enterprises
- Family ownership
- Domestic ownership
(Individuals & Institutions)
- State ownership
- Foreign ownership
(Individuals & Institutions)

1.

C: Executive remuneration
E: Research & development (R&D)
Business innovation
- Product Innovation
* New Product
** Product Improvement
- Process Innovation

Note:* The improvement of new products
that differ considerably from existing
products. **a significant development
in the existing product technologically
(see Lee and Kang, 2007, p344).

B: Sources of finance
1. Internal sources
- Retained Profit
- Saving
- Sales of assets
- Loans from directors / shareholders
2. External sources
- Ownership capital
Ordinary shares
Preference shares
- Non-ownership capital
Debentures
Bank loans
Working capital facilities
Short-term and long-term loans
Lines of credit from other creditors
Hire purchase
Venture Capital
Franchising
Government assistance
Leasing
D: Financial constraints
1. Low liquidity
Quick Ratio
Current Ratio
2. Low profitability
3. High financial leverage
- Debt to Assets Ratio
- Debt to Equity (D/E) Ratio

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

F: Other factors
Government assistance
Business networking
Foreign cooperation
Geographical diversification
Size
Age

The self-selection hypothesis
Firm
Performance

Firm Performance Æ Export
The learning-by-exporting hypothesis
ExportÆ Firm Performance
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Figure 3.2: Measurements of firm performance
Firm performance
1. Financial Performance
Profitability Measures
- Profit Margin
- Return on Assets
- Return on Investment
- Return on Equity
Market Value Measures
Price/Earnings (P/E) ratio
Market-to-book ratio (market value)
Efficiency Measures (Asset management)
Asset turnover
Inventory turnover
Receivables turnover
Capital Structure Measures (financial leverage)
Debt to Equity (D/E) Ratio
Debt to Asset Ratio
Interest Coverage Ratio
Cash Flow

Financial measures

2.

Efficiency
- Input & output analysis
3. Productivity
- Labour Productivity
- Capital Productivity
- Total Factor Productivity
Source: Author
4. Growth
Economic measures
- Assets
Growth
Market Value
Measures
- Sales Growth
5. Market
Others value can only be used to measure the performance of publicly
- Employment
Export information on current stock market prices. These ratios
firms, since it- requires
- Market Share

listed

Source: Author

Firms also have an obligation to pay cash or returns for their use of debt,
financial leases, and share issuance. For instance, debt requires periodic interest and
principle payments; leases require rental payments; preference shares require
dividend payments (Petty et al., 2006, p125). Petty et al. (2006) suggest that firms
normally should not increase their financial leverage if their operating leverage is
high, but they can do so with a low operating leverage. The leverage level of each
industry may be different depending on the nature of its own business. The banking
sector is likely to have high leverage ratios compared with other industries.
Therefore, corporate financial analysts, investors, bankers, and debt-rating agencies
practically compare the leverage ratios of a firm with its industry leverage ratio.
Since the leverage ratio in the banking sector is normally high compared with other
sectors, a bank’s leverage ratio should be compared with its industry leverage ratio.
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Cash flow
Cash flow can indicate changes in a firm’s financial position, which consists
of three main activities, as follows: (i) operating activities, (ii) investment activities,
and (iii) financing activities. Cash flow from operating activities shows a firm’s dayto-day activities of selling its products and services. Investment activities, however,
focus on long-term activities which have a longer life time than operating activities.
Long-term investment causes increased expenditure to firms, but it will increase
firms’ revenues and cash flows in the future (Quiry et al., 2005). Cash flow from
financing activities can be supported by investors, shareholders, creditors, and
lenders. In other words, financial resources can be obtained by either shareholder’s
equity or debt capital, or both. The difference between equity financing and debt
financing is that equity financing transfers powers and control over firms to
shareholders, but debt financing does not. For debt financing, banks will grant their
loans after they have carefully analysed their borrowers’ financial ability to repay
debts.
3.2.2

Productivity
Productivity is widely used in the economic literature to measure a firm’s

performance. It can be defined as the ratio of the output(s) that a firm produces with
respect to the input(s) that it uses. In addition, total factor productivity normally
refers to a productivity measure, which includes all factors of production (Coelli et
al., 2005). Other productivity measures, such as labour productivity used in factories,
power stations, and farming, are partial productivity measures. Labour productivity is
commonly measured by labour value-adding over the number of workers, but total
factor productivity captures all factors of production. Nevertheless, they can provide
a misleading result of overall productivity when considered in isolation (Coelli,
2005, p3). A number of empirical studies have measured a firm’s performance in
terms of productivity (Aw and Hwang, 1995; Pushner, 1995; Aw et al., 1998;
Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999; Castellani, 2002; Li, 2009).
Labour productivity and total factor productivity are most commonly used to
measure a firm’s performance (see Table 3.3).
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3.2.3

Efficiency
The concept of economic efficiency is used to measure a firm’s performance,

which consists of two components; (i) technical efficiency and (ii) allocative
efficiency. Technical efficiency means the capacity and ability of a firm to produce
at the maximum possible output from a given bundle of inputs and a given
technology. Allocative efficiency refers to the ability and willingness of a firm to
equate its marginal revenue with its marginal cost (Kalirajan and Shand, 1999).
Figure 3.3: Production frontier and technical efficiency
Y

B
Optimal scale

F’
C
A

X

O
Source: Coelli et al. (2005, p5)

The term “productivity” basically refers to “total factor productivity” (see
Section 3.2.2). More importantly, the concept of productivity and efficiency are
different. The productivity of a firm is defined as the ratio of total outputs over total
inputs, as indicated by the slope of a production frontier (such as the OF’ line) in
Figure 3.3. From Figure 3.3 a firm is technically efficient if its operation is on the
production frontier (the OF’ line), for example, points B and C. It is, however,
technically inefficient if its operation is beneath the production frontier (the OF’
line), for example, at point A. A firm operating at point A can achieve the same level
of output as at point B without requiring more input (Coelli at el., 2005, p3). A firm’s
operation that is defined as being technically efficient can also raise its productivity
by moving to a point which provides a greater slope on the production frontier
(Coelli et al., 2005). For example, its productivity increases when a firm’s operation
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moves from point B to point C, even though both points B and C are of technically
efficient scale. The operation at point C results in maximum productivity, or
(technically) optimal scale. A review of the theoretical literature on efficiency will be
comprehensively conducted in Chapter 4 (Methodology Overview: Firm Efficiency
Concepts and Measurement).

3.2.4 Growth
Growth is another indicator used in measuring a firm’s performance. Firms
with a high level of growth capacity (e.g., profit growth) are likely to gain higher
earnings, leading to higher (free) cash flow than firms with a lower level of growth
capacity. This leads to favourable firm market value (firm performance). For publicly
listed firms some empirical studies find a positive relationship between a firm’s
growth and its market value (Cho and Pucik, 2005; Chang and Shin, 2007). Cho and
Pucik (2005) also find a positive relationship between a firm’s growth and its market
value for US firms. Chang and Shin (2007) find a positive association between a
firm’s growth and its market value for 15 Korean chaebols (conglomerates). In
addition, the concept of growth can be applied to other measures of firm
performance. For instance, it can be used to analyse the change of sales revenue,
employment, market share, and exports.
3.2.5

Other measures of firm performance
Other measures of firm performance are also important to be considered, such

as employment, exports, and market share. Harvie (2002) focuses upon the
development of small rural manufacturing enterprises, or township and village
enterprises (TVEs), in China. He also comprehensively measures a TVEs’
performance not only in terms of output, improvements in productivity as measured
by labour productivity and total factor productivity, and sustained profitability, but
also by an upgrading of technology, employment, and exports. Sahakijpicharn (2007)
also finds that network embeddedness is the most important factor that improves
business performance for Sino-Thai SMEs. His business performance analysis
focused upon cash flow, sales growth, profitability, exports and market share.
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3.3

Agency and asymmetric information problems
This section provides a basic understanding of agency and asymmetric

problems. These can be used to explain why ownership structure and sources of
funds affect a firm’s performance. Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 discuss agency problems
and asymmetric information problems respectively.
3.3.1

Agency problems
Berle and Means (1932) 27 provide a basic understanding of the classical

economic model of the free-market firm. They then initiate the idea that the
corporation is an economic organization with “equity capital”, which is widely held
by individual shareholders. In other words, the ownership of capital is widely
dispersed. For example, equity capital is a necessary factor to promote a firm’s
growth. The firm’s owner, however, does not have adequate funds, since he faces
limited personal wealth. Therefore, he may need to obtain funds by issuing the firm’s
shares. Obviously, publicly listed firms are likely to draw on financial resources from
individual investors. The corporation system, therefore, has become “the principal
factor in economic organisation through its mobilisation of property interests”
(Berle and Means, 1932, p2). At this stage, the owner cannot effectively manage or
control the firm, since ownership becomes dispersed, and several investors have their
rights to control the firm. The oversight and management, therefore, is delegated to
professional corporate management. Professional managers (the agent) have their
responsibilities to ensure that shareholders (the principals) will receive the maximum
return on the firm’s investment. The concept of separation of ownership from
control, therefore, was originally obtained from this theory of the firm first proposed
by Berle and Means (1932).
For publicly listed firms, agency problems arise when authority over the firm
is transferred to professional managers due to the dispersion of shareholders. In
addition, managers may not pay much attention to management of the firm’s
resources, as an owner-manager does, and might transfer the firm’s resources to
maximize their own benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to Jensen and
Meckling (1976, p308) agency costs are the sum of (i) monitoring expenditures by
27

See the “The Modern Corporation and Private Property”, 1932.

80

shareholders, (ii) bonding expenditures by managers 28 , and (iii) the residual loss.
First, shareholders can also limit divergences from the managers’ interests by (i)
establishing appropriate incentives for managers and by (ii) incurring monitoring
costs designed to limit harmful activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For example,
managers may be offered bonus stocks in the company they manage to ensure
profitability and performance remain consistent with shareholder interests. Second,
managers can be asked to guarantee that their actions will not harm the firm, or to
ensure that shareholders will be compensated from aberrant activities. This is called
“bonding costs” paid by managers. The third agency cost is called the “residual loss”
due to the reduction in shareholders’ wealth affected by limited divergences from
managers’ interests. In addition, a conflict of interest can also arise between
shareholders and creditors, particularly banks. Due to debt contracts or covenants,
creditors have rights to control over borrowing firms (e.g., a debtor must be
consented by creditors before borrowing external loans, or creditors may appoint
their representatives to participate in the board of directors’ meetings). In particular,
creditors normally prevent borrowing firms, for example, from investing in high-risk
projects, since if the investment fails banks are highly affected and bear some of the
costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Banks, therefore, have a strong incentive to
monitor borrowing firms to ensure that they can repay debts without any default. In
this regard the monitoring behaviour of banks can be too conservative, which can
raise agency problems.
According to capital structure theory based on agency costs the conflict of
interest between managers and shareholders can be alleviated by reducing the
amount of free cash flow available to managers, unless free cash flow is returned to
investors. This is because managers cannot transfer firm resources (available cash) to
their own personal benefits by decreasing free cash flow available or increasing the
leverage of the firm (Jensen, 1986). Moreover, managers may have their own
incentives to pursue only safe projects, although other projects will yield higher
returns for shareholders. This is because their reputation is threatened if they
undertake projects that default. For leveraged firms managerial reputation building
28

Managers are required to pay the principle (bonding costs) to ensure that they will not take certain
actions which would harm the principal or to guarantee that the owner (principal) will be compensated
if they take such harmful actions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
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can reduce the agency cost of risky debts, but shareholders’ value is not optimized
due to an excessive conservatism in investment policy for unleveraged firms
(Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992). Another agency problem is that of asset substitution.
This problem arises because shareholders are likely to invest in risky projects (valuedecreasing projects), since their liabilities are limited to the value of their shares. If
their investment projects are not successful, debt holders are mostly affected.
3.3.2

Asymmetric information problems
Asymmetric information problems occur when firm insiders (managers) can

access better information than market participants, typically shareholders, on the
value of firms’ assets and investment opportunities (Klein et al., 2002). This
asymmetry distorts the real price of a firm’s securities. From the capital structure
literature the separation of ownership and management can be one of the causes of
asymmetric information problems (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Harris and Raviv
(1991) survey capital structure theories based on asymmetric information. They
conclude that a new stock issue can have a negative effect on a firm’s stock price, but
a positive relationship is found between a firm’s (risky) debt issue and its stock price.
Myers and Majluf (1984) also suggest the existence of a pecking order theory
where managers prefer internal sources of funds, and then they prefer debt to equity
if external finance is required. Managers are likely to use internal sources of funds
rather than external funds. For example, if mangers need external funds they will
prefer bonds to stock, since they can avoid the discipline of capital markets. Myers
and Majluf (1984) also suggest that a firm’s leverage increases with the extent of
asymmetric information. For example, managers who act in existing shareholders’
interest may prefer the choice of debt (e.g., issuing bonds) rather than issue new
shares (due to the stock dilution) if they ensure that the project undertaken provides a
good investment opportunity. Narayanan (1988) also indicates that managers have a
preference for debt (e.g., bank loans) rather than equity due to the dilution of existing
shareholders in controlling the firm. However, investors may misperceive that firms
undertake projects that do not provide positive - net present value (NPV) returns due
to this asymmetric information. Therefore, it may cause a decrease in a firms’ shares
due to the misperception of firms’ increased leverage. On the contrary, managers will
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issue new shares when the firm’s share price is overvalued. In other words, the firm’s
share price is higher than the true value of its share price.
A dispersed ownership structure can cause asymmetric information problems
between managers and shareholders, since small shareholders lack expertise and
incentives to monitor managers who work as their agents. DeAngelo and DeAngelo
(1985) argue that managerial ownership (insiders hold a large stake of the firm) may
solve asymmetric information problems. As a result, asymmetric information
problems can be used to explain two problems. First, managers can cause “adverse
selection” problems, since they may possess some information which is unknown to
outside investors. Due to information asymmetry, firms prefer a financial hierarchy.
In other words, firms will use their retained earnings, and the use of other riskless
debts are required if their internal sources of funds are depleted. Equity will be used
as a last resort (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Second, managers can cause “moral
hazard” problems, since they may not maximize shareholders’ benefits. In other
words, there is a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (the
principal - agent conflict). The agency and asymmetric information literature
discussed in this section provides a basic and useful background to studying the
relationship between finance and firm performance (see Section 3.4) and ownership
structure and firm performance (see Section 3.5).
3.4

Finance and firm performance
This section consists of three main parts. Section 3.4.1 overviews the literature

that uses “financial variables” to study their effects on, for instance, a firm’s growth,
investment, and technical efficiency (see Table 3.1). Section 3.4.2 will provide
background to the concepts of liquidity and leverage, and relate these to firm
performance. Section 3.4.3 discusses sources of finance, and relates these to firm
performance.
3.4.1

Financial variables on various areas of interest
Over two decades, a number of studies have employed “financial variables”

to examine their effect on firm investment (Bond and Meghir, 1994; Kaplan and
Zingales, 1997; Kadapakkam et al., 1998; Guariglia, 1999; Bond et al., 2003; Cleary,
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2006), firm export decisions (Greenaway et al., 2005; Greenaway et al., 2007; Mok
et al., 2007; Bellone et al., 2010), firm survival and growth (Musso and Schiavo,
2008), and firm technical efficiency (Maietta and Sena, 2003; Sena, 2006; Mok et al.,
2007). Previous empirical studies that examined the effect of a firm’s financial
variables (e.g., liquidity or leverage) on its investment, firm growth, or exporting
decisions as mentioned in Table 3.1 are discussed in Section 3.4.2. From Table 3.1 it
can be seen that there are a number of financial variables which can be used as a
proxy for financial constraints (leverage) such as debt to asset ratio (D/A ratio),
interest coverage ratio (ICR), quick ratio, current ratio, cash flow, and gross
operating profit. Some empirical studies also combine financial variables together to
form their own financial index (Bellone et al., 2010).
Table 3.1: Financial constraints as the segmenting variables used in the previous
studies
Authors

Financial variables

Dependent variables
(Methods)
Investment
(GMM 29 )

Results
Measures of dividend
payments and new share
issues are found to be
statistically significant.

Bond and Meghir
(1994)

Dividend over
capital stock and
share issues

Kaplan and
Zingales (1997)

Qualitative data from
financial statements
(investment-cash
flow sensitivities)

Investment (OLS)

Less financially constrained
firms show significantly
greater investment-cash flow
sensitivities than more
financially constrained firms.

Kadapakkam et al.
(1998)

Cash flow and firm
size (firm value,
total assets, and
sales volume)

Investment (OLS)

The large firm size group
shows the highest cash flow investment sensitivity, but
the lowest cash flowinvestment sensitivity is
found for the small firm size
group

29

Hall (2005, p2) states that “generalized method of moments (GMM) is a set of population moment
conditions which are deduced from the assumptions of the econometric models”. In addition, the
advantage of its estimation compared with the maximum likelihood estimation is that the exact
distribution of the disturbances is not required.
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Authors

Financial variables

Dependent variables
(Methods)
Inventory investment
(GMM)

Results

Guariglia (1999)

Interest coverage
ratio (the pre-tax and
pre-interest earnings
to total long and
short-term interest
payments)

Becchetti and
Trovato (2002)

Leverage (Bank debt
to total assets ratio)

Firm growth
(OLS)

Size and age are not the only
important factors for SME
growth and that financial
constraints and access to
foreign markets significantly
affect on their growth.

Maietta and Sena
(2003)

Debt-to-asset ratio
(DAR)

Technical efficiency
(DEA, 2 stage
approach)

The shortage of financial
resources can have a positive
impact on the growth in a
firm’s technical efficiency
with profit-sharing schemes.

Bond et al. (2003)

Cash flow and gross
operating profit

Investment (OLS,
GMM)

Cash flow and profit terms
are both statistically and
quantitatively significant for
investment in the UK but not
in Belgium, France, and
Germany.

Greenaway et al.
(2005)

Liquidity ratio
(current assets to
current liabilities),
coverage ratio (total
profits before tax and
interest, and total
interest payments),
short-term debt to
total assets ratio, and
total debt to assets
ratio

Exporting decisions
(Probit models)

Less financially constrained
firms tend to export
compared with more
financially constrained firms.

Cleary (2006)

Size (total assets),
dividend payout ratio
(dividend over
EBIT), and change of
dividend payout ratio

Investment (OLS)

Financially healthy firms are
more investment-cash flow
sensitive than financially
constrained firms. In
addition, financially
constrained firms are likely
to have greater risk as
measured by cash flow
volatility.

The coverage ratio has a
significant impact on
inventory investment for
financially constrained firms,
but has weaker effects for
other firms.
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Authors

Financial variables

Dependent variables
(Methods)
Technical efficiency
(SFA)

Results

Sena (2006)

Interest coverage
ratio (ICR) and Debtto-Asset ratio (DAR)

Greenaway et al.
(2007)

Liquidity ratio
(current assets less
current liabilities
over total assets),
leverage ratio (shortterm debt to current
assets), and Quiscore
(a number in range
from 0 to 100)

Export decisions
(Probit models,
GMM)

Exporters show a stronger
financial performance than
non-exporters. Continuing
exporters show better
financial performance than
export-starters. Exporting
helps improve a firm’s
financial performance.

Mok et al. (2007)

Leverage ratio (Total
liabilities / total
assets)

Technical efficiency
and profitability
(DEA, two stage
approach)

The findings reveal a positive
association between leverage
and a firm’s technical
efficiency as well as a firm’s
technical efficiency and its
profitability.

Bellone et al.
(2010)

Synthetic Index
(seven financial
variables such as
total assets, returns to
total assets, current
assets over current
liabilities, cash flow,
owned funds over
total liabilities, trade
credit over total
assets, financial debt
over cash flow)

Firm export
participation /
intensity (OLS,
Heckman Two-Step
model)

Balance sheet variables are
important determinants of a
firm’s exporting decision.
They find that exporting does
not improve firm financial
performance. Finally, there is
a negative association
between export intensity and
financial health. Export
intensity leads to higher sunk
start -up costs, and therefore
worsens the financial health
of exporters.

Musso and Schiavo
(2008)

Synthetic index
(seven financial
variables)

Firm survival and
firm productivity
growth (OLS)

Financial constraints are
found to be an important
factor in determining the
probability of firm survival.
Financial constraints also
positively affect a firm’s
productivity growth in the
short run.

If firms are not able to
access external financial
resources, they will
enhance their technical
efficiency over time to
assure positive gains in
productivity.

Source: Author
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3.4.2 Liquidity, leverage, and firm performance
Liquidity and firm performance
Liquidity refers to a firm’s ability to meet its short-term obligations on time
for its normal business activities, to obtain new sources of financing, and to ensure
financial balance between income and expenditure (Quiry et al., 2005). In other
words, liquidity is simply a firm’s ability to convert its assets into cash in order to
meet its coming debt payments. The concept of liquidity, therefore, can be measured
by some financial ratios, such as working capital, equity, debt, and current ratio
(current assets/current liabilities). If a firm has more liquidity, it is likely to face less
financial distress (e.g., less difficulty in paying debts or buying needed assets) (Ross
et al., 2007). Manufacturing assets, for example, are not liquid, since they are
machinery and equipment, which cannot be converted into cash very quickly (Ross et
al., 2007). In addition, a highly liquid asset can be converted into cash without
significant loss of value. The most liquid assets are placed first in a firm’s balance
sheet. Current assets are a group of assets that are relatively liquid, including cash
and assets convertible into cash within 12 months. However, intangible assets (e.g., a
trademark, patent, and goodwill) are also very valuable, but they are not liquid. Noncurrent assets are relatively non-liquid, including buildings, machinery, and
equipment. Goldar et al. (2003) find that the liquidity ratio (the ratio of current assets
minus inventories to current liabilities) has a significant and positive effect on the
technical efficiency of Indian engineering firms during the period 1997 to 2000, but
such a significant result is not found during the period 1990 to 1997. They conclude
that liquidity is an important factor to facilitate production operations, since the
liquidity ratio indicates the ability of a firm to meet its financial liabilities in a short
run of one year. Financially constrained firms, therefore, may have difficulty in
operating their businesses efficiently (Goldar et al., 2003, p12).
Financial constraints (leverage) and firm performance
Studies focusing upon the relationship between financial constraints
(leverage) and a firm’s performance can be linked to the literature on agency
problems. Agency costs can arise from the conflicts of interest among managers,
shareholders, and debtors as mentioned previously (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Firms with a higher level of leverage are likely to induce managers to improve their
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managerial performance to avoid bankruptcy and liquidation. In other words,
leverage can decrease agency costs, and hence there exists a positive effect between
leverage and a firm’s performance. For example, debt constrained firms hardly
obtain external finance. These firms, therefore, are forced to reduce their operating
costs by cutting back their labour and other operating expenditures. Furthermore,
workers also face a high risk of losing their jobs leading to an increase in workers’
efficiency (Sena, 2006).
A number of empirical studies find a positive relationship between leverage
and a firm’s performance (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Lang et al., 1996; Nickell and
Nicolitsas, 1999; Maietta and Sena, 2003; Weill, 2003; Sena, 2006; Mok et al.,
2007). Grossman and Hart (1982) also suggest that firms under the threat of
bankruptcy induce managers to increase their efforts to avoid bankruptcy.
Consequently, a firm is forced to reduce its internal inefficiency. Maietta and Sena
(2003) and Sena (2006) suggest that once a firm cannot gain access to external
financial resources, it has an incentive to enhance its technical efficiency over time to
ensure positive profits. Mok et al. (2007) find that leverage has a positive impact on a
firm’s performance, as measured by technical efficiency. They also find that there
exists a positive association between a firm’s technical efficiency and its profitability
for the 238 largest foreign-invested toy manufacturing firms in southern China in
2002.
Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) conclude that leverage has a positive effect on
firm performance, as measured by productivity for 670 UK manufacturing
companies during the period 1972 to 1986. Lang et al. (1996) empirically
documented a positive association between leverage and firm performance, measured
by a firm’s growth for all industrial firms with sales of 20 million dollars in a given
year during the period 1986 to 1991. Crutchley et al. (1999) find a significant
positive relationship between firm leverage and firm performance, as measured by
dividend payout for publicly listed firms on the New York and American Stock
Exchanges. Similarly, financially constrained firms may be more efficient than
financially unconstrained firms, since borrowing money to finance financially
constrained firms’ operations may force them to be more efficient (Dilling-Hansen et
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al., 2003). Dilling-Hansen et al. (2003) find that financial solvency has a negative
effect on firm performance, as measured by technical efficiency for 2,370 Danish
firms in 1997. A number of empirical studies, however, find a negative association
between leverage and a firm’s performance (Pushner, 1995; Chang and Shin, 2007;
Weill, 2008). Pushner (1995) finds a negative relationship between leverage and firm
performance, as measured by productivity for 1,247 Japanese manufacturing firms
during the period 1976 to 1989. Weill (2008) also observes a negative relationship
between leverage and firm performance, as measured by technical efficiency for
4,403 Italian manufacturing firms and 2,312 Spanish manufacturing firms during the
period 1998 to 2000. Chang and Shin (2007) also find a negative effect between
leverage and firm performance, as measured by firm market value for 15 Korean
chaebols.
3.4.3

Sources of finance
Sources of finance can be classified into short-term and long-term financing.

Petty et al. (2006) suggest that firms can receive funds from one of four principal
sources: (i) from its operations, (ii) by borrowing, (iii) by the sale of assets, and (iv)
by issuing shares. This section, however, classifies sources of finance into two
categories: (i) internal financing and (ii) external financing.
Internal financing
There are two arguments regarding the effect of internal financing on a firm’s
performance. First, internal financing can enhance a firm’s resource allocation, since
investment information is produced and transferred at less cost in an internal capital
market than in an external one (Kim, 2003, p134). The reason is that there exists a
strong incentive for a firm to monitor the allocation of its internal funds when these
have been lent by either the owner manager or by major shareholders. In particular,
Gertner et al. (1994) conclude that the ownership aspect of internal capital allocation
has three significant consequences: (i) increased monitoring incentives, (ii) decreased
entrepreneurial incentives, and (iii) better asset redeployability. Consequently, a
firm’s capital is allocated more efficiently in an internal capital market than an
external one, because it improves the efficiency of investments and resource
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allocation (Kim, 2003). Du and Girma (2009) also find that self-raised finance 30
appears to be the most efficient for smaller firm’s growth, as measured by total factor
productivity (TFP) growth for Chinese manufacturing firms during the period 1998
to 2005.
On the contrary it is argued that internal financing has a negative effect on a
firm’s technical efficiency due to the agency problem, implying that mangers can
easily mobilize internal funds to maximize their own interests and lack the desire or
necessity to maximize shareholders’ interests due to the lack of external monitoring
from banks or financial institutions. Managers, therefore, have strong incentives to
abuse internal funds (Jensen, 1986). This is especially the case in underdeveloped
countries where firms’ managerial rights are not fully developed and their
information is not fully publicized, and managers attempt to maximize their benefits
rather than the firm’s value (Kim, 2003, p134). Ayyagari et al. (2008) also find that a
small percentage of firms in their 2,400 Chinese firms during the period 1999 to
2002 utilized external financing in the form of bank loans, and also relied mostly on
informal sources (e.g., self-raised financing). However, formal financing (e.g., bank
loans) is associated with faster firm growth, but self-financing (informal financing) is
not statistically significantly associated with firm growth. Finally, internal financing
can be funded by the following financing options: (i) retained earnings, (ii) saving,
(iii) sales of assets, and (iv) loans from directors / major shareholders / related
parties.
External financing
External financing can be raised through the following financing options: (i)
Ownership capital and (ii) Non-ownership capital. Ownership capital consists of (i)
ordinary shares and (ii) preference shares. Non-ownership capital consists of (i)
debentures, (ii) lines of credit from banks, (iii) lines of credit from other creditors,
(iv) hire purchase, (v) venture capital, (vi) government assistance, and (vii) leasing.

30

Self - raised finance includes finance from individual capital, collective capital, and corporate or
legal person’s capital (Du and Girma, 2009, p30).
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Ownership capital
(i) Ordinary shares represent ownership rights or equity capital. Ordinary
share purchasers are called “shareholders” who receive profits in the form of
dividends. Ordinary shareholders have voting rights specified by the firm. They,
however, can be viewed as unsecured creditors (Ross et al., 2007). In other words, in
the case of winding-up, creditors and preference shareholders are eligible to exercise
their claim on the firm’s assets before ordinary shareholders. Dividends are
determined by the firm’s board of directors and must be approved by shareholders
(Petty et al., 2006).
(ii) Preference shares typically are identified as equity, but they also contain
some elements of debt. In other words, preference shareholders can receive dividend
payments at a fixed dividend rate before other classes of shares (e.g., ordinary
shares), and have preferential rights over ordinary shareholders to claim the firm’s
assets during winding-up (Petty et al., 2006; Ross et al., 2007). In addition, some
preference shares have the feature of being convertible into a number of ordinary
shares. Most preferred shares have no voting rights, but such voting rights can also
be found in some firms.
Non-ownership capital
(i) Debentures are long-term debt securities used by firms, particularly
during 5 to 10 years, which offers fixed rates of interest for certain periods to
creditors. They are usually known as “bonds”, or refer specifically to a firm’s
securities (Ross et al., 2007). Bonds can be subordinated, convertible, or redeemable
in shares (Quiry et al., 2005, p517). In addition, debentures are an alternative source
of finance for corporations to raise funds for their investments. Bonds become
popular for corporations, since the cost of issuing bonds is cheaper than direct
borrowing from banks. Some corporations view direct borrowing from banks as
more restrictive, since banks normally require lenders to follow their debt covenants.
Debentures normally become more popular under the case of low bank interest rates.
(ii) Lines of credit from banks can be viewed as working capital facilities,
short - term, and long-term loans. Working capital facilities and short-term loans
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provided by banks help firms to bridge the time gap between payments to suppliers
and settlements, and to invest in current assets. Common working capital facilities
are documentary credits (Letter of Credit - L/C) and trust of receipts (T/R), bank
guarantees, overdrafts (O/D), promissory notes, factoring, export credit, and stock or
inventory loans (Quiry et al., 2005; Petty et al., 2006). Long-term bank loans can also
be used to invest in long-term assets.
(iii) Lines of credit from other creditors can be any credit made available
by the firm’s suppliers (or trade credit). Trade credit can be normally observed in
nearly all business entities. It allows firms to purchase materials without immediate
cash, which is normally granted for at least 30 days (Beal et al., 2008).
(iv) Hire purchase is a form of instalment credit and similar to leasing,
where financial institutions buy, for example, equipment required by customers, and
then they hire them to customers for certain periods. Unlike leasing, customers can
own equipment or any good if they pay the outstanding balance at the end of the
period, whereas a lessee in leasing never becomes the owner of that equipment or
those goods. Hire purchase used to be highly demanded for customers, but it is
currently less attractive due to increasing demand for credit-card finance and
personal loans (Beal et al., 2008).
(v) Venture capital is an alternative source of finance for firms which have
difficulty in obtaining funds, since they are typically small and young firms with
high risk of failure. These firms might have few tangible assets as collateral, and
operate in a market which is highly volatile. This causes them difficulty in obtaining
loans from creditors or banks (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Engel, 2002). The
advantages of venture capital are that it provides not only financial resources for
firms with high growth potential, but also significant management resources,
upgraded technologies, and new markets, as well as coaching investing firms in their
start-ups (Davila et al., 2003). Gompers and Lerner (2001, p152) also explain that the
venture capital cycle normally begins with (i) fundraising from investors, (ii)
investing in potential firms, (iii) monitoring and adding value to its investing firms,
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(iv) withdrawing funds if the deals are successful, (v) returning capital to its
investors, and (vi) raising additional funds from its investors again.
(vi) Government assistance can be another financial source for young firms
or financially constrained firms, since the government can provide financial
assistance (e.g., low-interest loans, capital subsidies, cash grants) and other
assistance to firms (e.g., aiding the adoption of new technologies, improving a
country’s infrastructure, offering tax-based and non-tax incentives). Tax-based
incentives include, for example, exempting or reducing import duties on machinery
and raw materials, and corporate income tax (CIT) exemptions. Non-tax based
incentives include, for instance, permitting foreign workers to work for local firms,
remitting foreign currency abroad as part of its policy to promote the economy
(Girma et al., 2007; The Board of Investment, 2009a).
(vii) Leasing is one of the long-term financing options, where both parties
(the lessee and the lessor) engage in a leasing agreement. The lessor can be either the
asset’s manufacturer or an independent leasing firm. The lessee has the right to use
assets, but make periodic payments as stated in a leasing contract. There are two
types of lease: (i) finance leasing and (ii) operating leasing. Finance leasing is a longterm lease where a lessee receives assets without immediately paying for them. This
type of leasing is normally long-lived and non-cancellable prior to the expiry date of
a contract (Ross et al., 2007, p831). The lessee is also solely responsible for upkeep
and maintenance of the asset. It normally requires that the leasing period must be
greater than 75 percent of the asset’s life. Operating leasing is a rental agreement for
operating assets, which is usually, but not always, short-lived and cancellable.
According to operating leasing, leased equipment or goods will not be stated in the
lessee’s balance sheet, and will not be reflected in the firm’s gearing ratios (leverage
ratios). Examples of operating leasing, for instance, are telephones, photocopiers,
motor vehicles, construction equipment, and computers (Ross et al., 2007, p831).
According to the external financing literature, banks and other financial
institutions are likely to screen efficient firms (e.g., collateral level, sufficient cash
flow, age, and size) before those firms are allowed to borrow capital. Kim (2003)
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examines the effect of external financing on a firm’s technical efficiency using the
ratio of interest expenditure to total capital as the proxy of external financing. His
results reveal that for the case of Korea external financing has a negative relationship
with a firm’s technical efficiency in the food and paper industries, but such a
relationship is not found in the textile, basic-metal, and fabrication industries. The
latter industries consist of large firms that have easy access to bank loans and other
external funds. Moreover, these industries are major exporting industries in the
Korean manufacturing sector, and received government support during the 1970s and
1980s. Du and Girma (2009) also suggest that domestic bank loans are found to be
more supportive to Chinese large-sized manufacturing firms during the period 1998
to 2005. Cull and Xu (2005) also find similar results that external financing, in the
form of bank loans, are positively associated with profit reinvestment for Chinese
firms across a number of industries during the period 2000 to 2002. In addition,
Gökçekus (1995) finds no significant effects of the relative efficiency of internal
versus external financing on a firm’s technical efficiency for the Turkish rubber
industry.
The conclusion from the literature is, therefore, that the relative efficiency of
internal versus external financing is still inconclusive. Some studies argue that a
firm’s capital is allocated more efficiently in an internal capital market than an
external one, since internal financing can increase monitoring incentives, decrease
entrepreneurial incentives, and have better asset redeployability. In other words,
internal financing improves the efficiency of investments and resource allocation.
(Gertner et al., 1994). Other studies, however, argue that internal financing causes
the agency problem, which implies that managers lack the desire or necessity to
maximize shareholders’ interests. This is especially the case in underdeveloped
countries where firms’ managerial rights are not fully developed and their
information is not fully publicized, and managers attempt to maximize their benefits
rather than the firm’s value (Kim, 2003, p134).
3.5

Ownership structure
Ownership structure plays an important role in influencing a firm’s goals and

its profitability, which finally affects shareholders’ wealth. Blair (1995, p4) also
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states that “ownership of private property is the central mechanism by which
incentives are created for the efficient use of resources in a free market economy”.
In this regard, it is interesting to examine the effect of ownership structure on a
firm’s performance. For this thesis ownership structure can be considered in terms of
(i) ownership concentration (Section 3.5.1), (ii) types of ownership (Section 3.5.2),
and (iii) managerial ownership (Section 3.5.3). Ownership concentration and
managerial ownership are only discussed in the finance literature, but types of
ownership are discussed in both the finance and economics literature.
3.5.1

Ownership concentration
Ownership concentration refers to the shares of a firm that are owned by a

shareholder or a small number of shareholders, namely controlling shareholders. For
empirical studies controlling ownership can be measured by the percentage of equity
owned by the five largest shareholders (Wiwanttanakantang, 2001; Yammeesri and
Lodh, 2003; Zeitun and Tian, 2007). In addition, controlling shareholders are likely
to exert their influence over the firm’s management through their voting rights at
shareholders’ meetings, or they influence the firm by being a member(s) of the board
of directors.
Ownership dispersion, however, refers to separate investors whose share
holdings in the firm are very small compared with the value of the whole firm (Blair,
1995). Figure 3.4 illustrates the “Berle-Means” model of the corporation, which
explains that the voting power of any individual shareholder is much less influential
due to the dispersion of equity ownership Shareholders can sell their shares if they
dislike the way that the firm is operating its business. In this regard, the firm’s
security price will fall if a large number of shareholders simultaneously sell their
shares, and few investors are willing to buy them. Dispersed shareholders, however,
are not likely to monitor the firm’s management as well as controlling shareholders,
since monitoring costs are much higher than the benefits that dispersed shareholders
will receive. There are both costs and benefits associated with ownership
concentration. The presence of controlling shareholders (shareholders with large
stakes) is likely to deteriorate a firm’s performance, since the interest of controlling
shareholders may not align with those of non-controlling shareholders (Shleifer and
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Vishny, 1997; Bebchuk et al., 1999). There is a possibility that controlling
shareholders may conduct corrupt activities (i.e., using a firm’s cash flows for their
own benefits). A number of empirical studies support a negative relationship
between controlling ownership and a firm’s performance, or that such a relationship
is not found between them (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; McConnell and Servaes, 1990;
Leech and Leahy, 1991).
Figure 3.4: Basic “Berle-Means” model of the corporation
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Demestz and Lehn (1985) find no significant evidence of a relationship
between controlling ownership (ownership concentration) and accounting profit rates
for 511 U.S. firms. Leech and Leahy (1991) find a negative association between
ownership concentration and firm performance, measured by firm value, trading
profit margin, and rate of growth of net assets for 470 UK listed firms, including 325
from the 1,000 largest industrial companies ranked by Time magazine, during the
period 1983 to 1985. McConnell and Servaes (1990) also find no significant
evidence of a relationship between controlling ownership (block ownership) and
Tobin’s q. According to agency theory, however, controlling shareholders are likely
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to perform better than dispersed shareholders, because a high level of ownership
concentration can reduce agency costs. Shareholders with large stakes alleviate the
free rider problem of monitoring a firm’s management, and therefore reduce agency
costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Admati et al., 1994).
Dilling-Hansen et al. (2003), however, find that firms owned by large
shareholders do not seem to be more efficient than other firms. Zeitun and Tian
(2007) find that ownership structure is positively associated with firm performance,
as measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), for 59 publicly
listed firms in Jordan. In the case of Thailand, Yammeesri and Lodh (2003) find that
controlling ownership has a strong and positive association with stock returns and
profitability. In addition, Wiwattanakantang (2001) also suggests a similar result that
controlling ownership is associated with higher performance as evaluated by
accounting measures such as ROA and sales-asset ratio.
3.5.2

Types of ownership
The aim of this section is to focus on the various types of ownership of listed

enterprises, which will be related to the analysis of firm performance for this thesis.
Listed enterprises
Types of ownership in publicly listed firms are different among countries (see
Table 3.2). Firm performance has largely been measured by firm value (Tobin’s q)
and profitability ratios (e.g., return on equity (ROE)). There has been a large number
of studies analysing the effect of ownership structure on a firm’s performance, as
measured by firm profitability - financial ratios and corporate value (Tobin’s q) for a
number of countries (e.g., China, Korea, and all East Asian countries) (McConnell
and Servaes, 1990; Smith, 1990; Cho, 1998; Xu and Wang, 1999; Claessens et al.,
2000; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Joh, 2003; Chang and Shin, 2007; Lee, 2008).
Few studies in the finance and economics literature, however, have analysed
firm ownership and its effect on technical efficiency. This is the main focus of this
thesis. Table 3.2 summarises a number of empirical studies that have examined the
effects of types of ownership on a firm’s technical efficiency, applying the SFA
approach (Jones et al., 1998; Wen et al., 2002; Goldar et al., 2003; Bottasso and
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Sembenelli, 2004; Sirasoontorn, 2004; Sheu and Yang, 2005) and two-stage DEA
approach (Zheng et al., 1998; Fukuyama et al., 1999; Zhang et al., 2001;
Sirasoontorn, 2004; Zelenyuk and Zheka, 2006; Hoang, 2007; Bachiller, 2009).
Table 3.2: Empirical studies: The effects of ownership structure on a firm’s
technical efficiency
Author
Jones et al. (1998)
Zheng et al. (1998)
Fukuyama et al. (1999)
Zhang et al. (2001)
Zelenyuk and Zheka
(2006)

Country (year)
Bulgaria (1989-1992)
China (1986-1990)
Japan(1992-1996)
China (1996-1998)
Ukraine (2001-2002)

No. of firms
Method
490
SFA
1,759
DEA
364
DEA (two-stage procedure)
1,989
DEA (two-stage procedure)
158
DEA (the truncated regression with
iterated bootstrap approach)

Dilling-Hansen et al.
(2003)

Denmark (1997)

2,370

SFA

Goldar et al. (2003)
India (1990-2000)
Bottasso and Sembenelli Italy (1978-1993)
(2004)

63
1,306

SFA
SFA

Sirasoontorn (2004)
Sheu and Yang (2005)
Hoang (2007)
Bachiller (2009)

24
416
1,171
5

DEA (two stage procedure) and SFA
SFA
DEA (two-stage procedure)
DEA (two-stage procedure)

Author

Thailand (1992-2001)
Taiwan (1996-2001)
Vietnam (2000-2005)
Spain (1984-2005)

Types of Ownership

The key findings
• Private ownership has a positive effect on
a firm’s technical efficiency.
• Cooperative ownership is always not
significant.
• State firms, state joint stock and joint
ventures do not affect firm performance.

Jones et al. (1998)

1. State firms
2. Non-state firms
3. State joint stock
4. Private firms
5. Independent cooperatives
6. Joint ventures

Zheng et al. (1998)

1. State-owned enterprises (SOEs)
• State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less
2. Urban collective-owned enterprises (COEs)
efficient than Township-village enterprises
3. Township-village enterprises (TVEs)
(TVEs), but more efficient than COEs.

Fukuyama et al. (1999)

1. Japan firms
2. Foreign firms

• All credit cooperatives in Japan are owned
by foreigners, and Koreans own more than
90 percent of those firms.
• Foreign - owned firms are found to be
more efficient than the others, and also
have higher productivity growth over the
same period.

98

Table 3.2: Empirical studies: The effects of ownership structure on a firm’s
technical efficiency
Author

Types of Ownership

The key findings

Zhang et al. (2001)

1. State-owned enterprises (SOEs)
2. Collective-owned enterprises (COEs)
3. Private-owned enterprises (POEs)
4. Foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs)
5. Domestic joint ventures (DJVs)
6. Hong Kong - Macao - Taiwan owned
Enterprises (HMTs)

• Non-state enterprises have a higher
average level of productive efficiency
than SOEs.
• HMTs and FOEs are the most technically
efficient groups.

Sheu and Yang (2005)

Insider ownership is classified as follows:
1. Executives
2. Outside directors
3. Large shareholders

• Executive shareholders firstly cause
a decrease and then an increase in a firm’s
technical efficiency.
• Outside - director shareholders is negatively
associated with a firm’s technical efficiency.

Dilling-Hansen et al. (2003)

1. Block shareholders ( > 5 % of total shares) • Block ownership is not statistically
2. LTDs ( legal form)
significant.
• LTDs are the most efficient firms.

Goldar et al. (2003)

1. Foreign - owned firms
2. Domestically - owned firms
3. Public - owned firms

• Foreign - owned firms have higher
efficiency than domestically owned firms.
• There is no significant difference between
domestic and public sectors.
• Domestically owned firms are likely to
enhance their technical efficiency and
attain the same technical efficiency level
as that of foreign owned firms.

Bottasso and Sembenelli (2004)

1. Independent firms
2. State owned firms
3. Multinational firms
4. Other national firms (Group firms)

• Multinational firms are the most efficient
group in most industries.
• State owned firms indicate systematic lower
efficiency levels.

Sirassontorn (2004)

Thai state owned electricity generating
firms

• The Thai state owned electricity generating
company performs better than other
electricity suppliers in OECD and
non -OECD countries on average.

Zelenyuk and Zheka (2006)

1. State firms
2. Foreign firms

• State firms are negatively associated with
a firm’s technical efficiency.
• Foreign ownership is negatively related
to a firm’s technical efficiency.
• However, the finding suggests a positive
association between the levels of corporate
quality and a firm’s efficiency.

Hoang (2007)

1.
2.
3.
4.

• SJVs exhibit the highest technical efficiency
Scores.
• SOEs exhibit the lowest.

State 100 % owned (SOEs)
State dominant shareholding (SDSHs)
Private Shareholding (PDSHs)
State Joint-Venture (SJVs)

Source: Author

Types of ownership can be classified as (i) family ownership, (ii) foreign ownership,
(iii) institutional ownership, and (iv) state ownership
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(i)

Family ownership
Family ownership (control) is an important type of ownership, since most

firms around the world are controlled by family founders (Burkart et al., 2002). In
addition, family ownership is commonly found in privately held firms, but also
dominant among listed firms. There are two opposite views with regard to an
individual or a group (family) as a controlling shareholder. On the one hand, family
ownership can cause agency problems, since it has the power to expropriate the
interests of minority shareholders. In other words, it is likely to implement policies
which benefit themselves, but harm a firm’s overall performance (Porta et al., 1999).
On the other hand, family members actually provide good monitoring in
their family-controlled firms, since they have advantages in communicating with
other related members (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In other words, the separation of
management and control, which causes agency problems, is reduced due to the close
relationship among family members within the firm. A number of empirical studies
suggest that family ownership has a positive impact on a firm’s performance
(Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Yammeesri and Lodh, 2003; Maury, 2006). Maury (2006)
finds that active family firms have higher profitability compared with non-family
firms for 1,672 non-financial firms in Western Europe, but such a relationship is not
found for passive family ownership
In the case of Thailand, Yammeesri and Lodh (2003) find that family
ownership of listed firms has a positive impact on a firm’s performance, as measured
by profitability (ROA) during the period 1993 to 1996.Wiwattanakantang (2001) also
finds that family ownership has a positive effect on firm performance, measured by
profitability (ROA) for 270 non-financial listed firms in 1996 for the case of
Thailand. Few studies, however, have linked family ownership with a firm’s
technical efficiency. Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) used a dummy variable 31 to
capture the effect of family ownership on a firm’s technical efficiency, as measured
by the two-stage DEA approach. Their results revealed a negative association

31

The number “one” is assigned for any firm which is controlled by a family or a partnership of
individuals; otherwise the number “zero” is used.
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between family ownership or partnership ownership and firm technical efficiency for
280 Israeli firms.
(ii)

Foreign ownership
Foreign ownership has become one of the most important ownership types.

Foreign ownership has superior technology, managerial expertise, good corporate
governance, and strong foreign - market network (Kimura and Kiyota, 2007). A
number of empirical studies find that foreign ownership has a positive association
with a firm’s performance, as measured by profitability and productivity (Takii,
2004; Choi and Yoo, 2006; Aydin et al., 2007; Kimura and Kiyota, 2007; Greenaway
et al., 2008). Aydin et al. (2007) find that foreign-owned firms perform better than
domestic-owned firms, as measured by return on assets (ROA) for 301 Turkish listed
firms during the period 2003 to 2004. Greenaway et al. (2008) also find that foreign
ownership has a positive effect on a firm’s performance, as measured by return on
assets (ROA), return on sales, labour productivity, and total factor productivity. In
addition, they also find an inverted U-shaped pattern between foreign ownership and
a firm’s performance. In other words, a firm’s performance increases as foreign
investors own up to about 47 percent to 64 percent, and declines thereafter. Takii
(2004) also finds that foreign-owned firms are more productive than domestically
owned firms for Indonesian manufacturing firms in 1995. Moreover, wholly foreignowned firms are likely to have higher productivity than partly foreign-owned plants.
Choi and Yoo (2006) also find a positive association between foreign
ownership and firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s q for Korean firms during
the period 1993 to 2002. Kimura and Kiyota (2007) also find that foreign-owned
firms perform better than domestically-owned firms, as measured by returns on
assets (ROA), value added productivity, and total factor productivity for Japanese
firms over the period 1994 to 1998. They also reveal that foreign-owned firms
achieve faster growth in terms of profitability and productivity than domesticallyowned firms. Moreover, they suggest that foreign investors bring useful firm-specific
assets such as new technology, managerial skills, and effective corporate governance
into Japan (Kimura and Kiyota, 2007). In addition, they also find that foreign
investors tend to invest in firms that have the most profitability in the future, but may
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not be immediately profitable. Yammeesri and Lodh (2003), however, study 243
non-financial firms listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand during the period 1993
to 1996, and find that foreign ownership is not associated with a firm’s performance,
as measured by profitability (return on assets (ROA), Average Return (AR), and
Sales/Assets ratio).
Focusing upon measures of a firm’s performance in terms of technical
efficiency a number of empirical studies suggest that foreign-owned firms have a
positive association with a firm’s technical efficiency (Fukuyama et al., 1999; Goldar
et al., 2003; Bottasso and Sembenelli, 2004). Zhang et al. (2001) use panel data for
1,989 Chinese industrial firms during 1996 to 1998 to quantify the effects of
ownership and market competition on a firm’s technical efficiency. Their findings
reveal a strong ownership effect on a firm’s technical efficiency. Foreign-owned
enterprises exhibit the highest efficiency scores, but state-owned enterprises exhibit
the lowest. Goldar et al. (2003) use panel data for 63 Indian engineering firms during
1990 to 2000 to analyse the effect of ownership on a firm’s technical efficiency.
Their findings reveal that foreign-owned firms have higher technical efficiency than
domestically owned firms. Bottasso and Sembenelli (2004) use panel data for 1,306
Italian manufacturing firms during 1978 to 1993 to examine the relationship between
corporate ownership and a firms’ technical efficiency in twelve industrial subsectors. Subsidiaries of multinational enterprises are found to be the most efficient
group in most industries, but state owned enterprises indicate systematically lower
efficiency levels.
(iii)

Institutional ownership
Institutional investors (e.g., pension funds, mutual funds) can decrease

agency costs, since they prefer to monitor the actions of firm managers more
effectively to increase firm performance (Crutchley et al., 1999). Navissi and Naiker
(2006) studied 123 listed firms on the New Zealand Stock Exchange in 1994. They
find that institutional investors with board representation have a positive impact on
firm value at lower levels of ownership, but institutional investors without board
representation is unrelated to firm value. In addition, they find a non-linear
relationship between institutional ownership and firm value, since it becomes
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negative when the share ownership increases. Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) also
support the active monitoring hypothesis, proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1986),
that the existence of controlling shareholders (ownership concentration) leads to
better monitoring of managers and also higher firm performance for 372 NYSE and
AMEX firms during the period 1979 to 1985. In particular, ownership is
concentrated in institutional investors rather than individual investors. Zeitun and
Tian (2007) also find that institutional ownership raised firm performance and
decreased the probability of default for 59 publicly listed firms in Jordan during the
period 1989 to 2002. McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a significant and positive
association between Tobin’s q and the fraction of shares owned by institutional
investors for 1,173 U.S. firms in 1976 and 1,093 U.S. firms in 1986. Crutchley et al.
(1999) find a significant association between institutional ownership and firm
profitability, as measured by return on equity (ROE), for U.S. publicly listed firms in
the New York and American Stock Exchanges in 1987 and 1993 (Crutchley et al.,
1999).

(iv)

State ownership
The effects of state ownership on a firm’s performance are widely discussed

and controversial. Most empirical studies find a negative association between state
ownership and a firm’s performance (see the survey by Djankov and Murrell, 2002).
From agency problems state-owned firms are controlled by politicians, and they can
exploit the firm’s assets easily (Le and Buck, 2009). In other words, they may have
an increased incentive to avoid maximizing a firm’s profitability for other minor
shareholders who are not the government. A number of studies also reveal that, in
competitive markets without significant externalities, government ownership is
inferior to private ownership, since the objectives of government ownership is quite
different from private ownership which focuses on profit maximization (Boycko et
al., 1996; Shleifer, 1998; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Sun et al., 2002). Sun et al.
(2002, p1) state that this is normally described by (i) the government's lack of
transferable residual claims, (ii) the government's choice of social and political
policy objectives rather than profit maximization, (iii) the government's employment
of officers and workers based on political relationship rather than their performance
capability, and (iv) the government’s higher transaction costs.
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Boycko et al.(1996) and Sheifer (1998) also mention that public firms around
the world are highly inefficient, since they adopt strategies, such as excess
employment, which satisfy policy interests. This is because state firms are likely to
serve the public interest better than private firms. In other words, state ownership
may generate significant positive externalities which are not captured by
profitability. Boycho et al. (1996, p318) suggest that the inefficiency of state firms is
due to the agency problem with politicians rather than that with managers, since
politicians aim to obtain voting support from employees of state firms and labour
unions by raising higher labour spending, but this leads to the expense of the
Treasury and other shareholders 32 . In this regard, privatisation may be implemented
for public firms to improve their efficiency. Sheifer and Vishny (1997, p48),
however, suggest that public firms, which are privatized without increasing the
number of investors, are likely to face the agency problem due to insufficient
investors to monitor firms. Zeitun and Tian (2007) also suggest that reducing
government ownership increased firm performance for 59 Jordanian listed firms
during the period 1989 to 2002.
A number of empirical studies, however, argue that state ownership has a
positive impact on a firm’s performance. According to Le and Buck (2009) state
ownership can increase a firm’s performance since it produces a “helping hand”,
which is based on efficiency or state power. In efficiency terms the government may
act as a controlling shareholder (a strategic block holder), and control managers more
efficiently than widely dispersed ownership In power terms the government may use
its power by providing supportive environments (e.g., subsidies) to improve a firm’s
performance. Le and Buck (2009) also find a positive association between state
ownership and firm performance for more than 1,000 Chinese listed firms during the
period 2003 to 2005. Hence, this issue is a complex one and can depend upon a
number of factors, such as the stage of economic development and how performance
is measured.

32

However, this is a very generalised statement that is unlikely to always be the case.
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3.5.3

Managerial ownership
Managerial ownership 33 can help align the conflict of interests between

shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). If managers’ interests
coincide more closely with those of shareholders, the conflicts between managers
and shareholders are alleviated. A number of empirical studies have investigated the
significance of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance
(McConnell and John, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Wiwattanakantang, 2001;
Yammeesri and Lodh, 2003). McConnell and John (1990) find a significant nonlinear association between managerial ownership ` as measured by market valuation
(Tobin’s Q) for 1,173 U.S. and 1,093 U.S. enterprises in 1976 and 1986,
respectively. More precisely, they find a significant and positive upward trend until
managerial shareholding contributes approximately 40% to 50% of total shares
ownership, and then begins to decline thereafter. Morck, et al. (1988) examined the
association between management ownership and market valuation as measured by
Tobin’s Q for 371 out of Fortune 500 enterprises in 1980. They reveal that the
association between managerial ownership and firm performance is “non-linear” or
“nonmonotonic”. More specifically, at the 0% - 5% managerial shareholding range,
managerial shareholders are found to have a significant and positive impact on firm
performance.
Managerial shareholding, however, is found to be significantly and negatively
related with firm performance in the 5% - 25% managerial shareholding ownership
range. This problem causes difficulty for minority shareholders to monitor or control
managerial shareholders’ actions, and, therefore, the firm’s performance can
deteriorate. Finally, a significant and positive association between managerial
ownership and firm performance is found when managerial shareholding is over
25%. Short and Keasey (1999) also find a positive non-linear relationship between
managerial ownership and firm performance, focusing upon both accounting and
market measures for UK firms quoted on the Official List of the London Stock
Exchange during the period 1988 to 1992. In addition, their results suggest that UK
managerial shareholders become entrenched at higher levels of ownership than is the

33

Managerial ownership is defined as being the owner manager who owns the company’s shares and
also works as an executive for the company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p56).
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case of US managerial shareholders due to greater institutional monitoring within the
UK.
In the case of Thailand, Wiwattanakantang (2001) examined the relationship
between managerial shareholding and firm performance for 270 non-financial
enterprises listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) in 1996. The level of
managerial shareholding is classified into three different groups (i) 25% to 50%, (ii)
50% to 75%, and (iii) 75% to 100%, and is compared with non-managerial
shareholding. At the 25% - 50% range, the results reveal that there is a significant
and negative association between managerial shareholding and firm performance as
measured by ROA and sales-to-assets. A positive result is also found when
managerial shareholding is over 75 %, but is not statistically significant. Yammeesri
and Lodh (2003) examined the effects of ownership structure on firm performance
for 243 non-financial firms listed in the SET over the period 1993 to 1996. They find
that there is a strong positive relationship between managerial ownership and
profitability (ROA), but such a relationship is not found in the case of market returns
and sales-to-assets. Finally, they suggest that a non-linear relationship between
managerial ownership and firm performance is not found in the case of Thailand.
They, however, find a significant non-linear relationship between managerial-nonfamily shareholding and market returns (average return rate (AR)). In other words,
managerial-non-family shareholding is significantly and positively related to
estimated market returns at the 0% to 15.39% managerial shareholding range,
significantly and negatively at the 15.39% to 50.61% managerial shareholding range,
and significantly and positively when managerial shareholding exceeds 50.61%.
Very few empirical studies, however, have examined the effect of managerial
ownership on a firm’s technical efficiency. Liao et al. (2010) separated the
percentage of equity owned by managers and the percentage of equity owned by the
board, and examined the effects of these variables on a firm’s technical efficiency as
measured by two-stage DEA. Their results found that managerial and board equities
are positively related with a firm’s technical efficiency, but their results are not
statistically significant. Liao et al. (2010) examined this hypothesis for securities
firms in Taiwan using only the two-stage DEA approach.
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3.6

Research and development (R&D) and firm performance

Business Innovation
Business innovation is another important factor in enhancing a firm’s
performance. Innovation can be broadly classified into two dimensions: (i) Product
innovation and (ii) Process Innovation. Some studies also include organizational
innovation as one of the innovative dimensions (Yamin et al., 1999). Product
innovation refers to the novelty of new products and product improvement, which
can promote growth, increase sales and profits (Dwyer and Mellor, 1993). Process
innovation, however, refers to the novelty of technology and technological
improvement, which is also a crucial component of business innovation.
A number of empirical studies find a positive association between innovation
and a firm’s performance (Yamin et al., 1999; Salavou, 2002; Cho and Pucik, 2005;
Prajogo, 2006). Yamin et al. (1999) reveal that an innovation index, which captures
three innovative dimensions (managerial innovation, process innovation, and product
innovation) positively affects firm performance, as measured by marketing
effectiveness, financial performance, asset management, and operational efficiency
for 237 Australian manufacturers during the period 1991 to 1992. Cho and Pucik
(2005) examine the linkage between innovativeness, product quality, growth,
profitability, and market value for U.S. firms (Fortune 1,000 companies) during the
period 1998 to 2000. Their results reveal that innovativeness, along with product
quality, positively affects a firm’s growth and also its profitability, which in turn
drives firm value to increase. Salavou (2002) also shows that product innovation has
a positive effect on firm performance, based on return on assets (ROA) for Greek
SMEs operating in the food and beverages industry during the period 1995 to 1997.
Prajogo (2006) reveals that process innovation has a relatively stronger association
with firm performance, based on sales, market share, and profitability than product
innovation in Australian manufacturing firms.
Research and development (R&D)
Research and development (R&D) enhances the level of a firm’s existing
technology or creates new technologies for a firm, and hence improves a firm’s
technical efficiency. A number of empirical studies examine the effects of research
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and development (R&D) on a firm’s performance, as measured by profitability,
growth, or firm value. For example, Denis et al. (2002) find that research and
development (R&D) is significantly associated with firm performance (firm value)
for 44,288 U.S. firms during the period 1984 to 1997. Yasuda (2005) reveals that
research and development (R&D) per employee has a positive effect on firm growth
for nearly 14,000 Japanese manufacturing firms in 1992 and 1998. Short (1999) also
finds that research and development (R&D) is positively associated with firm
performance using both accounting and market measures for UK listed firms during
the period 1988 to 1992. Choi and Yoo (2006) reveal that research and development
(R&D) expenditure has a positive impact on firm performance, measured by Tobin’s
q for Korean firms during the period 1993 to 2002. In addition, they find that foreign
investors may not necessarily invest in R&D-intensive firms.
A number of studies also examine the effects of research and development
(R&D) on a firm’s technical efficiency (Aw and Batra, 1998; Dilling-Hansen et al.,
2003; Kim, 2003; Sheu and Yang, 2005). They find a positive relationship between
research and development (R&D) and a firm’s technical efficiency. Aw and Betra
(1998) use micro data from Taiwan to estimate technical efficiency for
manufacturing firms. Their findings indicate that a firm’s technical efficiency has a
positive association with a firm’s investment in training and research and
development (R&D). Sheu and Yang (2005) also find that research and development
(R&D), as measured by annual R&D expenditure and deflated by the general WPI,
positively influences technical efficiency in Taiwan’s electronics industry. Kim
(2003) identifies and estimates the factors affecting a firm’s technical efficiency in
Korean manufacturing industries. His results reveal that the ratio of R&D spending
to total output has a positive association with a firm’s technical efficiency for the
textile and chemical industries, but such a relationship is not found in the fabrication
industry. Dilling-Hansen et al. (2003) use a sample of 2,370 Danish firms in 1997 to
examine the effects of a firm’s investment in R&D on its technical efficiency. Their
results reveal a positive relationship between a firm’s investment in R&D on a firm’s
technical efficiency.
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3.7

Executive compensation and firm performance
There are a number of empirical studies that have investigated the effect of

executive compensation on firm performance (Mehran, 1995; Baek and Pagán, 2002;
Kato et al., 2007; Ozkan, 2007; Buck et al., 2008; Unite et al., 2008). Buck et al.
(2008) use 601 Chinese enterprises listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock
Exchanges during the period 2000 to 2003. In practice, top executive compensation
includes total remuneration to the members of the board of directors, the supervisory
boards and senior management (Buck et al., 2008, p10). However, the top three
Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) pay was used as a proxy for executive pay due to
the information available from the annual report of Chinese listed companies. Their
results indicate that there is a two-way relationship between executive pay and firm
performance. Kato et al. (2007) examined the relationship between cash
compensation of Korean executives and firm performance for 246 publicly-traded
firms in Korea over the period 1998 to 2001. Their results reveal that cash
compensation of Korean executives is significantly associated with stock market
performance. In addition, Unite et al. (2008) suggest that there is a positive
association between executive compensation and firm performance for publiclytraded corporations which are not affiliated to a cooperative group listed on the
Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) over the period 2001 to 2003.
Ozkan (2007) examined the relationship between firm performance and the
level of CEO cash compensation for 390 UK non-financial firms over the period
1999 to 2005. Her results reveal a significant and positive association between firm
performance and CEO cash compensation, but such a significant and positive
relationship is not found for total CEO compensation (cash and equity-based CEO
compensation (stock options and long term incentive plans)). Mehran (1995)
examined the executive compensation structure for 153 randomly-selected
manufacturing firms over the period 1979 to 1980. His empirical results indicate that
the percentage of equity owned by CEOs and the percentage of CEOs’ equity-based
compensation have a significant and positive effect upon firm performance, as
measured by Tobin’s q and returns on assets. Focusing on firm performance, as
measured by technical efficiency, very few empirical studies examined the effect of
executive remuneration on a firm’s technical efficiency. Baek and Pagán (2002)
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conducted a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to measure a firm’s technical
efficiency, and found that the level of CEO total compensation is positively
associated with a firm’s technical efficiency for S&P 1,500 firms.
3.8

Export performance
The role of exports in promoting a firm’s performance based on productivity

and growth has been discussed in several studies (see Table 3.3), but discussions of
the role of exports on a firm’s technical efficiency have rarely been emphasised. This
section will firstly provide a review of the literature on sunk start-up costs and
heterogeneity in firm productivity, and then discuss the two-way hypotheses (the
self-selection and the learning-by-exporting hypotheses).
3.8.1

Sunk start-up costs and heterogeneity in firm productivity
Sunk start-up costs and heterogeneity in firm productivity can provide the

reason as to why not all firms can export to foreign markets. New exporters face
significant start-up costs, since they have to spend in gathering information on
foreign markets, developing marketing channels, modifying products to satisfy
foreign consumption, and improving existing packaging (Greenaway et al., 2005).
Recent trade literature studies show how sunk start-up costs, heterogeneity in firm
productivity, and other significant factors affect firm exporting decisions.
Roberts and Tybout (1997) examine exporting decisions for a large group of
Colombian manufacturing firms. They find that sunk start-up costs are significant for
firm exporting decisions. They also reveal that exporting experience can statistically
increase the probability of exporting, but the significance of exporting experience
declines once firms stop exporting to foreign markets. Moreover, they find that firms
that are large, old, and owned by corporations are likely to export. Finally, they also
suggest that any country which is undertaking export-promotion policies should
clarify whether these policies aim at increasing the export volume of existing
exporters, or promoting the entry of new exporters. Therefore, if the latter policy is
desired, then reducing entry costs and uncertainty (e.g., providing information about
targeting foreign markets, enhancing exporting infrastructure, or providing a stable
macroeconomic policy) is required.
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Similarly, Melitz (2003) analyses a new transmission channel for the effect of
trade on industry structure and performance. His results reveal that sunk start-up
costs significantly affect foreign trade, which is distributed across different types of
firms. Furthermore, only more productive firms enter exporting markets, while less
productive firms continue to produce only for the domestic market, and the least
productive firms will simultaneously be forced to exit. Export participation can also
be very costly, but firms will decide to export after they gain knowledge of their
productivity.
Bernard and Jensen (1999) also study export participation for U.S.
manufacturing firms during the period 1984 to 1992. The factors that affect export
participation such as barriers to entry, individual plant attributes, exchange rates,
spillovers, and export promotion on exporting decisions are examined in their model
(Bernard and Jensen, 1999, p20). They conclude that sunk start-up costs are
significant, and firm heterogeneity is also important in firm exporting decisions.
Furthermore, they find that exchange rate movements significantly affect a firm’s
exporting decisions, but spillovers, subsidies, and state government exporting
promotion are not significant and positively related to firm export participation.
Campa (2004) also finds sunk cost hysteresis in entry and exit to be an important
factor in determining export market participation for Spanish manufacturing firms
during the period 1990 to 1997. Sunk costs of entering the market appear to be much
larger than the costs of exiting the market. Similarly, Máñez et al. (2008) study the
sunk costs explanation for hysteresis in exports for Spanish manufacturing firms
during the period 1990 to 2000. Their results support the sunk costs explanation for
hysteresis for Spanish manufacturing firms. Furthermore, they find that large firms
have significantly smaller sunk costs than small firms.
3.8.2

The two-way effect between firm performance and export performance
There are a large number of empirical studies examining the two-way

relationship between a firm’s performance and its export participation (World Bank,
1993; Rhee, 1994; Aw and Hwang, 1995; Clerides et al., 1996; Bernard and Wagner,
1997; Aw et al., 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Liu et al., 1999; Castellani, 2002;
Kraay, 2006; Granér and Isaksson, 2007) (see Table 3.3). The direction of causality
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as to whether exporting decisions improve a firm’s technical efficiency or vice versa
has been proposed by at least two different mechanisms. According to the so-called
“self-selection hypothesis”, only more efficient firms will self-select into the export
market. The main reason is that the most productive firms can survive in highly
competitive markets. The reason for this hypothesis is that there exist additional costs
in exporting to foreign countries. These costs include transportation costs, marketing
costs, or production costs in developing existing products for foreign customers,
which obstruct small or less successful firms to become new exporters (Wagner,
2005). In addition, only high productivity firms will participate in the export market
if the fixed selling costs in exporting products are higher than for the domestic
market, and exporters whose productivity decreases will be forced to leave the
market (Aw et al., 1998).
Table 3.3: The self-selection and learning-by-exporting hypotheses
Author

Country (Year)

Firm Performance

Selfselection
hypothesis

Bernard and Jensen
(1999)

U.S. (1984-1992)

Bernard and Wagner
(1997)

Germany
(1978- 1992)

- Labour productivity
- Shipments

Yes

No

Cherides et al. (1998)

Colombia
(1981-1991),
Mexico (1986-1990),
Morocco
(1984 -1991)

- Labour productivity

Yes

No

Liu et al. (1999)

- Total factor

Yes

Learningbyexporting
hypothesis
No

productivity
- Size (total
employment)

Taiwan (1989-1993)

- Costs

-Total factor
productivity growth
- Shipments per
employee growth
- Labour productivity
Growth

Yes

No
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Table 3.3: The self-selection and learning-by-exporting hypotheses
Author

Aw et al. (1998)

Country (Year)

Taiwan (1986,1991)
Korea (1983, 1988,
1993)

Firm Performance

Selfselection
hypothesis

- Average total
factor
productivity
- Average total
factor
productivity

Yes

Learningbyexporting
hypothesis
Yes

Yes

No

Granér and Isaksson
(2007)

Kenya
(1992 -1994)

-Technical efficiency

Yes

Yes

Castellani (2002)

Italy (1989 -1994)

- Labour productivity
Growth

Yes

Yes

Kraay (2006)

China
(1988 -1992)

- Labour productivity
- Total factor
productivity
- Unit costs

Not
examined

Yes

Blalock and Gertler
(2004)

Indonesia
(1990 - 1996)

- Production output

Not
examined

Yes

Hansson and Lundin
(2003)

Sweden (1990 -1999)

- Total factor
productivity
- Labour productivity

Yes

Yes

Girma et al. (2004)

UK (1988 - 1999)

Yes

Yes

Hallward-Driemeier
et al. (2002)

Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia,
Philippines, Thailand
(1996 - 1998)

-Total factor
productivity growth
- Output growth
- Employment
Growth
- Labour productivity
Growth
-Total factor
productivity

Baldwin and Gu
(2003)

Canada (1974 - 1996)

-Labour productivity
growth
- Total factor
productivity Growth

Yes

Máñez et al. (2003)

Spain (1990 - 2000)

-Labour productivity

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Not
Examined

Source: Author
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According to the learning-by-exporting hypothesis, knowledge and expertise
gained from export market experience is an alternative explanation as to why the
productivity of exporting firms is relatively higher than non-exporting counterparts.
This is because the communication between foreign customers and exporting firms
provide exporting firms with access to new technical expertise (e.g., new product
designs and production methods). Aw et al. (1998, p3) also mention that both the
self-selection and learning-by-exporting hypotheses are plausible, but their actual
importance is likely to vary across countries and industries with different products
and process innovation, which can change the possibilities for a country’s learning
and its trade policy. The learning-by-exporting hypothesis may be particularly
relevant for the East Asian countries (World Bank, 1993; Rhee, 1994; Kraay, 2006).
The self selection hypothesis
According to Table 3.3 there exists strong evidence that the self selection
hypothesis, where only more efficient firms can participate in the export market, can
be observed in several countries. Bernard and Jensen (1999) use unbalanced panel
data for over 50,000-60,000 U.S. manufacturing plants during the period 1984 to
1992, to investigate whether good firms become exporters or whether exporting
improves a firm’s performance. As part of their results, total factor productivity
(TFP) is found to be statistically significant in explaining the firm decision to export.
Bernard and Wagner (1997) find that German manufacturing firms had to be
successful before beginning exporting. In other words, good firms most certainly
become exporters. Cherides et al. (1996) reveal that relatively efficient firms will be
exporters, but previous export participation does not affect the unit costs of firms.
Therefore, the efficiency gap between non-exporters and exporters is because the
more efficient firms self-select into the export market, rather than learn by exporting.
Similarly, results found in Taiwan by Aw et al. (1998) and Liu et al.(1999)
support the self-selection mechanism that firms entering into the foreign market have
higher productivity prior to entry in comparison to firms that choose not to enter into
the export market. Furthermore, Aw et al. (1998) reveal less evidence of the self
selection hypothesis, compared with Taiwan, for two of five Korean industries,
where significant differences between firms that enter into the foreign market and
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those that do not was found. Granér and Isaksson (2007) also suggest that selfselection behaviour appears among Kenyan manufacturing firms during the period
1992 to 1994. Castellani (2002, p625) finds that the higher the orientation towards
foreign markets, the higher is a firm’s productivity growth for the case of Italian
manufacturing firms over the period 1989-1994. Hanssan and Lundin (2003) study
the relationship between exporting and productivity for Swedish Manufacturing
firms during the period between 1990 to 1999. Their results reveal that firms that
begin exporting show higher productivity than firms that are non-exporters after two
years. Girma et al. (2004) also investigate the link between exporting and
productivity for UK manufacturing firms during the period 1988 to 1999. They find
that exporting firms were more productive than non-exporters before entering export
markets, since their growth rate of employment and output were faster before
exporting.
Baldwin and Gu (2003) also find that more productive firms were likely to
participate in the export market for Canadian manufacturing firms during the period
1990 to 1996. Their results reveal that firms that start exporting have higher labour
productivity than non - exporters, and exporters that exit from export markets have
lower labour productivity than continuing exporters. Hallward-Driemeier et al.
(2002) study the patterns of manufacturing productivity for Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand during the period 1996 to 1998. They
explain that firms can export after improving their technologies and production
processes, making new investments to improve their efficiency, training their work
force, and using external auditing. A series of these decisions, therefore, raise their
productivity.
The learning-by-exporting hypothesis
According to the learning-by-exporting hypothesis, Bernard and Jensen
(1999) find no evidence that future productivity growth is significantly higher for
U.S. exporting plants. Cherides et al. (1996) also find little evidence of efficiency
gains from the export experience in Colombia, Mexico and Morocco. On the
contrary, Castellani (2002) finds support that entering into export markets produces a
learning-by-exporting effect in Italy. Aw and Hwang (1995) and Liu et al. (1999)
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find that exporting improves plant performance in Taiwan. Similarly, Aw, Chung et
al. (1998) also support the learning-by-exporting hypothesis in Taiwan, but such
support is not found in Korea. Aw and Hwang (1995) use the 1986 census of plants
in the electronics industry collected by the Taiwanese Bureau of Statistics. Their
results reveal that exporting activity is generally correlated with higher firm-level
productivity, but the pattern is product specific. Their results indicate that the
magnitude of the contribution of productivity differences to value-adding differences
between exporters and non-exporters are product specific (Aw and Hwang, 1995).
Granér and Isaksson (2007) also provide evidence of a learning-by-exporting
hypothesis among Kenyan manufacturing firms. Kraay (2006) also finds evidence to
support the learning-by-exporting hypothesis in China.
Blalock and Gertler (2004) use panel data for Indonesian manufacturing firms
to investigate evidence from the self selection hypothesis that firms can improve
their productivity by learning through exporting during the period 1990 to 1996.
Their results contradict previous results from developed countries that the
productivity of exporting firms increases between 2 percent to 5 percent after
exporting (see Table 3.3). Hansson and Lundin (2003) also support the view that
exporting firms are significantly more productive than non-exporters. Their results
reveal that continuing exporters have significantly higher labour productivity than
non-exporters, but they find no significant differences in TFP growth between
various exporters and non-exporters.
Girma et al. (2004) reveal that exporting is likely to have boosted
productivity for UK manufacturing firms during the period 1988 to 1999. They also
point out that the US market is a larger and more competitive market than the UK
market, since most US firms have similar technological frontiers and, therefore, the
learning-by-exporting hypothesis appears to be less important than for UK firms
(Girma et al., 2004, p864). Baldwin and Gu (2003) reveal that export participation
improved firm productivity for UK manufacturing firms during the period 1990 to
1996. However, the learning effect is much stronger for domestic firms than for
foreign firms, and for younger firms than for older firms. Hallward-Driemeier et al.
(2002) also find that foreign-owned firms and exporting firms have significantly
116

higher productivity for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand
during the period 1996 to 1998.
3.9

Other sources and firm performance
This section reviews the literature with regard to other factors that can affect

a firm’s performance, including: (i) government assistance, (ii) networking, (iii)
foreign cooperation, (iv) geographical diversification, (v) firm size, and (vi) firm
age.
(i)

Government assistance
Government assistance can take a number of forms, such as (i) providing

financial assistance (e.g., low-interest loans, capital subsidies, cash grants), aiding
the adoption of new technologies, (ii) improving a country’s infrastructure, (iii)
offering tax-based incentives (e.g., exempting, or reducing import duties on
machinery and raw materials, and corporate income tax exemptions), and non-tax
based incentives (e.g., permitting foreign workers to work for local firms, remitting
foreign currency abroad) (Girma et al., 2007; The Board of Investment, 2009a).
The effects of government assistance on a firm’s performance are still
ambiguous. Tran et al. (2008) find that the effect of direct government support (e.g.,
government credit assistance and government technical support) on firm performance
in Vietnam varied across years and industries. For instance, they find a positive
effect of “government credit assistance” on technical efficiency for the machinery
and transport equipment sector and also the miscellaneous industries sector in 1996.
Their empirical results also reveal that “government technical support” has a
significant and positive effect on technical efficiency for the machinery and transport
sector in 1996, and for the (i) food processing and (ii) miscellaneous manufacturing
sectors in 2002. Girma et al. (2007) find that government grants enhance firm
performance, as measured by survival probabilities for Irish manufacturing firms
during the period 1983 to 1998. Tzelepis and Skuras (2004) find that government
capital subsidies are positively associated with firm growth, but not the efficiency
and profitability measures for Greek firms in the food-and-drinks manufacturing
sector during the period 1982 to 1996. They provide explanations as to why
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efficiency and profitability are not significantly associated with capital subsidies.
Capital subsidies may be spent on non-productive activities, such as lobbying and
advertisement, which do not help to increase the efficiency and profitability of a
firm.
However, Le and Harvie (2010) find that government assistance in the form
of land, premises, and credit have a significant and negative effect on the technical
efficiency of Vietnamese manufacturing SMEs using surveys for 2002, 2005, and
2007, but such a significant and positive evidence is only found for government
credit assistance for newly established SMEs in the 2002 survey. Beason and
Weinstein (1996), however, find no evidence that productivity was improved by
industrial policy measures (e.g., tariff, tax relief, and Japan Development Bank
(JDB) loans, subsidies) for Japanese industries during the period 1955 to 1990.
Bergström (2000) also studies the effects of public capital subsidies on total factor
productivity (TFP) for Swedish firms during the period 1989 to 1993. His results
suggest that subsidization positively affects a firm’s growth, but not productivity. He
also argues that subsidization can make firms less efficient due to market failure.
(ii)

Networking
Networking can provide value to members by allowing them access to social

resources embedded within a network (Watson, 2007, pp852-853). It can be one of
the factors which can enhance a firm’s performance. Inter-firm networks (or interorganizational networks) are increasingly perceived as a model for entrepreneurial
firm growth, since they can enhance the survival and capabilities of firms by
exchanging shared learning, technical knowledge, and resources (Nohria and Eccles,
1992; Lechner and Dowling, 2003). Tseng (2005) suggests that a business
community relationship can improve large firms’ profit growth, but such a
relationship is found to be negative for small firms, based on a survey of 138
Taiwanese FDI cases that invested in China and the United States. Watson (2007)
examined the potential effect of networking on a firm’s performance, measured by
survival, growth, and ROE for Australian SMEs. He finds that networking is
significantly and positively associated with firm survival and, to a lesser extent, firm
growth, but such a significant relationship is not found for ROE. Sahakijpicharn
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(2007) also finds that network embeddedness has a positive effect on Sino-Thai
SMEs’ business performance for 298 Bangkok based Sino - Thai SMEs.
(iii)

Foreign cooperation
Cooperation with foreign partners can increase a firm’s performance, which

can take a number of forms, such as technology transfer, subcontracting, licensee
production, trademark, employee training program, financial support, and market
information (e.g., new customers and suppliers). Schmitz and Nadvi (1999) also
suggest that firms which increase co-operation are likely to improve their
performance. Le and Harvie (2010) empirically show that co-operation with foreign
partners are likely to have a significant and negative effect upon the technical
efficiency of Vietnamese SMEs, since they have to follow the agreement set by
foreign partners. This might limit the flexibility and innovation and hence adversely
affect their efficiency performance.
(iv)

Geographical diversification
The effect of geographical diversification on a firm’s performance is still

ambiguous. For multinational corporations geographic diversification can benefit
from new foreign operations, since they can increase firm value through economies
of scale, location-specific advantages, and synergy effects (e.g., sharing market,
production, technology, knowledge, and expertise) (Kim and Mathur, 2008, p749).
According to the agency view by Jensen and Meckling (1976), geographical
diversifications can create more difficulty for shareholders to monitor management’s
decisions. In other words, geographical diversification increases agency problems,
which deteriorate a firm’s performance. In addition, geographical concentration of
economic activity and market integration can lead to more efficient production, since
firms can operate at a larger scale and capitalize on internal economies of scale
(World Bank, 2009).
Kim and Mathur (2008) find a negative association between firm value and
geographical diversification for 28,050 firms during the period 1990 to 1998. Denis
et al. (2002) also find that geographical diversification does not increase firm value,
based upon purely domestic firms in the U.S. during the period 1984 to 1997.
However, some studies find a positive association between geographical
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diversification and a firm’s performance. Bodnar et al. (1997) find that geographical
diversification is positively associated with firm value for U.S. firms during the
period 1987 to 1993. Driffield et al. (2008) find a positive relationship between
geographical diversification and corporate performance (total factor productivity) for
more than 400 UK MNEs during the period 1990 to 1999. Rijkers et al. (2009) also
suggest that location and institutions have become increasingly recognized as key
factors in promoting economic performance.
(v)

Firm size
The effect of firm size on firm performance is still inconclusive, differing

across countries and sectors. A number of studies empirically reveal a positive
association between a firm’s size and its performance (Hall and Weiss, 1967;
Admassie and Matambalya, 2002; Joh, 2003; Bottasso and Sembenelli, 2004;
Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul, 2004; Oczkowski and Sharma, 2005). Oczkowski
and Sharma (2005) find that firm size is positively associated with firm efficiency for
121 Nepalese manufacturing firms during the period 2000 to 2001. Joh (2003) finds
that firm size (total assets) has a significant and positive relationship with
profitability (net income to assets) for 5,829 Korean firms during the period 1993 to
1997. Bottasso and Sembenelli (2007) also find that firm size has a positive effect on
efficiency (only for foreign subsidies) for manufacturing Italian firms during the
period 1978 to 1993. Firm size, however, might be negatively associated with
efficiency if large firms face management and supervision problems (Admassie and
Matambalya, 2002). Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul (2004), however, find that
firm size (total assets) has no significant association with operating performance
changes for Thai listed firms that conducted equity offerings in the Stock Exchange
of Thailand during the period 1991 to 1994.
(vi)

Firm age
The effect of firm age on firm performance is also ambiguous depending on

sectors and countries. Sheu (2005) suggests a significant and positive association
between firm age and efficiency for 416 Taiwanese listed firms during the period
1996 to 2001. Malerba (1992) also states that such a positive age-efficiency
association results from learning-by-doing effects. In other words, a firm can become
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more efficient as a result of accumulating its expertise. However, some empirical
studies find no evidence of such a relationship (Yammeesri and Lodh, 2003;
Berghall, 2006; Zeitun and Tian, 2007). Berghall (2006) suggests that firm age is not
significantly associated with its performance, as measured by technical change and
efficiency for the Finnish ICT equipment manufacturing industry during the period
1990 to 2003. Zeitun and Tian (2007) find no significant relationship between firm
age and performance, as measured by return on assets (ROA), return on equity
(ROE), and market value of equity/book value of equity ratio for 59 listed firms in
Jordan during the period 1989 to 2002. Lundvall and Battese (2000) also find no
significant association between firm age and technical efficiency in all sectors for
235 Kenyan manufacturing firms during the period 1992 to 1994.
In the case of Thailand, Yammeesri and Lodh (2003) find that firm age has
no association with performance, as measured by return on equity (ROA), salesassets ratio, and stock returns for Thai non-financial listed firms during the period
1993 to 1996. Wiwattanakantang (2001) found mixed results that firm age has a
significant and positive effect on return on assets (ROA), but such a significant
relationship is not found for the sales-assets ratio and Tobin’s q for Thai nonfinancial listed firms in 1996. The age-performance relationship, however, has been
found to be significant and negative in some studies (Chi, 2009; Yusuda, 2005; Park,
2009). Chi (2009) finds that firm age has a significant and negative association with
performance, as measured by Tobin’s q for 880 Taiwanese listed firms in 2005.
Yusuda (2005) finds that firm age has a negative effect on growth for Japanese
manufacturing firms. Park (2009) also finds a significant negative effect between
firm age and growth for 7,889 Korean manufacturing firms during the period 1994 to
2003.
3.10

Conclusions
There are a number of ways to measure firm performance, such as financial

performance, efficiency, productivity, growth, exports, employment, and market
share. The finance and accounting literature widely measure a firm’s performance by
applying several financial ratios (see Figure 3.2). Financial ratios, such as
profitability measures, market value measures, efficiency measures, capital
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measures, capital structure measures (financial leverage), and liquidity (cash flow),
can be used to measure how firms perform well relative to others. According to the
economics literature the concepts of productivity and efficiency are different (see
Section 3.2.3). Productivity, however, is widely used to measure a firm’s
performance compared with efficiency. A review of the literature with regard to (i)
the effects of financial constraints (leverage) and liquidity on a firm’s performance as
well as (ii) the effects of internal and external financing on a firm’s performance, as
measured by technical efficiency, has not been widely addressed (see Sections 3.4.2
and 3.4.3). None of these studies have been conducted before for Thailand. These
empirical studies also provide mixed results. On the one hand firms with a high level
of leverage are likely to improve their efficiency, but some studies find a negative
association between financial constraints and a firm’s performance.
A review of the literature with respect to the effect of ownership
concentration on a firm’s performance, as measured by financial performance, are
widely discussed in the finance and accounting literature. None of these studies,
however, has focused upon technical efficiency as a measure of firm performance
before in Thailand. The results of these empirical studies are still ambiguous. A
review of the literature with regard to the effects of types of ownership on a firm’s
performance, as measured by financial performance (e.g., ROE, ROA, and Tobin’s
q) have been widely discussed in the finance and accounting literature, but few
studies have analysed this in terms of technical efficiency (see Table 3.2). Types of
ownership can be classified into (i) family ownership, (ii) foreign ownership, (iii)
institutional ownership, and (iv) state ownership From a review of the literature,
family ownership has a positive association with a firm’s performance, as measured
by profitability. There are opposite views with regard to family-controlled firms.
On the one hand family-controlled firms may expropriate the interest of
minority shareholders causing a negative effect on a firm’s performance. On the
other hand, they may have advantages in communicating with other related members
leading to a positive association with a firm’s performance. In addition, a number of
empirical studies find that institutional ownership (e.g., pension funds, mutual funds)
has a positive effect on a firm’s performance (see Section 3.5.2), since institutional
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shareholders are likely to monitor the actions of firm managers more effectively to
increase a firm’s performance. None of the studies with regard to the effects of
family and institutional ownerships on a firm’s performance, as measured by
technical efficiency, has been examined before for Thailand. Moreover, most of the
empirical studies have found that state ownership negatively affects a firm’s
performance, since the government can exploit the firm’s assets easily due to control
by politicians. In addition, they aim at following the government’s choice of social
and political policy goals rather than profit maximization. Some studies, however,
argue that state ownership can positively affect a firm’s performance due to their
state power (see Section 3.5.2). A number of empirical studies have shown that
foreign ownership can positively affect a firm’s performance, since it has superior
technology, managerial expertise, good corporate governance, and a strong foreign market network (see Section 3.5.2).
Managerial ownership can alleviate the conflict of interests between
shareholders and managers. A number of empirical studies also support that
managerial ownership significantly increases a firm’s performance and some studies
find a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and performance (see
Section 3.5.3). None of these studies have linked managerial ownership with a firm’s
technical efficiency before for Thailand. Many empirical studies have investigated
the relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance, as measured
by accounting or financial measures (see Section 3.6). Very few empirical studies
have examined the linkage between executive remuneration and firm performance, as
measured by the firm’s technical efficiency, but none of these empirical studies has
been conducted for Thailand.
A number of empirical studies have examined the two-way effects between a
firm’s performance and its export participation (the self-selection and the learning-by
-exporting hypotheses). According to the self-selection hypothesis, only more
efficient firms are likely to self-select into the export market. Sunk start-up costs and
heterogeneity in firm productivity provide the reasons as to why not all firms can
self-select to export markets (see Section 3.7.1). According to the learning-byexporting hypothesis export experience can help increase a firm’s performance. This
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is because exporting firms gain new technical expertise (e.g., new product designs
and production methods). It is obvious that the self-selection hypothesis exists in
almost all countries, but the learning-by-exporting hypothesis is not supported in
some countries, especially in developed countries. Most empirical studies have
examined these two hypotheses in terms of productivity (see Table 3.3). None of the
studies, however, have focused upon technical efficiency before for Thailand. Finally
there are other factors that significantly determine a firm’s performance, such as (i)
government assistance, (ii) networking, (iii) foreign cooperation, (iv) geographical
diversification, (v) firm size, and (vi) firm age.
According to the review of the literature discussed previously, key firm
characteristics affecting technical efficiency will be hypothesised and examined in
Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. These are as follows: (i) finance (leverage and
liquidity; internal financing and external financing), (ii) research and development
(R&D), (iii) ownership structure (controlling and managerial ownerships), (iv)
executive remuneration, (v) types of owned firms (foreign and family-owned firms),
(vi) exporting (the learning by exporting and self-selection hypotheses 34 ). Other
factors that significantly determine a firm’s performance, such as (i) firm size, (ii)
firm age, (iii) government assistance, and (iv) foreign cooperation will also be
investigated in Chapter 6.
Before identifying hypotheses and variables in Chapter 5, the next chapter
(Chapter 4) will discuss the methodology (an overview of firm efficiency concepts
and measurement) to be used for the empirical analysis conducted in Chapter 6.
Chapter 4 will also provide a review of firm efficiency measurement concepts, and
review two competing parametric and non-parametric efficiency methods for
measuring technical efficiency.

34

For the self-selection hypothesis there are a number of business environment and firm specific variables that
affect a firm’s export decision, such as firm size, firm age, leverage, and foreign investment (see Table 5.3).
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW:
FIRM EFFICIENCY CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENT

4.1

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of firm efficiency

measurement concepts, which include (i) technical efficiency, (ii) allocative
efficiency, (iii) scale efficiency, and (iv) cost and revenue efficiencies. This chapter
also reviews competing parametric and non-parametric efficiency methods, which
include Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA),
respectively. These methods will be used to predict firm technical efficiency in
Chapter 6.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 presents a review of
efficiency measurement concepts. Section 4.3 illustrates two competing approaches
in estimating firm technical efficiency, which are “Stochastic Frontier Analysis
(section 4.3.1) and “Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)” (section 4.3.2). Section 4.4
explains production functions accounting for technical (technological) change.
Section 4.5 discusses the strengths and weaknesses of non-parametric DEA and
parametric SFA approaches. Section 4.6 provides a summary of this chapter.

4.2

Efficiency measurement concepts
This section discusses efficiency concepts which are of common interest: (i)

technical efficiency, (ii) allocative efficiency, (iii) scale efficiency, and (iv) cost and
revenue efficiency.
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Figure 4.1: Technical and allocative efficiencies from an input-orientation
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4.2.1 Technical efficiency
Farrell (1957) firstly proposed efficiency measurements of a firm based on
“an efficient production function” which was not addressed in the previous works of
Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951), and which consists of (i) technical efficiency
and (ii) price (allocative) efficiency 35 . He defined “technical efficiency” as the ability
of a firm to produce maximum output from a given set of inputs, and “price
(allocative) efficiency” as the ability of a firm to use an optimal proportion of inputs,
given different prices and production technology. Farrell (1957) provided the
explanation of a firm’s efficiency in a simple way using two factors (inputs) (x and
y) to produce a unit of output (R) under the assumption of constant return to scale 36 .
The “isoquant” line (PP’) in Figure 4.1 represents the minimum combinations of the
two inputs that a fully efficient firm 37 might use to produce a unit of output (Farrell,
1957, p254). The various combinations of the two inputs along the isoquant line
(PP’) are considered to be technically efficient. However, any point which is located
above and to the right of the isoquant line (PP’) is defined as technically inefficient.
The point S represents the various combinations of the two inputs that a firm uses to

35

Coelli at el. (2005, p51) pointed out that the terminology of “price efficiency” used in Farrell (1957)
is also equivalent to “allocative efficiency” used in recent literature.
36
The assumption of constant returns to scale allows the technology to be presented in a simple
“isoquant” diagram (Farrell, 1957, p254).
37
The production frontier of perfectly efficient firms is not observed in practice. It must be estimated
from a sample of firms in the industry (Coelli et al., 2005, p52).

126

produce a unit of output, but this point indicates technical inefficiency since the firm
can reduce inputs by the distance RS without reducing output. In other words at the
point S a firm needs to reduce its inputs to achieve technically efficient production,
which can be represented by the ratio RS/0S. At the point R the firm can be
technically efficient by producing the same unit of output as it produces at the point
S but it uses only 0R inputs, which can be defined by the ratio 0R/0S.
As a result, the technical efficiency (TE) of a firm can be measured by the
ratio TE = 0R/0S. This ratio ranges between zero and one, indicating the level of
technical efficiency of the firm. If TE equals one this indicates technically efficient
production. This can be observed at the point R, since this point lies on the efficient
isoquant line (PP’) (Coelli et al., 2005, p52). In addition, technical efficiency can be
measured from an output-orientated perspective, assuming that an efficient firm uses
a single input (x) to produce two outputs (

and

). From Figure 4.2 the distance

CD indicates the technical inefficiency of a firm, which is the amount by which
output could be increased without requiring additional input (Coelli et al., 2005, p
56). Therefore, the technical efficiency (TE) of a firm can be measured by the ratio
0C/0D.

Figure 4.2: Technical and allocative efficiencies from an output-orientation
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Source: Coelli et al. (2005, p55)
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4.2.2 Allocative efficiency
Farrell (1957) illustrated the term allocative efficiency (AE) when input price
information is given. From Figure 4.1 allocative efficiency (AE) is measured by the
ratio 0Q/0R (Coelli et al., 2005). The production of a firm is technically efficient at
the point R but it can be allocatively inefficient at this point, since production costs at
the point R are not efficient and can be reduced by the distance QR. At the point R’
the firm’s production is allocatively and technically efficient. From Figure 4.2
allocative efficiency (AE) can also be estimated from an output-orientation
perspective by the ratio of 0D/0E (Coelli et al., 2005). At the point D the firm’s
production is technically efficient but not allocatively inefficient, since its production
costs can be reduced by the distance DE. As a result, the firm’s production is
allocatively and technically efficient at the point D’.
4.2.3

Scale efficiency

Figure 4.3: Scale efficiency
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Source: Coelli et al. (2005, p59, 61)

Coelli et al. (2005, p58) illustrated that a firm can be both technically and
allocatively efficient, but its scale of operation may not be optimal. For example,
under the specification of variable-returns-to-scale (VRS), a firm might operate with
increasing returns to scale (irs) if its scale of production is too small. Moreover, the
firm may operate with decreasing returns to scale (drs) if its scale of production is
too large. From Figure 4.3, Firm C operates over the increasing returns to scale part
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of the production frontier. Hence, it can be more productive by increasing its scale of
production towards point A. On the other hand, Firm B operates over the decreasing
returns to scale part of the production frontier. It, therefore, can become more
productive by decreasing its scale of operation towards the point A. At the point A,
the firm cannot change its production scale, since it operates at the most productive
scale size (MPSS) or at the technically optimal productive scale (TOPS) (Coelli et
al., 2005, p59). Moreover, it is possible to use “distance measures” to estimate
different types of efficiencies. For example, the ratio of the slope of the ray 0F to the
slope of the ray 0C is equivalent to the ratio DC/DF, which is the technical efficiency
of Firm F based on variable returns to scale technology (see Figure 4.3).
TEVRS = DC/DF

(4.1)

Furthermore, the scale efficiency of Firm F can be estimated by the distance of
constant returns to scale technology (DE) over the technically efficient data point
(DC) (Coelli et al., 2005, p60).
Scale Efficiency (SE) = DE/DC

(4.2)

The scale efficiency measure in the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
literature cannot be estimated directly, as mentioned before, but it can be estimated
using the ratio of technical efficiency under constant returns to scale over technical
efficiency under variable returns to scale (Coelli et al., 2005). For example, the scale
of efficiency of Firm F can be estimated as follows (see Figure 4.3).
Scale Efficiency (SE) = TE CRS / TE VRS
= (DE/DF) / (DC/DF)
= DE/DC

(4.3)

4.2.4 Cost and revenue efficiencies
Cost efficiency can be measured when “input prices” are provided. Cost
efficiency can be estimated using input-orientated measures, since it deals with how
costs can be minimized without changing the output quantities produced. Figure 4.1,
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for example, represents the case of input-orientated measures. The vector of input
prices (w) is introduced and the vector of inputs (x, x̂ ,x*) associated with the point S,
the technical efficiency point (R), and the cost-minimising point (R’), respectively
(Coelli et al., 2005, p53). Cost efficiency is defined as the ratio of input costs (w)
associated with input vectors, x (at the point S) and x* (at the point R’) (see Figure
4.1). Therefore,
Cost Efficiency =

(4.4)

Furthermore, the product of technical and allocative efficiency measures is also equal
to “the total overall cost efficiency (CE)” as in Equation (4.4) (Coelli et al., 2005,
p53):
(4.5)

Where, technical efficiency and allocative efficiency can be estimated using the
isocost line (CC’) as mentioned in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 (see Figure 4.1) as
follows:
Technical Efficiency (TE) =

(4.6)

Allocative Efficiency (AE) =

(4.7)

Similarly, revenue efficiency can also be estimated using output-orientated measures
when “output prices” are given. From Figure 4.2, for example, the vector of observed
output prices (p) is introduced and the vector of outputs ( , , *) associated with the
point C, the technical efficiency point (D), and the cost-minimising point (D’),
respectively (Coelli et al., 2005, p53). Revenue efficiency is defined as the ratio of
output price (p) associated with output vectors,

(at the point C) and * (at the point

D’) (see Figure 4.2). Therefore,

Revenue Efficiency =

(4.8)
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Furthermore, the overall revenue efficiency can also be defined as the product of the
allocative and technical efficiency measures as below (Coelli et al., 2005, p56):

(4.9)

Where, technical efficiency and allocative efficiency measures can be defined as
follows (Coelli et al., 2005, p56):
Technical Efficiency (TE) =

Allocative Efficiency (AE) =

4.3

′

C

′

D

′
′

D
E

(4.10)

(4.11)

Efficiency methods
There are two competing measures of a firm’s efficiency: (i) non-parametric

approach (e.g., Data Envelopment Analysis) and (ii) parametric approach (e.g.,
Stochastic Frontier Analysis). This section will illustrate these two competing
approaches. Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) will be explained in Section 4.3.1
and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) will be illustrated in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.1

The stochastic production frontier
This section examines the literature with regard to the development stages of

the stochastic production frontier, in measuring firm efficiency. It consists mainly of
three phases of development: (i) deterministic production frontier, (ii) stochastic
production frontier, and (iii) stochastic production frontier with panel data.
(i)

Deterministic production frontier
The concept of this approach is that the free disposal convex hull of the

observed input-output ratios can be constructed by linear programming techniques
(Førsund et al., 1980, p9). The concepts of technical and allocative efficiencies were
also introduced by Farrell (1957) (See Section 4.2). Førsund et al. (1980) also
pointed out that the advantage of this approach is that the functional form is not
required but its disadvantage is that it is restricted to the assumption of “constant
returns to scale”, and the estimated frontier is vulnerable to some extreme
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observations (outliers problem) and measurement error since the frontier is drawn
from observations from the sample. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p67) also
mentioned that the major drawback of this programming approach is that the
parameters are “computed” (applying mathematical programming techniques) rather
than “estimated” (applying regression techniques). Farrell’s work has influenced a
number of contributions in the literature (Aigner and Chu, 1968; Seitz, 1971; Afriat,
1972; Richmond, 1974). The deterministic production frontier can, therefore, be
written in the general form as below (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p66):
;
Where,

exp

(4.12)

is the scalar output of producer i (i=1,….,n);

frontier, xi is a vector of N inputs;
estimated;

;

is the production

is a vector of technology parameters to be

is technical efficiency (

variable associated with technical inefficiency (

); ui is a non-negative random
0) 38 .

Aigner and Chu (1968) considered the log-linear Cobb-Douglas production
frontier

∑

and applied mathematical programming

models (linear and quadratic programming models 39 ) to obtain the production
frontier. There are a number of techniques in estimating unknown parameters for
Aigner and Chu’s (1968) model. Afrait (1972, p581) suggested that with the CobbDouglas form, it is common to assume log (1/u) = z as a gamma distribution and to
use the method of maximum likelihood. Richmond (1974) applied Afrait’s (1972)
model to conduct an empirical analysis of Norwegian manufacturing industries in
1963 using “Modified Ordinary Least Squares (MOLS)”, which is estimated by
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)

40

under the assumption of a one-sided distribution

(e.g., exponential or half normal).

38

0 guarantees that
; , since technical efficiency is required to be less than or equal
to one
1 . Note that
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p66).
39
Linear and quadratic programming models minimize ∑
and ∑
respectively, subject to
∑
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p67).
40
COLS, suggested by Winsten (1957), can be estimated in two steps. First, ordinary least squares
(OLS) is applied to obtain consistent and unbiased estimates of the slope parameters, and a consistent
but “biased” estimate of the intercept term. Second, the biased OLS intercept term will be corrected
(shifted up) so that the estimated production frontier lies on or above the observations (Kumbhakar
and Lovel, 2000, pp70-71).
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The main problem with this deterministic production frontier, as mentioned
above, is that it does not consider measurement errors or statistical noise. All
deviations from the frontier are solely from the effects of technical inefficiency
(Coelli at el., 2005). Pitt and Lee (1981, p44) also mentioned that the non-stochastic
(deterministic) frontier does not allow for random shocks, which are outside the
firm’s control, and hence a few extreme observations can determine the frontier and
overstate the maximum possible output given inputs. From this discussion “statistical
noise” can be introduced along with non-negative random variables associated with
technical inefficiency. This is called “the stochastic production frontier”, which will
be explained in Section 4.3.1 (ii).
(ii)

The stochastic production frontier
The basic stochastic production frontier was independently proposed by

Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) within
a cross-sectional context. Their models contained two error components. First, the
error component

allows random variation of the frontier across firms, and captures

(i) the effects of the omission of relevant variables from the vector

, (ii) random

shocks outside the firm’s control, (iii) measurement errors, and (iv) approximation
errors associated with the use of this functional form (Førsund et al., 1980, p13;
Coelli et al., 2005, pp242-243). The error component

is assumed to be

independently and identically distributed as N (0, σ 2V ). Second, the error component
captures the effects of inefficiency relative to the stochastic frontier. The error
component
negative (

is also assumed to be distributed independently of

, and

is non-

41

0) . For example, the following equation represents the log-linear

Cobb-Douglas stochastic frontier model version, which consists of three main
components: (i) a deterministic component, (ii) a noise effect, and (iii) an
inefficiency effect (Coelli et al., 2005, p243).

exp

41

The condition of
frontier.

0 allows for all observations lying on or beneath the stochastic production
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exp

exp
Deterministic
Component

Where

exp

Noise

(4.13)

Inefficiency

accounts for the two-sided statistical noise, and

accounts for the

nonnegative random variables associated with the technical inefficiency component.
Stochastic frontier analysis can be explained graphically, as shown in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: The stochastic production frontier
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Source: Coelli et al. (2005, p244)

From Figure 4.4 it is assumed that there are two firms (Firm A and B). Firm
A uses input xa to produce output ya. Similarly, Firm B uses input xb to produce
output yb 42 . The difference between Firms A and B is that Firm A’s (unobserved)
frontier output lies above the deterministic frontier, since its “noise effect” (va) is
positive, but Firm B’s (unobserved) frontier output lies within the deterministic
frontier due to its negative “noise effect” (vb). Hence, unobserved frontier outputs are
likely to lie either above or below the deterministic frontier. However, the observed
frontier outputs tend to lie below the deterministic frontier 43 . From Figure 4.4 the

42

If the inefficiency effects of Firms A and B are zero (ua = 0 and ub = 0), their outputs would be at y*a
and y*b respectively.
43
For example, Firm A lies above the deterministic frontier since the “noise effect” is positive and
greater than the inefficientcy effect.
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output-oriented measure of technical efficiency can be specified as follows (Coelli et
al., 2005, p244):
′
′

′

exp

)

(4.14)

The value of technical efficiency (TEi) ranges between zero and one. Yi
attains its maximum feasible output if and only if TEi = 1. TEi < 1 illustrates a
measure of the shortfall of observed output from maximum feasible output (Berg et
al., 2005, p279).
The estimation of stochastic production frontiers becomes more complicated
where there are two random error terms: (i) the noise component (
inefficiency component (

. The noise effect (

and (ii) the

is assumed to meet the properties

identified in the Classical Linear Regression Model. The inefficiency component
(

also has identical properties to that of the noise component, except it has a non-

zero mean because

≥ 0 (Coelli et al., 2005, p245). Coelli et al. (2005, p245) also

argue that the slope estimators obtained from “ordinary least squares” (OLS) are
consistent, but the intercept estimator is biased downwards. Technical efficiency,
therefore, cannot be predicted by using OLS. Different estimation techniques may be
used to obtain a consistent estimate of the intercept and estimates of technical
efficiency of each producer (Kumbhakar and Lovel, 2000, p74).
The corrected ordinary least squares (COLS) 44 can also be used to correct the
bias in the intercept term. However, the method of maximum likelihood (ML) is also
preferred to other estimators (e.g., COLS), since ML estimators have asymptotic
properties (desirable for large samples) (Coelli et al., 2005, p245). Aigner, Lovell,
and Schmidt (1977) also applied the method of maximum likelihood under the
assumptions of a half-normal model. First, the statistical components

are

independently and identically distributed normal random variables with zero means
and variances

44

~

0,

. Second, the inefficiency components

are

See footnote 40.
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independently and identically distributed half-normal random variables with variance
~
(iii)

0,

.

Stochastic production frontier with panel data
Cross-sectional data requires strong distributional assumptions, but these

assumptions are relaxed when panel data is applied. Panel data used in measuring a
firm’s technical efficiency provides desirable statistical properties (Kumbhakar and
Lovell, 2000, p95). In addition, Schmidt and Sikles (1984), p367) noted that
stochastic frontier models that use cross-sectional data suffer three serious
difficulties. First, the technical efficiency of a firm can be estimated but its estimates
may not be consistent, since the variance of the distribution of technical efficiency,
conditional on the whole error term, does not vanish (become zero) when the sample
size increases. Second, maximum likelihood estimation of the stochastic production
frontier model and the separation of technical inefficiency from statistical noise
requires strong distributional assumptions of (i) technical inefficiency (e.g., halfnormal distribution) and (ii) statistical noise (e.g., normal distribution). Third,
maximum likelihood estimation requires that the technical inefficiency effect is not
dependent on the independent variables, but it may be correlated with input vectors
that a firm chooses.
Furthermore, panel data can be used to examine changes in technical
efficiency as well as the underlying production technology over time (Coelli et al.,
2005, p275). Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p96) also mentioned that having access
to panel data can avoid the disadvantages mentioned above. First, panel data
(repeated observations on a sample of firms) can relax the independent and strong
distributional assumptions. Second, adding more observations for each firm can
provide more information compared with cross sectional data, and the firm’s
technical efficiency can be estimated consistently since the number of observations
of the firm begins to increase. For several industries the assumption that the random
error term (Uit) is independently distributed is not realistic, since efficient firms also
expect to maintain their efficiency level while inefficient firms expect to enhance
their efficiency levels over time. Hence, it is crucial to impose some structure on the
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inefficiency effects and classify them as to whether they are time-invariant or timevarying (Coelli et al., 2005, p275).
Time-invariant inefficiency models
Time-invariant inefficiency models do not allow for technical change,
making them similar to the cross-sectional production frontier model given in
Equation (4.13). In addition, these models are similar to a conventional panel data
model except that the inefficiency effects are introduced, and are assumed to be
nonnegative

0 . More importantly, the technical inefficiency effects in these

models are constant over the time period indicated as follows (Coelli et al., 2005, p
276):
=

i = 1,……, I ; t = 1,…….,T,

(4.15)

The parameters of the model as well as technical efficiency can be estimated
using a number of methods (e.g., fixed effects model and random effects model)
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p97). The fixed effects model treats technical
inefficiency effects as a fixed (non-random) parameter that is required to be
nonnegative

0 (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The technical inefficiency

effects are allowed to be correlated with the independent variables or with statistical
noise

). However, there is no distributional assumption on the technical efficiency

effects. Statistical noise

) is assumed to be independently and identically

distributed with zero mean and variance

~

0,

, and is not correlated

with the independent variables. The fixed effects model can be estimated by applying
OLS with dummy variables (LSDV) (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The estimates
of the coefficients are also consistent as the number of firms, or the number of years,
increases. Moreover, the fixed effects model provides consistent estimates of a firm’s
technical efficiency, which is in contrast to the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE)
cross-sectional model (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p100). Its estimates, however,
may not be reliable if the number of firms is small, since the fixed effects model
measures a firm’s efficiency relative to the most efficient firm in the sample (Coelli
et al., 2005, p276). In addition, technical efficiency

in the fixed effects model

intends to capture variation across firms in time-invariant technical efficiency, but it
also captures the effects of all phenomena (e.g., the regulatory environment) which
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vary across firms but which are time invariant for each firm (Kumbhakar and Lovell,
2000, p100). The drawback in this model motivates interest in the random effects
model. In contrast to the fixed effects model the random effects model allows
technical efficiency to be randomly distributed with constant mean and variance, but
is assumed to be uncorrelated with the independent variables and the statistical error
). The statistical noise

) is assumed to be independently and identically

distributed with zero mean and constant variance

~

0,

(Kumbhakar

and Lovell, 2000). The random effects model can be estimated either by the standard
two-step generalized least squares (GLS) method or the maximum likelihood
approach (MLE).
For the standard two-step generalized least squares (GLS) method the
estimates of all parameters are obtained by OLS in the first step In the second step
the intercept and coefficients are re-estimated by feasible GLS. Estimates of GLS are
consistent as the large number of firms and long time-series data are applied. GLS
requires the assumption that the technical efficiency effects are uncorrelated with the
independent variables and the statistical error ( ), but the fixed effects model does
not. This assumption improves efficiency in estimation (Kumbhakar and Lovell,
2000). The method mentioned before with panel data can avoid the strong
distributional assumptions or the strong independence assumptions 45 . These
assumptions are usually required in the cross-sectional production frontier literature.
The maximum likelihood approach for a stochastic production frontier panel data
model with time-invariant technical efficiency is similar to the stochastic production
frontier cross-sectional data, except that the statistical error (noise component) varies
through time as well as across firms (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). In addition,
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is feasible when these assumptions hold. For
instance, Pitt and Lee (1981) used these assumptions (a half-normal distribution) to
obtain estimates of time-invariant technical efficiency using panel data. Kumbhakar
(1987)

and

specification

Battese
~

and
0,

Coelli

(1988)

proposed

the

truncated

normal

).

45

The distributional assumptions on the error components are (i) ~
0,
,
0,
, and (iii)
and v are distributed independently of each other, and of the
(ii) ~
independent variables (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p102).
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As a result, these three approaches impose different assumptions and they
have different properties. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p106) pointed out that a
random effects model based on GLS is preferred to a fixed effects model with
dummy variables when the number of firms is large, and the time period is small. If
the assumption regarding the independence of inefficiency effects and independent
variables holds MLE is more preferable than the other two, since MLE has
distributional assumptions that the others do not. However, if the panel data becomes
longer, it is less likely that technology does not change.
Time-varying inefficiency model
The time-invariant inefficiency model restricts the technical inefficiency
effects to be constant through time. The technical efficiency levels, however, can
change over time, since firms expect to learn from their learning by doing effect. As
the panel becomes larger, the technical efficiency effects would change. The form of
time-varying technical inefficiency can be identified as (Coelli et al., 2005, p278).
(4.16)
Where,

is a function that determines how technical inefficiency changes

over time (Coelli et al., 2005, p278). Kumbhakar (1990) and Battese and Coelli
(1992) use the maximum likelihood technique in a random effect framework to
estimate the time-varying technical efficiency model. Both models assume that
technical inefficiency (
0,

has a truncated normal distribution

~

).
Kumbhakar (1990, p204) specified

1

exp

, which

contains two parameters ( and ) to be estimated. This function has the properties
that 0

1 and

can be monotonically increasing or decreasing and

concave or convex, depending on the signs of these two parameters ( and ).
Battese and Coelli (1992) introduced a stochastic frontier production function for
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(unbalanced) panel data 46 in which the technical inefficiency effects are assumed to
be distributed as truncated random variables, and vary systematically with time.
Their model can be expressed as
47
F

, where

. The technical inefficiency function (

F

involves only one parameter

, and therefore becomes less flexible (Coelli et al., 2005, p278). This function
has the properties that

≥ 0, and

0, increases at an increasing rate if

decreases at an increasing rate if

< 0, or remains constant if

>

= 0.

The Stochastic frontier model using a single-stage estimation
The one-stage process suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995) is one of the
most commonly used SFA models. The one-stage process is more significant
compared with the two-stage process. The inefficiency model can be estimated by
two methods: (1) a one-step process and (2) a two-step process. For the two-step
process the frontier production function is estimated and the prediction of technical
efficiency of each sample is derived. Then, the predicted technical inefficiency effect
is regressed against a set of explanatory variables in the second-stage regression
(e.g., the OLS model and the Tobit model). A number of studies (e.g., Pitt and Lee,
1981) have estimated stochastic frontiers and predicted technical efficiency using the
two-stage estimation. The inefficiency effects obtained from the second-stage
regression, however, are biased due to the omission of relevant variables in the firststage of the frontier estimation 48 (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p264). However, a
one-step process can be estimated simultaneously. This approach is significant
because it solves the problem of omitted variables in the first-stage approach. In
particular, Battese and Coelli (1995) present a model for capturing technical

46

Fifteen Indian farmers were examined during the period 1957 to 1985. Nine out of fifteen farmers
were observed for all ten years, and therefore only 129 observations were used and 21 observations
were missing from the study.
47
S are non-negative random variables and are assumed to be identically and independently
distribution. is an unknown parameter to be
distributed as truncations at zero of the
,
estimated (Coelli, 1996a, p4).
48
For the two-stage process two assumptions are made: (i) the exogenous variables independently
influence output via their effects on estimated efficiency and (ii) the exogenous variables are
correlated with inefficiency. However, there are serious econometric problems. First, due to the
second assumption the estimation of the stochastic frontier model and efficiency is biased due to the
exclusion of exogenous variables in the first step of the two-stage procedure. Second, the
inefficiencies are assumed to be identically distributed in the first step of the two-stage procedure, but,
in fact, predicted inefficiencies are assumed to have a functional association with exogenous variables
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p264).
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inefficiency using SFA based on “panel data”. Their model assumes that the
inefficiency effects are stochastic, and also allows for the estimation of both
technical change in the stochastic frontier and time-varying technical inefficiencies.
Consider the stochastic frontier production function for panel data (Battese and
Coelli, 1995, p326),
= exp (

(4.17)

The above equation specifies the stochastic frontier function in terms of the original
production values. Where;

is production (output) of the ith firm;

is a (1×X)

vector of inputs of production used in the production of the ith firm, and other
independent variables associated with the ith firm;

is a (k × 1) vector of unknown

parameters; its 49 are iid N (0, σ2) random errors, independently distributed of the
non - negative random variables ( its);

its are non-negative random variables,

associated with technical inefficiency in production, and are assumed to be
independently distributed such that
normal distribution with mean,
effect,

it is obtained by truncation (at zero) of the
, and variance, σ2. The technical inefficiency

in the stochastic frontier model shown above, can be specified in the

following equation (Battese and Coelli, 1995, p327):
(4.18)
Where;

is a (1×m) vector of independent variables associated with technical

inefficiency effects; δ is an (m ×1) vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated;
is the unobserved random variables, which are assumed to be independently and
identically distributed, obtained by truncation of a normal distribution with zero
mean and unknown variance, σ2 (iid N (0, σ2)), such that uit is non-negative (i.e., wit ≥
-

49

δ).

Note that
frontier,

measures the shortfall in output

from its maximum value given by the stochastic

.
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However, the assumption that the

s and

s are independently distributed

for all t=1,2,…,T, and i = 1,2,…..,N, is obviously a simplifying but restrictive
condition (Battese and Coelli, 1995). Alternatively, the method of maximum
likelihood is used for simultaneous estimation of the parameters of the stochastic
frontier and the technical inefficiency effects model (Battese and Coelli, 1995). The
likelihood function is expressed in terms of the variance parameters: σs2 ≡ σv2 + σu2
and γ ≡ σu2 / σs2 (Battese and Coelli, 1995, p327). Where the γ parameter represents
the share of inefficiency in the overall residual variance, and has a value between
zero and one. The technical efficiencies of production are predicted using the
conditional expectations of exp (

), given the composed error term of the

stochastic frontier. Hence, given the above assumptions, the technical efficiency of
the ith firm can be defined as follows (Battese and Coelli, 1995, p327):
TEit 50 = exp (

) = exp (-Zitδ - Wit)

(4.19)

As a result their model can be applied in this research since it is formulated
with panel data, rather than in a cross-sectional context. Finally, the two most
commonly used packages for estimating SFA and inefficiency are FRONTIER 4.1
and LIMDEP In this study, FRONTIER 4.1 (developed by Coelli (1996)) will be
used to estimate a firm’s technical efficiency as well as an inefficiency model
measured by a one-step process. LIMDEP can only estimate the inefficiency model
in a two-stage process. Furthermore, FRONTIER can accommodate a wider range of
assumptions regarding the error distribution term than LIMDEP (Herrero and Pascoe,
2002)
4.3.2 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
Non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) can also be used to
predict technical efficiency, which involves the use of a linear programming method
to construct a non-parametric piece-wise surface (or frontier) over the data (Coelli et
al., 2005, p162). The term “Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)” was first proposed

50

If a firm has an inefficiency effect equal to zero, technical efficiency equals one.
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by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) (CCR model) 51 , which had an input
orientation and assumed constant returns to scale (CRS). CRS assumes that all firms
are operating at an optimal scale. DEA can be presented as the ratio of all outputs
over all inputs, which can be solved by the mathematical programming problem as
follows (Coelli et al., 2005, p162):
/

,

Subject to

,

/

1,
,

Where there are
vector of output weights,
matrix, and
and

is an

1,2, … . . , ,

0,

(4.20)

inputs and

outputs for each of I firms,

1 vector of input weights,

is a

is a

1

is a

output

input matrix. These equations attempt to find values for

such that the efficiency measure for the ith firm is maximized, subject to the

constraints that (i) values for

and

must be equal to or greater than zero, and (ii)

all efficiency measures must be less than or equal to one. However, the efficiency
ratio obtained from these equations has an infinite number of solutions (Coelli et al.,
2005). To solve this problem the constraint

1 is imposed, which is specified as

follows (Coelli et al., 2005, p163):

,

Subject to
,

,
1,
0,
0,

1,2, … . . , ,
(4.21)

Equivalently, the duality in linear programming can be derived as follows (Coelli et
al., 2005, p163):
,

Subject to

Where,

is a scalar, and

is a

,
0,
0,
1,2, … . . , ,
0,
1 vector of constants.

(4.22)

51

The technical efficiency calculated under CRS is known as total technical efficiency. It can be
decomposed into two parts, (VRS) technical efficiency and scale efficiency.
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This duality form (4.22) has fewer constraints than the multiplier form (4.23),
which is the preferred form to solve (Coelli et al., 2005, p163). The value of
indicates the efficiency score for the ith firm. A value of

1 indicates that a firm is

technically efficient, since its operation is on the frontier (Coelli et al., 2005). A
value of

< 1 indicates that a firm is technically inefficient. However, it is possible

that a firm does not operate at optimal scale due to imperfect competition,
government regulations, and financial constraints (Coelli et al., 2005). As a result,
the use of the CRS specification is not applicable if not all firms are operating at the
optimal scale. Hence, a number of subsequent papers (e.g., Färe, Grosskopf, and
Logan (1983); Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) (BCC model) 52 ) proposed
variable returns to scale (VRS). The use of the VRS assumption can enable the
calculation of efficiency (TE) which is devoid of scale efficiency (SE). Equation
(4.22) shows that the CRS linear programming problem can be modified to account
for the VRS linear programming problem, by adding the convexity constraint
1

1 as follows (Coelli et al., 2005, p172):

,

Subject to
1

Where, 1 is an

,
0,
0,
1,
0,

1,2, … . . , ,
(4.23)

1vector of ones 53

The convexity constraint ( 1

1) illustrates that an inefficient firm is only

“benchmarked” against similar firms in terms of the size. For the CRS case this
convexity constraint is not imposed, and hence a firm may be benchmarked against
firms that are considerably larger or smaller than it (Coelli et al., 2005). In addition,
there are two common orientations, input and output, using DEA models. Inputorientated models measure technical efficiency as a proportional reduction in input
usage, but output levels are fixed. Input orientation is useful when firms have fixed
output levels, and, therefore, where they are forced to minimize their input usage. On

52
Unlike the CCR model, the BCC model considers variable returns to scale between inputs and outputs.
Allowing variable returns to scale, means that the convexity condition for the weights
is necessarily required.
Where∑
is a new constraint (convexity condition).
53
There are I rows, and one column in which all values are equal to “unity”.
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the other hand output-orientated models identify technical efficiency as a
proportional increase in output production, where input levels are constant. Output
orientation is appropriate when firms have fixed input amounts, and hence they are
forced to maximize output production. Coelli et al. (2005) suggested that the TE
scores of both input and output orientations are the same under CRS. The following
output-orientated DEA models are similar to input-orientated DEA models, except
that

is imposed into Equation 4.23, and

is removed from Equation 4.23 (Coelli et

al., 2005, p180).
,

Subject to
1

,
0,
0,
1,
0,

1,2, … . . , ,

Where, 1

∞ and

level of inputs.

is a technical efficiency score between zero and one.

(i)

(4.24)

1 is the proportional increase in outputs with constant

The problem of “slacks”
One problem of the piece-wise linear frontier in DEA is that the firm is

operating parallel to the axes, which causes the problem of “slacks” (see Figure 4.5).
From Figure 4.5 Firms A and B are efficient firms since they are operating on the
frontier, but Firms P and Q are not. According to Farrell (1957) the technical
efficiency of Firms P and Q can be measured as 0P’/0P and 0Q’/0Q, respectively.
For Firm P point P’ is located on the frontier, which is the efficient point. However,
the amount of input x2 can be reduced without changing the output. This problem is
known as “input slack” (or input excess) 54 . There are a number of slack treatments
(e.g., one-stage DEA, two-stage DEA, and multi-stage DEA) (Coelli et al., 2005).
One-stage DEA is to solve the linear programming Equation (4.21), and slacks are
calculated residually.

54

For the output orientated model this problem can also be known as “output slack” (or output excess)
(see Chapter 6).
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Figure 4.5: Efficiency measurement and input slacks
⁄
P

P’

Q

A
Q’

B
0

⁄

Source: Coelli et al. (2005, p165)
Note: This figure is assumed under the input orientated model.

Two-stage DEA aims to maximize the sum of slacks required to move from
the first-stage projected point (such as P’ in Figure 4.5) to an efficient frontier point
(such as A in Figure 4.5) (Coelli et al., 2005, p198). However, two-stage DEA is
applicable when there is only one efficient point to select from the vertical facet, but
it is not applicable when there are two or more dimensions of slacks. As a result
multiple-stage DEA can be useful since it is invariant to units of measurement and its
efficient projected points, and have input and output mixes that are similar to those of
the inefficient points. These slack treatments can be applied by DEAP version 2.1,
written by Coelli (1996). For Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) scale efficiency can
be obtained by measuring both CRS technical efficiency and VRS technical
efficiency. Unlike SFA, technical efficiency can be decomposed into scale
inefficiency and pure technical inefficiency under the assumption of variable returns
to scale (Coelli et al., 2005).
From Figure 4.6 technical efficiency (TE) under CRS and VRS can be
expressed as the ratio BCC/BC and BCv/BC, respectively. Scale efficiency can be
measured as the ratio BCC/BCv or TECRS/TEVRS 55 . The measurement of scale
efficiency, however, does not indicate whether the firm is operating under increasing
or decreasing returns to scale. By replacing 1

55

Scale efficiency (SE) =

=

1 for 1

1 in Equation

=

146

(4.23), non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) is imposed (see Figure 4.6). Increasing
returns to scale exist when the NIRS technical efficiency score is not equal to the
VRS technical efficiency score, but decreasing returns to scale arise when they are
both equal (Coelli et al., 2005, p174).
Figure 4.6: Scale efficiency measurement in DEA

CRS Frontier
NIRS Frontier
A

B

CC CV

0

D

C

VRS Frontier

Source: Coelli et al. (2005, p174)
Note: This figure is assumed under the input orientated model.

(ii)

Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) adjusting for business environment
and firm-specific factors
Business environment and firm-specific factors (e.g., government assistance,

firm age, firm size, and financial constraints) can affect the efficiency of a firm. For
DEA these factors are assumed not to be controlled by the manager of a firm, since
they are not considered as traditional inputs (e.g., capital and labour inputs). There
are a number of methods to deal with business environment variables and firmspecific variables. For example, business environment and firm-specific variables are
included directly into the linear programming formulation, but the variables for this
method must be continuous. In other words, they cannot be categorical variables
(e.g., dummy variables). In addition, if the business environment and firm-specific
variables can be ordered in terms of their values from the least to the most
detrimental effect on the firm’s efficiency, then the efficiency of firms can be
compared with others only if their business environment and firm-specific variables
have less or equal values (e.g., restaurants are only compared within the same city)
(Coelli et al., 2005). However, this method requires the same detrimental direction of
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business environment and firm-specific variables on a firm’s efficiency, and several
firms must be found to be efficient.
Furthermore, if the business environment and firm-specific variables are not
ordered (e.g., domestic versus foreign ownership) then the method suggested by
Charnes et al. (1981) can be used, which consists of three stages. In the first stage,
the sample is divided into sub-samples (e.g., domestic and foreign sub-samples), and
each of them is solved by using DEA. In the second stage, all observed data are
projected onto their respective frontiers. In the last stage, a single DEA is solved
using the projected points and the difference in the mean efficiency of sub-samples is
assessed (Coelli et al, 2005, p191). However, this method requires the business
environment and firm-specific variables to be categorical variables, and many firms
must also be found to be efficient. In addition, one of the problems with these
methods is that they are only suitable when one business environment or firmspecific variable is considered to determine the efficiency of a firm.
The two-stage method is the most commonly adopted of the DEA methods
previously mentioned. This method deals with business environment and firmspecific factors which influence the efficiency of a firm. It can accommodate more
than one business environment or firm-specific variable, which can be either
continuous or categorical. It is not necessary to make prior assumptions with regard
to the direction of the business environment and firm-specific variables upon the
firm’s efficiency. Moreover, it is simple and transparent, and consists of two steps.
The first-stage involves solving a DEA problem using traditional inputs and outputs.
In the second stage, the efficiency scores obtained from the first-stage are regressed
on the business environment and firm-specific variables. A significant proportion of
the efficiency score is assumed to be equal to one. The method of ordinary least
squares (OLS), however, is likely to predict efficiency scores which are greater than
one (Coelli et al., 2005). The Tobit regression method is recommended in the second
stage, and is applicable for truncated data (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p264;
Coelli et al., 2005, p194). Hypothesis tests are conducted to test for the significance
of business environment and firm-specific variables upon a firm’s efficiency.
However, the results of this method may be biased if the variables used as inputs and
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outputs in the first stage are highly correlated with the business environment and
firm-specific variables in the second stage (Coelli et al., 2005, p194).
4.4

Production functions accounting for technical (technological) change
Production functions can change over time due to technological advances. In

order to account for technological change, a time trend is included in the model
reflecting industry-specific knowledge of technological developments (Coelli et al.,
2005). There are some common functional forms for production functions such as
linear, Cobb-Douglas, quadratic, normalised quadratic, Translog, generalised
Leontief, and constant elasticity of substitution (CES). These functional forms have
different properties. For instance, the linear and Cobb-Douglas forms are first-order
flexible and have enough parameters to provide a first-order differential
approximation, while the other functional forms (e.g., Translog, quadratic,
normalised quadratic, generalised leontief, CES) provide second-order flexible
approximation. The second-order flexible form is preferable to that of the first-order
flexible form, but if there are more parameters, or more flexibility, then this may
cause econometric problems (e.g., multicollinearity) (Coelli et al., 2005). In addition,
the Cobb-Douglas and Translog functional forms are not linear in the parameters, but
this can be solved by taking logarithms. The Cobb-Douglas function has restrictive
properties, since returns to scale are constant and elasticity of substitution is unity.
This functional form may not be applicable in a situation where elasticity varies
across data points (Coelli et al., 2005). The most common functional forms used in
several empirical studies (see Chapter 3) are the Cobb-Douglas and Translog
production functions, which are given as follows (Kim, 1992; Coelli et al., 2005):
1. The Cobb-Douglas production function (restricted model)
∑

l

(4.25)

2. The Translog production function (unrestricted model)
∑

∑

∑

∑
Where y is the level of output; x is a set of inputs whose elements are
a time trend representing technical change.

(4.26)
; T is
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Once the functional form is selected by conducting the model specification
test in the first step an alternative hypothesis of the selected functional model with
technical change (unrestricted model) is identified, and tested against the null
hypothesis of the same selected functional model with no technical change (restricted
2
model) using the likelihood ratio (LR) test to compare with the critical value ( χ0.95(
j) )

where j is the number of restrictions. If the obtained likelihood ratio (LR) statistic is
2
greater than the critical value ( χ0.95(
j) ) then the null hypothesis that the technical

(technological) change effect is zero (restricted model) is rejected, indicating that
there is the existence of technical progress. From Equations (4.25) and (4.26) it is
possible to calculate the percentage change in y in each period regarding
technological change, this is given by the derivative of lny with respect to the time
trend (T) as follows:

Cobb-Douglas production function:

=

(4.27)

Translog production function:

∑

(4.28)

=

From Equations (4.27) and (4.28) the technological change effect of the
Cobb-Douglas production function is constant, but the technical change effect of the
Translog production function can either increase or decrease with time (T) depending
is positive or negative. Coelli et al. (2005, p213) suggested that a

upon whether

time trend can capture industry-specific knowledge of technological developments,
and investigate whether labour and capital inputs have been used or saved. For the
DEA approach technological progress can be examined by using the Malmquist TFP
index, which is constructed by measuring the radial distance of the observed output
and input vectors in periods s and t relative to a reference technology (Coelli et al.,
2005, p67). The distances can be either output orientated or input orientated. The
following, for example, is the output-orientated Malmquist TFP index which is the
geometric mean of the indices based on period-s and period-t technologies (Coelli et
al., 2005, p291).
,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

.

(4.29)
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Where,

,
,

represents efficiency change; and

,

,

,

,

.

indicates

technical change.
According to Equation (4.29), when the firm is technically efficient in both
period s and t the Malmquist TFP index indicates no productivity growth and its
value is equal to one. However, if a firm is technically inefficient then it is possible
that the change in its observed productivity, as reflected in the Malmquist TFP index,
could be the result of a change in its efficiency and/or a change in its underlying
production technology (technical change) (Coelli, et al., 2005). The Malmquist TFP
index, therefore, can be decomposed into two parts which are (i) efficiency change
and (ii) technical change.
For the DEA approach the Malmquist TFP index can be constructed by the
DEAP computer program, which has been written to conduct DEA with regard to
Equation (4.29) 56 . However, the Malmquist TFP index estimated by the DEA
frontier can only be applied to “balanced” panel data (Coelli, 1996b). For this study
the characteristics of panel data for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises over the
period 2000 to 2008 are obviously “unbalanced”, since new firms were listed on the
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) while some firms were delisted from the SET
over time. As a result, the SFA approach is likely to be more preferable than the
DEA approach in investigating technological progress for “unbalanced” panel data
of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
4.5

Strengths and weaknesses of data envelopment analysis (DEA) and
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA)
The differences between the SFA and DEA approaches are that the SFA

approach imposes functional forms on the production frontier, and assumes that
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For the SFA approach the Malmquist TFP index can be calculated by multiplying efficiency change
with technical change. Efficiency change is equal to
, where i is the i-th firm in periods s and t.
Technical change can be calculated as the geometric mean of the two partial derivatives (production
function with respect to periods s and t). For example, technical change calculated from the Translog
(Coelli et al., 2005,
production function can be mathematically represented as exp
p301).
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firms may deviate from the production frontier not only due to technical inefficiency
but also from measurement errors, statistical noise or other non-systematic influences
(Admassie and Matambalya, 2002). Therefore, the advantage of the SFA approach is
that it allows for statistical noise (e.g., errors of measurement), but its disadvantage is
that it requires strong assumptions as to the form of the frontier production function
(Jacobs, 2000, p3). In particular, estimation of an SFA production function for a
single cross section of firms requires the explicit specification of the distribution of
statistical noise and inefficiency variable terms.
However, such strong assumptions are not required when panel data are
available (Kalirajan and Shand, 1999, p159). The DEA approach, however, does not
impose functional forms, and uses linear programming to construct a frontier that
envelops the observations of all firms. The DEA approach has the advantage of being
non-parametric. Hence, all firms are compared relatively to the “best” performing
firms, requiring few assumptions about the underling production technology (Jacobs,
2000). In other words, it overcomes restrictions on production specifications and
distributions of various residuals. However, the DEA approach also has some
weaknesses. This approach considers only the supply side, and ignores the demand
side and properties of the market. Furthermore, it is likely to overstate inefficiency if
a single firm (or industry) performs far better than the others (Minh and Vinh, 2007).
It also allows for no statistical noise, or the estimated results are not subject to
statistical properties. Statistical tests, therefore, cannot be applied. Focusing on
“returns to scale” the DEA approach can examine whether a firm is operating under
decreasing, increasing, or constant returns to scale, including in an industry-level
context 57 . For the SFA approach “returns to scale” can be investigated through an
estimated production function 58 . Furthermore, the SFA approach only provides pure
(VRS) technical efficiency scores, but the DEA approach provides variable returns to
scale (VRS) technical efficiency scores, constant returns to scale (CRS) technical
efficiency scores, and scale efficiency scores (Coelli, 1996a). The strengths and
weaknesses of each estimation approach are summarized in Table 4.1. This thesis
57

This can be calculated as an average of each type of returns to scale (e.g., increasing, decreasing, or
constant returns to scale).
58
For the Cobb-Douglas production function returns to scale is calculated from the sum of the
estimated input coefficients (elasticities). For the Translog production function it is calculated from
the sum of the output elasticities with respect to each input (Kim, 1992).
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will employ both the DEA and SFA approaches and attempt to select statistically
superior models for each approach and then compare results.
Table 4.1: Strengths and weaknesses of the SFA and DEA approaches
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
Strengths
‐ Statistical noise is allowed.

Weaknesses
‐ Strong distribution assumptions are required.
‐ Functional form is required.
‐ Sufficient sample size is required.
‐ Pure (VRS) technical efficiency is only predicted.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)

Strengths
‐ Strong distribution assumptions are not
required.
‐ Sufficient sample size is not required due
to this being a non - parametric approach
that uses linear programming.
‐ VRS TE, CRS TE, and scale efficiency are
predicted.
Source: Author

Weaknesses
‐ Statistical noise is not allowed.
‐ It may overstate inefficiency if a single firm is
far superior to that of other firms.

Note: VRS TE is variable returns to scale technical efficiency; CRS TE is constant returns to scale
technical efficiency; DEA is only based on predicting a firm’s technical efficiency without
considering the effects of business environment and firm-specific variables on a firm’s technical
efficiency.

4.6

Conclusions
This chapter has discussed efficiency concepts, which include (i) technical

efficiency, (ii) allocative efficiency, (iii) scale efficiency, and (iv) cost and revenue
efficiency. Technical efficiency is the main efficiency measurement to be used in this
thesis, which will be estimated in Chapter 6 (see Section 4.2.1). There are two
competing measures of a firm’s efficiency. Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is the
parametric approach. The advantage of this approach is that it allows for statistical
noise (e.g., measurement errors), but its drawback is that strong assumptions (e.g.,
distributions of random variables, adequate functional forms) are required. Other
advantages and disadvantages of the SFA and DEA approaches are also summarized
in Table 4.1. The most distinctive characteristics of the stochastic production frontier
is that an inefficiency effect is introduced, which is represented by the nonnegative
random variable ( ) besides the deterministic component and noise effect (

(see

Figure 4.4). It is, however, necessary to choose an adequate frontier functional form
suited for particular manufacturing sectors. The Cobb-Douglas and Translog
production functions are commonly used in the literature. A model specification test
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(the likelihood ratio statistic) is used to select the best functional form for the
stochastic frontier production (see Chapter 6).
For the SFA approach the one-stage process suggested by the Battese and
Coelli (1995) model will also be applied to conduct an empirical analysis in Chapter
6, since it is applicable for unbalanced panel data of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises. Their model allows for the estimation of both technical change in the
stochastic frontier and time-varying technical inefficiencies simultaneously. Frontier
4.1, developed by Coelli (1996), can be used to predict a firm’s technical efficiency,
and examine the inefficiency effects upon a firm’s technical efficiency
simultaneously for the Battese and Coelli (1995) model (see Section 4.3.1). This can
resolve bias due to the omission of relevant variables in the first stage of the frontier
estimation. This will be conducted in Chapter 6 of the thesis.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric approach which does
not require functional forms. Linear programming is used to construct a frontier that
envelops the observations of all firms. The DEA approach has the advantage of being
non-parametric, since all firms are compared relative to the “best” performing firm.
As a result, it overcomes restrictions on production specifications and distributions of
random variables, and no production function is required. However, the estimates of
inefficiency may be overstated if a firm (or industry) performs far better than the
others (arising from the outlier problem). The estimated results of a firm’s technical
efficiency are not subject to statistical properties, as there is no statistical noise. For
the SFA approach only “pure” technical efficiency (or variable returns to scale
technical efficiency) is predicted using FRONTER 4.1. Unlike SFA, the specification
of constant returns to scale is also available for DEA, and hence scale efficiency can
be estimated using this approach (see Section 4.2.3). Moreover, the DEAP version
2.1 can be used to construct the DEA frontier (Coelli, 1996b). One problem of the
piece-wise linear frontier used in DEA is that there might be, for example, an input
excess (input slack) for the case of the input orientated model (see Section 4.3.2).
There are a number of treatments of “slack” such as one-stage DEA, two-stage DEA,
and multi-stage DEA. These slack treatments can be simply applied by DEAP
version 2.1 written by Coelli (1996).
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The most common DEA approach in dealing with the effects of business
environment and firm-specific variables on a firm’s technical efficiency is “the twostage method”, which can accommodate more than one business environment or
firm-specific variable. In the first stage a firm’s technical efficiency is predicted by
linear programming with DEA using traditional inputs and outputs. In the second
stage, the efficiency scores are regressed upon a set of business environment and
firm-specific variables (e.g., the Tobit regression method) (see Section 4.3.2). This
two-stage approach is simple and transparent, but care must be exercised when all
variables are identified since the results might be biased if the inputs and outputs
used to predict the firm’s technical efficiency (in the first stage) are highly correlated
with the business environment and firm-specific variables (in the second stage).
It is crucial to consider whether firms improve their efficiency due to an
efficiency change or technical (technological) change. For the SFA approach a time
trend variable can be introduced to investigate the existence of technical progress
through an estimated stochastic frontier production function (e.g., Cobb-Douglas and
Translog production functions).
For the DEA approach technological progress can be examined by compiling
a Malmquist TFP index, which can be applied to decompose the productivity change
of a firm (see Section 4.4). However, the samples (panel data) must be “balanced”
(all firms must be observed over the period) in order to conduct this index (Coelli,
1996b).
As a result, this thesis will apply both the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
based on the Battese and Coelli (1995) model and Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) based on the two-stage DEA approach to predict a firm’s technical efficiency,
and analyse the inefficiency effects model. The main reasons are that it can increase
the confidence of the estimations in conducting the empirical analysis of Chapter 6,
since it cannot be concluded which estimation approach is more preferable due to
their advantages and disadvantages as discussed in Section 4.5. Other literature also
suggests that a firm’s technical efficiency should be analyzed using both estimation
techniques for a robust checking of the empirical results (Bauer et al., 1998; Stone,
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2002; Jacobs et al., 2006; Miranda et al., 2010). More specifically, one of the
advantages of DEA is that “functional form” is not required making it a useful
estimation technique when predicting the technical efficiency for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises. For the SFA approach the prediction of technical
efficiency and the study of an inefficiency effects model, however, are based on an
estimated production function. Hence, selecting an inappropriate production function
and obtaining insignificant coefficients for the estimated production function (due to
high multicollinearity among the inputs in the case of the Translog production
function) (Lundvall and Battese, 2000; Oczkowski and Sharma, 2005) may change
the empirical results of the study. Finally, the SFA can only provide variable returns
to scale (VRS or Pure) technical efficiency scores, but the DEA approach can predict
constant returns to scale (CRS) technical efficiency and scale efficiency besides
variable returns to scale (VRS or Pure) technical efficiency.
Before predicting technical inefficiency and analysing the inefficiency effects
model using these two estimation approaches in Chapter 6, it is very important to
identify hypotheses which are crucial and have not been empirically examined for
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, and then describe variables used to conduct
the empirical analysis in Chapter 6. These hypotheses aim to examine the effects of
important firm-specific and business environment variables on the technical
efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing firms. Focusing on hypotheses discussed in
Chapter 5, input and output variables used to predict technical inefficiency scores are
identified and selected. Firm-specific and business environment variables, which are
related to each hypothesis and used to link with predicted inefficiency scores, are
also explained and employed in the conduct of an inefficiency effects model for the
SFA approach, and also in the second step of the two-stage DEA approach.
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CHAPTER 5
HYPOTHESES AND DATA DESCRIPTION

5.1

Introduction
This chapter identifies the hypotheses and variables which will be developed

and tested in Chapter 6 (Empirical Models and Results), and also describes data
sources and data selection. The organization of this chapter is conducted as follows:
Section 5.2 identifies eight hypotheses that will be used to conduct the empirical
analysis in Chapter 6. These hypotheses aim to investigate the relationship between
business environment and firm-specific variables and firm technical efficiency.
Section 5.3 discusses possible input and output variables which are used in predicting
technical inefficiency effects (scores) through (i) the selected stochastic frontier
production function for the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), and via (ii) the first
step of the two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). In Section 5.4 business
environment and firm-specific variables related to each hypothesis are also explained
and used in the conduct of an inefficiency effects model for the SFA approach, and
also in the second step of the two-stage DEA approach. Finally, conclusions are
provided in Section 5.5.
5.2

Hypotheses
This section aims to explain the hypotheses which will be empirically tested

and the results of which will be reported in Chapter 6. There are eight hypotheses
emphasising factors impacting technical efficiency which are grouped into six
categories, as follows: (i) finance (leverage and liquidity; internal financing and
external financing), (ii) research and development (R&D), (iii) ownership structure
(controlling and managerial ownerships), (iv) executive remuneration, (v) types of
owned firms (foreign and family-owned firms), (vi) exporting (the learning by
exporting and self-selection hypotheses 59 ). Besides these eight hypotheses there are
also a number of firm-specific and business environment factors that affect a firm’s
59

For the self - selection hypothesis there are a number of business environment and firm specific variables that
affect a firm’s export decision, such as firm size, firm age, leverage, and foreign investment (see Table 5.3).
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technical efficiency, such as (i) firm size, (ii) firm age, (iii) government assistance,
and (iv) foreign cooperation, which will be discussed at the end of this section
(Section 5.4.2 vii).
5.2.1

Finance and firm technical efficiency
Hypotheses 1 and 2 aim to examine the relationship between finance and a

firm’s technical efficiency, which were referred to in the literature review (see
Section 3.4.2, Chapter 3).
Hypothesis 1 60 : Financial constraints (leverage) have a significant and positive
relationship with the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
Vice versa, the more liquidity the lower is the technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises.
Several empirical studies have investigated the impact of financial constraints
(leverage) on a firm’s performance as measured by accounting or financial ratios (see
Section 3.4.2, Chapter 3). These empirical results are found to have produced
ambiguous results. However, few empirical studies have examined the effect of
financial constraints (leverage) on a firm’s technical efficiency (Dilling-Hansen et
al., 2003; Sena, 2006; Mok et al., 2007; Weill, 2008). The empirical results from
these studies reveal that financial constraints have a significant and positive
relationship with a firm’s technical efficiency. No empirical study has examined the
effects of both financial constraints (leverage) and liquidity on a firm’s technical
efficiency. More specifically, the following hypothesis has not been examined for the
case of Thailand.
Hypothesis 2: External financing has a significant and positive relationship with a
firm’s technical efficiency for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. Vice versa,
internal financing has a significant and negative effect on a firm’s technical
efficiency for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.

60

From the literature on agency problems, financially constrained firms are likely to induce managers
to improve their managerial performance so as to avoid possible bankruptcy and liquidation of their
firms (see Section 3.4.2). In addition, financially constrained firms are likely to utilize their financial
resources and control input costs effectively.
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This hypothesis aims to examine the effects of external and internal financing
on a firm’s technical efficiency as discussed in the literature review. As previously
discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3, there are a number of theoretical studies
focusing on the relative efficiency of internal versus external financing (Jensen,
1986; Gertner et al., 1994; Stein, 1997). Empirical studies have also revealed
inconclusive results (Gökçekus, 1995; Kim, 2003). More importantly, from the
perspective of this study, this hypothesis has not been examined in any empirical
studies focusing on Thailand, especially for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.

5.2.2

Research and development (R&D) and firm technical efficiency
The following hypothesis aims to examine the effect of research and

development (R&D) on a firm’s technical efficiency.
Hypothesis 3 61 : Research and development (R&D) has a significant and positive
relationship with the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
As discussed in the literature review in Section 3.6 of Chapter 3, many
empirical studies have found that research and development (R&D) has a positive
effect on a firm’s technical efficiency (Aw and Batra, 1998; Dilling-Hansen et al.,
2003; Kim, 2003; Sheu and Yang, 2005). More importantly, this hypothesis has not
been investigated before for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
5.2.3

Ownership structure and firm technical efficiency

Hypothesis 4: Controlling ownership has a significant and positive effect on the
technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
As discussed in Section 3.5.1 of Chapter 3, many empirical studies have
examined the effect of controlling ownership on a firm’s performance based on
accounting or financial measures (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; McConnell and Servaes,

61

A dummy research & development (R&D) variable is used in this hypothesis, since R&D
expenditures were not reported consecutively over the period 2000 to 2008 (see Section 8.3 for
limitations and further studies).
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1990; Leech and Leahy, 1991; Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Yammeesri and Lodh,
2003; Zeitun and Tian, 2007). Their empirical findings are found to be inconclusive.
In the case of Thailand, Wiwanttanakantang (2001) and Yammeesri and Lodh (2003)
found that controlling ownership is positively associated with a firm’s performance
as evaluated by accounting or financial measures (i.e., ROA, the sales-asset ratio, and
stock returns). None of these empirical studies examined the effect of controlling
ownership on a firm’s technical efficiency, and especially in applying both the SFA
and two-stage DEA approaches. More importantly, this hypothesis has not been
investigated before for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
Hypothesis 5: Managerial ownership has a significant and positive effect on a firm’s
technical efficiency for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
With respect to Section 3.5.3 of Chapter 3, empirical studies have found that
managerial ownership is significantly related with firm performance, as measured by
financial profitability (McConnell and John, 1990; Morck et al., 1988;
Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Yammeesri and Lodh, 2003). Very few empirical studies
have examined the effect of managerial ownership on a firm’s technical efficiency
(Liao et al., 2010). More importantly, this hypothesis has not been examined before
for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
5.2.4

Executive remuneration and a firm’s technical efficiency

Hypothesis 6: Executive remuneration has a significant and positive effect on the
technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
Many empirical studies in the finance and accounting literature have
examined the effect of executive remuneration on a firm’s performance based on
accounting or financial measures (see Section 3.7, Chapter 3). Most empirical
findings have found a significant and positive relationship between executive
remuneration and a firm’s performance. Few empirical studies, however, have
applied the SFA approach or the two-stage DEA approach to investigate the linkage
between executive remuneration and a firm’s technical efficiency (Baek and Pagán,
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2002 62 ). This hypothesis has not been investigated before for Thai listed
manufacturing firms.
5.2.5 Types of owned-firms and firm technical efficiency
Hypothesis 7: Foreign and family ownership 63 have a significant and positive effect
on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises; foreign-owned
firms perform best in terms of technical efficiency relative to other ownership types
for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
According to Section 3.5.2 of Chapter 3, there is strong evidence to suggest
that foreign ownership has become one of the most important types of ownership
Many empirical studies have found that foreign ownership has a significant and
positive association with a firm’s performance, as measured by accounting or
financial measures (Zhang et al., 2001; Takii, 2004; Choi and Yoo, 2006; Aydin et
al., 2007; Kimura and Kiyota, 2007; Greenaway et al., 2008). Similarly, a number of
empirical studies have also found a positive association between foreign ownership
and a firm’s technical efficiency (Fukuyama et al., 1999; Goldar et al., 2003;
Bottasso and Sembenelli, 2004). While information on family ownership has been
extensively discussed in the finance literature (see Section 3.5.2, Chapter 3), few
studies have linked family ownership with a firm’s technical efficiency (Lauterbach
and Vaninsky, 1999). In the case of Thailand, Wiwattanakantang (2001) and
Yammeesri and Lodh (2003) studied the effect of family ownership on a firm’s
performance based on accounting or financial measures. This hypothesis has not
been examined for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
5.2.6 Export performance and a firm’s technical efficiency
Hypothesis 8: A firm’s exports have a significant and positive association with its
technical efficiency (the learning by exporting hypothesis exists); A firm’s technical
efficiency has a significant and positive effect on the export participation (the self
selection hypothesis exists) of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.

62

They found a significant and positive relationship between the level of CEO total compensation and
the technical efficiency of 1,500 S&P firms.

63

This refers to majority foreign and family ownership using a cut-off shareholding level of 25
percent.
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This hypothesis aims to examine the existence of the learning-by-exporting
and the self-selection hypotheses for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, as
discussed in Section 3.8 of Chapter 3. Many empirical studies have examined the
effect of a firm’s export performance on its productivity (see Table 3.3, Chapter 3).
Few empirical studies have investigated the learning-by-exporting hypothesis in
which a firm’s performance is measured by technical efficiency (Dilling-Hansen et
al., 2003; Kim, 2003; Granér and Isaksson, 2007). Moreover, there is strong evidence
from the self-selection hypothesis that only more efficient firms can participate in
export markets (see Table 3.3, Chapter 3). However, very few studies have examined
the self-selection hypothesis using technical efficiency as the measurement of firm
performance. More importantly, this hypothesis examines the existence of both
learning-by-exporting and the self-selection hypotheses on the technical efficiency of
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. This has not been previously conducted.
5.2.7 Other business environment and firm-specific factors and a firm’s
technical efficiency
As discussed in Section 3.9 of Chapter 3, there are a number of business
environment and firm-specific factors that can affect a firm’s technical efficiency
such as (i) firm size, (ii) firm age, (iii) government assistance, and (iv) foreign
cooperation. Many empirical studies have investigated the effect of a firm’s size on
its performance, using either accounting (financial) or technical efficiency measures.
The empirical results are inconclusive based on the countries and sectors analysed. A
number of empirical studies have also investigated the effect of a firm’s age on its
performance, using either accounting (financial) or technical efficiency measures.
These findings are also quite mixed, depending upon the countries and sectors
analysed. The effect of government assistance on firm performance, using
accounting (financial) measures has also been examined in a number of studies.
These findings are ambiguous depending on the countries and industrial sectors
studied. Finally, a number of empirical studies have examined the effect of foreign
cooperation on firm performance. These results are also quite mixed, depending upon
the countries analysed.
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5.3

Data sources and data classification

5.3.1 Data sources
The raw data to be used in Chapter 6 was obtained from the Stock Exchange
of Thailand (SET), which consists of (i) the list of board of directors and major
shareholders, (ii) financial reports, (iii) and annual reports of Thai listed companies
(Form 56-1). Financial reports consist of five major components: (i) an auditor’s
report, (ii) statements of income, (iii) balance sheet statements, (iv) statements of
cash flows, and (v) notes to financial statements. In addition, there are two types of
financial reports: (i) an unconsolidated financial report and (ii) a consolidated
financial report.
In this study, annually consolidated financial reports are used, since all the
business activities of listed firms, including their subsidiary companies, are recorded
in annually consolidated financial reports. Form 56-1 is an annual company report
required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), where all Thai listed
firms are obligated to disclose their annual business performance for shareholders
and investors. Form 56-1 consists of three main parts: (i) executive summary, (ii)
company issuing securities, and (iii) confirmation of accuracy. Part (ii) is used for
this study, which consists of the listed company’s information, such as (a) risk
factors and risk management, (b) nature of business operation, (c) business
operations of the company, (d) research and development, (e) business assets, (f)
future plans, (g) legal disputes, (h) capital structure, and (i) management, (j) internal
control, (k) related transactions, (l) financial position and operational performance,
and (m) reference information. Moreover, the data obtained from annually
considered financial reports and Form 56-1 are very reliable compared with that of
Thai Industrial Census as well as Thai Industry Survey data, since annually
considered financial reports are prepared by professional auditors approved by the
SEC and Form 56-1 is also monitored by the SEC.
5.3.2

Data classification
There are eight industrial sectors according to the SET. The SET’s eight

industrial sectors consist of (1) Agro and Food Industry which can be sub grouped
into (i) Agribusiness and (ii) Food and Beverage; (2) Consumer Products which can
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be sub grouped into (i) Fashion, (ii) Home and Office Products, and (iii) Personal
Products and Pharmaceuticals; (3) Financials which can be divided into (i) Banking,
(ii) Finance and Securities, and (iii) Insurance; (4) Industrials which can be classified
into (i) Automotive, (ii) Industrial Materials and Machinery, (iii) Paper and Printing
Materials, (iv) Petrochemicals and Chemicals, and (v) Packaging; (5) Property and
Construction which can be divided into (i) Construction Materials, (ii) Property
Development, and (iii) Property fund; (6) Resources (energy and utilities); (7)
Services which can be divided into (i) Commerce, (ii) Health Care Services, (iii)
Media and Publishing, and (iv) Professional Services (Tourism and Leisure, and
Transportation and Logistics); (8) Technology which can be divided into (i)
Electronic Components and (ii) Information and Communications technology.
Table 5.1: Classification of listed manufacturing firms in the SET during 2000
to 2008
No of sectors
1

2

3

4
5
6

Manufacturing Sectors
Agro and Food Industry
1.1 Agribusiness
1.2 Food & Beverage
Total
Consumer Products
2.1 Fashion
2.2 Home & Office Products
2.3 Personal Products & Pharmaceuticals
Total
Industrials
3.1 Automotive
3.2 Industrial Materials & Machinery
3.3 Packaging
3.4 Paper & Printing Materials
3.5 Petrochemicals & Chemicals
Total
Publishing
Construction Materials
Technology (Electronic components)
Total listed manufacturing firms

No of firms

No of firms

20
20
40
18
11
4
33
12
19
13
2
13
59
7
27
12
178

Source: Author
Note: The reason that listed manufacturing firms are only selected in this thesis is due to the use of
SFA, which requires the firm’s production function to be estimated. Other listed firms, which are not
classified as listed manufacturing firms, are known as listed services firms. They are “heterogeneous”
in terms of the nature of their businesses (e.g., hospitals, traders, IT services, hotels). As a result, they
cannot be used to compare with listed manufacturing firms in this study.
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Besides these eight industrial sectors there were also 22 listed firms under
rehabilitation (NPG) 64 in 2008. The securities of these listed firms have been
suspended until they can meet the SET’s rules and regulations in order to resume
their trading again. With regard to the International Standard Industrial Classification
of all economic activities (ISIC), it is necessary to remove some listed firms that are
not classified as manufacturing firms. In addition, this study also includes listed
manufacturing firms that had been delisted from the SET during 2000 to 2008. As a
result, 178 listed manufacturing firms over the period 2000 to 2008 will be used to
conduct the empirical analysis of this study, and this is summarized in Table 5.1.

5.4

Data description
This section aims to discuss possible inputs and outputs that can be used for

the empirical study in Chapter 6 to predict a firm’s technical inefficiency effects
(scores) through an estimated stochastic frontier production function for SFA, and
via the first-stage of the two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model (see
Section 5.4.1). In addition, business environment and firm-specific variables used to
link with a firm’s technical inefficiency effects (scores) for SFA, and the second
stage of the two-stage DEA approach, are also described in Section 5.4.2.
5.4.1 Outputs and inputs
Coelli et al. (2005) suggested that input and output quantities, prices, and
quality characteristics are important for the measurement of efficiency and
productivity. This part aims to discuss possible input and output variables from the
literature, and then select appropriate input and output variables to be used in the
empirical analysis conducted in Chapter 6.

64

Listed enterprises which are likely to be delisted by the SET (e.g., having negative shareholders’
equity) will be moved to the rehabilitation sector (REHABCO sector), since the SET aims not to delist
them intermediately due to the SET’s proposal of protecting minority shareholders, but rather
encourages them to submit their rehabilitation plans in order to improve their financial performance so
that they can still maintain their trading status.
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(i)

Outputs
It is much easier for firms which produce tangible goods and services to

identify their outputs than firms which are in the service sector (i.e., universities). For
this study Thai listed manufacturing firms also produce tangible goods which can be
easily identified and compared with firms which are in the service sector. Value
added and gross outputs are commonly used as the output in most empirical studies
for the manufacturing sector (Aw et al., 1998; Lundvall and Battese, 2000; Kim,
2003; Sena, 2006; Latruffe and Davidova, 2008). For example, Sena (2006) used real
value added as output for the Italian manufacturing sector during the period 1989 to
1994. Kim (2003) applied real value added as the output for Korean manufacturing
firms over the period 1980 to 1993. Aw and Batra (1998) used value added as the
output for the Taiwanese manufacturing sector in 1986. Lundall and Battese (2000),
however, used the value of all outputs produced as the output for Kenyan
manufacturing firms over the period 1992 to 1994. If value added 65 is adopted as the
output, only two inputs, capital (K) and labour (L) are used.
On the contrary, three input variables, capital (K), labour (L), and
intermediate inputs (M), are used when value added is not adopted. For instance,
Lundall and Battese (2000) used the value of all output produced as the output. Thus,
capital (K), wages (L), and intermediate inputs (M) are used as the inputs in
estimating the Translog frontier production function for their empirical analysis. For
this study there are two reasons why adopting value added is not applicable. First,
there are a moderate number of negative values using value added. In practice, if
value added is applied a negative value must be deleted from the samples, since a
negative value cannot be used where natural logarithms are used in estimating the
production function (i.e., Cobb Douglas and Translog production functions).
Second, some years must be excluded along with the elimination of negative values
for value added causing missing observations (years) for the panel data. As a result
output is represented by the value of produced outputs (annual sales revenue) for this
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The formula for value added is calculated by subtracting intermediate inputs (i.e., costs of raw
materials, solid and liquid fuel, electricity, and water) from the output (i.e., outputs produced or sales
revenue).
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study, which can be obtained from the income statement of Thai listed manufacturing
firms.
(ii)

Inputs
There are five input categories that are commonly used for empirical analysis;

(i) capital (K), (ii) labour (L), (iii) energy (E), (iv) material inputs (M), and (v)
purchased services (S). These five input categories are sometimes known as the
KLEMS approach in productivity measurement (Coelli et al., 2005). In addition,
energy (E), material inputs (M), and purchased services (S) can often be combined to
form a single “other input” category (Coelli et al., 2005, p141). This study will use
three inputs (i) capital (K), (ii) labour (L), and (iii) intermediate inputs (i.e., energy,
material inputs, purchased services and other administrative and production costs).
For intermediate inputs energy, material inputs, purchased services, and other
administrative and production costs are aggregated for this study, since these input
variables cannot be separated individually due to the limitation of data provided in
financial statements. These three inputs are explained in detail as follows:
Labour (L)
Labour is one of the major components for a firm’s total costs. There are a
number of proxy variables for labour input, such as (i) number of persons employed,
(ii) number of hours of labour input, (iii) number of full-time equivalent employees,
and (iv) total wages and salaries bill (Coelli et al., 2005, p142). For instance, Kim
(2003) used number of employees as the labour input for the Korean manufacturing
sector during the period 1989 to 1994. Hossain and Karunaratne (2004) also used
number of employees as the labour input for Bangladesh manufacturing industries
during the period 1978 to 1994. Bottasso and Sembenelli (2004) also used total
number of employees for Italian manufacturing firms during the period 1987 to 1993.
Lundvall and Battese (2000) used “wages” as the labour input for Kenyan
manufacturing firms during the period 1992 to 1994. In addition, labour input can
also be classified in terms of (i) skilled and unskilled labour or (ii) non-production
(administrative) staff and production employees. Aw and Batra (1998) also classified
labour input into the number of non-production and production workers for the
Taiwanese manufacturing sector in 1986.
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However, total employee expenditure 66 , which includes salaries, wages and
other employee benefits, are used as the labour input for this study. This can be
found at the “notes to financial statements” for any of the financial statements
prepared by SET listed manufacturing firms. There are a number of reasons why the
number of workers and working hours cannot be adopted as the labour input. First,
the number of working hours is not available. Second, the number of employees is
normally counted at the end of the financial year. In fact, the number of employees
might have increased or decreased substantially during the year. In addition, firms
that employ more employees might have less wages and salaries compared with
firms that employ a lesser number of employees 67 . More importantly, the number of
employees is not provided in almost all of the financial statements of listed
manufacturing enterprises during the period 2007 to 2008.
Capital (K)
The selection of capital (K) is also important for efficiency and productivity
studies. There are a number of variables that can be used to measure the capital input,
such as (i) total capital service flows from different assets, (ii) capital stock as
measured by either the perpetual inventory method (PIM), survey method, or a
combination of the PIM and survey methods, (iii) replacement value, (iv) physical
measures, and (v) net capital stock (OECD, 2001; Coelli et al., 2005). Capital
services are referred to as the use of a financial or operating lease in the production
process. In theory, an undepreciated capital stock in constant prices is equal to the
undepreciated replacement value of the capital stock (Coelli et al., 2005). Some
physical measures or proxies (i.e. number of computers, number of cars, total floor
area, and total horsepower of machines) can be useful when there is difficulty in
conducting an estimation of particular assets. Net capital stock can also be used as
the capital input, which is calculated as the gross stock less the accumulated
consumption of fixed capital (depreciation).
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According to the financial statements provided by Thai listed enterprises, it is not possible to
separate production from non production labour expenditure. Total employee expenditure, therefore,
is used as one of the set of inputs (e.g., labour, capital, intermediate inputs) to obtain the maximum
output in this thesis. This labour input is different from the concept, “labour productivity” (wages
divided by the number of workers), since “labour productivity” is one of the productivity outputs (e.g.,
labour productivity, capital productivity, total productivity).
67
Firms located in rural areas can hire more employees due to cheaper wages and salaries compared
with their counterparts located in city areas.
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A number of capital stock measurements have been used in various empirical
studies. For instance, Hossain and Karunaratne (2004) used gross fixed assets as the
capital input, which is an aggregate of the book value of land, buildings, machinery,
tools, transport, and office equipment for Bangladesh manufacturing firms. Bottasso
and Sembenelli (2004) used the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) to measure the
capital stock for Italian manufacturing firms. Kim (2003) used the total value of
tangible fixed assets as the capital stock for Korean manufacturing firms. Lundvall
and Battese (2000) used the replacement cost of existing machinery and other
equipment employed in the production process as the capital input for Kenyan
manufacturing firms. Sheu and Yang (2005) applied the value of net fixed assets
based on the Perpetual Inventory Method for Taiwan’s Electronics Industry. Mok et
al. (2007) used net fixed assets as the capital output for foreign-invested toy
manufacturing firms in China.
For this study, with respect to the financial statements of listed firms, net
fixed productive and net fixed non-productive assets are normally recorded
separately in balance sheets. In addition, they are calculated from gross fixed
productive assets less straight-line depreciation. Only net fixed productive assets,
however, are used as the capital input, since net fixed non-productive assets do not
lead to an improvement in efficiency and productivity. Net fixed productive assets
can be taken from the section of “Property, Plant and Equipment” provided in “notes
to financial report”. For instance, net fixed assets provided in financial statements
normally include (i) land and land improvements, (ii) building and building
improvement, (iii) machinery and equipment, (iv) office furniture and fixtures, (v)
motor vehicles, (vi) leasehold rights, and (vii) buildings under construction, and
machinery and equipment under installation. Net fixed non-productive assets (vii) are
excluded from this study, since they cannot be used for production in that financial
year. In addition, net fixed productive assets also include new asset acquisitions and
asset disposals. For instance, listed firms may purchase new machinery and
equipment (asset acquisitions) that can be operated promptly in the production
process. On the other hand, net fixed productive assets are also adjusted with respect
to “asset disposals”, since listed firms might sell or remove any productive assets in
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that financial year. As a result, net fixed productive assets will be used as the capital
input for this study.
Intermediate inputs
This input category mainly includes (i) material input, (ii) energy input, and
(iii) purchased services and outsourcing. Purchased services and outsourcing are also
considered an intermediate input. For example, firms may use services from other
outsourcing companies such as security, cleaning, and IT services. Coelli et al.
(2005) also mentioned that these three inputs are normally aggregated into one
category called “other inputs”. In practice, many empirical studies aggregated costs
for materials, fuel, and energy as the intermediate inputs. For instance, Mok et al.
(2007) also used intermediate inputs which include costs for materials, fuel, and
energy for foreign-invested toy manufacturing firms in China. Lundvall and Battese
(2000) aggregated costs for (i) raw materials, (ii) solid and liquid fuel, (iii) electricity
and water for Kenyan manufacturing firms as the intermediate inputs. The
intermediate inputs can also be used to calculate gross value added (Aw and Batra,
1998; Kim, 2003; Hossain and Karunaratne, 2004).
Costs of raw materials, fuel, electricity, and other production expenses,
however, cannot be separated individually for this study due to the limitation of data
provided in financial reports. Separate transactions relating to production and nonproduction costs are not provided in listed firms’ financial statements over the period
2000 to 2006. Instead, the sum of production and non-production costs is given. Each
transaction for production and non-production costs, however, has been provided in
listed firms’ financial statements since 2007. As mentioned above, production costs
directly occur from a firm’s operational process. They are recorded in a listed firm’s
income statement as “cost of sales”, which mainly include (i) material cost, (ii)
energy cost, (iii) production labour cost, (iv) depreciation and amortization. Nonproduction costs (selling and administrative costs) are directly incurred from a firm’s
administrative process in the head office and company branches, which normally
include (i) non-production labour cost, (ii) marketing cost, (iii) transportation cost,
(iv) management remuneration, (v) stationary cost, and (vi) other related
administrative costs.
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To solve this problem, intermediate input costs can be obtained as follows: (i)
adding costs for production and non-production together, (ii) subtracting costs
obtained from (i) total employee expenditures (the sum of salaries, wages, other
employee benefits, depreciation and amortization). The reasons for subtracting total
employee expenditures are as follows: (i) total employee expenditures (salaries,
wages, and other employee benefits) are also included in costs for production and
non-production. These costs, however, are also included in labour input for this
study, and, therefore, must be excluded from costs for production and nonproduction; (ii) depreciation and amortization are normally included in costs for
production and non-production. However, these costs are known as accounting costs.
In other words, they are not classified as monetary costs for production and nonproduction. As a result, intermediate inputs for this study mainly include costs for (i)
raw materials, (ii) energy, (iii) purchased services and outsourcing, and (iv) other
production and non-production costs, excluding salaries, wages, other employee
benefits, depreciation and amortization.
Time trend
This study uses unbalanced panel data over the period 2000 to 2008, and,
therefore, a time trend can be introduced in the stochastic frontier production
function (i.e., Cobb-Douglas and Translog production functions) to represent
technological progress. This variable is not classified as an input, but is used to
investigate whether technical progress of a selected manufacturing sector is
decreasing (or increasing) over a certain period as indicated by the negative (or
positive) sign of an estimated time trend coefficient. In addition, the interaction of an
estimated time trend coefficient with other estimated input coefficients (i.e., labour
and capital inputs) can also be used to investigate whether technical progress has
been, for example, labour-saving and capital-using for Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises (see Kim, 2003). As a result, a time trend is also introduced into the
estimated stochastic frontier production function in Chapter 6.
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Adjustments for price changes
Dealing with panel data it is necessary to make appropriate adjustments for
price changes before measuring productivity and efficiency. Coelli et al. (2005,
p155) suggested that “the deflator selected must relate to the commodities that
constitute the aggregate as closely as possible”. Therefore, appropriate deflators
should be selected to make real values (e.g., real value added) for selected output and
inputs. For empirical studies different price indices are used to deflate selected
outputs and inputs. For instance, Sheu and Yang (2005) used (i) the wholesale price
index (WPI) for the electronics industry to deflate annual net sales of a firm (output),
(ii) average annual earnings per employee on the payrolls of the electronic industry
to deflate annual salary and wage expenditure, (iii) the WPI of capital goods to
deflate the value of net fixed assets, and (iv) the WPI of intermediate materials in the
electronics industry to deflate material input for panel data for 416 Taiwanese listed
electronics firms. Hossain and Karunaratne (2004) used (i) the wholesale price index
(WPI) of industrial products to deflate gross value added, (ii) the WPI of
manufacturing excludes fuel and lighting to deflate gross fixed assets, and (iii) the
WPI of raw materials to deflate intermediate inputs for Bangladesh manufacturing
industries. For Kim (2003) the firms’ value added was deflated by the wholesale
price index (WPI) of each Korean sub manufacturing industry. Mok et al. (2007)
used (i) the ex-factory output price index for consumer goods as the deflator for the
gross output, (ii) the price index of raw materials, fuel, and energy as the deflator for
the intermediate inputs, and (iii) the capital price index as the deflator for the net
value of fixed assets for foreign-invested toy manufacturing firms in China. In
addition, Hossain and Karunarantne (2004), Kim (2003), and Mok et al. (2007) all
used the number of employees as the labour input, and therefore a price index is not
required.
For this study the outputs produced, as measured by annual sales revenue, is
deflated by the producer price index (PPI) of the manufacturing sector, which can be
obtained from the Bureau of Trade and Economic Indices. The producer price index
(PPI) is also equivalent to the wholesale price index (WPI) for Thailand (Bank of
Thailand, 2010). The capital input, represented by net fixed productive assets, will be
deflated by the PPI of capital goods. The intermediate input will be deflated by the
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PPI of intermediate goods. In addition, Coelli et al. (2005, p144) suggested wage
costs should be deflated for the industry either over time or across regions within a
country. In Thailand, there is no specific index for labour input (i.e., labour price
index). Coelli et al. (2005) also pointed out that researchers in several productivity
studies are likely to select any price index that can be accessible. With respect to the
unavailability of a labour price index for Thailand, the manufacturing PPI, therefore,
will be used as the wage deflator for labour input.
5.4.2 Firm specific and business environment variables used for the Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA) and the two - stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
After discussing possible outputs and inputs in Section 5.4.1, one output and
three inputs are selected to predict technical inefficiency effects (scores) obtained
from the SFA and the first step of the two-stage DEA. The next procedure is to
identify business environment and firm-specific variables that could significantly
influence a firm’s technical inefficiency. In other words, an inefficiency effects
model for the SFA and the second-stage of the two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) model needs to be examined. This section, therefore, aims to highlight
business environment and firm-specific variables that affect a firm’s technical
inefficiency. With respect to the hypotheses discussed in Section 5.2 a number of
business environment and firm-specific variables emphasised in the literature are
used to examine their effects on a firm’s technical inefficiency, and these can be
classified into seven sub-sections as follows: (i) finance, (ii) research and
development (R&D), (iii) ownership structure, (iv) types of owned firms
(ownership), (v) executive remuneration, (vi) exporting, and (vii) other business
environment and firm-specific variables (i.e., firm age, firm size, government
assistance, and foreign cooperation) (see Table 5.2).
(i)

Variables used for finance (hypotheses 1 and 2)
In this part, two financial aspects are examined as follows: (i) leverage

(financial constraints) and liquidity and (ii) internal financing and external financing.
A number of financial ratios can be used to represent a firm’s leverage, such as the
debt to asset ratio (D/A ratio) and the interest coverage ratio (ICR).
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Table 5.2: Summary of variables used for hypotheses 1 to 8
Variables used for the production functions

Data Description

Output variable
1.Output (Y)

Annual sales revenue deflated by the PPI of the manufacturing sector

Input variables
1. Labour input (L)

Total employee expenditure deflated by the PPI of the manufacturing sector

2. Capital input (K)

Net productive fixed assets deflated by the PPI of capital goods

3. Intermediate input (IM)

Intermediate inputs deflated by the PPI of intermediate goods

Time

Time trend (technical progress)

Variables used for the inefficiency effects model

Data Description

Hypothesis

Expected
Sign*

Finance
1. Leverage

The ratio of total debt to total assets (D/A ratio)

H1

(+)

2. Liquidity

The ratio of current assets to current liabilities (Quick ratio)

H1

(-)

3. Internal financing

Dummy variable (1= Short term and long term loans

H2

(-)

Total interest expenses deflated by the general PPI

H2

(+)

Dummy variable (1 = R&D, 0 = otherwise)

H3

(+)

The percentage of equity owned by the largest

H4

(+)

H5

(+)

H7

(+)

from related parties, 0= otherwise)
4. External financing
Research and development (R&D)
1. R&D
Ownership structure
1. Controlling ownership

five shareholders
2. Managerial ownership

The percentage of equity owned by top executives
and board members

Executive remuneration
1. Executive remuneration

The ratio of top executive and board member remunerations
to total employee expenditures

Types of owned firms
1. Foreign-owned firms

Dummy variable (1= Foreign, 0 = otherwise)

H6

(+)

2. Family-owned firms

Dummy variable (1= Family, 0 = otherwise)

H6

(+)

3. Domestic-owned firms

Dummy variable (1= Private domestic, 0 = otherwise)

4. Hybrid-owned firms

Dummy variable (1= Hybrid, 0 = otherwise)

5. Joint -owned firms

Dummy variable (1= Joint, 0 = otherwise)

H8

(+)**

Exports
1. Exports (the learning -by-

The ratio of export revenue to total sales revenue

exporting hypothesis)

(as a percentage)

Other factors
1. Firm Size

Total assets (logarithm )

2. Age

The number of operating years

3. Government Assistance

Dummy variable (1 = BOI, 0 = otherwise)

4. Foreign Cooperation

Dummy variable (1 = Foreign Cooperation, 0 = otherwise )

Source: Author
Note: *Expected signs are based on the hypotheses and from existing studies which focus on the effects of
business environment and firm-specific variables on “a firm’s technical efficiency”; **Hypothesis 8 is only for
the learning-by-exporting hypothesis; The summary of data statistics for all of the variables of all manufacturing firms and
sub-manufacturing sectors are provided in Section 6.3, Chapter 6.
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Focusing on hypothesis 1 (leverage and liquidity) the leverage ratio
represented by the ratio of total debts to total assets (the D/A ratio) is used to capture
financial constraints (leverage) for this hypothesis (Sena, 2006; Mok et al., 2007).
This debt ratio captures how much a firm is constrained in its expansion (Sena,
2006). The interest coverage ratio (earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) / total
interest expense) is not applicable for this study, since an inefficiency effects model
using FRONTIER 4.1 is not applicable for such a negative value of the interest
coverage ratios. The interest coverage ratios are also found to be widely dispersed
among Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
In addition, liquidity can be represented either by the current ratio (current
assets / current liabilities) or the quick ratio ((current assets – inventories) / current
liabilities). Goldar et al. (2003) applied the quick ratio to examine the liquidity of
Indian engineering firms on their technical efficiency. The current ratio (current
assets/current liabilities), however, is used for this study to examine the effect of a
firm’s liquidity on its technical efficiency. The current ratio captures the ability of a
firm to meet its short-term liabilities, which is quite similar to the quick ratio, except
inventories are included in current assets in the current ratio. Moreover, the debt to
asset and current ratios can be calculated from listed firms’ balance sheets.
Focusing on hypothesis 2, a dummy variable is used for internal financing.
The number “1” is assigned when a listed manufacturing firm has short-term and
long-term loans from related parties (i.e., executives, major shareholders, related and
subsidiary firms), and the number “zero” is assigned when a listed manufacturing
firm does not have any loan from related parties. The reason that the real value of
internal loans cannot be used for hypothesis 2 is because this item cannot be
observed for many listed manufacturing firms over the period 2000 to 2008, while
high volumes of internal loans are also observed in a number of listed manufacturing
firms. In other words, the raw observations obtained from the balance sheets of
listed manufacturing firms are widely dispersed, and therefore the dummy variable
used for internal financing is a good proxy in examining this hypothesis. For external
financing, Kim (2003) used interest expense as represented by the ratio of total
interest payments on borrowed capital to total capital for external financing.
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Therefore, interest expenses deflated by the general Producer Price Index (PPI) is
used for external financing for hypothesis 2, which can be obtained from listed
manufacturing firms’ statement of incomes.
(ii)

Variables used for research and development (R&D) (hypothesis 3)
Empirical studies such as that of Sheu and Yang (2005) and Kim (2003) used

R&D expenditure and the ratio of R&D spending to total output, respectively, as
proxies for research and development (R&D). Dilling - Hansen et al. (2003) used a
dummy variable as a proxy for R&D activity. However, there is some difficulty in
obtaining R&D expenditure for this hypothesis, since only some of the listed
manufacturing firms provided annual R&D expenditures in Form 56-1. Moreover,
some listed manufacturing firms did not report their annual R&D expenditures
continuously over the period 2000 to 2008. The information that can be obtained in
the R&D section of the Form 56-1 is R&D activities in new products and new
processes only for each year. To solve this problem, a dummy variable is applied for
R&D activities 68 . The number “1” is given to Thai listed manufacturing firms which
engage in R&D, but the number “0” is given to those firms which do not participate
in R&D.
(iii)

Variables used for ownership structure (hypotheses 4 and 5)

Controlling ownership (hypothesis 4)
In the literature, controlling ownership has been measured by the percentage of
equity owned by the five largest shareholders (Wiwanttanakantang, 2001;
Yammeesri and Lodh, 2003; Zeitun and Tian, 2007). This is the approach adopted in
this study. The list of shareholders for each listed manufacturing firm is used to
calculate this variable by summing up the equity owned by the five largest
shareholders expressed as a percentage of total equity.

68

R&D may have a lagged effect on a firm’s technical efficiency, since it takes some time to increase
the firm’s technical efficiency. Due to data limitation a R&D dummy variable is used instead of R&D
expenditure. In addition, most listed manufacturing firms engaged in R&D, were unlikely to report
their R&D activities consecutively. For example, if the firm engages in R&D activities, “1” will be
given over the years. Therefore, a lagged R&D variable is not applicable for this study.
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Variables used for managerial ownership (hypothesis 5)
The variable for managerial ownership can be obtained by combining the
percentage

of

equity

owned

by

board

members

and

top

executives

(Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Yammeesi and Lodh, 2003; Liao et al., 2010). From Form
56-1 board members consist of (i) executive board members, (ii) non-executive
board members, and (iii) audit committees. In addition, executive board members
normally have control over their listed firms. The variable for managerial ownership
can be obtained from the “management” section of Form 56-1. This section normally
provides the percentage of equity owned by each board member and top executives.
However, some listed manufacturing firms only provide the number of stocks owned
by board members and top executives. In this case the percentage of equity owned by
board members and top executives can be calculated as the ratio of equity owned by
top executives and board members to a listed firm’s total paid equity multiplied by a
hundred.
(iv)

Variable used for executive remuneration (hypothesis 6)
The variable used for executive remuneration only focuses on monetary

(cash) rewards for top executives and board members including (i) salaries, (ii)
bonuses, and (iii) other remunerations (i.e., meeting allowances, superannuation, and
medical allowances). Other non-cash rewards are excluded from this variable, such
as (i) warrants issued for top executives and board members, and (ii) properties (i.e.,
cars and houses given to top executives during their period of employment). The
reasons that non-cash rewards are excluded from this variable are as follows: (i)
Even though warrants are given to executives and board members they must still pay
cash to convert warrants into listed firms’ shares. As a result some top executives and
board members may not have converted warrants to their listed companies’ stocks.
(ii) Properties normally belong to listed firms, but are given to top executives or
board members only for the period of their employment. As a result the variable
representing

executive

remuneration

excludes

non-cash

items.

Executive

remuneration is then calculated by the ratio of top executive and board remunerations
to total employee expenditures. Information used to calculate this variable is
obtained from the “management” section of Form 56-1.
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(v)

Variables used for types of owned firms (hypothesis 7)
Focusing upon different types of owned firms a dummy variable is used to

classify each type of ownership Claessens et al. (2000) defined the controlling
shareholder (ultimate owner) by adopting cut-off shareholding levels of 10 percent
and 20 percent to study ultimate control for businesses in nine Asian countries such
as Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korean, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan,
and Thailand.
However, according to the Public Limited Companies Act B.E. 2535 of
Thailand (Section 31) 69 , shareholders must have at least 75 percent of their voting
rights to obtain the absolute power over the public limited firm. In addition,
Wiwattanakantang (2001) and Yammeesri and Lodh (2003) used the cut-off
shareholding level of at least 25 percent for Thai listed enterprises. Hence, it is much
more appropriate to adopt a cut-off shareholding level of 25 percent for Thailand.
The Form 56-1 and the list of shareholders are used to classify these ownership
variables. The dummy variable used for family - owned firms can be constructed by
examining the family relationship among the executive board members, top
executives, and shareholders. In addition, some insolvent family-owned firms are
controlled by the planner appointed by the Bankruptcy Court. These firms are also
excluded from this firm category, since they do not have the control over their firms.
The sections of “management” and “reference information” provided in the
Form 56-1 normally provide the information with respect to the family relationship
among board members and executive shareholders.

In some cases, private companies are major shareholders. If these private
companies are owned by the same top executives or board members, a listed firm is
normally required to declare this related ownership transaction in the “capital
69

According to the Public Limited Companies Act B.E. 2535 of Thailand, Section 31, “The company
may amend the memorandum or the articles of association of the company only when a resolution
therefore has been passed at the meeting of shareholders by not less than three-fourths of the total
number of votes of shareholders attending the meeting and having the right to vote. For amending the
memorandum of association or the articles of association of the company, the company shall apply to
register the amendment within fourteen days as from the date on which the resolution was passed at
the meeting” (source: http://www.lawreform.go.th/lawreform/images/th/legis/en/act/1992/12878.pdf
(24/03/2009)).
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structure” section of the Form 56-1 70 . However, it is possible that they do not report
this transaction in the Form 56-1. The Business Online (BOL)’s database is also used
to trace the owners of private companies. Similarly, the dummy variable for foreign owned firms can also be conducted by the same procedure. In addition, a dummy
variable can be used for hybrid-owned firms if dispersed shareholders (who hold less
than a 25 percent shareholding) are observed in any listed manufacturing firm. A
dummy variable can be used for domestic-owned firms where another type of
ownership entity (i.e., government, banks, the crown property bureau, and firms
under the Bankruptcy Court) 71 holds at least a 25 percent shareholding level. A
dummy variable is used for jointly-owned firms where Thai shareholders, or a group
of foreigners, control the listed manufacturing firms. However, each partner must
obtain at least a 25 percent shareholding level.
(vi)

Variables used for the learning-by-exporting and self-selection
hypotheses (hypothesis 8)
The variable used to capture the learning-by-exporting hypothesis is the ratio

of total exports to total sales, expressed as a percentage. Export sales can be obtained
from “notes to financial statements” of the financial reports, or the “business
operations of the firm” section of the Form 56-1. However, export sales obtained
from financial reports are preferable, since they cover export sales among related or
subsidiary firms. For the self-selection hypothesis two main variables are required:
(i) technical efficiency scores obtained from both the Stochastic Frontier Analysis
(SFA) and the two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approaches are required
as the independent variables, and (ii) the dummy variable for export participation is
required as the dependent variable (see Table 5.3).
Both SFA and DEA technical efficiency scores will be obtained for this
study, and, therefore, they can be used to confirm that the self-selection hypothesis
exists for the case of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. Besides examining the
self selection hypothesis as show in Table 5.3, there are a number of variables that
70

The identities of the ultimate beneficial owners of those shareholdings and related party transactions
must be disclosed by the SEC regulations (World Bank, 2005, p3).
71

The reason that these ownership entities are combined together as domestic-owned firms is that they
represent only a small number of firms.
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affect a firm’s export participation such as firm size, firm age, leverage, and foreign
investment.
Table 5.3: Summary of variables used for hypothesis 8 (the self-selection
hypothesis*)
Variables

Data Description

Dependent variable
Export participation

Hypothesis Expected
Si

Dummy variable (1= Export Participation, 0 = otherwise)

Independent variables:
Technical inefficiency scores

Technical inefficiency scores obtained from the SFA approach

H8

(+)

Technical inefficiency scores obtained from the DEA approach

H8

(+)

Other independent variables:
Firm size

Total assets (logarithm)

Firm age

The number of operating years (logarithm)

Leverage

The ratio of total debt to total assets (D/A ratio)

Foreign investment

The percentage of equity owned by foreigners

Source: Author
Note: *The Probit model is conducted in examining the self-selection hypothesis.

Total assets are used as a proxy of firm size. The number of operating years is
used as a proxy of firm age. It is also very interesting to study the effect of financial
constraints (leverage) on a firm’s export participation, since very few empirical
studies have examined the relationship between financial constraints (leverage) and a
firm’s export participation (Greenaway et al., 2007; Bellone et al., 2010). The ratio
of total debt to total assets (D/A ratio) is used as a proxy of firm leverage. Finally,
the effect of foreign investment on a firm’s export participation is also investigated,
and the percentage of equity owned by foreigners is used as a proxy of foreign
investment.
(vii)

Variables used for other firm-specific and business environment factors
Besides the business environment and firm-specific variables used for the

previous eight hypotheses, from Table 5.2 there are a number of variables that affect
a firm’s technical efficiency 72 , such as (i) firm size, (ii) firm age, (iii) government
assistance, and (iv) foreign cooperation (see Section 3.9, Chapter 3). These variables
can be explained as follows:
72

According to Kohpaiboon (2006, p148) the effect of any possible exogenous factors on “industry
productivity (labour productivity)” would be conditioned by the degree of market competition (e.g.,
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(i)

Firm size
The variable used to capture the effect of firm size on its technical efficiency

can be represented as either (i) total assets (Kim, 2003; Sheu and Yang, 2005; Liao et
al., 2010), (ii) the number of employees (Bottasso and Sembenelli, 2004), or (iii)
intermediate inputs (Lundvall and Battese, 2000; Hossain and Karunaratne, 2004;
Oczkowski and Sharma, 2005). Total assets 73 are used as the proxy for firm size for
this study, since the number of workers is not completely available as discussed in
Section 5.4.1. This variable can be collected from the balance sheets of listed firms.
(ii)

Firm age
The variable used for firm age is represented by the number of operating years

(Lundvall and Battese, 2000). This variable can be obtained from the “nature of
business operation” section of Form 56-1.
(iii)

Government assistance
A dummy variable for government assistance will be used in this study.

Government assistance is based on promotional privileges received from the Board
of Investment (BOI) 74 . According to financial reports provided, promotional
privileges can be any of the following promotional privileges or a combination of
these promotional privileges, such as (i) exemption from corporate income tax on net
the sum of the five largest firms (CR5) and the Herfindahl-Hirshman index of concentration (HHI))
under the assumption that two industries with “the same technical efficiency” may indicate different
levels of labour productivity. These variables, however, are not suitable in the context of Thai listed
manufacturing firms as follows (i) the 178 Thai listed manufacturing firms used in this study are fairly
“homogeneous”, since their sizes are all large due to the SET’s listing criteria. Kohpaiboon (2006),
however, used 15,624 firms which are “heterogeneous”, consisting of micro, small, medium, and large
enterprises; (ii) this thesis aims to examine the effects of firm-specific and business variables on
technical efficiency at the firm level focusing upon only 4 manufacturing sub-sectors. Kohpaiboon
(2006), however, examined the factors affecting labour productivity for the entire Thai manufacturing
sector, including locally owned industry in aggregate across 105 industries.
73

The standard deviation of Thai listed firms’ total assets is very large. Therefore, the logarithm form
for total assets is introduced in this model.
74
Government assistance can have a lagged effect on a firm’s technical efficiency, since it takes some
time to increase the firm’s technical efficiency. Due to data limitation a dummy variable is used as a
proxy for government assistance instead of government assistance expenditure. A lagged dummy
variable for government assistance, therefore, is not applicable for this analysis. The reasons are as
follows: (i) most of the listed manufacturing firms which received BOI privileges were likely to report
this transaction consecutively in their annual reports, according to the period of the BOI privileges
granted. For example, if the firm receives BOI privileges, “1” will be given over the years; (ii) unlike
other types of government assistance (e.g., providing training courses) BOI privileges mainly focus on
financial assistance (e.g., the corporate income tax exemption and the import duty exemption on
machinery), which can be used to increase the firm’s revenue immediately.
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income from the promoted activities, (ii) a 50 percent reduction of corporate income
tax on net income from the promoted activities, (iii) exemption from import duty on
machinery, and (iv) exemption from import duty on essential raw materials and
supplies imported for manufacturing products for export sales.
(iv)

Foreign cooperation
A dummy variable for foreign cooperation is also considered for this study,

which includes (i) technical assistance from foreign partners (e.g., providing new
knowledge or a new technique in operating the businesses of Thai listed
manufacturing firms) and (ii) assistance from foreign partners in exporting to new
foreign markets (e.g., providing new foreign customers via their networking). The
“business operations of the company” section of Form 56-1 can provide this
information. In some cases foreign technical assistance is also recorded in financial
reports, since listed manufacturing firms have the obligation to pay for such technical
assistance. Therefore, a dummy variable is used in this study to capture foreign
cooperation.
5.5

Conclusions
This chapter has provided the context for the eight hypotheses to be examined

in Chapter 6. These eight hypotheses specifically aim to investigate the relationship
between business environment and firm-specific variables and firm technical
efficiency (see Section 5.2). The raw data used to conduct the empirical analysis in
Chapter 6 have been obtained from the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), which
consists of (i) the list of board of directors and major shareholders, (ii) financial
reports, and (iii) annual reports of Thai listed companies (the Form 56-1). With
regard to the International Standard Industrial Classification of all economic
activities (ISIC), some listed firms that are not classified as manufacturing firms are
removed from the study. In addition, some listed manufacturing firms that had been
delisted from the SET during 2000 to 2008 are also included in the study. As a result,
178 listed manufacturing firms over the period 2000 to 2008 are used to conduct the
empirical analysis in Chapter 6. From Table 5.1 there are six sub-manufacturing
sectors, such as Agro and Food Industry, Consumer products, Industrials, Publishing,
Construction Materials, and Technology. However, publishing, construction
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materials, and technology are grouped as “Other Sectors” due to the small number of
firms in each sector.
With respect to the hypotheses discussed in Section 5.2, firm technical
inefficiency effects (scores) to be used as the dependent variable can be predicted by
the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) approach through an estimated stochastic
frontier production function, and via the first step of the two-stage Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) approach. More specifically, technical inefficiency effects (scores)
are predicted by employing one output and three inputs. Annual sales revenue
deflated by the manufacturing Producer Price Index (PPI) is used as the output. Net
fixed productive assets deflated by the PPI for capital goods, total employee
expenditures deflated by manufacturing PPI, and intermediate inputs deflated by PPI
for intermediate goods, are used as the capital, labour, and intermediate inputs,
respectively. A time trend is also introduced to capture technological progress for the
unbalanced panel data used in this study.
Business environment and firm-specific variables (independent variables) can
be grouped into seven categories such as (i) finance, (ii) research and development
(R&D), (iii) ownership structure, (iv) types of owned firms (ownership), (v)
executive remuneration, (vi) exports, and (vii) other business environment and firmspecific factors. Finance can be sub-grouped into two categories: (i) financial
constraints (leverage) and liquidity (hypothesis 1) and (ii) external financing and
internal financing (hypothesis 2). First, the debt to asset and the current ratios are
used for financial constraints (leverage) and liquidity, respectively (see hypothesis
1). Second, a dummy variable is used to capture internal financing and interest
payment deflated by the general Producer Price Index is used to capture external
financing for hypothesis 2. In addition, a dummy variable is used to represent R&D
activities for hypothesis 3. For ownership structure, controlled and managerial
ownerships are captured by the percentage of equity owned by the five largest
shareholders and the percentage of equity owned by top executives and board
members, respectively (see hypotheses 5 and 6). Moreover, the ratio of top executive
and board member remunerations to total employee expenditures is used as the proxy
for executive remuneration (see hypothesis 6).
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Types of owned firms are classified into (i) family-owned firms, (ii) foreignowned firms, (iii) domestic-owned firms, (iv) hybrid-owned firms, and (v) jointowned firms. A cut-off shareholding level of 25 percent is adopted to classify these
types of owned firms. Family and foreign owned firms are mainly focused upon in
this study. The effects of family and foreign owned firms on a firm’s technical
efficiency are examined by hypothesis 7. For hypothesis 8 there are two sub
hypotheses: (i) the learning-by-exporting hypothesis and (ii) the self - selection
hypothesis. The classification of these ownership types as well as controlling and
managerial ownerships are based on the finance literature (see Section 3.5, Chapter
3), and therefore it leads to the uniqueness of this thesis when linking these
ownership variables with technical efficiency.
Focusing on the learning-by-exporting hypothesis, the independent variable is
represented by the export revenue to total sales revenue ratio and the SFA and DEA
technical inefficiency scores are used as the dependent variables. For the selfselection hypothesis a dummy variable is used to capture export participation as the
dependent variable while the SFA and DEA technical inefficiency scores are applied
as the independent variables (see Table 5.3). In the following chapter the results from
an empirical analysis of the eight hypotheses is presented.
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CHAPTER 6
EMPIRICAL MODELS AND RESULTS

6.1

Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to conduct an empirical analysis with respect

to the hypotheses discussed in Chapter 5. This chapter employs both the Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA) and two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
approaches, since both estimation approaches have advantages and disadvantages as
discussed in Chapter 4. Therefore, there is no reason to favour one estimation
technique over the other, and it is reasonable to analyse the firm’s technical
efficiency using both estimation techniques to “cross-check” the results as suggested
in a number of contributions in the efficiency literature (Bauer et al., 1998; Stone,
2002; Jacobs et al., 2006; Miranda et al., 2010).
This study uses unbalanced panel data for 178 Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises covering the period 2000 to 2008. For the SFA approach the Battese and
Coelli (1995) model is applied by estimating (i) a stochastic frontier production
function which is selected by using likelihood-ratio test statistics (see Section 6.4),
and (ii) an inefficiency effects model simultaneously using FRONTIER Version 4.1.
In other words technical inefficiency effects, which are predicted through estimates
of the stochastic frontier production function, are regressed with business
environment and firm-specific variables simultaneously. For the two-stage DEA
approach the first stage is to predict technical inefficiency scores using variable
returns to scale (VRS) linear programming as analysed by the Data Envelopment
Analysis (Computer) Program (DEAP) Version 2.1. In the second stage the
maximum likelihood Tobit model is applied, in which technical inefficiency scores 75
are regressed with business environment and firm-specific variables. Moreover, the
maximum likelihood Probit model is used to investigate the effect of a firm’s

75

Technical inefficiency scores are obtained by subtracting the efficiency score predicted by DEAP
Version 2.1 from “unity” (Sirasoontorn, 2004).
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technical efficiency on its export participation (the self-selection hypothesis) as
discussed in Chapter 5.
The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 6.2 provides an
overview of the empirical models to be utilized in this study consisting of the
stochastic frontier production function model (Section 6.2.1) and the two-stage Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model (Section 6.2.2). Data statistics are provided in
Section 6.3. Hypothesis tests are conducted in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 is divided into
three sub sections as follows: The empirical results obtained from the Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA) approach are provided in Section 6.5.1 Section 6.5.2
illustrates the empirical results obtained from the two-stage Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) approach. Section 6.5.3 compares the empirical results between the
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) approaches. In addition, the self-selection hypothesis for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, as discussed in Chapter 5 (part of hypothesis 8), is
examined in Section 6.6, by applying the maximum likelihood Probit model. Finally,
the conclusions for this chapter are provided in Section 6.7.
6.2

Empirical models
This section aims to explain the parametric and non-parametric models used

in this chapter, specifically the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and the Two-stage
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approaches. As discussed in Chapter 4 there are
important differences between the SFA and the DEA approaches. SFA requires
functional forms for the production frontier and assumes that firms may deviate from
the production frontier not only due to technical inefficiency but also from
measurement errors, statistical noise or other non-systematic influences (Admassie
and Matambalya, 2002). In addition, SFA requires strong distributional assumptions
of both statistical random errors (i.e., normal distribution) and non-negative technical
inefficiency random variables (i.e., half-normal distribution for time-invariant
inefficiency model (Pitt and Lee, 1981), and truncated normal distribution for both
the time-invariant inefficiency model (Battese and Coelli, 1988) and the time-variant
inefficiency model (Battese and Coelli, 1992, 1995). The DEA approach, however,
)

does not impose functional forms, and uses linear programming to construct a
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frontier that envelops the observations of all firms. Hence, all firms are compared
relative to the “best” performing firms. It also overcomes restrictions on the
production and distribution of various residuals.
6.2.1 The stochastic frontier production function model
According to Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and Kumbhakar and Lovel (2000)
as previously discussed in Section 4.3.1 (iii), Chapter 4, the preferred model for
capturing firm inefficiency is the stochastic frontier production function model based
on the time-variant efficiency model of Battese and Coelli (1995).
The model of Battese and Coelli (1995) allows the technical efficiency levels
to change over time, since firms expect to learn from their learning-by-doing
experience. As the panel becomes larger the technical efficiency effects would
change. The model consists of two main components. The first component is to
estimate the time-varying stochastic frontier production function which contains two
) and non-negative random variables (

random errors: (i) random errors (

). The

first random errors, which are assumed to be independently and identically
distributed

normal

variances,

~

random
0,

variables

with

zero

means

and

, can be observed, for example, when the problems

of omitted variables and model misspecification arise. The second non-negative
random variables which are assumed to be independently and identically distributed
normal random variables as truncations at zero with
variances

~

0,

means and

are known as the technical inefficiency effects. In

addition, these two random variables are assumed to be independently distributed for
all time periods (t=1,2,…..,T) and all firms (i=1,2,….,N).
The second component links business environment and firm-specific
variables (i.e., types of firm ownership, government assistance, firm age, and firm
size) with the inefficiency effects or the non-negative random variables. In other
words, this part aims to examine what business environment and firm-specific
variables significantly affect the firm’s inefficiency. The stochastic frontier
production function and the inefficiency effects will be simultaneously estimated by
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the method of maximum likelihood (ML)

76

which has desirable large sample (or

asymptotic) properties. More specifically, the ML estimator is consistent and
asymptotically efficient (Coelli, 2005, p218).
FRONTIER Version 4.1 is used to conduct a single - step process 77 in which
the stochastic frontier production and the model of technical inefficiency effects are
estimated simultaneously by the method of maximum likelihood estimation (QuasiNewton methods) (Coelli, 1996a). This software utilizes the parameterisation from
Battese and Corra (1977) by replacing

and

. The technical inefficiency for the

with

and

/

firm in the Battese and Coelli (1995)

model is given by TE = exp (-U ,) = exp (-Z δ - W ). Applying the model of
Battese and Coelli (1995), the stochastic frontier production functions in the CobbDouglas and Translog functional forms are tested for adequate functional form. The
Cobb-Douglas functional form can be written as:
ln

ln

ln

(6.1)

The Translog functional form can be written as:
ln
ln
ln

ln

ln

ln
ln

ln
ln

ln

ln
ln

ln

–

(6.2)

Where:
= Sales revenue deflated by the manufacturing Producer Price Index (PPI)
of firm i at time t
= Employee expenses deflated by the manufacturing Producer Price Index (PPI)
of firm i at time t

76

According to Coelli et al. (2005, p245), the method of maximum likelihood is preferred to other
estimation techniques in computing measures of technical efficiency, such as ordinary least squares
(OLS) and corrected ordinary least squares (COLS). The OLS estimates cannot be used to compute
the firm’s technical efficiency, since the estimated “intercept” coefficient obtained from the OLS is
“biased downwards” even though the estimated “slope” coefficients are consistent.
77
See footnote 48 in Chapter 4 for the reason why the one-stage process is more preferred than the
two-stage process.
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= Net productive fixed assets deflated by the Producer Price Index (PPI) of
capital goods of firm i at time t
= Intermediate inputs deflated by the Producer Price Index (PPI) of
intermediate inputs of firm i at time t
=

Random error (

~

0,

))

= Non-negative random variable (or technical inefficiency) (

~

,

))

The Inefficiency Effects Model for this study can be written as follows:
5

+

&
+
+

(6.3)

All of the below variables are described in detail in Section 5.4 of Chapter 5.
Where:
= Leverage of firm i at time t, represented by the ratio of total debt to
total assets (the D/A Ratio)
= Liquidity of firm i at time t, represented by the ratio of current assets
to current liabilities (the Current Ratio)
= Dummy for internal financing;
= 1 if firm i at time t borrows from related parties.
= 0, otherwise
= External financing, represented by total interest expenses deflated by
the general Producer Price Index (PPI)
= Executive Remuneration of firm i at time t, represented by the ratio
of top executive and board member remunerations to total employee
expenses
5

= Controlling ownership of firm i at time t, represented by the
percentage of equity owned by the five largest shareholders
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= Managerial ownership of firm i at time t, represented by the percentage of
equity owned by top executives and board members 78
= Exports of firm i at time t, represented by the ratio of export revenue
to total sales revenue
&

= Dummy for research and development:
&

= 1 if firm i at time t has R&D.
= 0, otherwise

= Dummy for Government assistance
= 1 if firm i at time t receives Board of Investment (BOI)
support.
= 0, otherwise
= Dummy for foreign cooperation
= 1 if firm i at time t engages in foreign cooperation
= 0, otherwise
= Size of firm i at time t, represented by total assets in the natural logarithm
form
= Age of firm i at time t, represented by the number of operating years
= Dummy for a family-owned firm:
= 1 if firm i at time t is a family-owned firm.
= 0, otherwise
= Dummy for a foreign-owned firm:
= 1 if firm i at time t is a foreign-owned firm.
= 0, otherwise

78

There might be some concern regarding the high correlation between controlling ownership and
managerial ownership variables, since they might be inter-related and their impacts on a firm’s
technical efficiency are not mutually exclusive. The result of the correlation test shows that both
explanatory variables have a negative relationship and they are not correlated (r = -0.009578). More
importantly, the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation is used for this thesis, and therefore the
assumptions underlying OLS (e.g., no multicollinearity) are not considered for the ML estimation (see
Wooldridge, 2006, pp347-354).
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= Dummy for a domestic-owned firm:
= 1 if firm i at time t is a domestically-owned firm.
= 0, otherwise
= Dummy for a hybrid-owned firm:
= 1 if firm i at time t is a hybrid-owned firm.
= 0, otherwise
~

= Random error (

0,

))

6.2.2 Two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
As previously discussed in Section 4.3.2, Chapter4, this study applies the
variable returns to scale (VRS) linear programming problem to predict the technical
efficiency for the first-stage of the two-stage DEA approach (F re, et al., 1983;
Banker, et al. 1984). The VRS assumes that firms are not operating at an optimal
scale due to imperfect competition, government intervention, and financial
constraints (Coelli et al., 2005). In addition, the output orientated model is used
assuming fixed input amounts and maximized output production. The VRS linear
programming program under the output orientated model can be written as follows
(Coelli et al., 2005, p180):

,

,
0, i=1,2,….,n,

st

0,
I1

1,
0,

Where:
is a scalar. 1

0, and

can be obtained for the

1 is the proportional increase in outputs ( ) which

firm, while holding input amounts ( ) constant.

is the efficiency score for the
is an input vector for the
I1′

(6.4)

firm.

firm.

is a vector of constants.

1 defines non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS).
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The DEA problem under Equation (6.4), for example, takes the firm i, and
radially expands the output vector of the firm i ( ) as much as possible, while still
remaining within the feasible output set. The inner-boundary of this output set is a
piece-wise linear production possibility curve which is determined by all the firms in
the sample (see Figure 6.1). The DEA model in linear programming (6.4) also
replaces the convexity constraint which is imposed for the VRS: I1
I1

1. The modified I1

1 for

1 indicates that the VRS can only be non-increasing.

In other words, the constraint: I1

1 is set to ensure that the

firm is compared

with firms that are smaller than it (Coelli et al., 2005, p174). The linear programming
)

problem (6.4) can also be illustrated in Figure 6.1 as follows:
Figure 6.1: Efficiency measurement under the output-orientated DEA model
Output (y)

CRS
NIRS

G

VRS

P

0

A

Input (x)

Source: Author
Note: Figure 6.1 is modified from Figures 3.7 and 6.3 of Coelli et al. (2005, p 55, 171). The original
figures described input- and output- orientated technical efficiency measures and Returns to Scale
(Figure 3.7), and the scale efficiency measurement under the input-orientated DEA model (Figure
6.3).

Figure 6.1 only explains the case of one output and one input as an example.
The VRS technical inefficiency is expressed, for example, by the distance between P
to

. The CRS technical inefficiency is expressed by the distance between P to

.

The difference between the CRS and VRS technical inefficiencies, which is given by
the distance between

to

, indicates scale inefficiency. In addition, the VRS

technical efficiency can be expressed by the distance ratio A

to AP, while the CRS
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technical efficiency can be expressed by the ratio A

to AP The scale efficiency is

simply the ratio of the CRS technical efficiency to the VRS technical efficiency
(AP / AP ). However, the disadvantage of this measure of scale efficiency is that it
does not indicate whether a firm is operating under increasing, constant, or
decreasing returns to scale. The term, non-increasing returns to scale (I1

1

technical efficiency is imposed in conducting further analysis for increasing,
constant, and decreasing returns to scale. If the non-increasing returns to scale
(NIRS) technical efficiency score is equal to the VRS technical efficiency score, for
example, as is the case for point G, then decreasing returns to scale exist. If the NIRS
technical efficiency score and the VRS technical efficiency score are not equal (as is
the case for point P), then increasing returns to scale apply (F re et al., 1983). If the
CRS technical efficiency is equal to VRS technical efficiency, constant returns to
scale apply.
One problem of the piece-wise linear frontier in DEA is that firms operating
parallel to the axes causes the problem of “slacks”. For the output-orientated model
shown in Figure 6.1 this problem is also known as “output slack” (or output excess),
since a firm’s production can be increased without using any more inputs. There are
a number of methods that can be used to treat the problem of slack (e.g., one-stage
DEA, two-stage DEA, and multi-stage DEA). As previously discussed in Section
4.3.2 (i) of Chapter 4, multiple-stage DEA can be useful, since it is invariant to units
of measurement and its efficient projected points have input and output mixes that
are similar to those of the inefficient points as strongly recommended by Coelli et al.
(2005). Hence, multi-stage DEA will be selected in this study to predict the VRS
technical efficiency as well as the CRS technical efficiency for the first-stage of the
two-stage DEA model. The second stage of the two-stage DEA model is conducted
by regressing business environment and firm-specific variables on the firm’s VRS
technical inefficiency scores which are predicted from the first step of the two-stage
DEA model. The firm’s technical inefficiency scores are used as the dependent
variable, which is obtained by subtracting the efficiency scores estimated from the
DEA model from “unity”.
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The set of business environment and firm-specific variables are used as
independent variables for the two-stage DEA model. The estimated inefficiency
scores are normally bounded between zero and one. Applying the method of
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with such a dependent variable that its values are
bounded between zero and one will lead to biased and inconsistent estimators, since
the OLS method is likely to predict inefficiency scores which are greater than one
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Coelli et al., 2005).
Therefore, the Maximum Likelihood estimation for a two-limit Tobit model 79
is adopted (Hoff, 2006; McDonald, 2009), which is given as follows:

1

∑

+

0
1

0
1
1

1
1

(6.5)

1

1
0
1

Where:
1
(1

= Unobserved inefficiency scores of firm i at time t.
θ

= Observed inefficiency scores of firm i at time t.

= Unknown parameter to be estimated for each business environment or firmspecific variable j at time t
= Business environment or firm-specific variables j at time t
= Random error (
6.3

~

0,

))

Data Statistics
Basic data statistics for all of the variables used to conduct the empirical

analysis in this chapter are summarized in Table 6.1.

79

The interval of predicted efficiency scores is 0; 1 . Efficiency scores normally concentrate at or
close to 1 (or have a positive pileup at or close to 1 at the right hand side of the interval), but often
none of them are at or close to 0 (McDonald, 2009). For this study inefficiency scores, however, are
used instead, and therefore inefficiency scores are skewed at or close to 0, but none of them are at or
close to 1.
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Table 6.1: Summary statistics of Thai listed manufacturing firms
Variables

Unit of Variables

Mean

Median

Max

Min

Std. Dev.

Obs.

Sales revenue (level)

000 Baht

6203706

1953962

210000000

24202

17190172

1309

Sales revenue (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

9.95

9.88

14.56

5.49

1.36

1309

000 Baht

433724

205636

11745483

4074

1005995

1309

Output

Inputs:
Labour expenses (level)
Labour expenses (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

7.64

7.66

11.84

3.71

1.15

1309

Fixed productive assets (level)

000 Baht

2832218

590693

81233000

3561

8409219

1309

Fixed productive assets (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

8.84

8.68

13.61

3.57

1.56

1309

Intermediate inputs (level)

000 Baht

4542167

1180994

156000000

19697

12963246

1309

Intermediate inputs (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

9.51

9.40

14.26

5.28

1.45

1309

No. of years

5

5

9

1

2.58

1309

Time trend
Finance:
Leverage

Ratio

2.40

1.57

46.20

0.00

2.81

1309

Liquidity

Ratio

0.57

0.43

29.13

0.01

1.50

1309

Internal financing

Dummy

0.35

0

1

0

0.48

1309

External financing

000 Baht

174663

20282

14030418

0

772070

1309

Dummy

0.80

1

1

0

0.40

1309

R&D
Ownership structure:
Controlling ownership

%

58.81

58.82

99.69

5.44

16.50

1309

Managerial ownership

%

20.53

12.63

96.53

0

21.67

1309

Family-owned firm

Dummy

0.53

1

1

0

0.50

1309

Foreign-owned firm

Dummy

0.19

0

1

0

0.39

1309

Types of owned firms:

Domestic-owned firm

Dummy

0.12

0

1

0

0.32

1309

Joint-owned firm

Dummy

0.07

0

1

0

0.26

1309

Dummy

0.09

0

1

0

0.29

1309

Executive remuneration

Hybrid-owned firm

Ratio

0.14

0.09

6.83

0

0.32

1309

Exports

%

32.68

19.32

100

0

33.53

1309

000 Baht

13689745

2273483

286000000

145806

40676518

1309

Other factors:
Total assets (level)
Total assets (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

14.76

14.54

19.47

11.73

1.27

1309

Firm age

No. of years

26

24

95

0

12

1309

Government assistance

Dummy

0.62

1

1

0

0.49

1309

Foreign cooperation

Dummy

0.31

0

1

0

0.54

1309

Additional variables used for the self-selection hypothesis
Foreign investment (ownership)

%

17.26

8.34

96.95

0.00

21.93

1309

Technical inefficiency scores (SFA)*

Number

0.188

0.156

0.997

0.045

0.123

1309

Technical inefficiency scores (DEA)* Number

0.113

0.114

0.50

0.000

0.065

1309

Note: *indicate SFA and DEA Technical inefficiency scores respectively which are calculated by taking technical efficiency
scores predicted by FRONTIER 4.1 and DEAP 2.1, respectively subtracted from “unity”.

There are 1,309 observations covering the period 2000 to 2008. Variables for
inputs and outputs are expressed in natural logarithm form due to the use of
production functions (i.e., Cobb-Douglas and Translog production functions).
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Business environment and firm specific variables are expressed in a variety of units
such as dummy variable, ratio, percentage, and real value. Descriptive statistics (i.e.,
mean, median, max, min, and standard deviation) are also provided for each variable.
From Table 6.1 the average age of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises is 26
years. Thai listed manufacturing enterprises export approximately 32.68 percent of
their total sales. The average leverage of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises is
quite low as given by the average of the debt to asset ratio (0.57), indicating that they
have strong financial health. This is because they have to meet certain listing criteria
set by the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) before their securities can resume
trading, and they have to maintain their financial health in order to retain their listing
status in the SET. The top 5 major shareholders of Thai listed manufacturing firms
hold approximately 58.81 percent of a firm’s total shares on average. In addition,
20.55 percent of a firm’s total shares are held by top executives and board members
on average. Focusing on types of firm ownership, family ownership (53 percent 80 ) is
the major type of ownership, followed by foreign ownership (19 percent), domestic
ownership (12 percent), hybrid ownership (9 percent), and joint ownership (7
percent). In terms of the percentage of foreign investment (ownership) for each listed
manufacturing firm, foreign investors hold approximately 17.26 percent on average
of a firm’s total shares. Finally, SFA and DEA inefficiency scores obtained from
FRONTIER 4.1 and DEAP 2.1, respectively, are 0.19 and 0.11. Technical
inefficiency scores from both estimation approaches are very low, and their mean
values are very close. In addition, basic data statistics for sub-manufacturing sectors
such as (i) the Agro and Food Industry, (ii) the Consumers Product, (iii) the
Industrials, and (iv) the Other Sectors are also summarized and provided in Tables
6.2, 6.3, 3.4, and 3.5, respectively.

80

Claessens et al. (2000, p103) also revealed the percentage of publicly listed and family-owned firms
among East Asian countries in 1996. They revealed that the percentage share of publicly listed and
family-owned firms was 61.6 percent for Thailand, 48.2 percent for Taiwan, 55.4 percent for
Singapore, 44.6 percent for the Philippines, 67.2 percent for Malaysia, 48.4 percent for Korea, 9.7
percent for Japan, 71.5 percent for Indonesia, and 66.7 percent for Hong Kong.
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Table 6.2: Summary statistics of the Agro and Food Industry sector
Variables

Unit of Variables

Mean

Median

Max

Min

Std. Dev.

Obs.

Sales revenue (level)

000 Baht

7189315

2790878

110000000

91910

15735308

323

Sales revenue (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

10.28

10.24

13.91

6.82

1.18

323

000 Baht

583642

222749

11745483

7710

1499821

323

Output

Inputs:
Labour expenses (level)
Labour expenses (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

7.87

7.72

11.84

4.35

1.04

323

Fixed productive assets (level)

000 Baht

1651510

686668

35755783

123533

4290412

323

Fixed productive assets (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

8.92

8.83

12.79

7.12

1.02

323

Intermediate inputs (level)

000 Baht

5792386

2171342

82592520

82698

12548765

323

Intermediate inputs (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

10.03

9.99

13.62

6.72

1.23

323

No. of years

5

5

9

1

2.59

323

Time trend
Finance:
Leverage

Ratio

2.10

1.35

10.67

0.00

1.83

323

Liquidity

Ratio

0.46

0.42

4.70

0.03

0.42

323

Internal financing

Dummy

0.30

0

1

0

0.46

323

External financing

000 Baht

1263

188

45862

0

3985.85

323

Dummy

0.87

1

1

0

0.34

323

R&D
Ownership structure:
Controlling ownership

%

57.45

55.46

98.53

8.63

17.42

323

Managerial ownership

%

25.20

19.86

96.53

0.00

22.46

323

Family-owned firm

Dummy

0.64

1

1

0

0.48

323

Foreign-owned firm

Dummy

0.18

0

1

0

0.38

323

Types of owned firms:

Domestic-owned firm

Dummy

0.04

0

1

0

0.20

323

Joint-owned firm

Dummy

0.01

0

1

0

0.10

323

Dummy

0.13

0

1

0

0.34

323

Executive remuneration

Hybrid-owned firm

Ratio

0.10

0.08

0.93

0.01

0.08

323

Exports

%

47.78

41.00

99.77

0.00

37.90

323

Total assets (level)

000 Baht

5498545

2139002

108000000

479127

13411746

323

Total assets (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

14.71

14.58

18.49

13.08

1.03

323

Firm age

No. of years

25

23

56

5

9

323

Other factors:

Government assistance

Dummy

0.77

1

1

0

0

323

Foreign cooperation

Dummy

0.15

0

1

0

0

323

Additional variables used for the self-selection hypothesis
Foreign investment (ownership)

%

11.75

7.20

49.00

0.00

12.78

323

Technical inefficiency scores (SFA)*

Number

0.16

0.14

0.42

0.09

0.05

323

Technical inefficiency scores (DEA)* Number

0.11

0.12

0.29

0.00

0.05

323

Note: *indicate SFA and DEA Technical inefficiency scores respectively which are calculated by taking technical efficiency
scores predicted by FRONTIER 4.1 and DEAP 2.1, respectively subtracted from “unity”.
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Table 6.3: Summary statistics of the Consumer Products sector
Variables

Unit of Variables

Mean

Median

Max

Min

Std. Dev.

Obs.

Sales revenue (level)

000 Baht

2222515

1482518

18180793

120479

2818906

252

Sales revenue (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

9.53

9.60

12.11

7.09

0.98

252

000 Baht

367573

225646

2525467

19873

413528.3

252

Output

Inputs:
Labour expenses (level)
Labour expenses (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

7.80

7.74

10.22

5.47

0.93

252

Fixed productive assets (level)

000 Baht

769543.7

484824

6230780

24105

974515

252

Fixed productive assets (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

8.38

8.49

11.04

5.49

1.08

252

Intermediate inputs (level)

000 Baht

1557376

1020563

15204191

23287

2190827

252

Intermediate inputs (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

9.26

9.26

11.93

6.72

0.99

252

No. of years

5

5

9

1

2.61

252

Time trend
Finance:
Leverage

Ratio

3.21

2.12

46.20

0.12

3.89

252

Liquidity

Ratio

0.39

0.32

2.98

0.01

0.36

252

Internal financing

Dummy

0.39

0

1

0

0.49

252

External financing

000 Baht

28875

10759

446610

0

53900

252

Dummy

0.78

1

1

0

0.42

252

Controlling ownership

%

57.39

58.45

97.86

17.82

15.26

252

Managerial ownership

%

19.26

12.615

74.6

0

17.97

252

Family-owned firm

Dummy

0.56

1

1

0

0.50

252

Foreign-owned firm

Dummy

0.13

0

1

0

0.34

252

R&D
Ownership structure:

Types of owned firms:

Domestic-owned firm

Dummy

0.05

0

1

0

0.21

252

Joint-owned firm

Dummy

0.17

0

1

0

0.38

252

Dummy

0.09

0

1

0

0.29

252

Executive remuneration

Hybrid-owned firm

Ratio

0.11

0.09

0.45

0.01

0.07

252

Exports

%

46.69

43.16

100

0

31.45

252

Total assets (level)

000 Baht

2665295

1555191

20730355

239644

3600346

252

Total assets (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

14.34

14.26

16.85

12.39

0.89

252

Firm age

No. of years

29.56

29

58

11

10.65

252

Other factors:

Government assistance

Dummy

0.53

1

1

0

0.50

252

Foreign cooperation

Dummy

0.44

0

1

0

0.50

252

Additional variables used for the self-selection hypothesis
Foreign investment (ownership)

%

18.23

8.2

96.95

0

22.51

252

Technical inefficiency scores (SFA)*

Number

0.23

0.19

0.97

0.11

0.15

252

Technical inefficiency scores (DEA)* Number

0.15

0.14

0.35

0

0.06

252

Note: *indicate SFA and DEA Technical inefficiency scores respectively which are calculated by taking technical efficiency
scores predicted by FRONTIER 4.1 and DEAP 2.1, respectively subtracted from “unity”.
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Table 6.4: Summary statistics of the Industrials sector
Variables

Unit of Variables

Mean

Median

Max

Min

Std. Dev.

Obs.

Sales revenue (level)

000 Baht

4878203

2057071

59404533

27867

7782736

397

Sales revenue (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

9.89

9.93

13.29

5.63

1.41

397

000 Baht

215330

163960

2079096

4074

247388

397

Output

Inputs:
Labour expenses (level)
Labour expenses (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

7.21

7.41

10.12

3.71

1.07

397

Fixed productive assets (level)

000 Baht

3218592

470835

79008697

3561

7460036

397

Fixed productive assets (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

8.65

8.46

13.58

3.57

1.97

397

Intermediate inputs (level)

000 Baht

3054417

709558

35449116

19697

5442074

397

Intermediate inputs (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

9.11

8.87

12.78

5.28

1.57

397

No. of years

5

6

9

1

3

397

Time trend
Finance:
Leverage

Ratio

2.12

1.46

23.15

0.02

2.24

397

Liquidity

Ratio

0.82

0.47

29.13

0.04

2.64

397

Internal financing

Dummy

0.31

0

1

0

0.46

397

External financing

000 Baht

176967

30698

6075890

0

574430

397

Dummy

0.796

1

1

0

0.40

397

R&D
Ownership structure:
Controlling ownership

%

60.87

61.82

99.69

5.44

16.59

397

Managerial ownership

%

20.65

8.92

94.17

0.00

23.75

397

Family-owned firm

Dummy

0.49

0

1

0

0.50

397

Foreign-owned firm

Dummy

0.24

0

1

0

0.43

397

Types of owned firms:

Domestic-owned firm

Dummy

0.18

0

1

0

0.38

397

Joint-owned firm

Dummy

0.02

0

1

0

0.15

397

Dummy

0.07

0

1

0

0.25

397

Executive remuneration

Hybrid-owned firm

Ratio

0.20

0.11

6.83

0.02

0.56

397

Exports

%

19.97

10.70

94.00

0.00

23.16

397

Total assets (level)

000 Baht

7838694

2190888

152000000

124793

15498386

397

Total assets (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

14.87

14.60

18.84

11.73

1.37

397

Firm age

No. of years

24

23

56

0

11.93

397

Other factors:

Government assistance

Dummy

0.62

1

1

0

0.48

397

Foreign cooperation

Dummy

0.30

0

1

0

0.46

397

Additional variables used for the self-selection hypothesis
Foreign investment (ownership)

%

17.57

9.55

94.95

0.00

20.23

397

Technical inefficiency scores (SFA)*

Number

0.17

0.13

1.00

0.04

0.15

397

Technical inefficiency scores (DEA)* Number

0.09

0.08

0.50

0.00

0.07

397

Note: *indicate SFA and DEA Technical inefficiency scores respectively which are calculated by taking technical efficiency
scores predicted by FRONTIER 4.1 and DEAP 2.1, respectively subtracted from “unity”.

199

Table 6.5: Summary statistics of the “Other Sectors” sector
Variables

Unit of Variables

Mean

Median

Max

Min

Std. Dev.

Obs.

Sales revenue (level)

000 Baht

9797572

1734844

210000000

24202

28423392

337

Sales revenue (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

10.01

9.76

14.56

5.49

1.59

337

000 Baht

596778

221618

10735169

8929

1214971

337

Output

Inputs:
Labour expenses (level)
Labour expenses (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

7.80

7.74

11.76

4.63

1.33

337

Fixed productive assets (level)

000 Baht

5051127

886631

81233000

16386

13479520

337

Fixed productive assets (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

9.31

9.09

13.61

5.10

1.62

337

Intermediate inputs (level)

000 Baht

7328468

1256944

156000000

22949

21123245

337

Intermediate inputs (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

9.67

9.44

14.26

5.44

1.61

337

No. of years

5

5

9

1

3

337

Time trend
Finance:
Leverage

Ratio

2.42

1.66

28.67

0.02

3.09

337

Liquidity

Ratio

0.52

0.48

2.84

0.02

0.37

337

Internal financing

Dummy

0.42

0

1

0

0.49

337

External financing

000 Baht

327273

22228

14030418

0

1317436

337

Dummy

0.76

1

1

0

0.43

337

R&D
Ownership structure:
Controlling ownership

%

58.75

59.97

97.63

17.54

16.19

337

Managerial ownership

%

16.87

6.67

90.28

0.00

20.09

337

Family-owned firm

Dummy

0.45

0

1

0

0.50

337

Foreign-owned firm

Dummy

0.17

0

1

0

0.37

337

Types of owned firms:

Domestic-owned firm

Dummy

0.16

0

1

0

0.37

337

Joint-owned firm

Dummy

0.12

0

1

0

0.33

337

Dummy

0.10

0

1

0

0.30

337

Executive remuneration

Hybrid-owned firm

Ratio

0.11

0.10

0.44

0.00

0.08

337

Exports

%

22.72

4.23

100.00

0.00

31.17

337

Total assets (level)

000 Baht

13689745

2273483

286000000

145806

40676518

337

Total assets (logarithm)

Natural Logarithm

14.98

14.64

19.47

11.89

1.49

337

Firm age

No. of years

26

23

95

0

16

337

Other factors:

Government assistance

Dummy

0.54

1

1

0

0.50

337

Foreign cooperation

Dummy

0.31

0

1

0

0.46

337

Additional variables used for the self-selection hypothesis
Foreign investment (ownership)

%

21.45

8.38

95.73

0.00

28.42

337

Technical inefficiency scores (SFA)*

Number

0.21

0.18

0.70

0.08

0.10

337

Technical inefficiency scores (DEA)* Number

0.12

0.12

0.31

0.00

0.06

337

Note: *indicate SFA and DEA Technical inefficiency scores respectively which are calculated by taking technical efficiency
scores predicted by FRONTIER 4.1 and DEAP 2.1, respectively subtracted from “unity”.
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6.4

Hypotheses tests
There are a number of null hypotheses that will be tested for estimation of the

stochastic frontier production function (i.e., (i) the validation of the Cobb-Douglas
production function, (ii) the absence of technical progress, (iii) the absence of neutral
technical progress), and for estimation of the model of inefficiency effects (i.e., (iv)
the absence of inefficiency effects, (v) the absence of stochastic inefficiency effects,
(vi) the insignificance of joint inefficiency variables). These results are reported in
Table 6.6. A likelihood-ratio test statistic (LR statistic) is used to test these
hypotheses, which can be conducted as follows:
2 log
Where, log

and log

log

are obtained from the maximized values

of the log-likelihood function under the null hypothesis (
hypothesis (

(6.6)

) and the alternative

), respectively. The LR test statistic has an asymptotic chi-square

distribution with parameters equal to the number of restricted parameters imposed
under the null hypothesis (

), except for hypotheses (iv) and (v) that have a

“mixed” chi-square distribution (Kodd and Palrm, 1986). Hypotheses (iv) and (v)
involve the restriction that

is equal to zero, which defines a point on the boundary

of the parameter space (Coelli, 1996a, p6).
(i)

Validation of the Cobb-Douglas production function
Both Cobb-Douglas and Translog production functions can be estimated by

FRONTIER 4.1, and then selected by conducting the likelihood-ratio test statistic
(LR statistic) for an adequate functional form. The reason is that FRONTIER 4.1
does not provide a diagnostic test for such an adequate functional form. As a result,
the null hypothesis that the Cobb-Douglas production function is an adequate
functional form for the data is tested against the alternative hypothesis that the
specification of the Translog production function is an adequate functional form.
From Equation (6.2) the null hypothesis
0 is strongly rejected at the 5 percent level of significance
for the SET’s manufacturing sector including all sub-manufacturing sectors, since all
the LR test statistics are greater than the critical value at the 5 percent level of
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significance (see Table 6.6). Therefore, the Cobb-Douglas production function is not
an adequate specification for the case of the SET’s manufacturing sector including
all sub-manufacturing sectors, compared with the specification of the Translog
production function model. This also indicates that input and substitution elasticities
are not constant among firms (Lundvall and Battese, 2000).
(ii)

The absence of technical progress
In dealing with panel data it is crucial to investigate whether technical

progress (technological change) exists for the study. This can be examined by
applying unrestricted and restricted models and then conducting the LR test statistic.
As a result, the null hypothesis that there is no technical progress is conducted
against the alternative hypothesis that there is technical progress. From Table 6.6 the
LR test statistics are greater than the critical value at the 5 percent level of
significance for the SET’s manufacturing sector including sub-manufacturing
sectors, except for the Agro and Food Industry. Hence, the second null hypothesis
that there is no technical progress

:

0 is rejected

at the 5 percent level of significance for the SET’s manufacturing sector including
sub-manufacturing sectors, except for the Agro and Food Industry.
(iii)

The absence of neutral technical progress
The third hypothesis test takes a further step from the second hypothesis test

in examining for the existence of neutral technical progress. In examining this
hypothesis test, the null hypothesis test that technical progress is neutral is tested
against the alternative hypothesis that there is no neutral technical progress. From
Table 6.6 the LR test statistics are greater than the critical value at the 5 percent level
of significance for the SET’s manufacturing sector including sub-manufacturing
sectors. For this hypothesis the Agro and Food Industry is not tested, since technical
progress does not exist in this sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis that technical
progress is neutral

0 is rejected at the 5 percent level of

significance for the SET’s manufacturing sector including other sub manufacturing
sectors such as Consumer Products, Industrials, and Other Sectors. This indicates
that technical change not only merely affects average output, but also changes
marginal rates of technical substitution. In other words the marginal rate of
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substitution is not dependent on time, indicating that Hicks neutral technology does
not exist for the SET’s manufacturing sector including Consumer Products,
Industrials, and Other Sectors.
(iv)

The absence of inefficiency effects
The fourth hypothesis test aims to investigate for the existence of the

inefficiency effects model. The null hypothesis that inefficiency is absent from the
model is tested against the alternative hypothesis that the inefficiency effects model
exists for the model. From Table 6.6 the LR test statistics are greater than the critical
value at the 5 percent level of significance for the SET’s manufacturing sector
including all sub-manufacturing sectors. As a result the null hypothesis (iv) which
…

specifies that the inefficiency effects are absent from the model

0 is strongly rejected at the 5 percent level of significance, which implies
that the model of inefficiency effects exists for the case of the SET’s manufacturing
sector including all sub-manufacturing sectors.
(v)

The absence of “stochastic” inefficiency effects
The fifth hypothesis test aims to investigate whether an inefficiency effects

model is “stochastic” or not. To examine this hypothesis test the null hypothesis that
the inefficiency effects are not “stochastic”

0 is tested against the alternative

hypothesis that the inefficiency effects are “stochastic. From Table 6.6 the LR test
statistics are greater than the critical value at the 5 percent level of significance for
the SET’s manufacturing sector including all sub-manufacturing sectors. Therefore,
the null hypothesis that the inefficiency effects are not “stochastic” (

0

81
F

F

is

strongly rejected, implying that the model of inefficiency effects is not reduced to a
traditional mean response function (Battese and Coelli, 1995). In other words, all the
explanatory variables in the inefficiency effects model are not included in the
production function, implying that the inefficiency effects model exists and therefore
the estimated parameters can be identified in the model of inefficiency effects. In

81

If the parameter is equal to zero, then the variance of the inefficiency effects is zero, and,
therefore, the inefficiency effects model reduces to a traditional mean response function in which
inefficiency variables (or firm-specific and business environment variables) are included in the
production function. As a result inefficiency variables are not identified (Battese and Coelli, 1995, p
330).
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addition, if the estimate of the variance parameter ( ) is close to one, it indicates that
overall residual variation (
components (
(vi)

and

) is highly related to the inefficiency

.

The insignificance of joint inefficiency variables
The last hypothesis test aims to investigate the significance of the joint

inefficiency variables (business environment and firm-specific variables) for the
model. To conduct this hypothesis test the null hypothesis that inefficiency effects
are not a linear function of all explanatory variables is tested against the alternative
hypothesis that inefficiency effects are a linear function of all explanatory variables.
In other words the null hypothesis specifying that all parameters of the explanatory
variables are equal to zero is tested against the alternative hypothesis that the
explanatory variables are not equal to zero. From Table 6.6 the LR statistic tests are
all greater than the critical value of approximately chi-square distribution at the 5
percent level of significance, implying that the null hypothesis that all coefficients of
0 is

the explanatory variables are equal to zero

strongly rejected at the 5 percent level of significance for the SET’s manufacturing
sector including all sub-manufacturing sectors, given the specification of the
Translog stochastic frontier and the model of inefficiency effects.
According to the rejection of the last null hypothesis test, the model of
inefficiency effects of the SET’s manufacturing sector including all submanufacturing sectors can be assumed to be independently and identically distributed
as truncations at zero of the normal distribution with mean,

and variance,

(Battese and Coelli, 1995). Similarly, the last hypothesis test can be conducted for
the two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Unrestricted and restricted models
are conducted and then used to conduct the LR test statistics (see Table 6.13).
As a result, the null hypothesis that all parameters of the explanatory
variables are equal to zero is also rejected at the 5 level of significance for the SET’s
manufacturing sector including all sub-manufacturing sectors. In addition, the
majority of the estimates of the Translog production frontier parameters are
statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance for the SET’s
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manufacturing sector including sub-manufacturing sectors (see Table 6.7). It is also
common to observe that some of the individual coefficients of the Translog
stochastic frontier are not statistically significant due to high multicollinearity among
the inputs (Lundvall and Battese, 2000; Oczkowski and Sharma, 2005).
6.5

Results from the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approaches
This section compares the empirical results obtained from the Stochastic

Frontier Analysis (SFA) and the two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
approaches for the SET’s manufacturing sector including sub-manufacturing sectors.
For the SFA approach, as described in Section 6.5.1, the empirical evidence can be
divided into two parts: (i) the empirical results obtained from the estimates of a
Translog frontier production function and (ii) the empirical results obtained from an
estimated inefficiency effects model. For the DEA approach, as described in Section
6.5.2, the empirical evidence can be classified into two parts: (i) the empirical results
from the estimates of DEA technical efficiency using DEAP Version 2.1 and (ii) the
empirical results from estimates of the maximum likelihood Tobit model. Section
6.5.3 compares the empirical evidence from both the Stochastic Frontier Analysis
(SFA) and two - stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approaches for robustness
of the results.
6.5.1

Results from the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) approach
This section presents the empirical results estimated by the Stochastic

Frontier Analysis (SFA) approach. The Battese and Coelli (1995) model is used for
this part by using FRONTIER 4.1. With respect to Section 6.4 (i) the Translog
frontier production function is used for the empirical analysis in Section 6.5.1 (i),
since it is found to be an adequate functional form for the SET’s manufacturing
sector including all sub-manufacturing sectors. Furthermore, an inefficiency effects
model is conducted in Section 6.5.1 (ii) to investigate the effects of business
environment and firm-specific variables on the technical inefficiency effects for Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises.
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(i)

Results from estimates of a stochastic frontier production function
Table 6.7 shows the empirical results obtained from the Battese and Coelli
and capital

(1995) model using FRONTIER 4.1. The estimates of the labour (
(

inputs are found to be significantly positive and negative, respectively, for Thai

listed manufacturing enterprises. The estimate of the intermediate input (

is found

to be significant and positive at the 5 percent level of significance. The expected sign
of the capital coefficient should be positive.
Unlike the Cobb-Douglas production function, a negative sign of the input
coefficients in the Translog production function can be observed due to the common
problem of a high degree of collinearity (Coelli, 1995; Shing, 1997). This negative
result can also be observed in other SFA studies applying the Translog production
function in their analysis (Kim, 2003; Tran et al., 2008). For sub-manufacturing
sectors the estimate of the labour (

input is found to be significantly positive in the

Agro and Food Industry and Other Sectors. The estimate of the capital input (

is

significantly positive for the Consumer Products, Industrials, and Other Sectors. In
addition, the estimate of the intermediate input (

is found to be significantly

positive for the Agro and Food Industry, Consumer Products, and Other Sectors, but
is found to be significantly negative in the Industrials sector.
However, the estimate for an individual input are not readily interpretable in
the Translog production function (Kim, 1992). Therefore, the production elasticities
of input, returns to scale, and the rate of technical change provide more useful
economic interpretation.
Returns to scale and technical change
Returns to scale can be estimated as the sum of the output elasticities with
respect to each input. For the case of three inputs (capital, labour, and intermediate
inputs) returns to scale can be calculated as the sum of the elasticities of output with
respect to capital, labour, and intermediate inputs (

). This can be

used to examine how much output will increase when the level of an input increases.
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Table 6.6: Statistics for the hypotheses tests of the stochastic frontier and inefficiency effect models for the SET’s manufacturing sectors
All manufacturing
Agro and Food Industry
Consumer Products
Industrials
Other Sectorsa
LR
Critical Decision LR
Critical Decision LR
Critical Decision LR
Critical Decision LR
Critical Decision
Statistics Value
Statistics Value
Statistics Value
Statistics Value
Statistics Value

Null Hypothesis
(i) Cobb-Douglas
:

210.37

18.31

Reject

82.25

18.31

Reject

104.30

18.31

Reject

98.07

18.31

Reject

127.50

18.31

Reject

26.42

11.07

Reject

5.00

11.07

Do not

54.88

11.07

Reject

77.46

11.07

Reject

22.69

11.07

Reject

33.56

7.81

Reject

53.91

7.81

Reject

12.67

7.81

Reject

0
(ii) No technical progress
:

0

reject

(iii) Neutral technical change
0
(iv) No inefficiency effects
:
…

0

32.49

7.81

628.72

29.55* Reject

217.75

29.55*

Reject

531.76

29.55*

Reject

366.91

29.55*

Reject

118.48

29.55*

Reject

2.71*

Reject

196.37

2.71*

Reject

664.65

2.71*

Reject

262.83

2.71*

Reject

308.68

2.71*

Reject

27.59

Reject

151.29

27.59

Reject

247.26

27.59

Reject

290.15

27.59

Reject

80.24

27.59

Reject

Reject

-

-

-

(v) Non stochastic inefficiency
(

:

0

(vi) No inefficiency
:
…

207.04
0

294.14

Source: Author’s estimates
distribution (Kodde and Palrm, 1986); a includes Publishing,
Note: All critical values of the test statistics are subject to the 5% level of significance; * indicates a mixture of
Construction Materials, and Technology (Electronic components); Hypotheses (i) - (iii) refer to Equation (6.2), and hypotheses (iv) – (vi) refer to Equation (6.3).
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Table 6.7: Maximum-likelihood estimates for parameters of the Translog
frontier production function
Variable
Stochastic frontiers
Constant
log(L)b
log(K) b
log(IM) b
t
½ (log(L)2)
2

½ (log(K) )
2

½ (log(IM) )
2

½ (t )
log(L)*log(K)
log(L)*log(IM)
log(L)* t
log(K)*log(IM)
log(K)*t
log(M)*t

All
Agro & Food Consumer Industrials
Manufacturing Industry
Products
-1.5394* 22.5773*
(0.5932) (2.0202)
0.3247
-0.2765
(0.2212) (0.3880)
0.5457*
1.0018*
(0.1525) (0.4624)
0.6910* -3.5993*
(0.2526) (0.6744)
0.0286
-0.2646*
(0.0394) (0.1131)
-0.1029** 0.2178*

Other
Sectorsa

3.8006*
(0.5481)
1.0182*
(0.1339)
-0.7088*
(0.1076)
0.2519**
(0.1519)
0.0911*
(0.0432)
0.0777*

1.0833*
(0.3057)
0.6049*
(0.0946)
0.1253
(0.0861)
0.2882*
(0.0787)
0.0870*

0.7657**
(0.4569)
0.5256*
(0.1151)
0.1298**
(0.0727)
0.3823*
(0.0984)
0.0596**
(0.0330)
0.0948*

(0.0216)
-0.0996*

(0.0243)
0.0211

(0.0590)
-0.0492

(0.0453)
-0.1546

(0.0347)
-0.0493*

(0.0259)
0.1301*

(0.0220)
0.1652*

(0.0306)
0.1423*

(0.1295)
0.7253*

(0.0173)
0.1868*

(0.0277)
-0.0051

(0.0126)
-

(0.0570)
-0.0023

(0.2230)
0.0008

(0.0189)
-0.0091*

(0.0046)
0.0886*
(0.0226)
-0.2125*
(0.0258)
-0.0198*
(0.0078)
0.0888*
(0.0192)
0.0164*
(0.0058)
-0.0040

0.0022
(0.0247)
-0.1151*
(0.0139)
-0.0275**
(0.0150)
-

(0.0024)
0.1279*
(0.0369)
-0.0485
(0.0323)
0.0082
(0.0056)
-0.1074*
(0.0285)
-0.0154*
(0.0040)
0.0054

(0.0097)
0.1627*
(0.0800)
-0.2495*
(0.0922)
-0.0219
(0.0184)
-0.1234
(0.1595)
0.0032
(0.0230)
0.0457

(0.0035)
0.0563*
(0.0184)
-0.1725*
(0.0194)
0.0105**
(0.0060)
-0.0041
(0.0158)
-0.0017
(0.0043)
-0.0073

(0.0071)

-

(0.0063)

(0.0305)

(0.0053)

Source: Author’s estimates using FRONTIER 4.1
Note: Standard Errors (S.E.) are in parentheses; * and ** indicate that the coefficients are statistically
significant at the 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. a includes Publishing, Construction Materials, and
Technology (Computer components); b L is the labour input, K is the capital input, and IM is
intermediate input (see Equation (6.2)); The empirical results refer to Equation 6.3.

For the Cobb-Douglas production function the sum of input coefficients
(elasticities) can measure whether the production function indicates constant,
increasing, or decreasing returns to scale (Coelli et al., 2005; Maity and Chatterjee,
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2010). Unlike the Cobb-Douglas production function the estimation of returns to
scale for the Translog production function is more complicated, since the sum of
individual estimated parameters (e.g., labour, capital, and intermediate inputs) of the
Translog production function cannot be used to measure the returns to scale. The
elasticities of output with respect to each input must be calculated and then added up
together as follows (Kim, 1992; Margono and Sharma, 2004):
The elasticity of output with respect to capital
⁄ ln

or
ln

+

can be estimated by

ln

+

ln

+

Whereas the elasticity of output with respect to labour (
⁄ ln

(6.7)

can be estimated by

or
ln

+

t

+

ln

+

ln

+

+

t

(6.8)

Whereas the elasticity of output with respect to intermediate inputs can be estimated
⁄ ln

by

or
ln

+

ln

+

ln

+

+

t

(6.9)

Finally, a measure of returns to scale is given by

. All

estimated parameters can be obtained from an estimated Translog production
function. The value of each input expressed by the natural logarithm form can be
is equal to one, there is constant

obtained by its mean value. If
returns to scale. If

is less than one, there is decreasing returns to

scale. If

is greater than one, there is increasing returns to scale. In

addition, the rate of technical change can be obtained as follows (Kim, 1992):
⁄

+

+

ln

+

ln

+

ln

(6.10)

The calculations of returns to scale for Thai listed manufacturing firms and all
manufacturing sub-sectors are calculated and summarized in Tables 6.8 and 6.9.
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Table 6.8: The calculations of returns to scale and technical change of Thai listed manufacturing sector and sub-manufacturing sectors
Sectors
Capital

0.2519

Estimated parameters and mean value of inputs
ln(kit)
ln(lit)
-0.0996
8.835966
0.0886
7.63786
0.0888
ln(lit)
ln(kit)
0.0777
7.637858
0.0886
8.83597
-0.2125
ln(imit)
ln(lit)
0.1301
9.511215
-0.2125
7.63786
0.0888

0.0911

-0.0051

0.1253

0.0211

0.6049

0.087

0.2882

0.1652

0.5457

-0.0492

0.3247

-0.1029

0.691

0.0286

Output Elasticity
⁄ ln
-0.7088

All
Manufacturing

Labour

⁄

Intermediate

⁄

1.0182

ln(imit)
9.511215
ln(imit)
9.511215
ln(kit)
8.835966

-0.004

t
5.14133
t
5.14133
t
5.14133

-0.004

ln(imit)
9.51122

0.0164
-0.0198

Returns to
Tech. Change

Capital
Agro & Food
Industry

⁄

⁄ ln

Labour

⁄

Intermediate

⁄

t
5.14133

ln(kit)
8.922412
ln(lit)
7.865809
ln(imit)
10.0255

-0.0198

0.0022
0.0022
-0.1151

ln(lit)
7.63786

ln(lit)
7.86581
ln(kit)
8.92241
ln(lit)
7.86581

0.0164

-0.0275
-0.1151
-0.0275

ln(kit)
8.835966

ln(imit)
10.0255
ln(imit)
10.0255
ln(kit)
8.922412

Consumer
Products

⁄ ln

Labour

⁄

Intermediate

⁄
0.1423

ln(kit)
8.38178
ln(lit)
7.802062
ln(imit)
9.264882

-0.0485

ln(lit)
7.80206
ln(kit)
8.38178
ln(lit)
7.80206

-0.0023

t
4.97619

0.0082

ln(lit)
7.80206

0.1279
0.1279

-0.1074

ln(imit)
9.264882
ln(imit)
9.264882
ln(kit)
8.38178

-0.0154

ln(kit)
8.38178

-0.1074
-0.0485

⁄

0.630333
0.918695

0.020515

0.15492
0.793692
1.003778

0.0054

t
4.97619
t
4.97619
t
4.97619

0.0054

ln(imit)
9.26488

-0.0154
0.0082

Returns to
Tech.

0.271597

Estimated e
0.055166

Returns to

Capital

Estimated e
0.016766

Estimated e
0.059519
0.185355
0.757661
1.002535

0.002083

Source: Author’s estimates

210

Table 6.8: The calculations of returns to scale and technical change of Thai listed manufacturing sector and sub-manufacturing sectors
Sectors

Estimated parameters and mean value of inputs
ln(kit)
ln(lit)
-0.1546 8.64896
0.1627
7.21283
-0.1234
ln(lit)
ln(kit)
0.2178 7.212825
0.1627
8.64896
-0.2495
ln(imit)
ln(lit)
0.7253 9.110764
-0.2495
7.21283
-0.1234

Output Elasticity
⁄ ln

Capital

1.0018
Labour

⁄

Intermediate

⁄

Industrials

-0.2765
-3.5993

ln(imit)
9.110764
ln(imit)
9.110764
ln(kit)
8.648955

0.0457

t
5.32494
t
5.32494
t
5.32494

0.0457

ln(imit)
9.11076

0.0032
-0.0219

Returns to
⁄

Tech. Change

t
0.0008 5.324937

-0.2646

⁄ ln

Capital

0.3823

ln(kit)
-0.0493 9.313047
ln(lit)
0.0948 7.797295
ln(imit)
0.1868 9.674245

0.0596

t
-0.0091 5.228487

0.1298
Labour

⁄

Intermediate

⁄

Other Sectors

0.5256

-0.0219

ln(lit)
7.21283

-0.1725

ln(lit)
7.7973
ln(kit)
9.31305
ln(lit)
7.7973

0.0105

ln(lit)
7.7973

0.0563
0.0563

0.0032

ln(kit)
8.64896

-0.0041

ln(imit)
9.674245
ln(imit)
9.674245
ln(kit)
9.313047

-0.0073

t
5.22849
t
5.22849
t
5.22849

-0.0017

ln(kit)
9.313047

-0.0073

ln(imit)
9.67425

-0.0041
-0.1725

-0.0017
0.0105

Returns to
⁄

Tech. Change

Estimated e
-0.269030
0.311887
0.385206
0.428062

0.025738

Estimated e
0.061102
0.175200
0.768064
1.004366

0.007438

Source: Author’s estimates

Note: The estimated parameters in Table 6.8 refer to Table 6.7 and the mean values of all inputs refer to Tables 6.1 to 6.5.
:
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln

ln

ln

ln

ln

ln

ln

ln

–
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From Table 6.9 intermediate inputs have a high production elasticity,
followed by the labour input and capital input, respectively, for the SET’s
manufacturing sector as well as all sub manufacturing sectors. In other words the
empirical results reveal that the production of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises is
mainly contributed by intermediate inputs and labour input, but capital is found to be
the least important input. A measure of returns to scale, given by the sum of the
elasticities of output with respect to each input, provides more economic meaning,
indicating whether firms in the manufacturing sector are operating under increasing,
decreasing, or constant returns to scale. The returns to scale, given by 0.9187,
indicates the existence of decreasing returns to scale 82 for Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises (see Table 6.9). For manufacturing subsectors there is evidence of constant
returns to scale for the Agro and Food Industry (1.0038) and Consumer Products
(1.0025) and Other Sectors (1.0044), but evidence of moderate decreasing returns to
scale is found in the Industrials sector (0.4281) (see Table 6.9).
Table 6.9: Estimated production elasticities, returns to scale, and technical
change rate
All

Agro & Food

Consumer

Manufacturing

Industry

Products

0.0168

0.0552

0.0595

Production Elasticity
Capital

Industrials

Other
Sectors

-0.2690

0.0611

Labour

0.2716

0.1549

0.1854

0.3119

0.1752

Intermediate Inputs

0.6303

0.7937

0.7576

0.38521

0.7681

Returns to Scale

0.9187

1.0038

1.0025

0.4281

1.0044

Tech. Change Rate

0.0205

-

0.0021

0.0257

0.0074

Source: Author’s estimates

Under the Translog specification for technology, Equation (6.2), the rate of
technical change is given by
ln

+

ln

ln

(Kim, 1992). From Table 6.9 the rate of technical change is found to be

0.0205 for the SET’s manufacturing sector, indicating that the rate of technical change
82

Constant returns to scale refers to an m-fold change in all inputs resulting in an m-fold change in
output; increasing returns to scale refers to a change in output by more than an m-fold change in all
inputs; decreasing returns to scale refers to a change in output less than an m- fold change in all inputs
(OECD, 2001, p125).
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increases at 2.05 percent per year. The positive rates of technical change, given by
0.0021, 0.0257, 0.0074, indicate that the rate of technical change increase at 0.21
percent, 2.57 percent, and 0.74 percent for the Consumer Products, Industrials, and
Other Sectors, respectively. In addition, the estimates of

and

are also

significantly negative and positive, respectively, for the SET’s manufacturing sector
(see Equation (6.2), Table 6.7). This evidence implies that there is the existence of
labour-using and capital-saving technical progress for Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises over the period 2000 to 2008. For sub-manufacturing sectors the evidence
for labour-using technical progress is also found for Industrials, as indicated by a
negative coefficient sign, but it is not statistically significant.
On the other hand evidence for labour-saving technical progress is found for
Other Sectors due to a significant and positive estimated coefficient. Such laboursaving technical progress is also found for Consumer Products due to a positive
coefficient sign for

, but it is not statistically significant. Focusing on the capital

input used for technical progress, the existence of capital-using technical progress is
.

found for Consumer Products due to a significant and negative coefficient sign for

The existence of capital-using and capital-saving technical progress is also found for
Other Sectors and Industrials, respectively, but their estimated coefficients are not
statistically significant.

Table 6.10: Technical efficiency scores (2000 - 2008) predicted by FRONTIER 4.1
Sector(s)
All manufacturing sector
Sub-manufacturing sector:
1. Agro and Food Industry
2. Consumer Products
3. Industrials 83
4. Other Sectors
Source: Author’s estimates

Std.

No. of Firms

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

1309

0.003

0.955

0.812

0.123

323
252
397
337

0.476
0.012
0.016
0.225

0.993
0.988
1.000
0.980

0.948
0.875
0.519
0.887

0.060
0.173
0.327
0.102

Deviation

83

Average technical efficiency is the lowest compared with mean technical efficiencies of other sub manufacturing sectors, but this result is consistent with the evidence that Industrials is the only sector
that experiences moderate returns to scale (see Table 6.9).
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With respect to the Battese and Coelli (1995) model, technical efficiency
scores can be predicted through estimates of the Translog frontier production function
using FRONTIER 4.1 which are summarized in Table 6.10. Average technical
efficiency scores are given by 0.812 (81.2%) for all Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises over the period 2000 to 2008. Comparing among the sub-manufacturing
sectors listed 84 the Agro and Food Industry perform the best, followed by those listed
manufacturing firms in the Other Sectors, and Consumer Products, and Industrials (see
Table 6.10).
(ii)

Results from estimates of an inefficiency effects model (using SFA)
Following the Battese and Coelli (1995) model the empirical results shown in

Table 6.11 are obtained from an inefficiency effects model using FRONTIER 4.1. In
other words, the effects of business environment and firm-specific variables upon a
firm’s technical inefficiency are examined in this part.
However, the signs of the estimated coefficients as shown in Table 6.11 must
be interpreted conversely in order to be consistent with the hypotheses discussed in
Chapter 5, which focus on the effects of business environment and firm-specific
variables on technical efficiency and not technical inefficiency.
For the inefficiency effects model the estimate of the variance parameter ( )
which is close to one indicates that the residual variation is highly related to the
inefficiency component (Battese and Coelli, 1995, p330). From Table 6.11 it can be
seen that the estimated

(0.870) is high and significant for overall Thai listed

manufacturing enterprises, indicating that much of the variation in the composite error
term is due to inefficiency effects

. Similarly, the estimated s are also high for

the Agro and Food Industry, Consumer Products, and Other Sectors, which are given
by 0.697, 0.995, and 0.807 respectively. The exception to this is the Industrials sector
where

is equal to 0.233 85 and this is statistically significant at the 5 percent level of

significance.

84

The Translog frontier production function is estimated separately for each sub manufacturing sector.
This result is also consistent with other empirical findings (e.g., moderate decreasing returns to scale
and low mean technical efficiency compared with other sub manufacturing sectors) (see footnote 83).

85
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Table 6.11: Maximum-likelihood estimates for parameters of the inefficiency
models from the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) approach
Inefficiency
Variables
Constant
Leverage (LEV)
Liquidity (LIQ)
Internal financing (INF)
External financing (EXF)
Executive remuneration (EXC)
Controlling ownership (TOP5)
Managerial ownership (MGR)
Exports (EXP)
Research and Development (R&D)
Government assistance (GOVT)
Foreign cooperation (FCO)
Firm Size (SIZE)
Firm Age (AGE)
Family -owned firm (FAM)
Foreign -owned firm (FGR)
Domestic- owned firm (DOM)
Hybrid -owned firm (HYD)
Variance parameters
sigma-square
gamma

)

All
Agro & Food Consumer Industrials Other
Manufacturing
Industry
Products
Sectorsa
12.8522*
1.6140*
10.3713* 13.2751* 1.8095*
(1.7039)
-0.0357*
(0.0175)
0.2208*
(0.0146)
0.6401*
(0.1194)
0.00007*
(0.00001)
-0.4883*
(0.2564)
-0.0345*
(0.0033)
-0.0211*
(0.0031)
-0.0124*
(0.0022)
0.8098*
(0.1511)
-0.6720*
(0.1732)
0.3051*
(0.1002)
-0.7578*
(0.1076)
-0.0389*
(0.0066)
-3.6974*
(0.2669)
-3.8385*
(0.5746)
-1.3651*
(0.2002)
-2.6310*
(0.2141)

(0.5875)
0.1670*
(0.0306)
-0.0464*
(0.0190)
0.1015*
(0.0342)
0.000002
(0.000003)
-0.2485
(0.1718)
-0.0005
(0.0012)
-0.0010
(0.0008)
0.0015*
(0.0005)
-0.0286
(0.0640)
0.0327
(0.0466)
0.2085*
(0.0546)
-0.1355*
(0.0295)
0.0019
(0.0031)
0.2022
(0.3720)
0.0611
(0.3770)
0.4357
(0.3797)
0.0598
(0.3986)

(1.4807) (1.0327)
(0.5490)
-1.3650*
0.0195
0.4244*
(0.3315) (0.0131)
(0.0897)
0.1165*
0.1288* 0.0135**
(0.0147) (0.0147)
(0.0077)
0.9345*
0.1275
0.2167*
(0.1176) (0.0879)
(0.0891)
0.00004
0.00007* -0.00001**
(0.00008) (0.00001) (0.00001)
-5.0034* -0.1132** -0.2790
(0.6406) (0.0681)
(0.4275)
-0.0088
-0.0142* -0.0053*
(0.0084) (0.0024)
(0.0017)
-0.0087
-0.0043*
0.0153*
(0.0060) (0.0018)
(0.0037)
0.0070* -0.0051* -0.0023**
(0.0032) (0.0014)
(0.0012)
0.8405*
0.0711
-0.2449*
(0.3273) (0.0829)
(0.0737)
-0.4809*
0.0905
-0.1830*
(0.1901) (0.0788)
(0.0792)
0.8618* -0.3426* -0.6338*
(0.1577) (0.1024)
(0.0946)
-0.7978* -0.8221* -0.1634*
(0.0781) (0.0635)
(0.0361)
0.0267*
0.0085*
0.0073*
(0.0092) (0.0036)
(0.0028)
-3.3580*
0.0358
-0.2756*
(0.3167) (0.2385)
(0.1014)
-3.3701*
0.2698
1.1706*
(0.3578) (0.2310)
(0.2140)
-0.1193 0.4520** 0.3781*
(0.5458) (0.2415)
(0.1742)
-3.6325*
-0.0449
0.2178
(0.4534) (0.2486)
(0.1588)

1.0536*
(0.0669)

0.0093*
(0.0016)

0.4190*
(0.0366)

0.1866*
(0.0139)

0.0850*
(0.0229)

0.8698*

0.6965*

0.9947*

0.2328*

0.8068*

(0.0113)
(0.0645)
(0.0020) (0.0443)
(0.0718)
-744.76
428.05
187.99
-212.97
132.94
Log-likelihood function
Source: Author’s estimates
Note: Standard Errors (S.E.) are in parentheses; * and ** indicate that the coefficients are statistically
significant at the 5% and 10 % levels, respectively; a includes Publishing, Construction Materials, and
Technology (Computer components); The empirical results refer to Equations 6.4.
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For the overall significance of the estimated model there is strong evidence that
inefficiency effects are a linear function of all the explanatory variables, since all the
LR test statistics are greater than the critical value at the 5 percent level of significance
for the SET’s manufacturing sector. This includes all sub - manufacturing sectors (see
Section 6.4 (vi)). The empirical results shown in Table 6.11 reveal the effects of firmspecific and business environment variables on technical efficiency by applying the
inefficiency effects model of the Battese and Coelli (1995) model using FRONTIER
4.1.
Leverage has a significant and positive effect on a firm’s technical efficiency
for the SET’s manufacturing sector, including Consumer Products, as suggested by
Sena (2006) and Mok et al. (2007). This result implies that financially constrained
firms are likely to utilize their financial resources and control input costs effectively,
resulting in an enhancement of their technical efficiency. The positive result is
different from the findings of Goldar et al. (2003) which concluded that financially
constrained firms may have difficulty in operating their businesses effectively due to
the inability to meet their financial liabilities, resulting in lower levels of their
efficiency. A significant and negative relationship, however, is found for the Agro and
Food Industry and Other Sectors. Leverage does not exert a significant effect on the
efficiency of the Industrials sector. To confirm this conclusion there is strong evidence
that liquidity has a significant and negative relationship with a firm’s technical
efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate, including submanufacturing sectors such as Consumer Products, Industrials, and Other Sectors, but
a significant and positive relationship is found for the Agro and Food Industry. This
negative result implies that financially healthy firms may use their financial resources
and control input costs ineffectively due to their abundant financial resources.
In addition, internal financing is also found to have a significant and negative
effect on a firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate,
including the Agro & Industry, Consumer Products, and Other Sectors. This implies
that the agency problem exists for the use of internal funds, since managers do not
appear to maximise shareholders’ interests or have strong incentives to abuse internal
funds, as suggested by Jensen (1986). A positive result is also found for the Industrials
sector, but it is not statistically significant.
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External financing is also found to have a significant and negative effect on a
firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate and for
Industrials, contradicting results obtained by Kim (2003). This negative result implies
that financial institutions may impose restrictive conditions on their loan agreements
which may negatively affect the operation of firms. A significant and positive
association is found for Other Sectors. This positive finding may indicate that firms
which obtain external funds (loans) from financial institutions are likely to be
technically efficient, since financial institutions are likely to provide funds for firms
which can pay back their loans. It is insignificant in the Agro and Food Industry and
Consumer products sectors. However, the effect of external financing on a firm’s
technical efficiency is very small for the SET’s manufacturing sector including all submanufacturing sectors due to a very small size of the estimated coefficients.
Executive remuneration is also significant and positively related with a firm’s
technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector including Consumer Products
and industrials, as suggested by Baek and Pagán (2002), but is insignificant for the
other manufacturing sub - sectors. This positive result implies that listed
manufacturing firms with higher levels of executive remuneration tend to be more
technically efficient. In practice, the amount of bonuses or increased salaries which
executives (i.e., board of directors and managers) will receive depends upon the firm’s
annual net profits. In some Thai listed manufacturing firms the amount of executive
remuneration (i.e., bonuses) that executives receive is based on the percentage of the
firm’s annual net profits. Therefore, a firm which provides high executive
remuneration tends to achieve an increase in its technical efficiency.
For ownership structure, controlling ownership is found to have a significant
and positive effect on a firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector
including Industrials, and Other Sectors but is not significant for the Agro and Food
Industry and Consumer Products sectors. This positive result is similar to the findings
of Wiwattanakantang (2001) and Yammeesri and Lodh (2003), who revealed that
controlling ownership is positively related to a firm’s performance as evaluated by
accounting or financial measures (e.g., ROA, sales-assets ratio, stock returns and
profitability). This finding also supports the agency theory that controlling
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shareholders tend to perform better than dispersed shareholders, since a high level of
ownership concentration can reduce agency costs.
Furthermore, managerial ownership is found to have a significant and positive
effect on a firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector including
Industrials, but a significant and negative effect is found for the Other Sectors. This
positive finding is consistent with results obtained by Liao et al. (2010). This indicates
that the agency problem is reduced, since managerial ownership can help align the
potentially conflicting interests of shareholders and managers, as suggested by Jensen
and Meckling (1976). In addition, the empirical results are found to be positive, but
not significant for the Agro and Food Industry and Consumer Products sectors.
Exporting has a significant and positive relationship with a firm’s technical
efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate, including Industrials and
Other Sectors, but such a significant and negative effect is found in the Agro and
Food Industry and for Consumer Products. In other words, evidence of the learningby-exporting hypothesis is only found in the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate,
and for the Industrials and Other Sectors. This positive result indicates that exporting
firms are also likely to improve their technical efficiency due to their learning-byexporting experience (i.e., new product designs and production methods).
Research and Development (R&D) is found to have a significant and negative
impact on a firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector in
aggregate, including Consumer Products, but a significant and positive relationship is
found for Other Sectors. The significant and negative result for the R&D dummy
variable found in the SET’s manufacturing sector including Consumer Products can be
interpreted that listed manufacturing enterprises which have research and development
(R&D) are likely to have lower technical efficiency compared with their counterparts
which have no research and development (R&D). Such a negative finding also implies
that most listed manufacturing firms misreported their R&D activities, since they did
not intend to implement them as they reported to investors. It is not significant for the
technical efficiency of firms in the Agro and Food Industry and Industrials sectors.
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Government assistance is significant and negatively related with a firm’s
technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate, including
Consumer Products and Other Sectors. This negative result implies that government
assistance does not promote the firm’s technical efficiency, since it only focuses on
financial privileges (e.g., exemption or reduction from corporate income tax on net
income from the promoted projects) provided by the Board of Investment (BOI) and
lacks assistance in improving firm innovation.
Foreign cooperation is found to have a significantly negative effect on a firm’s
technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate and including the
Agro and Food Industry and Consumer Products, but a significant and positive effect
is found for Industrials and Other Sectors. This negative result implies that Thai listed
manufacturing firms which required foreign cooperation (e.g., technical assistance)
faced operational problems within their firms. According to their financial reports,
most were required to pay for such foreign technical assistance. The significant and
negative result of a dummy variable for foreign cooperation found in the SET’s
manufacturing sector, including the Agro and Food Industry and Consumer Products
indicates that listed manufacturing enterprises with foreign cooperation tend to have
lower technical efficiency compared with their counterparts with no foreign
cooperation.
There is strong evidence that firm size has a significant and positive
relationship with technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate
as well as all sub-manufacturing sectors. This positive result is also consistent with the
findings of Charoenrat and Harvie (2011), which found a positive relationship between
firm size and technical efficiency for 13,176 Thai SMEs in three northern-eastern
provinces. This finding also implies that large firms are likely to obtain higher levels
of technical efficiency due to economies of scale. Firm age has a significant and
positive effect on a firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector86 in
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It is observed that all the sub-manufacturing sectors produce a negative relationship, but a positive
association is found for the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate. This is due to the difference in
production technology in each sub-manufacturing sector. More specifically, the Agro and Food Industry
sector has no technical progress. Moreover, the empirical results estimated by the SFA approach will be
compared with the empirical evidence obtained from the DEA approach for robustness. Therefore, the
DEA approach is useful for this situation, since it does not require any functional form.
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aggregate, but a significant and negative relationship is found for the Consumer
Products, Industrials, and Other Sectors. A positive result is also found for the Agro
and Food Industry sector, but is not statistically significant. This positive result implies
that firm technical efficiency is enhanced through a learning-by-doing experience.
Focusing on the types of owned firms, family-owned firms have a significant
and positive effect on technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector in
aggregate, including the Consumer Products and Other Sectors. This positive result is
similar to the empirical studies of Wiwattanakantang (2001) and Yammeesri and Lodh
(2003), except that their studies focused on firm performance as measured by
profitability and financial ratios. This also implies that family ownership has the
advantage of enhancing communications between related members in the firm, as
suggested by Fama and Jensen (1983). In other words the separation of management
and control, which causes agency problems, is alleviated due the close relationship
among family members within their firm. It is insignificant for the other sub - sectors.
Foreign - owned firms are found to have a significant and positive effect on
technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector including Consumer Products.
The significant positive relationship between foreign ownership and technical
efficiency is also consistent with empirical results obtained from a number of other
studies (Fukuyama et al. 1999; Goldar et al. 2003; Bottasso & Sembenelli 2004). This
implies that foreign-owned firms have superior technology, managerial expertise,
good corporate governance, and a strong - market network (Kimura and Kiyota, 2007).
Such significant and negative evidence 87 , however, is found for Other Sectors.
Moreover, it is insignificant for other sub-manufacturing sectors.
Domestic - owned firms are found to have a significant and positive effect on
technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate, but a significant
and negative effect is found for the Industrials and Other Sectors. A positive effect for
the technical efficiency of firms is also found for the Consumer Products sector, but it
is not statistically significant. The result is not statistically significant for the Agro and
87

This negative result contradicts results obtained from other empirical studies which were reviewed in
Section 3.5.2, Chapter 3. However, this SFA finding will be cross checked with the DEA result for the
“Other Sectors” sub-sector.
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Food Industry sector. Hybrid-owned firms are found to have a significant and positive
effect on technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate, and for
the Consumer Products sector, but it is insignificant for other sub - sectors. Comparing
among types of owned firms the empirical results, as indicated by the size of the
significantly estimated coefficients, reveal that foreign - owned firms perform the best
for the SET’s manufacturing sector, followed by family - owned firms, hybrid - owned
firms, and domestic - owned firms, given joint - owned firms as the base category 88 .
6.5.2

Results from the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach
This section presents empirical results obtained from the two-stage Data

Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach for the SET’s manufacturing sector, including
all sub-manufacturing sectors, which can be divided into two stages of the estimation:
(i) estimates of the DEA technical efficiency scores 89 predicted by DEAP 2.1 and (ii)
estimates of the maximum - likelihood Tobit model.
(i)

Results from estimates of the DEA technical efficiency scores
Section 6.5.2 (i) provides results from estimates of DEA technical efficiency

scores for the first step of the two-stage DEA approach. For this part the output
orientated model is used assuming fixed input amounts and maximized output
production 90 . One output and three inputs, as previously used for the Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA), are also used to predict DEA technical efficiency scores.
Technical efficiency scores are predicted by VRS linear programming as analysed by
DEAP 2.1 (see Equation 6.4). In addition, the multiple - stage DEA option provided in
DEAP 2.1 is applied to predict technical efficiency scores (see Section 6.2.2). The
efficiency scores predicted by DEAP 2.1 are summarized in Table 6.12.
DEAP 2.1 91 provides three different types of estimated efficiency scores: (i)
constant returns to scale (CRS) technical efficiency, (ii) variable returns to scale
(VRS) technical efficiency, (iii) and scale efficiency (see Section 6.2.2). Only the VRS
88

This is to avoid the problem of the dummy variable trap.
DEA technical efficiency scores will be converted to technical inefficiency scores by subtracting
them from “unity”.
90
Coelli et al. (2005, p180) pointed out that the selection of orientation (e.g., input or output orientated
model) has only a very small impact on predicted efficiency scores.
91
By selecting the variable returns to scale option in DEAP 2.1. In addition, only CRS technical
efficiency scores are obtained if constant returns to scale is selected.
89
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technical efficiency scores, however, will be used for estimates of the maximumlikelihood Tobit model, since VRS technical efficiency scores predicted by DEAP 2.1
for the DEA approach is equivalent to pure technical efficiency scores predicted by
FRONTIER 4.1 for the SFA approach.
Table 6.12: Efficiency scores (2000 - 2008) predicted by DEAP 2.1
Sector
All manufacturing sector
(1+2+3+4)
Sub-manufacturing sectors
1. Agro & Food Industries

2.Consumer Products

3.Industrials

4.Other Sectors

Technical No. of Obs. Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
CRS
1309
0.474
1.00
0.814
0.068
VRS
1309
0.503
1.00
0.887
0.065
SCALE
1309
0.714
1.00
0.918
0.058
CRS
VRS
SCALE
CRS
VRS
SCALE
CRS
VRS
SCALE
CRS
VRS
SCALE

323
323
323
252
252
252
397
397
397
337
337
337

0.707
0.708
0.726
0.583
0.653
0.777
0.474
0.503
0.738
0.691
0.691
0.714

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

0.809
0.889
0.911
0.784
0.854
0.918
0.848
0.911
0.931
0.801
0.883
0.909

0.055
0.052
0.056
0.062
0.058
0.051
0.075
0.070
0.052
0.057
0.062
0.066

Source: Author’s estimates
Note: CRS = Constant Returns to Scale Technical Efficiency; VRS = Variable Returns to Scale
Technical Efficiency; SCALE = Scale Efficiency. Predicted technical efficiency scores are classified
with respect to manufacturing firms in aggregate and for manufacturing sub-sectors.

From Table 6.12 the average VRS technical efficiency score is given by 0.887
for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises over the period 2000 to 2008.
(ii)

Results from estimates of the maximum-likelihood Tobit model
This section provides empirical results obtained from the second stage of the

two-stage DEA approach. The maximum-likelihood Tobit Model is used to conduct
the empirical analysis in this part (see Section 6.5.2). Technical inefficiency scores are
used as the dependent variable, which are simply calculated by subtracting VRS
efficiency scores predicted by DEAP 2.1 from “unity”. The business environment and
firm-specific variables, as previously used in the SFA approach, are also applied as the
independent variables for this part. The heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are
used for this model, which are shown in parentheses in Table 6.13. In addition, the
overall significance of the estimated model is tested by conducting the likelihood-ratio
test statistic (LR statistic) as discussed in Section 6.4 (vi).
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Table 6.13: Maximum-likelihood Tobit estimates for parameters of the two-stage
DEA approach
Firm Specific Variables

All
Agro & Food Consumer Industrials
Other
Manufacturing
Industry
Products
Sectorsa
Left censoring (value) at zero
93
13
1
52
27
Right censoring (value) at one
0
0
0
0
0
Uncensored observations
1216
310
251
345
310
Total observations
1309
323
252
397
337
Dependent variable: Technical inefficiency (VRS)
Constant
0.5833*
0.6566*
0.7427*
0.3209*
0.4815*
(0.0447)
(0.0561)
(0.0837)
(0.0792)
(0.0507)
Leverage (LEV)
-0.0048*
0.0128**
-0.0355*
-0.0035
0.0288*
(0.0022)
(0.0068)
(0.0122)
(0.0023)
(0.0127)
Liquidity (LIQ)
0.0023*
0.0012
0.0024*
0.0071*
-0.0014
(0.0011)
(0.0019)
(0.0010)
(0.0030)
(0.0020)
Internal financing (INF)
0.0052
0.0029
0.0119**
-0.0056
-0.0116*
(0.0035)
(0.0048)
(0.0067)
(0.0080)
(0.0055)
External financing (EXF)
0.0000006
-0.0000004 0.0000001 0.000006* -0.0000015*
(0.0000007)
(0.0000003) (0.0000053) (0.000001) (0.0000006)
Executive remuneration (EXC)
-0.1026*
-0.0964**
-0.1862* -0.0955*
0.0343
(0.0263)
(0.0514)
(0.0649)
(0.0357)
(0.0434)
Controlling ownership (TOP5)
-0.0002
0.0003*
-0.0002
-0.0001
-0.0005*
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
(0.0002)
Managerial ownership (MGR)
-0.0004*
-0.0002*
0.0004** -0.0007*
-0.0001
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
Exports (EXP)
-0.0001*
-0.0002*
0.0001
-0.0001
-0.0001
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0002)
(0.0001)
Research and Development (R&D)
0.0142*
0.0243*
0.0260*
-0.0078
0.0275*
(0.0051)
(0.0071)
(0.0120)
(0.0114)
(0.0100)
0.0094
Government assistance (GOVT)
0.0075**
0.0163*
0.0128** 0.0238*
(0.0041)
(0.0062)
(0.0068)
(0.0088)
(0.0062)
Foreign cooperation (FCO)
0.0042
0.0006
0.0077
0.0164*
0.0011
(0.0035)
(0.0068)
(0.0076)
(0.0077)
(0.0071)
Firm Size (SIZE)
-0.0295*
-0.0369*
-0.0428* -0.0186*
-0.0238*
(0.0025)
(0.0028)
(0.0052)
(0.0051)
(0.0032)
Firm Age (AGE)
-0.00004
0.0013*
0.0010*
0.0005
-0.0004
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
(0.0004)
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
Family -owned firm (FAM)
-0.0263*
-0.0717*
-0.0340*
0.0492*
-0.0067
(0.0065)
(0.0151)
(0.0108)
(0.0161)
(0.0090)
Foreign -owned firm (FGR)
-0.0424*
-0.0757*
-0.0332*
0.0040
-0.0212*
(0.0073)
(0.0141)
(0.0131)
(0.0153)
(0.0099)
Domestic- owned firm (DOM)
-0.0059
-0.0461*
0.0097
0.0482*
0.0306*
(0.0090)
(0.0185)
(0.0176)
(0.0181)
(0.0111)
Hybrid -owned firm (HYD)
-0.0217*
-0.0634*
-0.0225**
0.0212
0.0322*
(0.0089)
(0.0169)
(0.0126)
(0.0242)
(0.0120)
Error Distribution
0.0593*
0.0346*
0.0443*
0.0646*
0.0498*
(0.0024)
(0.0016)
(0.0025) (0.0029)
(0.0028)
Log likelihood (unrestricted)
1596.95
589.18
424.53
401.75
464.18
1405.30
444.52
357.39
330.60
362.22
Log likelihood (restricted)b
LR test
383.29*
289.33*
134.29*
142.29*
203.93*
Critical value
27.59
27.59
27.59
27.59
27.59
Source: Author’s estimates
Note: Huber/White robust standard errors (S.E.) are in parentheses; * and ** indicate that the
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level and 10 % levels, respectively; a includes
Publishing, Construction Materials, and Technology; b Inefficiency scores are regressed by a constant.

223

The LR test statistics are all greater than the critical value at the 5 percent level
of significance, indicating that joint explanatory variables significantly explain all
estimated models (see Table 6.13). From Table 6.13 the empirical results reveal the
effects of business environment and firm-specific variables on technical inefficiency.
However, the signs of the estimated coefficients are interpreted in the opposite
direction in order to be consistent with the hypotheses discussed in Chapter 5, which
focus on the effects of these inefficiency variables on firm technical efficiency.
From Table 6.13 leverage has a significant and positive association with a
firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector including Consumer
Products, but a significant and negative relationship is found for the Agro and Food
Industry and Other Sectors. This positive finding implies that financially constrained
firms have efficient control over their financial resource input costs, resulting in an
improvement of their efficiency. No significant relationship is found for the Industrials
sector. To confirm this conclusion there is evidence to suggest that liquidity has a
significant and negative relationship with a firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s
manufacturing sector, including Consumer Products and Industrials. No significant
relationship is found for the Agro and Food and Other Sectors.
Moreover, internal financing is also found to have a significant and negative
effect on a firm’s technical efficiency for Consumer Products, but a significant and
positive effect is found for the Other Sectors. This negative finding implies that the
use of internal funds causes an agency problem, since managers tend not to maximise
shareholders’ interests or have strong incentives to abuse internal funds. No significant
relationship is found for the manufacturing sector in aggregate and for the Agro and
Food Industry and Industrials sub sectors. External financing is also found to have a
significant and negative effect on a firm’s technical efficiency for the Industrials
sector, but a significant and positive association is also found for the Other Sectors.
However, the effect of external financing on a firm’s technical efficiency is very weak
due to very small size of the estimated coefficients (close to zero) for the Industrials
and Other Sectors. No significant relationship is found for the manufacturing sector in
aggregate and for the Agro and Food Industry and Consumer Products sub-sectors.
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The effect of executive remuneration on a firm’s technical efficiency is found
to be significant and positive for the SET’s manufacturing sector including Agro and
Food Industry, Consumer Products, and Industrials, but is not significant for the Other
Sectors. This positive finding indicates that listed manufacturing firms with higher
levels of executive remuneration are likely to be more technically efficient, since
managers have strong incentives to control the firms’ input costs effectively or
maximise the firms’ profit which in turn will increase executive remuneration.
For ownership structure, controlling ownership is significant and positively
related with a firm’s technical efficiency for Other Sectors, but is significant and
negatively related in the Agro and Food Industry. A positive relationship is found for
the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate and for Consumer Products and
Industrials sectors, but is not statistically significant. This positive finding also
supports the agency theory that controlling shareholders are likely to perform better
than dispersed shareholders, since they have strong incentives to protect the interests
of their firms. In other words, a high level of controlling ownership can reduce agency
costs.
Furthermore, managerial ownership is found to have a significant and positive
effect on a firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate
and for the Agro and Food Industry and Industrials sectors. A positive relationship is
also found for Other Sectors, but it is not statistically significant. The positive result
implies that managerial ownership can help align the conflict of interests between
shareholders and managers, or reduce the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). A significant and negative relationship is found for Consumer Products. This
negative finding shows that managerial shareholders exert more controlling power
over the firm’s operation, which results in a deterioration of a firm’s performance.
Exporting is also significant and positively related with a firm’s technical efficiency
for the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate and for the Agro and Food Industry.
In other words, the learning-by-exporting hypothesis exists for the SET’s
manufacturing sector and the Agro and Food Industry. No significant relationship,
however, is found for Consumer Products, Industrials, and Other Sectors.
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Research and Development (R&D) is found to have a significant and negative
impact on a firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector in
aggregate and all other sub-manufacturing sectors, except Industrials. The
significantly negative dummy variable for research and development (R&D) indicates
that listed manufacturing enterprises are likely to have lower technical efficiency
compared with their counterparts with no research and development (R&D). This
negative result implies that all Thai listed manufacturing firms, except those firms in
the Industrials sub-sector, did not intend to implement their R&D seriously as stated in
their annual reports.
Government assistance is significant and negatively related with a firm’s
technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate and for the Agro
and Food Industry, Consumer Products, and Industrials. The significant and negative
dummy variable for government assistance implies that listed manufacturing
enterprises with government assistance tend to have lower technical efficiency than
their counterparts with no government assistance. The relationship with Other Sectors
is also negative but is not significant. This negative finding also implies that
government assistance in the form of financial privileges provided by the Board of
Investment (BOI) is not effective in promoting the technical efficiency of firms.
Foreign cooperation is only found to have a significant and negative affect on a
firm’s technical efficiency for Industrials. The significant and negative dummy
variable for foreign cooperation implies that listed manufacturing enterprises with
foreign cooperation have lower technical efficiency compared with their counterparts
with no foreign cooperation. This negative result also implies that firms faced
operational problems within them before they required foreign assistance. More
importantly, most firms had to pay for such technical assistance. No significant
relationship, however, is found for the SET’s manufacturing sector, including other
sub-manufacturing sectors. There is strong evidence that firm size has a significant
and positive relationship with technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector
in aggregate and for all sub-manufacturing sectors. This positive finding also implies
that large firms tend to have higher levels of technical efficiency due to economies of
scale. Firm age has a significant and negative effect on the technical efficiency for the
Agro and Food Industry and Consumer Products, but is insignificant for the
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manufacturing sector in aggregate and for all other sub-sectors. This positive result
implies that the technical efficiency of firms is enhanced through accumulated
experience.
Focusing on the various types of firm ownership, family-owned firms have a
significant and positive relationship with the technical efficiency of the SET’s
manufacturing sector in aggregate, including that of the Agro and Food Industry and
Consumer Products. This also implies that the separation of management and control,
which causes agency problems, is reduced due to the close relationship among family
members within their firms. However, a significant and negative relationship is found
for the Industrials sector, indicating that family-owned firms can cause an agency
problem due to lack of monitoring of the interests of minority shareholders. In other
words they are likely to implement policies which benefit themselves, but deteriorate
the overall performance of their firms. There is no significant relationship for the
Other Sectors. Foreign-owned firms also have a significant and positive effect on the
technical efficiency of the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate as well as the
Agro and Food Industry, Consumer Products, and Other Sectors. This implies that
foreign-owned firms bring new technology, managerial expertise, good corporate
governance, and a strong market network for domestic listed firms. No significant
relationship is found for the Industrials sector.
Domestic-owned firms are found to have a significant and positive relationship
with technical efficiency for the Agro and Food Industry, but a significant and
negative relationship is found for the Industrials and Other Sectors. No significant
relationship is found for the manufacturing sector in aggregate and for the Consumer
Products sector. Hybrid-owned firms are found to have a significant and positive
association with technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate
and including the Agro and Food Industry and Consumer Product sectors, but a
significant and negative effect is found for Other Sectors. No significant relationship
was found in the Industrials sector. Comparing among the different types of owned
firms, the size of the estimated dummy coefficients, given joint-owned firms as the
base firm, indicate that foreign-owned firms perform the best, followed by familyowned firms, hybrid-owned firms, and domestic-owned firms for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises.
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Table 6.14: Average technical efficiency scores classified by estimating approaches and the SET’s manufacturing sectors
Agro and Food Industry
Consumer Products
Industrials
Other Sectors
All Manufacturing
CRSTE VRSTE SCALE CRSTE VRSTE SCALE CRSTE VRSTE SCALE CRSTE VRSTE SCALE CRSTE VRSTE SCALE
2000
0.808
SFA
0.814
0.871
DEA
2001
0.821
SFA
0.838
0.895
DEA
2002
0.786
SFA
0.832
0.896
DEA
2003
0.819
SFA
0.890
0.927
DEA
2004
0.820
SFA
0.826
0.901
DEA
2005
0.813
SFA
0.779
0.878
DEA
2006
0.815
SFA
0.789
0.878
DEA
2007
0.813
SFA
0.784
0.876
DEA
2008
0.813
SFA
0.787
0.870
DEA
2000 - 2008
0.812
SFA
0.814
0.887
DEA
Source: Author’s estimates

0.936

0.825

0.947
0.885

0.935

0.799

0.864
0.851

0.940

0.830

0.443
0.885

0.940

0.795

0.876
0.858

0.930

0.938

0.838

0.943
0.900

0.933

0.827

0.862
0.881

0.940

0.860

0.453
0.908

0.947

0.825

0.866
0.888

0.932

0.930

0.828

0.944
0.898

0.923

0.816

0.854
0.875

0.933

0.855

0.454
0.908

0.942

0.823

0.874
0.895

0.922

0.960

0.892

0.946
0.927

0.963

0.851

0.864
0.899

0.947

0.915

0.463
0.944

0.970

0.888

0.896
0.928

0.957

0.918

0.817

0.948
0.898

0.912

0.804

0.891
0.876

0.919

0.855

0.563
0.923

0.927

0.813

0.889
0.896

0.910

0.889

0.757

0.951
0.868

0.875

0.740

0.900
0.839

0.883

0.828

0.566
0.911

0.910

0.765

0.900
0.873

0.880

0.900

0.778

0.955
0.875

0.890

0.743

0.884
0.833

0.894

0.836

0.577
0.910

0.920

0.773

0.895
0.874

0.887

0.897

0.770

0.961
0.877

0.880

0.736

0.870
0.821

0.898

0.832

0.551
0.909

0.917

0.772

0.891
0.874

0.887

0.906

0.774

0.965
0.873

0.889

0.738

0.888
0.815

0.906

0.835

0.741
0.904

0.925

0.773

0.891
0.865

0.896

0.918

0.809

0.948
0.889

0.912

0.784

0.875
0.854

0.918

0.848

0.519
0.911

0.931

0.801

0.887
0.883

0.909

Note: Following the Battese and Coelli (1995) model technical efficiency scores are obtained from the estimates of FRONTIER 4.1 by estimating the Translog frontier
production function. Predicted technical efficiency scores are classified with respect to each sub-manufacturing sector.
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Table 6.15: Number of listed manufacturing firms classified by types of returns to scales and the SET’s manufacturing sectors

DRS

All

Agro & Food

Consumer

Manufacturing

Industry

Products

%

IRS

%

CRS

%

DRS

%

IRS %

CRS

%

DRS

%

Industrials

Other
Sectors

IRS % CRS %

DRS

%

IRS

%

CRS

%

DRS % IRS %

CRS

%

2000

100 73% 33

24%

4

3% 30

81% 7

19%

0

0% 23

77%

6 20% 1

3%

22

59% 13

35%

2

5%

25 76% 7

21%

1

3%

2001

109 81% 23

17%

3

2% 35

95% 2

5%

0

0% 24

86%

4 14% 0

0%

23

64% 11

31%

2

6%

27 79% 6

18%

1

3%

2002

115 85% 18

13%

3

2% 36

97% 0

0%

1

3% 25

89%

3 11% 0

0%

27

71%

9

24%

2

5%

27 82% 6

18%

0

0%

2003

114 83% 18

13%

5

4% 32

97% 0

0%

1

3% 25

93%

1

4%

1

4%

29

73%

9

23%

2

5%

28 80% 6

17%

1

3%

2004

139 95%

5

3%

2

1% 35

100% 0

0%

0

0% 27

100%

0

0%

0

0%

41

89%

3

7%

2

4%

36 95% 2

5%

0

0%

2005

138 91% 12

8%

2

1% 35

97% 1

3%

0

0% 27

100%

0

0%

0

0%

40

82%

7

14%

2

4%

36 90% 4

10%

0

0%

2006

140 89% 15

10%

2

1% 35

97% 1

3%

0

0% 28

97%

1

3%

0

0%

40

78%

9

18%

2

4%

37 90% 4

10%

0

0%

2007

141 91% 12

8%

2

1% 35

100% 0

0%

0

0% 27

96%

1

4%

0

0%

41

82%

8

16%

1

2%

38 90% 3

7%

1

2%

2008

135 88% 14

9%

5

3% 35

100% 0

0%

0

0% 26

93%

2

7%

0

0%

37

74%

9

18%

4

8%

37 90% 3

7%

1

2%

Source: Author’s estimates
Note: DRS is Decreasing Returns to Scale; IRS is Increasing Returns to Scale; CRS is Constant Returns to Scale. Technical efficiency scores are predicted by VRS linear programming
using by DEAP 2.1. Predicted technical efficiency scores are classified with respect to each sub-manufacturing sector.
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Table 6.16: Nonparametric correlation (Spearman rank-order correlation)
All Thai listed manufacturing firms
Spearman’s rho

SFA

SFA

DEA VRS

1.000

0.562**

.

0.000

1309

1309

0.562**

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

0.000

.

N

1309

1309

SFA

DEA VRS

1.000

0.224**

.

.

323

323

Correlation Coefficient

0.224*

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

0.000

.

323

323

SFA

DEA VRS

1.000

0.351**

.

0.000

252

252

0.351**

1.000

0.000

.

252

252

SFA

DEA VRS

1.000

0.303**

.

0.000

397

397

0.303**

1.000

0.000

.

397

397

SFA

DEA VRS

1.000

0.363**

.

0

337

337

0.363**

1.000

0.000

.

337

337

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

DEA VRS

Correlation Coefficient

(1) Agro & food industry sub-sector
Spearman’s rho

SFA

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

DEA VRS

N
(2) Consumer products sub-sector
Spearman’s rho

SFA

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

DEA VRS

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

(3) Industrials sub-sector
Spearman’s rho

SFA

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

DEA VRS

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

(4) Other sectors sub-sector
Spearman’s rho

SFA

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

DEA VRS

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Source: Author’s estimates
Note: ** The correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); The estimated Spearman rank-order
correlation coefficients in this table refer to the technical efficiency scores predicted by the SFA and
DEA approaches as summarized in Table 6.14.
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6.5.3 Consistency of the results from Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
This section aims to compare the empirical results obtained from the SFA and
DEA approaches in Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2, and these are summarized in Table
6.17.
Table 6.17: Comparison of the results of maximum-likelihood estimates for
parameters between the SFA and the two-stage DEA approaches
Dependent variable:
Technical inefficiency

All
Agro & Food
Manufacturing
Industry

(Pure or VRS)

SFA

Consumer
Products

DEA SFA

DEA

Industrials

Other
Sectorsa

SFA

DEA

SFA DEA SFA DEA

Independent variables :
Constant

+*

+*

+*

+*

+*

+*

+*

+*

+*

+*

Leverage

-*

-*

+*

+**

-*

-*

+

-

+*

+*

Liquidity

+*

+*

-*

+

+*

+*

+*

+*

+**

-

Internal financing

+*

+

+*

+

+*

+**

+

-

+*

-*

External financing
Executive remuneration

+*
-*

+
-*

+
-

-**

+
-*

+
-*

+*

+*

-*

-

-

+*

-

-

-*
-

-*
+

Controlling ownership

-**
-*

-**
-*

-*

Managerial ownership

-*

-*

-

-*

-

+**

-*

-*

+*

-

Exports

-*

-*

+*

-*

+*

+

-*

-

-**

-

R&D

+*

+*

-

+*

+*

+*

+

-

Government assistance
Foreign cooperation

-*
+*

+**
+

+
+*

+*
+

-*
+*

+**
+

+

+*

-*

-*

-*

-*

-*

-*

+*
-*

+*
+
+

Firm size

-*
-*

-*
-*
-*
-*

-*

Firm age

-*

-

+

+*

+*

+*

+*

+

+*

-

Family owned firm

-*

-*

+

-*

-*

-*

+

+*

-*

-

Foreign owned firm

-*

-*

+

-*

-*

-*

+

+

+*

-*

Domestic owned firm
Hybrid owned firm

-*
-*

-*

+
+

-*
-*

-*

+
-**

+**
-

+*
+

+*
+

+*
+*

Source: Author’s estimates
Note: * and ** indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% and 10 % levels,
respectively; a includes Publishing, Construction Materials, and Technology (Electronic components).

The empirical results obtained from the SFA and two-stage DEA approaches
are quite consistent for overall Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. Average
technical efficiency scores predicted by the SFA and DEA approaches are compared
and summarized in Table 6.14. The average technical efficiency scores for Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises predicted by the SFA and the DEA approaches are
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very close, and are given by 0.812 and 0.887, respectively (see Table 6.14) 92 . Due to
differences in the SFA and VRS DEA technical efficiency scores in the Industrials
sub-sector, a Spearman rank-order correlation, which is a non-parametric correlation
test, was conducted to examine the ranking consistency for Thai listed manufacturing
firms, including all manufacturing sub-sectors as shown in Table 6.16. The values of
the estimated Spearman rank correlation coefficients 93 are 0.562, 0.224, 0.351,
0.303, and 0.363 for the Thai listed manufacturing sector, the Agro and Food
Industry sub-sector, the Consumer Products sub-sector, the Industrials sub-sector,
and the Other Sectors sub-sector, respectively. Moreover, all estimated correlation
coefficients are found to be statistically significant at the 1 percent level of
significance, and therefore the results of both the SFA and DEA techniques are
consistent in terms of ranking (see Sirasoontorn, 2004 94 ).
The technical efficiency scores obtained from DEA should normally be lower
than that obtained from SFA, since the technical efficiency scores predicted by DEA
does not separate the non-negative technical inefficiency components (
systematic errors (

). However, if the estimated

) from the

is close to 1 this implies that the

error variation is mainly due to inefficiency effects. For overall Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises
variations (

and

is given by 0.870, which indicates that the overall error

) are mostly due to inefficiency components (

insignificantly caused by random error terms (

, and

. Therefore, technical efficiency

92

Average technical efficiency scores for the manufacturing sub-sectors predicted by the SFA and
DEA approaches are very close, except for the Industrials sub-sector where TE scores predicted by
both approaches differ, as given by 0.519 and 0.911, respectively (see Table 6.14). This is because
the estimated gamma ( ) of the Industrials sub - sector is 0.233 which is close to 0, indicating that the
inefficiency effects model does not perform well. This result is consistent with the SFA evidence that
the Industrials sub-sector is the only sub-sector that experiences moderate returns to scale (see Table
6.9). Unlike the SFA approach the DEA approach does not require a functional form in predicting
efficiency scores.
93

Appendix 2 also shows the estimated Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients. Unlike the
results of Table 6.16 the results of Appendix 2 are based on the SFA technical efficiency scores which
are estimated from the Translog Production function of all Thai listed manufacturing firms (1,309
observations). The SFA TE scores are then classified according to each sub - manufacturing sector.
All estimated correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance,
but the values of the estimated correlation coefficients in Appendix 2 are higher than the ones shown
in Table 6.16.
94
For Sirasoontorn (2004) the estimated Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient between both
approaches is 0.55 for Thai and Australian power plants.
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scores obtained from SFA can also be smaller than those scores obtained from DEA
due to the effect of inefficiency components (Sirasoontorn, 2004).
The empirical results from both estimation approaches also reveal that Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises operated under decreasing returns to scale over the
period 2000 to 2008. The production returns to scale, given by 0.9187, indicates the
existence of moderate decreasing returns to scale for Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises (see Table 6.9). Similarly, the DEA approach indicates that
approximately 86% of Thai listed manufacturing firms, on average, operated under
decreasing returns to scale (DRS) during the period 2000 to 2008, given the
specification of the output-orientated model (see Table 6.15). The empirical results
from both the SFA and the two-stage DEA approaches are found to be quite
consistent (see Table 6.17).
The empirical results from both approaches reveal that leverage (financial
constraints) has a significant and positive effect on a firm’s technical efficiency for
the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate and for Consumer Products, but a
significant and negative result is found for the Agro and Food Industry and Other
Sectors. A significant and positive result implies that financially constrained firms
tend to utilize their financial resources and control input costs effectively, leading to
an enhancement in their technical efficiency. Moreover, this positive result also
implies that Thai listed manufacturing firms have become more risk averse, resulting
in more effective control of their input costs. No significant relationship is found for
the Industrials sector.
To confirm this conclusion, both estimation approaches reveal that a firm’s
liquidity is found to be significant and negatively related with technical efficiency for
the SET’s manufacturing sector in aggregate and for the Consumer Products and
Industrials sub sectors. This finding also implies that financially unconstrained firms
are not likely to control their input costs effectively due to sufficient financial
resources. Inconclusive results are found for the Agro and Food Industry and Other
Sectors due to the differences in estimated coefficient signs and significance results.
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The empirical evidence from both approaches also confirms that internal
financing has a significant and negative relationship with a firm’s technical
efficiency for Consumer Products, but inconclusive results are found for the Other
Sectors. The negative result implies that an agency problem exists from the use of
internal funds, since managers do not appear to maximize shareholders’ interests or
have a strong incentive to abuse internal funds. This is especially the case in
underdeveloped countries where firms’ managerial rights are not fully developed and
their information is not fully publicized, and therefore managers attempt to maximize
their benefits rather than the firm’s value (Kim, 2003, p134).
Both estimation approaches also reveal a positive relationship for the SET’s
manufacturing sector in aggregate and for the Agro and Food Industry sector, but
only the empirical results estimated by the SFA approach is statistically significant.
This positive finding also implies that there exists a strong incentive for listed firms
in the Agro and Food Industry sub-sector to monitor the allocation of their internal
funds when these have been lent by either the owner manager or by major
shareholders. No significant relationship is found for the Industrials sector.
Both approaches also confirm that external financing has a significant and
negative association with a firm’s technical efficiency for Industrials, but a
significant and positive relationship is found for the Other Sectors. Both estimation
approaches also reveal a negative relationship for the SET’s manufacturing sector in
aggregate, but only the empirical results estimated by the SFA approach is
statistically significant. No significant relationship is found for the Agro and Food
Industry and Consumer Products sub sectors. The relationship between external
finance and firm technical efficiency is very weak, since the estimated “external
financing” coefficients are very small (close to zero) for the SET’s manufacturing
sector in aggregate and including all sub-manufacturing sectors.
The empirical results from both estimation approaches reveal that “executive
remuneration” is also found to be significant and positively related with a firm’s
technical efficiency for the SET’s listed manufacturing sector in aggregate and
including Consumer Products and Industrials sectors, indicating that listed
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manufacturing firms with higher levels of executive remuneration tend to have more
technical efficiency. For the Agro and Food Industry both estimation approaches
show a positive relationship between executive remuneration and firm technical
efficiency, but only the empirical result from the DEA approach is statistically
significant. No significant relationship is found for the Other Sectors. As previously
discussed, executive remuneration also depends upon the firm’s annual net profits. In
some listed firms the amount of executive remuneration (i.e., bonuses) that
executives receive is based on the percentage of the firm’s annual net profits. This
reward system which provides high executive remuneration, therefore, tends to
achieve an increase in technical efficiency.
The empirical results from both approaches confirm that managerial
ownership has a significant and positive relationship with the technical efficiency of
SET manufacturing sector firms, including Industrials. This indicates that the agency
problem is reduced, since managerial ownership can help resolve the conflict of
interests between shareholders and managers. A positive effect is also observed in
the Agro and Food Industry, but only the empirical result from the DEA approach is
statistically significant. An inconclusive relationship is also found for the Consumer
Products and Other Sectors due to differences in significance results and estimated
coefficient signs.
The empirical evidence from both estimation approaches reveal that
controlling ownership has a significant and positive effect on a firm’s technical
efficiency for Other Sectors. A positive effect is also found for the SET’s
manufacturing sector in aggregate and for the Industrials sector, but significant
results are only found from the SFA approach. A positive result is also found for
Consumer Products, but is not statistically significant. The empirical result found in
the Agro and Food Industry is inconclusive due to differences in the estimated
coefficient signs and significance results. A positive result supports the agency
theory that controlling shareholders are likely to perform better than dispersed
shareholders, since a high level of ownership concentration can reduce agency costs.
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Learning-by-exporting evidence is also found for Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises, since the two estimation approaches confirm that the coefficient for
“exports” has a significant and positive association with a firm’s technical efficiency.
A positive relationship is also found for the Industrials and Other Sectors, but only
the empirical result from the SFA approach is statistically significant. This positive
result implies that export market experience (i.e., new product designs and
production methods), gained from communication between foreign partners and
exporting firms, tends to improve the technical efficiency of exporting firms. A
negative association is also found for Consumer Products, but only the SFA approach
produces a significant result. The empirical result found in the Agro and Food
Industry sub-sector is ambiguous due to differences in the estimated coefficient signs
and significance results.
Research and development (R&D) is found to be significant and negatively
associated with firm technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector
including Consumer Products, indicating that listed manufacturing firms with R&D
are not likely to have higher technical efficiency compared with listed manufacturing
firms with no R&D. This result is different from that of many other empirical results,
where a positive effect on a firm’s technical efficiency is found (see Section 3.6,
Chapter 3). Such a negative finding also implies that the R&D activities of listed
manufacturing firms were misreported in their annual reports, and in fact they did not
intend to implement them seriously. The empirical results found in the Agro and
Food Industry and Other Sectors are inconclusive due to differences in estimated
coefficient signs and significance results. No significant result was found for the
Industrials sub-sector.
Focusing on the classification of different ownership types among listed
manufacturing enterprises, the results from both approaches indicate that familyownership of firms has a significant and positive effect on their technical efficiency
for the SET’s manufacturing sector including Consumer Products. A positive result
is also found for Other Sectors, but only the empirical result from the SFA approach
is statistically significant. This positive result indicates that agency problems are
reduced due to the close relationship among family members. In other words, family
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ownership has advantages in communicating with other related members, and hence
the separation of management and control, which causes agency problems, is reduced
due to the close relationship among family members within the firm (Fama and
Jensen, 1983). A negative relationship is also found in the Industrials sector, but only
the empirical result from the DEA approach is statistically significant. This negative
result, however, indicates that agency problems exist from family ownership, since it
has the power to expropriate or marginalise the interests of minority shareholders. An
inconclusive result is found for the Agro and Food Industry due to the differences in
the estimated coefficient signs and significance results.
The empirical results from both estimation approaches reveal that foreignownership of firms has a significant and positive relationship with firm technical
efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector including Consumer Products. This
positive result indicates that foreign ownership has increasingly become important
for the improvement of firm technical efficiency, since it brings superior technology,
managerial expertise, good corporate governance, and a strong foreign - market
network (Kimura and Kiyota, 2007). A negative result is also found for Industrials,
but the empirical results from both estimation approaches are statistically
insignificant. Inconclusive results, however, are found for the Agro and Food
Industry and Other Sectors due to the differences in estimated coefficient signs and
significance results.
For domestic-owned firms a positive association is also found from both
estimation approaches for the SET’s manufacturing sector, but only the SFA
approach produces a significant result. The empirical results from both estimation
approaches reveal a significant and negative relationship between domestic-owned
firms and their technical efficiency for the Industrials and Other Sectors. An
inconclusive result is found for Agro and Food Industry due to differences in the
estimated coefficient signs and significance results. No significant result is found for
Consumer Products.
Hybrid-ownership of firms is found to have a significant and positive effect
on their technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector including Consumer
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Products. An inconclusive result is found for the Agro and Food Industry Sector due
to differences in the estimated coefficient signs and significance results. However, a
negative result is also found for the Other Sectors, but only the DEA approach
produces a significant result. No significant result is also found for Industrials. Jointownership of firms, as indicated by a constant term, is found to have a significant and
negative relationship with firm technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing
sector including all sub-manufacturing sectors, indicating that joint-ownership of
firms has the least technical efficiency compared with other ownership types. For
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, as indicated by significant dummy ownership
coefficients, foreign-owned firms perform the best among other types of owned
firms, followed by family-owned firms, hybrid-owned firms and domestic-owned
firms, given joint-owned firms as the base category.
Moreover, there is strong evidence from both estimation approaches that a
firm’s size tends to have a statistically positive effect on its technical efficiency for
the SET’s manufacturing sector including all sub-manufacturing sectors. This
indicates that firms are likely to perform better when their size is large due to
economies of scale, more business opportunities, improved efficiency in asset usage,
capital, technology management, and other operational synergies.
Both estimation approaches reveal that the effect of a firm’s age on its
technical efficiency is found to have a positive effect on firm technical efficiency for
the SET’s manufacturing sector, but the result from only the SFA approach is
statistically significant. A positive result indicates that learning-by-doing, as captured
by the number of operating years, is found to be positively related to technical
efficiency for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. Both estimation approaches,
however, find a significant and negative relationship between a firm’s age and its
technical efficiency for Consumer Products. Such a negative result is also found for
the Agro and Food Industry and the Industrials sub-sectors. The empirical result from
the DEA approach is statistically significant for the Agro and Food Industry, but a
significant result from the SFA approach is only found for the Industrials sector. This
negative finding also implies that old firms may lack the ability to improve their
physical capital, but young firms may apply more modern technology. Moreover,
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they may be more proactive, flexible, and aggressive than older firms (Aggrey et al.,
2010).
In addition, the relationship between government assistance and a firm’s
technical efficiency is found to be inconclusive for the SET’s manufacturing sector
including Consumer Products, due to the same significant results but differences in
the signs of the estimated coefficients. A negative relationship is also found for the
Agro and Food Industry and for Industrials, but only the DEA approach produces
results that are significant. As previously discussed, this negative result implies that
government assistance which only focuses on financial privileges provided by the
BOI is not likely to improve firm technical efficiency. An inconclusive result is
found for Other Sectors due to differences in estimated coefficient signs and
significance results. Lastly, foreign cooperation has a negative impact on a firm’s
technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector including the Agro and Food
Industry and Consumer Products sub-sectors, but only the SFA approach produces a
significant result. As previously discussed, listed firms may have faced operational
problems before requiring foreign cooperation. In addition, they must pay for such
technical assistance. Inconclusive results are found for the Industrials and Other
Sectors due to differences in the signs of estimated coefficients and for the
significance results.
6.6

The self-selection hypothesis
This section aims to analyse the self-selection hypothesis for Thai listed

manufacturing enterprises as part of hypothesis 8 in Chapter 5. In other words, the
effect of a firm’s technical efficiency on its export participation is examined in this
section. More specifically, inefficiency scores obtained from the Stochastic Frontier
(SFA) and the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approaches 95 are used separately
as the independent variable to examine this hypothesis. For the self-selection
hypothesis a dummy dependent variable for firm export participation is introduced,
and hence the binary response model is applicable to investigate this hypothesis.

95

Inefficiency scores are calculated by taking predicted efficiency scores subtracted from “unity”.
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For the binary response model, Wooldridge (2006, p256, 582) also mentioned
that the Probit and Logit models can overcome certain drawbacks from the limited
probability model (LPM), since the LPM model violates the homoskedasticity
assumption which is important for justifying the t and F statistics. The assumption of
linear parameters between the dependent and independent variables is also generally
required for the LPM model under the OLS estimation. The Probit model is also
more popularly compared with the Logit model, since economists are likely to favour
the normality assumption of the Probit model (Wooldridge, 2006, p385). In addition,
the method of maximum likelihood estimation of the Probit model automatically
accounts for the heteroskedasticity problem. As a result, the maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE) of the Probit model is applied in this section. For the Probit model
the G function is assumed to be an increasing function which lies between zero and
one (i.e., 0 G(z)

1). The Probit model can be written as follows (Wooldridge,

2006):

(6.11)
Where
G (z) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf)
is the standard normal density which is given by 2

/

exp (- / 2)

Firm export participation regressed by the lagged independent variables 96 are
investigated for the self-selection hypothesis since it is believed that export
participation may be dependent on previous firm-specific variables (Bernard and
Wagner, 2001; Greenaway et al., 2007; Bellone et al., 2010). The equation can be
written as follows 97 :

96

All independent variables are lagged one year so as to reduce possible simultaneity problems (see
Bernard and Jensen, 1999, p12).
97
The equation of firm export participation without lagged independent variables ( =
+
+
+ ) has also been examined, which provides
quite consistent results compared with Equation 6.12 (See Appendix 4). For the self-selection
hypothesis Equation 6.12, however, produces more consistent results, since the empirical results,
obtained by using either SFA or DEA technical inefficiency scores, consistently reveal a significant
and positive association between a firm’s technical efficiency and its export participation for the
SET’s manufacturing sector including almost all sub - manufacturing sectors (see Table 6.20).
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=

+

,
,

Where

,

+

,
,

+

(6.12)

= Dummy variable for export participation
=

1 if firm i at time t engages in export
0, otherwise

= Size of firm i at time t-1, represented by the logarithm of total assets

,

= Age of firm i at time t-1, represented by the logarithm of number of
operating years

,

= Inefficiency scores of firm i at time t-1, obtained from the Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA) or the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)

,

= Leverage of firm i at time t-1, represented by the ratio of total debt to
total assets (the D/A Ratio)

,

,

= The percentage of equity held by foreign investors of firm i at time t-1.
= Random error (

~

0,

))

From Equation 6.9, besides an investigation of the self-selection hypothesis
there are important factors that significantly affect firm export participation such as
firm size, firm age, firm leverage, and foreign investment (foreign ownership). Firm
size is one of the important factors that can determine firm export participation, since
large firms can cover sunk costs necessary to enter into export markets (Greenaway
et al., 2007). In other words, large firms can earn sufficient profits to cover their sunk
costs incurred during exporting (Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon, 2008). Firm age,
indicated by a learning-by-doing experience, can also significantly affect firm export
decisions, since old firms can compete with foreign companies due to their
cumulative experience, business network, and reputation. However, Aggrey et al.
(2010) pointed out that young firms are more proactive, flexible, and aggressive than
old firms. As a result, they are willing to adopt modern technology, but old firms are
stuck with outdated physical capital. Few empirical studies have investigated the
effect of leverage on firm export participation (Greenaway et al., 2007; Bellone et al.,
2010). Leverage can obstruct the possibility of a firm to export, since more liquid
and less leveraged firms are likely to export due to their ability to cover exporting
sunk costs. Foreign investment (foreign ownership) is also one of the significant
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factors that influences a firm’s decision to export, since foreign investment (foreign
ownership) brings advanced production technology, managerial expertise, foreign
networks and distribution (Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon, 2008).
The empirical results obtained from Equation (6.12) produces consistent
results for the self-selection hypothesis. Table 6.18 and 6.19 show the empirical
results for the self-selection hypothesis. The difference between Table 6.18 and 6.19
is that technical inefficiency scores are predicted by the Stochastic Frontier Analysis
(SFA) and the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), respectively. The signs of the
estimated coefficients for technical inefficiency scores, however, are interpreted in
the opposite direction to be consistent with hypothesis 8 discussed in Chapter 5.
Table 6.18: Maximum-likelihood Probit estimates for export participation of
listed manufacturing firms (using SFA technical inefficiency scores)
Dependent variable:
Export Participation
Obs. with Dependent variable = 0
Obs. with Dependent variable = 1
Total observations
Independent variables:
Constant
Firm Sizet-1
Firm Aget-1
Technical Inefficiency (SFA)t-1
Leveraget-1
Foreign Investmentt-1

McFadden R-squared
LR statistic
Probability (LR statistic)

All
Agro & Food Consumer Industrials Other
Manufacturing
Industry
Products
Sectorsa
247
884
1131

40
243
283

1
218
219

85
253
338

121
170
291

-1.278**
(0.729)
0.199*
(0.041)
-0.248*
(0.097)
-1.131*
(0.363)
0.054*
(0.021)
0.009*
(0.002)

-0.734
(1.897)
0.163**
(0.095)
-0.120
(0.331)
-0.950
(1.761)
-0.140
(0.239)
0.001
(0.007)

-54.910**
(29.029)
4.397**
(2.401)
2.009
(1.808)
-22.608*
(10.692)
-2.336
(1.906)
0.461*
(0.227)

-1.938
(1.435)
0.268*
(0.079)
-0.394*
(0.167)
-2.449*
(0.686)
0.565*
(0.252)
0.002
(0.005)

-2.878*
(0.938)
0.373*
(0.062)
-0.686*
(0.155)
-1.568**
(0.919)
-0.414**
(0.236)
0.014*
(0.003)

0.076
89.946
0.000

0.020
4.586
0.468

0.560
7.150
0.210

0.175
66.754
0.000

0.250
98.922
0.000

Source: Author’s estimates
Note: Huber/White Robust Standard Errors (S.E.) are in parentheses; * and ** indicate that the
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% and 10 % levels, respectively; a includes Publishing,
Construction Materials, and Technology (Electronic components).
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From Table 6.18 the empirical results reveal that the P-values for the LR test
statistics are less than 0.05, indicating that the joint significance of all explanatory
variables are statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance for the
SET’s manufacturing sector, including all sub-manufacturing sectors, except for the
Agro and Food Industry and Consumer Products sub-sector. For the self selection
hypothesis a firm’s technical efficiency has a significant and positive relationship
with its export participation for the SET’s manufacturing sector, including Consumer
Products, Industrials, and Other Sectors. A positive result is also found for the Agro
and Food Industry sector, but is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level of
significance (see Table 6.18).
Table 6.19: Maximum-likelihood Probit estimates for export participation of
listed manufacturing firms (using DEA technical inefficiency scores)
Dependent variable:
Export Participation
Obs. with Dependent variable = 0
Obs. with Dependent variable = 1
Total observations
Constant
Firm Sizet-1
Firm Aget-1
Technical Inefficiency(DEA)t-1
Leveraget-1
Foreign Investmentt-1

McFadden R-squared
LR statistic
Prob (LR statistic)

All
Agro & Food Consumer Industrials
Manufacturing Industry
Products

Other
Sectorsa

247
884
1131

40
243
283

1
218
219

85
253
338

121
170
291

-1.848*
(0.777)
0.224*
(0.045)
-0.249*
(0.100)
-0.136
(0.845)
0.035**
(0.020)
0.009*
(0.002)

2.044
(1.823)
-0.015
(0.114)
-0.040
(0.337)
-5.353*
(2.345)
-0.073
(0.233)
0.002
(0.007)

2.757
(8.937)
0.290
(0.642)
-0.334
(0.598)
-13.141*
(5.458)
-2.426*
(0.787)
0.583*
(0.245)

-3.597*
(1.319)
0.334*
(0.078)
-0.199
(0.162)
-3.276*
(1.283)
0.535**
(0.276)
0.001
(0.005)

-4.801*
(1.191)
0.474*
(0.073)
-0.759*
(0.156)
2.549
(1.843)
-0.423**
(0.247)
0.014*
(0.003)

0.066
78.694
0.000

0.037
8.602
0.126

0.427
5.449
0.364

0.145
55.225
0.000

0.249
98.303
0.000

Source: Author’s estimates
Note: Huber/White Robust Standard Errors (S.E.) are in parentheses; * and ** indicate that the
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% and 10 % levels, respectively; a includes Publishing,
Construction Materials, and Technology (Electronic components).
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With respect to DEA technical inefficiency scores used for the empirical
analysis the empirical results are shown in Table 6.19. These show that the P-values
for the LR test statistics are less than 0.05, indicating that the joint significance of all
explanatory variables are statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance
for the SET’s manufacturing sector including all sub-manufacturing sectors, except
for the Agro and Food Industry and Consumer Products sub sectors. From Table 6.19
a firm’s technical efficiency has a significant and positive effect on its export
participation for the Agro and Food Industry, Consumer Products, and Industrials sub
sectors. A positive result is also found in the SET’s manufacturing sector, but is not
statistically significant.
Table 6.20: Comparison of the results of maximum-likelihood estimates for
parameters between SFA technical inefficiency scores and DEA technical
inefficiency scores
Dependent variable:
Export Participation
Independent variables :
Constant
Firm Sizet-1
Firm Aget-1
Technical Inefficiencyt-1
Leveraget-1
Foreign Investmentt-1

All
Agro & Food Consumer
Industrials
Other
Manufacturing
Industry
Products
Sectorsa
SFA
DEA
SFA DEA SFA DEA SFA DEA SFA DEA
-**
+*
-*
-*
+*
+*

-*
+*
-*
+**
+*

+**
+

+
-*
+

-**
+**
+
-*
+*

+
+
-*
-*
+*

+*
-*
-*
+*
+

-*
+*
-*
+**
+

-*
+*
-*
-**
-**
+*

-*
+*
-*
+
-**
+*

Source: Author’s estimates
Note: * and ** indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% and the 10 % levels,
respectively; a includes Publishing, Construction Materials, and Technology (Electronic components).

From Table 6.20 the empirical results, obtained by using either SFA or DEA
technical inefficiency scores, consistently reveal a significant and positive
relationship between a firm’s technical efficiency and its export participation for the
Consumer products and Industrials sub sectors. A positive result is also found for the
SET’s manufacturing sector, but only the empirical result using SFA technical
inefficiency scores is statistically significant. A positive result between a firm’s
technical efficiency and its export participation is observed for the Agro and Food
Industry, but the empirical evidence using only the DEA technical inefficiency
scores is statistically significant. A significant and positive result applying SFA
technical inefficiency scores is found for the Other Sectors, but the empirical
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evidence using DEA technical inefficiency scores is statistically insignificant at the 5
percent level of significance. As a result, the significant and positive evidence is
consistent with other empirical studies, implying that only more efficient firms
participate in the export market since they can compete with foreign enterprises (see
Section 3.8.2, Chapter 3). In other words, the self-selection hypothesis exists for the
case of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
Besides the empirical evidence for the self-selection hypothesis, foreign
investment (foreign ownership) has a significant and positive effect on a firm’s
export participation for the SET’s manufacturing sector, including the Consumer
Products and Other Sectors. A positive result is also found in all other sub sectors,
but is not statistically significant. This result is also consistent with other empirical
studies (Greenaway et al., 2007; Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon, 2008; Aggrey et al.,
2010). For example, Greenaway et al. (2007) found that foreign ownership has a
significant and positive effect on firm export participation for 9,292 UK
manufacturing firms over the period 1993 to 2003. For Thailand Jongwanich and
Kohpaiboon (2008) used the 1997 Thai manufacturing census and found that foreign
ownership has a significant and positive impact on firm export participation for Thai
manufacturing enterprises. This positive result implies that an increase in foreign
participation also encourages firms to participate in the export market, since foreign
partners bring new foreign markets and distribution, new products, managerial know
how, and advanced production technology (Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon, 2008).
Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2008, p21) also pointed out that foreign owned firms
can cover sunk costs and enter into foreign markets more easily than domestically
owned firms.
Leverage is also found to have a significant and positive impact upon a firm’s
export participation for the SET’s manufacturing sector, including Industrials, but a
significant and negative association is found for the Other Sectors. A negative result
is also found for the Agro and Food industry and Consumer Products. However, the
empirical result using DEA inefficiency scores is found to be statistically significant
for only Consumer Products. This positive result is different from other empirical
studies that exporters are financially healthier than non-exporters (Greenaway et al.,
2007; Bellone et al., 2010). However, this result is plausible for young exporters.
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Their leverage can be increased, since they must pay sunk costs in entering into
export markets (Greenaway et al., 2007, p382). Moreover, the empirical evidence
indicates that there is a significant and positive association between a firm’s size and
its export participation for the SET’s manufacturing sector including Industrials and
Other Sectors, indicating that large firms are likely to engage in the export market
due to their ability to compete internationally with foreign enterprises. In other
words, the high fixed costs of exporting (sunk costs) cause difficulty for small firms
to engage in export markets. A significant and positive effect is also found for
Consumer Products, but only the result using SFA technical inefficiency scores is
statistically significant. An inconclusive result is found for the Agro and Food
Industry sector due to differences in the estimated coefficient signs and significance
results. Finally, the effect of a firm’s age and its export participation is found to be
significantly negative for the SET’s manufacturing sector including Other Sectors. A
negative effect is also found in the Industrials sector, but only the result using SFA
technical inefficiency scores is statistically significant. No significant evidence,
however, is found for the Agro and Food Industry and Consumer Products sub
sectors. This negative result also implies that old firms may be stuck with outdated
physical capital, but young firms may apply more modern technology and they may
be more proactive, flexible, and aggressive than old firms (Aggrey et al., 2010).
6.7

Conclusions
This chapter has aimed to measure the technical efficiency performance of

Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, and answer eight hypotheses highlighted in
Chapter 5, by employing two estimation approaches to test for the robustness of the
results: (i) the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) approach and (ii) the two - stage
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach. For the SFA approach the Battese and
Coelli (1995) model was applied, which is applicable for unbalanced panel data for
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
For the Battese and Coelli (1995) model the Translog frontier production
function and the inefficiency effects model are estimated simultaneously by
FRONTIER 4.1. Technical inefficiency effects, used as the dependent variable, are
estimated using the Translog frontier production function, and are then regressed on
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business environment and firm-specific variables (the independent variables)
simultaneously. For the two-stage DEA approach the first-stage is to predict
technical efficiency scores using variable returns to scale (VRS) linear programming
by DEAP 2.1. Technical efficiency scores predicted by DEAP 2.1 are converted into
technical inefficiency scores by subtracting predicted technical efficiency scores
from “unity”.
Moreover, business environment and firm-specific variables, previously used
for the SFA approach, are also applied as the independent variables. The maximumlikelihood Tobit model is applied to study the effects of business environment and
firm-specific variables on firm technical inefficiency scores for the second stage of
the two - stage DEA approach. The empirical results from the SFA and DEA are
summarized in Table 6.17. In addition, the maximum-likelihood Probit model is
conducted to answer the last part of hypothesis 8 discussed in Chapter 5. Eight
hypotheses discussed in Chapter 5 are answered, which focus on the empirical
evidence for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises as follows:
Hypothesis 1: There is strong evidence from both estimation approaches that
financial constraints (leverage) have a significant and positive relationship with
technical efficiency for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, implying that
financially constrained firms tend to improve their technical efficiency through the
effective control of input costs and financial resources. Vice versa, the empirical
evidence from both estimation approaches also indicate that liquidity has a negative
effect on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, indicating
that financially healthy firms are likely to neglect enhancing their technical
efficiency due to an excess of financial liquidity.
Hypothesis 2: The empirical evidence from the SFA approach reveals that external
financing has a significant and negative relationship with technical efficiency for
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, which is opposite to the statement of this
hypothesis. A negative result is also found from the DEA approach, but it is not
statistically significant. This negative finding does not suggest a significant impact
on a firm’s technical efficiency due to the very small size (close to zero) of the
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estimated “external financing” coefficient. On the other hand, there is evidence from
the SFA approach that internal financing has a significant and negative effect on
technical efficiency for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, indicating that
managers tend to utilize internal funds ineffectively due to a lack of external
monitoring. Kim (2003, p134) also emphasized that this normally exists in several
underdeveloped countries where firms’ managerial skills are not fully strengthened
and firm operation information is not fully disclosed to investors, and therefore there
is an opportunity for managers to maximize their benefits rather than the firm’s
value. A negative result is also found from the DEA approach, but it is not
statistically significant.
Hypothesis 3: The empirical evidence from both estimation approaches reveal that
research and development (R&D) expenditure has a significant and negative
relationship with technical efficiency for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. This
result is different from the expected positive result for this hypothesis. Such a
negative finding, however, suggests that most listed manufacturing firms
misleadingly reported their R&D activities in their annual report, and in fact did not
intend to implement these activities seriously.
Hypothesis 4: The empirical results from the SFA approach reveal that controlling
ownership has a significant and positive effect on technical efficiency for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises. This supports the agency theory that controlling
shareholders are likely to perform better than dispersed shareholders, since a high
level of ownership concentration can reduce agency costs. A positive result is also
found from the DEA approach, but it is not statistically significant.
Hypothesis 5: There is strong evidence from both estimation approaches that
managerial ownership has a significant and positive effect on technical efficiency for
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. This indicates that the agency problem is
reduced, since managerial ownership can help align the conflict of interests between
shareholders and managers. In other words this result implies that a group of people,
who receive direct benefits from the firm through dividends relative to the level of
their cash flow or voting rights, tend to monitor the firm carefully and effectively. On
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the contrary, managers who do not hold any ownership over a firm’s cash flow or
voting stocks lack the incentive to monitor the firm effectively, since they do not
participate in profit sharing in the form of dividends.
Hypothesis 6: There is strong evidence from both estimation approaches that
executive remuneration has a significant and positive effect on technical efficiency
for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, indicating that listed manufacturing firms
with higher levels of executive remuneration tend to have more technical efficiency.
The reason is that the amount of bonuses or increased salaries that executives (i.e.,
board of directors and managers), will receive, in practice, depends upon the firm’s
annual net profits. In some listed firms, the amount of executive remuneration (i.e.,
bonuses) is based on the percentage of the firm’s annual net profits. Hence, there is a
strong incentive for executives to control input costs and maximize the firm’s net
profit.
Hypothesis 7: There is strong evidence from both estimation approaches that foreign
and family ownership exerts a significant and positive effect on the technical
efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. With respect to the size of the
estimated coefficients for each type of owned-firm, there is strong evidence from
both estimation approaches that foreign-owned firms perform the best for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, followed by family-owned firms, hybrid-owned firms and
domestic-owned firms, given joint-owned firms as the base category.
Hypothesis 8: There is strong evidence from both estimation approaches that
exporting has a significant and positive association with the technical efficiency of
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. This result reveals the existence of a learning
by exporting hypothesis, indicating that exporting firms are also likely to improve
their technical efficiency due to their learning-by-exporting experience (i.e., new
product designs and production methods). Vice versa, there is evidence that a firm’s
technical efficiency predicted by the SFA approach has a significant and positive
effect on its export participation for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. In other
words the self-selection hypothesis exists for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises,
implying that only more efficient firms participate in the export market since they
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can compete with foreign enterprises. The positive effect of a firm’s technical
efficiency predicted by the DEA approach on its export participation is also found for
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, but it is not statistically significant.
Besides the empirical evidence for the hypotheses mentioned above, this
chapter has also shown empirical evidence with respect to the effects of (i) firm age,
(ii) firm size, (iii) government assistance, and (iv) foreign cooperation on firm
technical efficiency. There is strong evidence that a firm’s size has a statistically
positive effect on its technical efficiency for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
Furthermore, the empirical results from both estimation approaches reveal that a
firm’s age is positively related with its technical efficiency for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, but only the empirical evidence from the SFA reveals a
significant result. This positive result implies that a firm’s technical efficiency is
improved through accumulated experience.
The relationship between government assistance and a firm’s technical
efficiency, however, is found to be inconclusive. While both approaches indicate that
this is significant the coefficients have different signs (positive and negative). Lastly,
empirical results from both estimation approaches indicate that foreign cooperation
has a negative impact on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises, but only the empirical result obtained from the SFA approach is
statistically significant. For sub-listed manufacturing sectors the results from both
approaches empirically find quite consistent results in coefficient signs, but
significance results from both estimation approaches may be different (see Table
6.17).
In comparing the two estimation approaches, the advantage of the stochastic
frontier analysis (SFA) approach, under the specification of Battese and Coelli
(1995), is that it allows investigation of technical progress through an estimated
production function. For the DEA approach the investigation of technological
progress can be referred to, for example, using a Malmquist TFP index, which can be
decomposed into “technical efficiency change” and “technological change” (see
Chapter 4). A Malmquist TFP index analysed by DEA, however, can only be applied
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for the case of balanced panel data. The SFA approach can investigate types of
returns to scale for the industry-level context through an aggregate of estimated input
elasticities (Coelli et al., 2005, p304), but the DEA approach can examine types of
returns to scale for the firm-level context. For the SFA approach the coefficients of
time interacted with labour (

and capita;

) for Thai listed manufacturing

enterprises are significantly negative and positive, respectively, indicating that
technical change has been labour-using but capital-saving (see Table 6.7). This result
implies that technological progress for Thai listed manufacturing firms still relies on
basic production resources, such as labour input.
Similarly, the production of Thai listed manufacturing firms is also mainly
contributed by intermediate inputs and labour input, but capital is found to be the
least important input (see Table 6.9). The rate of technical change is found to be
0.0205 for the SET’s manufacturing sector, indicating that the rate of technical
change increases at 2.05 percent per year (see Table 6.9). Furthermore, both
estimation approaches reveal that Thai listed manufacturing enterprises have been
operating under decreasing returns to scale over the period 2000 to 2008, since the
calculated returns to scale is given by 0.919 for the SFA approach (see Table 6.9).
This finding is also consistent with the empirical evidence from the DEA approach
that approximately 86 percent of the listed manufacturing enterprises were operating
under decreasing returns to scale (DRS) on average over the period 2000 to 2008.
The drawback of FRONTIER 4.1 used for the SFA approach has also been
found by the author. The empirical results are volatile subject to the decimal digits
used in each variable 98 . This problem has not been raised in any literature. To deal
with this problem it is necessary to apply the same decimal digits for all variables 99
across all sub manufacturing sectors. This can help in producing accurate and reliable
empirical results for this thesis.

98
99

Except a dummy variable, since it only has “1” or “0”.
Eight decimal digits are applied for all variables.
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A two stage DEA approach 100 can be useful for a robust checking of the
empirical results, since it applies different software and techniques. One prominent
advantage of this approach is that it does not require any functional form of the
production function. For the SFA approach the differences in production
technologies (e.g., Cobb-Douglas and Translog Production functions) and the
significance of estimated coefficient inputs, however, can alter the empirical results
of a particular study. A number of studies in the efficiency literature also suggest that
it seems prudent to analyse the firm’s technical efficiency using both estimation
techniques to “cross-check” the results (Bauer et al., 1998; Stone, 2002; Jacobs et al.,
2006; Miranda et al., 2010). Finally, the empirical results obtained for all hypotheses,
including other related questions, will be used to conduct the policy implications in
Chapter 7.

100

DEAP Version 2.1 is used to produce technical efficiency scores for the first stage, and other
econometric softwares (e.g., EVIEWS and STATA) can be used for the second stage to link business
environment and firm specific variables with technical inefficiency scores (converted from technical
efficiency scores).
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CHAPTER 7
Policy Implications and Recommendations

7.1

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide valuable policy implications and

recommendations based on the empirical evidence for the technical efficiency
performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, and hypotheses 1 to 8 in
Chapter 6. These policies and recommendations aim to improve the technical
efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. The structure of this chapter is as
follows:
Section 7.2 lays emphasis upon policy implications and recommendations
based on the empirical evidence for the technical efficiency performance of Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises. Section 7.3 focuses on policy implications and
recommendations based on the empirical evidence for hypotheses 1 and 2. The first
part of this section provides policies and recommendations focusing on the empirical
evidence of hypothesis 1 which is related to the effects of leverage and liquidity on
the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing firms. The second part of this
section also suggests policy implications and recommendations based on the
empirical result for hypothesis 2, which investigates the effects of internal and
external financing on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises. Section 7.4 provides policies and recommendations based on the
empirical result for hypothesis 3, which examines the effect of research and
development (R&D) on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises. Section 7.5 also suggests policy implications and recommendations with
respect to the empirical results for hypotheses 4 and 5. The first part of this section
focuses on policies and recommendations based on the empirical evidence of
hypothesis 4 which examines the effect of controlling ownership on the technical
efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing firms. In addition, the second part of this
section lays emphasis upon policies and recommendations based on the empirical
evidence for hypothesis 5, which is related to the effect of managerial ownership on
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the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. Section 7.6 also
provides policy implications and recommendations based on the empirical results for
hypothesis 6, which investigates the effect of executive remuneration on the
technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. Section 7.7 also
suggests policy implications and recommendations focusing on the empirical
evidence for hypothesis 7, which is related to the effects of foreign and family
ownership on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
Section 7.8 introduces policy implications and recommendations based on the
empirical findings for the last hypothesis, which examines the existence of the
learning-by-exporting and self-selection hypotheses for Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises. Section 7.9 also provides policy implications and recommendations
based on the empirical evidence of the effect of firm-specific factors (e.g., firm size
and firm age) on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
Finally, conclusions are provided in Section 7.10.
7.2

The technical efficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises
The SFA and DEA approaches reveal predicted mean technical efficiency

scores of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises of 0.812 and 0.887, respectively,
indicating that Thai listed manufacturing enterprises operated at a high level of
technical efficiency. Even though the technical efficiency performance of Thai listed
manufacturing firms is high, they have operated under decreasing returns to scale 101 ,
and have relied on labour-intensive or low value added production activities (see
Chapter 6). To operate on a higher production frontier, or to enhance the future
technical efficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, they
should focus on upgrading their production technology, or participating in higher
value-adding production activities. The government, via the Board of Investment
(BOI), can help promote the enhancement of their production technology, and higher
value-adding production activity participation through BOI financial and non101

The estimated returns to scale is calculated by the sum of the elasticity of output with respect to
capital ( , the elasticity of output with respect to labour ( , and the elasticity of output with respect
(see Section 6.5.1). From Tables 6.8 and 6.9 in Chapter 6 the estimated
to intermediate inputs (
returns to scale for Thai listed manufacturing firms is 0.9187, which is lower than one. This result
indicates that their production operated under “decreasing returns to scale” during the period 2000 to
2008.
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financial privileges. According to investment promotion policies prescribed by the
BOI, promoting the competitiveness of Thai quality and production standards in the
world market is one of the BOI’s key investment promotion policies. In practice the
BOI has introduced measures to encourage investors to improve their production
along with an increase in their revenues and the maintenance of their employment
since 4th March 2009 (The Board of Investment, 2010a). The BOI investment
promotion measures aim to provide financial incentives such as (i) import duty
exemption on new machinery and (ii) a three-year corporate income tax exemption
on revenues which are obtained from the production of new products for investors
who upgrade their existing production line for new manufactured goods (The Board
of Investment, 2010a). The SET and SEC can promote and facilitate fundraising
which will be used for productive investments of Thai listed manufacturing firms,
such as upgrading their production technology and improving their value-adding
production.
7.3

Finance (Hypotheses 1 and 2)

7.3.1 Leverage and liquidity (Hypothesis 1)
Focusing on the empirical evidence for hypothesis 1, there is strong evidence
from both estimation approaches that financial constraints (leverage) have a
significant and positive association with the technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises. Vice versa, the empirical results from both estimation
approaches also indicate that more liquidity is associated with less technical
efficiency for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
Listed manufacturing firms which have high leverage are likely to improve
their technical efficiency through the effective control of input costs and financial
resources. In addition, it is possible that Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, which
are found to have high leverage, might be investing in capital intensive projects,
since they aim to improve their future production process or extend the capacity of
their production (e.g., building new plant, acquiring new machinery and equipment).
These capital intensive projects, however, require large funding (e.g., long-term
loans received from financial institutions, or issuance of debentures). As a result they
might be technically efficient, but their leverage might be high due to new
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technology investment used for enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of their
future production. However, Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, which have high
liquidity, might appear to be less technically efficient, since they might be stuck with
old machinery and equipment, and prefer not to invest in new technology. The SET
and SEC, therefore, should promote only productive investments by Thai listed
manufacturing firms. More specifically, the SET and SEC 102 can support and
facilitate them in raising enough funds (e.g., issuing shares to (i) existing
shareholders (rights offering), (ii) a specific group of strategic investors (private
placement), and (iii) public investors (public offering)) to finance their technology
investments (see hypothesis 2 in Section 7.3.1). In other words, the SET can help
attract foreign and local investors to invest in Thai listed manufacturing enterprises
which have productive investments. As discussed earlier in Section 7.2, the BOI can
promote BOI privileged participation of Thai listed manufacturing firms which are
interested in launching new products and upgrading their production technology.
7.3.2 Internal and external financing (Hypothesis 2)
From the empirical evidence for hypothesis 2 both internal and external
financing are found to have a significant and negative association with the technical
efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, but external financing has a very
small estimated coefficient (close to zero). A significant and negative effect of
internal financing on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises
indicates that managers tend to utilize internal funds ineffectively due to a lack of
external monitoring (see Chapter 6). However, it is unavoidable for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises to use either external or internal financing. Focusing on
the use of internal financing it is possible that firms’ managerial skills are not fully
strengthened and firm operation information is not fully disclosed to investors, and,
therefore, there is an opportunity for managers to maximize their benefits rather than
the firm’s value (Kim, 2003, p134). As a result, internal financing transactions
should be fully disclosed to avoid an agency problem. Managers (or connected
persons to listed manufacturing companies) may use internal funds for their own
interests, or they lack the desire to maximize shareholders’ interests due to the lack
102

The SEC, which is an independent state agency, has responsibilities for supervising and developing
the Thai capital market. A listed manufacturing firm must obtain approval from the SEC when raising
funds by a public offering.
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of external monitoring from banks or financial institutions as argued by Jensen
(1986). In other to reduce these influences the SET monitors any connected
transaction between listed companies including subsidiaries and persons who control
the companies’ decision-making. There are a number of connected transactions of
listed companies which have been monitored by the SET, such as (i) an ordinary and
normal business transaction, (ii) a supporting ordinary and normal business
transaction, (iii) a short-term property rental or lease, (iv) an asset or service
transaction, and (v) a financial assistance transaction.
According to the SET’s connected transaction regulations, financial
assistance transactions can be classified into two categories. First, where any listed
company, including its subsidiary, receives or grants financial assistance to another
company. Moreover, a connected person is someone who holds shares in another
company “less than or equal” to his share holdings in a listed company including its
subsidiaries. In this case the listed company is required to compare the connected
transaction value with its net tangible assets (NTA) 103 , and follow the criteria and
procedures as summarized in Table 7.1.
Second, where any listed company, including its subsidiary, grants financial
assistance to a person or a company. In addition, a connected person is someone who
holds shares in that company “more than” the shares that he actually holds in the
listed company including its subsidiaries. The listed firm, therefore, must compare
the connected transaction value with its net tangible assets (NTA), and follow the
criteria and procedures as summarized in Table 7.2.
As a result the SET has imposed the criteria and procedures for its members
to follow if they have connected transactions involving financial assistance.

103

NTA = total assets – (total liabilities + intangible assets + minority equity) (The Stock Exchange of
Thailand, 2009, p55).
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Table 7.1: The criteria and procedures for financial assistance transactions
(Case 1)
Levels of connected transaction
Criteria
Procedures
Non-significance
Less than or equal to THB 1 million or • Summarize and disclose
0.03 % of NTA (whichever is higher)
in the annual report.
Moderate significance

Greater than THB 1 million or 0.03% • Obtain approval from
of NTA (whichever is higher) but less
the board of directors,
than THB 20 million or 3% of NTA
and report to the SET.
(whichever is higher)
• Summarize and disclose
in the annual report.

Substantial significance

More than or equal to THB 20 million • Obtain approval from
or 3 % of NTA (whichever is higher)

the board of directors,
and report to the SET.
• Obtain approval from
shareholders.
• Summarize and disclose
in the annual report.

Source: Author (the information is obtained from the Listed Companies Handbook (2009));
Where, NTA is net tangible assets (see footnote 103).

Table 7.2: The criteria and procedures for financial assistance transactions
(Case 2)
Levels of connected transaction
Moderate significance

Criteria
Less than THB 100 million or
3 % of NTA (whichever is lower)

Procedures
• Obtain approval from
the board of directors,
and report to the SET.
• Summarize and disclose
in the annual report.

Substantial significance

More than or equal to THB 100
• Obtain approval from
million or 3 % of NTA (whichever is
the board of directors,
and report to the SET.
lower)
• Appoint an independent
financial analyst.
• Obtain approval from
shareholders.
• Summarize and disclose
in the annual report.

Source: Author (the information is obtained from the Listed Companies Handbook (2009));
Where, NTA is net tangible assets (see footnote 103).

258

This is to prevent a conflict of interest caused by connected persons and to
protect the benefits of shareholders. In the case of substantial significance, as
indicated in Tables 7.1 and 7.2, shareholders, especially minority shareholders, play
an important role in monitoring these connected transactions, since they need to
approve these connected transactions. Therefore, information with respect to
minority shareholders’ roles and rights should be promoted, since this can help them
in realizing the importance of their voting rights for the meeting of shareholders and
also encourage them to participate in shareholders’ meetings. In addition, the SET
should monitor listed manufacturing firms to ensure their internal financing
transactions are fully disclosed to minority shareholders.
Focusing on the effect of external financing on the technical efficiency of
Thai listed manufacturing firms, the negative result 104 for hypothesis 2 implies that
listed manufacturing firms, which obtain external financing, are obligated to pay
different interest payments subject to the amount of their loans and current economic
conditions (e.g., financial institutions normally prefer to provide a floating interest
rate which can be altered according to (i) interest rates announced by the Bank of
Thailand and (ii) financial costs of each financial institution). More importantly,
listed manufacturing firms are obligated to pay principle and interest to creditors on
time as stated in their loan agreements. They, however, might not be able to pay their
loans and interest regularly due to unexpected circumstances (e.g., Thai political
unrest, global financial crisis, unexpected interest rate hike, and Thai currency
appreciation). Therefore, interest payments known as the cost of external financing
can decrease the competitiveness and efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises 105 . It is possible that Thai listed manufacturing firms might misuse the
loans granted by financial institutions and put these to other purposes (e.g., buying
listed firms’ shares in the stock market), resulting in a deterioration of their
efficiency performance.

104

However, the effect of external financing on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing
firms is very small (its estimated coefficient is close to zero).
105
The fluctuation of interest rates charged by financial institutions directly impacts the cost of
production of firms (or the input cost in firm production) and, therefore, may adversely affect the
competitiveness and efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing firms.
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As a result, equity instruments (e.g., issuing shares to investors) are also
alternative funding sources for Thai listed manufacturing firms, besides issuing debt
instruments (e.g., debentures) and borrowing funds from financial institutions (e.g.,
short-term and long-term loans). A dividend payment is the cost of equity
instruments, but it provides more flexibility than a loan repayment (The Stock
Exchange of Thailand, 2009b). The reason is that the amount of the dividend
payment is subject to the performance of Thai listed manufacturing firms, which will
be paid only in the case where profits are made. Issuing equity instruments, however,
may cause dilution of control for existing shareholders (or the dilution effect). In
practice, the listed manufacturing firms’ equity can be issued to different investors
such as (i) existing shareholders (rights offering), (ii) a specific group of strategic
investors (private placement), and (iii) public investors (public offering). Thai listed
manufacturing firms can, firstly, consider a rights offering 106 to existing
shareholders. In other words, they should provide the opportunity for existing
shareholders to buy new shares subject to the proportion of their existing shares. It is
possible that some of the existing shareholders prefer not to buy new shares or
maintain their controlling rights, and therefore they may initiate a public offering 107
(e.g., offering new shares to the public) or a private placement 108 (e.g., involving a
particular group of strategic investors). These equity instruments can increase the
liquidity and stock prices of firms.
In addition, the SET and the government, via the SEC, may support equity
financing that will be used to conduct only productive investments (e.g., upgrading
new technology), and avoid equity financing support which aims to roll over the
existing debts of Thai listed manufacturing firms. All information regarding the
106

For a rights offering listed firms must receive approval from the board of directors and from a
meeting of shareholders. In addition, they must write notices of the allocation of new shares to
existing shareholders and the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) at least five business days
beforehand (The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2009b).
107
After obtaining approval from the board of directors and the meeting of shareholders as well as
informing the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), listed firms must submit their applications and
reports (a filing) to the Office of Securities Commission (SEC) for final approval (The Stock
Exchange of Thailand, 2009b).
108
For a private placement (PP) listed firms must obtain approval from the board of directors and the
meeting of shareholders as well as informing the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). However, there
is no requirement for them to submit their applications and reports to the Office of Securities
Commission (SEC) for final approval, but they need to disclose the information (e.g., the subscription
form, the payment methods, the name of investors) to the SET (The Stock Exchange of Thailand,
2009b).
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purpose of the use of equity financing should be fully disclosed to investors,
especially for the case of public offerings. This is because incorrect or hidden
information about listed manufacturing firms’ securities provided to investors can
harm investors’ benefits, and, therefore, reduce the reliability of the Thai equity
market. Finally, in practice, it is very difficult to determine an adequate level of
internal and external financing to be used for each Thai listed manufacturing firm 109 ,
due to differences in their financial status and size. In practice, listed manufacturing
firms are normally required to appoint an independent financial analyst to provide a
third party comment on their financial activities which directly affect shareholders’
benefits (e.g., issuing debentures or shares). These financial analysts must be
certified by the SEC so that they can legally comment on those listed manufacturing
firms’ financial activities. Therefore, the government, via the SEC, can play an
important role in promoting the reliability of these financial analysts. For example,
providing regular training courses related to updated regulations of the SEC for
certified financial analysts are also important to prevent any harmful action to
shareholders or investors. Strong and prompt penalties on those financial analysts,
including listed manufacturing firms, who are fraudulent should be strengthened to
ensure compatibility with international standards.
7.4

Research and Development (R&D) (Hypothesis 3)
The empirical evidence for hypothesis 3 in Chapter 6 reveals that for both

approaches research and development (R&D) has a significant and negative impact
on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. This result is the
opposite of what might be expected. Such a negative finding, however, suggests that
most listed manufacturing firms might misleadingly reported R&D activities in their
annual report, and in fact did not intend to implement these activities seriously. In
other words, they used R&D funds very ineffectively or in areas that did not enhance
their technical efficiency. In addition, some deductible expenses such as total R&D
expenditure, job training expenses, and expenditure on the provision of equipment
for the disabled are allowed to increase at a 200 percent rate of actual expenses for
the purpose of corporate income tax (CIT) reduction (The Board of Investment,

109

From the finance literature this refers to the optimal capital structure where a firm uses a mix of
concentrated debt and equity to maximise its value (Beal, 2008, p241).
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2010b). Thai listed manufacturing enterprises also report their R&D activities
including employee training activities in their annual reports (56-1 form). As a result
they are likely to include these expenses in order to reduce their corporate income tax
and provide a good image to the public and possible investors without enhancing
their efficiency, since they have lacked serious intention to develop, for example,
their existing products and production processes as well as enhancing their employee
capabilities.
The government, including the SET, should, therefore, monitor Thai listed
manufacturing firms’ R&D and employee training activities very closely, since these
R&D activities, including all R&D transactions, have not required disclosure in their
annual reports since 2008. For example, R&D evaluation reports should be required
and submitted to the government (e.g., the Revenue Department of Thailand) instead
of providing only R&D billing expenses to claim the reduction in corporate income
tax (CIT). The government, via the BOI, can play an important role in promoting the
technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing firms by providing financial and
non-financial privileges for those firms which lay emphasis on R&D activities. More
importantly, the government should focus on promoting the SET manufacturing
sector’s innovation readiness, including all manufacturing sub-sectors besides
providing financial privileges 110 . Providing only financial privileges for Thai listed
manufacturing firms may help them generate more profits during the BOI’s financial
privilege period, but they lack a long-term efficiency improvement.
The BOI should review these activities regularly, after BOI privileges have
been granted, to increase the effectiveness of this policy implementation, and,
therefore, enhance the performance of Thai listed manufacturing firms. Similarly,
R&D evaluation reports must be submitted to the SET besides providing brief
explanations of R&D activities as listed in manufacturing firms’ annual reports. It is
also recommended that the SET conduct its annual R&D report which aims to
provide the ranking of Thai listed manufacturing firms’ R&D development and give
explicit recognition to those firms which have successfully achieved their R&D

110

See “government assistance” in Section 7.9 for similar comments.
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improvement. This is to encourage serious R&D activity participation by Thai listed
manufacturing firms.
7.5

Ownership structure (Hypotheses 4 and 5)

7.5.1 Controlling ownership (Hypothesis 4)
For hypothesis 4 the empirical results from the SFA approach reveal that
controlling ownership has a significant and positive effect on the technical efficiency
of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. A positive result is also found from the
DEA approach, but it is not statistically significant. Controlling shareholders are,
therefore, likely to improve the performance of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises, since they are likely to monitor their listed firms very closely, which is
different from dispersed shareholders who lack the incentive and ability to monitor
their firms.
Without close monitoring of listed manufacturing firms which have a high
level of controlling ownership, controlling shareholders may deteriorate the
performance of Thai listed manufacturing firms since the interest of controlling
shareholders may not align with those of non-controlling shareholders (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997; Bebchuk et al., 1999). In other words, they might conduct corrupt
activities (e.g., conducting connected transactions which only benefit their group but
which adversely affects the profitability of listed firms). As a result, providing
information with respect to minority shareholders’ roles and voting rights over their
listed manufacturing companies is very important, and, therefore, should be
promoted as a checks and balances mechanism. For example, most minority
shareholders focus upon annual dividends paid by their listed manufacturing firms.
They lack a willingness to monitor the operation of their listed manufacturing firms.
In other words, they prefer not to attend “annual general meetings (AGM)” including
“extraordinary general meetings (EGM)”, since they believe that they cannot
influence any proposed agenda in the meeting. This might reduce the benefits that
they receive in the future, since current actions by the management of listed
manufacturing firms may adversely affect the overall firms’ performance or only
benefit a specific group (e.g., executives, directors, or any persons related to
executives and directors).
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According to the Public Limited Company Act (2535) there are a number of
special cases (e.g., (i) increasing or decreasing registered capital, (ii) selling or
transferring a company’s business to other persons, (iii) buying other companies’
businesses, (iv) signing, changing, and exterminating a business lease of the
company with other companies as well as assigning other persons to manage the
company’s business and merging the company’s business with other persons for the
purpose of sharing profit and losses, (v) issuing the company’s debentures) where
listed companies 111 must have shareholders controlling at least 75 percent of total
shares attending the meeting and eligible to vote (see Public Limited Company Act
(2535)). Minority shareholders, therefore, can play an important role in monitoring
listed manufacturing firms’ actions as mentioned previously. As a result, it is very
important to promote a checks and balances mechanism by educating the importance
of their roles and controlling rights over their listed manufacturing companies. The
reasons for this are now discussed:
With respect to the Public Limited Company Act (2535), Section 108 of this
Act also provides the right for shareholders to request the court 112 to order
cancellation or suspended resolution of that shareholders’ meeting if they found that
the company did not follow the rules and conduct as stated in its articles of
association 113 , or in this Act’s provisions. However, they must submit their appeal
within one month. More specifically, “at least five shareholders” or “shareholders
gathering at least 10 percent of the total number of sold shares” are eligible to
request the court to consider and cancel the resolution of a particular meeting which
are contradictory with the company’s articles of association or the Public Law
Limited Company Act (2535). In addition, Section 129 of this Act also provides
“shareholders who gather at least 10 percent of the total number of sold shares” or
“one-third of the total number of shareholders” can request the registrar to appoint

111

In order to become a listed company it must be registered as a “public limited company” or
corporation established under a special law, and approved by the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET)
subject to the SET’s listing criteria (The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2009a).
112
In Bangkok the court is referred to as the Civil and Provincial Court. For the rest of Thailand each
province has its own Provincial and Municipal Court. They, therefore, can request the court in the
province where a listed manufacturing enterprise has been established.
113
The articles are required in establishing a company. For a listed company the articles of association
consists of a number of chapters, such as (i) general provisions, (ii) directors, (iii) shares and
shareholders, (iv) shareholder meetings , (v) balance sheet, and (vi) dividend and reserve fund.

264

an inspector(s) to investigate the company’s operations and financial status (see
Public Limited Company Act (2535)). As a result, if minority shareholders fail to
closely monitor the transparency of listed manufacturing companies’ operations,
their benefits might not be maximized due to agency costs from mismanaged or
corrupt activities. The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), the government, via the
Office of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Thai Investors
Association (TIA) can continuously provide training courses, or necessary updated
information, regarding investors (or shareholders)’ roles and rights, since the SET’s
rules and regulations have been continuously improved.
The SET has also considered the importance of maintaining sufficient
minority shareholders, and, therefore, every listed company 114 must have at least 150
shareholders whose shares must amount to not less than 15 percent of the listed
company’s paid-up capital. A listed company which cannot meet this requirement (or
the free-float requirement) for two consecutive years or more will result in a public
announcement by the SET, and penalty fees based on the level of their free float
shortfall and the number of years where they have started to experience a free float
shortfall. This is a good monitoring policy in maintaining sufficient minority
shareholders. Therefore, it is very important that the SET keeps monitoring Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises to meet the free float requirement. In addition, the
SET should disclose the names of those listed companies which cannot meet free
float requirements promptly. This is because it would help new investors to decide
whether they should invest in those listed manufacturing firms or not. This also helps
encourage listed manufacturing companies to rectify this problem in order to
maintain their good public image. The government, via the SEC, can help protect
minority shareholders by strengthening its regulations to be in line with international
corporate governance standards to protect minority shareholders’ benefits, since any
action of listed manufacturing firms, which directly affects shareholder’s benefits or
decisions (e.g., issuing securities and disclosing company information to investors),
must be approved by the SEC.

114

Companies which are rehabilitating under the Central Bankruptcy Court and are not required to
organize their annual general meeting (AGM) are exempted from the free-float requirement.
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7.5.2

Managerial ownership (Hypothesis 5)
The empirical results for hypothesis 5 indicate strong evidence from both

estimation approaches that managerial ownership has a significant and positive
association with the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
This indicates that managerial ownership can reduce the agency problem by helping
to align the interests of both shareholders and managers (see Chapter 6). From
Appendices 1.1 and 1.2 the 10 best listed manufacturing enterprises in 2008 have
managerial ownership averaging 23.38 percent which is higher than managerial
ownership of the 10 least listed manufacturing enterprises, averaging 16.81 percent.
Managerial ownership, therefore, can be promoted for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, since it can enhance their technical efficiency. In practice,
“stock options” provided for executives, including employees, can be used to
increase managerial ownership of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. Stock
options are the right that employees receive to purchase their companies’ shares for a
specific price and also at a specified period of time (Delves, 2004). In the case of
Thailand, stock options are also known as the “Employee Stock Option Program
(ESOP)”. The ESOP allows employees, including executives, to engage in the listed
firms’ performance through the appreciation of their companies’ share values and the
receipt of dividends. As part of the ESOP either “warrant” or “convertible debentures
(CD)” can be provided for executives and employees. These securities can be
converted to the shares of the listed manufacturing firm at a specific price within a
certain period.
The ESOP, however, may cause some problems, as follows: (i) The ESOP
may dilute the share prices of listed companies (price dilution) and the control of
existing shareholders (control dilution); (ii) listed companies may engage in
misconduct in relation to the ESOP For example, they may specify a very low
exercise price for their securities given to executives and employees (e.g., warrant
and convertible debenture (CD)) compared with the current market price of their
listed companies’ securities. Executives and employees, therefore, can earn profits in
converting, for example, their warrants to their listed manufacturing companies’
shares. Therefore, this will harm the long-term performance of Thai listed
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manufacturing companies, since they may lack the incentive to work harder.
Furthermore, listed manufacturing companies may issue and offer their securities
(e.g., warrant and convertible debentures) only to a specific group of executives and
employees. One of the concerns is how to specify an appropriate vesting period for
ESOPs, since they may allow their executives and employees to exercise their
securities very promptly. This might not be useful in enhancing the long-term
performance of listed companies. Delves (2002, p xiii) also pointed out good and bad
characteristics of stock options as shown in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3: Stock options - different characteristics
Stock Options Characteristics
Good
Options for start-ups and other cash-strapped companies; options that are based
on performance; options with exercise prices that vary with the market.
OK

Fixed-price options as part of a mix of performance-based incentives and/or
required stock ownership

Bad

Fixed-price options for large, established public companies.

Ugly

Mega grants of fixed price options to executives of large, established public
companies.

Very Ugly

Mega grants of options to executives of poorly performing companies whose
stock price has dropped suddenly.

Source: Delves (2002, p xiii)

As a result the ESOP may cause problems in relation to control and price
dilution for existing investors (or shareholders). The SEC has realized these
problems, and therefore its notification regarding “Offer for Sale of Securities to
Companies’ Directors or Employees” has been implemented for Thai listed
companies since 2008. According to the notification of the SEC, Thor-Chor 32/2551
(2008) 115 , if any listed company specifies the exercise price of its securities (e.g.,
warrant and convertible debenture) lower than ten percent of its share’s current
market price, or it issues securities to executives and employees that are more than
five percent of total voting shares, they must obtain the approval from at least twothirds of current shareholders who attend the meeting and have a voting right. More
importantly, not more than 5 percent of shareholders who attend the meeting and
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The title in Thai is, “Offer for Sale of Securities to Companies’ Directors or Employees” .
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have a voting right can veto the ESOP initiated by any listed company. Therefore,
information regarding minority shareholders’ roles and controlling rights over their
listed manufacturing firms should by promoted for a checks and balances
mechanism, as previously discussed. In addition, the SET and SEC should monitor
the ESOP very closely by checking that they fully disclose all information (e.g.,
exercise price and time of securities, groups of persons who receive securities from
the ESOP) necessary for shareholders to make the correct approval.
7.6

Executive remuneration (Hypothesis 6)
The empirical evidence for hypothesis 6 suggests that there is strong evidence

from both estimation approaches that executive remuneration has a significant and
positive effect on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises
(see Chapter 6). More specifically, the top 10 best listed manufacturing firms obtain
higher levels of executive remuneration relative to total labour expenditure,
averaging 23.38 percent in 2008, compared with that of the top 10 least listed
manufacturing firms, averaging 16.81 percent in 2008 (see Appendices 1.1 and 1.2).
As a result, performance based incentives for executives should be promoted
since they can enhance the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises. Ellig (2002, p5) also pointed out that there are four basic compensation
elements such as (i) salary, (ii) employee benefits and perquisites 116 (e.g., time off
with pay, health care, survivor protection, employee stock option schemes (ESOP),
and retirement coverage), (iii) short-term incentives which are based on individual
rather than group achievement (e.g., bonus, or salary increases awarded for a yearly
achievement), and (iv) long-term incentives which are based on group rather than
individual achievement (e.g., stock options, or salary increases awarded for the
accomplishment of multi-year targets). Ellig (2002, p460) also suggested that a
salary or a short-term pay incentive is not sufficient for executives to promote a
firm’s performance, and, therefore, long-term incentives should be promoted in order
to increase the firm’s long-term performance. The reason is that long-term incentives
encourage executives to engage in the firm’s long-term goals if their payouts are
attractive enough (Ellig, 2002, p7).
116

Perquisites are also known as executive benefits (Ellig, 2002, p6).
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According to the SET’s 15 principles of good corporate governance for listed
companies (2006), the SET’s 10th principle similarly recommended that the level and
composition of remuneration should be appropriate and high enough to keep
qualified directors but for them not to be overpaid 117 . In addition, executives and
directors should be compensated (e.g., an increase in salaries, bonuses, or stock
options) based on each listed manufacturing enterprise’s performance and also
individual executive’s performance. Executives and directors should be remunerated
based on listed manufacturing companies’ compensation policy proposed by the
compensation committee or the board of directors.
Unreasonable executive compensation may be proposed, since some directors
and executives, who are also members of the board of directors, may propose
executive pays and rewards which purposely benefit themselves. For example, the
CEO is normally the chairman of the board of directors, and, therefore, conflicts of
interest between the board of directors and the CEO with respect to executive
remuneration can also arise (Alston, 2006). Ellig (2002, p521) also provided a
comparison between reasonable and non-reasonable executive pay as summarized in
Table 7.4. Similarly, the Thai Institute of Directors Association (2007) also
suggested that the compensation committee should consider available director
compensation surveys 118 or hiring a consulting firm before proposing an appropriate
remuneration package to the company. The director compensation survey of the
companies listed in the SET has been published every two years since 2001, which
provides a benchmark of the composition and compensation amounts provided to
listed companies’ executives in different firm sizes and businesses (Thai Institute of
Directors Association, 2010).

117

Reasonable executive remuneration can be referred to as (i) the average executive remuneration for
all companies listed in the SET, based on the Director Compensation Survey, or (ii) that advocated by
a compensation consultant.
118
For Thai listed enterprises
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Table 7.4: Unreasonable and reasonable executive compensation characteristics
•
•
•
•
Executive •
Pay
•
•

May be unreasonable
Little experience
Light work schedule
Either significant increase in pay
or no change for years
Pay significantly higher than for other
companies or data not available
Pay set near end of year (when profits
can be more exactly measured)
Pay of shareholder-owners higher than
comparable non-shareholder employees
Has significant holdings of company stock

•
•
•

•

•
•

•

May be reasonable
Extensive experience
Work long hours
Increase in pay consistent with
growth of company, increase in
responsibility, or back pay for
lean years.
Pay is basically consistent with
comparable sized companies
in comparable industries
Basis for pay clearly set at
beginning of year
Pay of shareholder - owners equal to
or lower than others in firm with
responsibilities
Non-stockholder or one with
percentage of ownership

Source: Ellig (2002, p521)

Buchholtz et al. (1998), however, pointed out that compensation committee
members may propose a generous pay package for executives and directors, since
they are also obligated to the board of directors (e.g., the CEO) for appointing them.
Therefore, the compensation committee members should not be connected with any
member of the board of directors (Alston, 2006).
For Thailand the Thai Institute of Directors Association (2007) also
suggested that at least two-thirds of the compensation committee members should be
independent directors, and the remainder should be non-executive directors. The
chairman of the compensation committee should be an independent director. More
importantly, appropriate executive pays and rewards recommended by the
compensation committee should be proposed to the listed companies’ annual general
meeting (AGM) for the approval of shareholders. Listed manufacturing companies
should also fully disclose their compensation committee’s objectives and policies,
and also executive compensation figures and benefits that are in their annual
company reports (Form 56-1) (see Thai Institute of Directors Association, 2007).
Training courses 119 regarding the roles of compensation committee members should
119

The training programme for compensation committee members is normally provided by the Thai
Institute of Directors Association each year.

270

be promoted, since this can help them to propose transparent and appropriate policies
for executive compensation based on their firms’ performance. Finally, providing
knowledge for minority shareholders regarding their roles and voting rights over
Thai listed manufacturing firms should be emphasised, since executive remuneration
must be finally approved by Thai listed manufacturing firms’ shareholders, and,
therefore, minority shareholders can examine this proposed agenda in the
shareholders’ meeting.
7.7

Types of firm ownership (foreign and family) (Hypothesis 7)
The empirical evidence for hypothesis 7 suggests that there is strong evidence

from both estimation approaches to indicate that foreign and family ownership exert
a significant and positive effect on the technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises (see Chapter 6). Based on the magnitude of the estimated
coefficients for each type of owned-firms, there is strong evidence from both
estimation approaches to indicate that foreign-owned firms perform the best,
followed by family-owned firms. As a result, foreign and family ownership can be
promoted for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
7.7.1

Foreign ownership
There is no problem with a foreign shareholding limit for Thai listed

manufacturing firms, since their foreign shareholding limit can be relaxed up to 100
percent if their manufacturing projects are approved by the Board of Investment
(BOI). Their businesses, however, must not be classified into three lists of prohibited
businesses such as (i) businesses that foreigners are not permitted for special reasons
(e.g., newspaper, radio, and television station undertaking, fishing, farming, raising
animals, extraction of Thai medical herbs, and forestry), (ii) businesses which are
concerned with (1) national security or safety (e.g., war equipment or their
components, aircraft, and components of fire-arms and explosives), (2) art and
culture, customs, and native manufacturing and handicrafts (e.g., production of Thai
musical instruments, Thai silk textiles, and goldware, silverware, nielloware,
bronzeware, or lacquerware), and (3) natural resources and the environment. (e.g.,
sugar from sugarcane and timber conversions to make furniture and articles of
wood), and (iii) businesses which Thais are not ready to compete with foreigners
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(e.g., legal, architectural, and engineering services, brokerage, retail and wholesale
trades) (Department of Business Development, 1999; The Board of Investment,
2010a).
However, the major concern is how to increase the confidence of foreign
investors to invest in Thai listed manufacturing firms or establish their businesses in
Thailand. Good corporate governance 120 should be continually promoted, and should
be closely monitored by the SET and SEC. For example, reliable and transparent
disclosure of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises’ information should be
continuously promoted. The corporate governance of Thai listed manufacturing
companies should be developed to be in line with international corporate governance
standards. The institutional framework for best accounting and auditing practices
should be continuously strengthened to enhance the quality and reliability of Thai
listed manufacturing firms’ financial and non-financial information. Rules and
responsibilities of board of directors should also be continuously strengthened.
Prompt and strong punishment for illegal activities caused by Thai listed
manufacturing firms should also be strengthened in order to promote the confidence
of foreign investors. Currently, a corporate governance report of Thai listed
companies 121 , which ranks Thai listed enterprises’ corporate governance, has been
published for investors (National CG Committee, 2009). This report should also be
continuously supported, since this can increase the confidence of foreign investors as
well as domestic investors. Moreover, this can motivate Thai listed manufacturing
firms, which are not qualified or ranked in the lower level, to improve their corporate
governance standard.
A number of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises prefer to limit foreign
shareholding due to the policies of their companies, even though they are allowed to
have up to 100 percent foreign shareholding according to the BOI’s approval. The
120

As previously discussed in Chapter 2, major development of Thai corporate governance began
after the 1997 financial crisis.
121
This report has been issued by the National Corporate Governance Committee in cooperation with
the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), the Office of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
and the Thai Institute of Directors (IOD). There are six score ranges such as (i) not pass (score range:
<50), (ii) pass (score range: 50-59), (iii) satisfactory (score range: 60-69), (iv) good (score range: 7079), (v) very good (score range: 80-89), and (vi) excellent (score range: 90-100) (National CG
Committee, 2009).
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SET has also initiated Non-Voting Depository Receipts (NVDRs) 122 to avoid foreign
shareholding limits in case listed firms cannot issue shares to foreign investors due to
their foreign shareholding limit. NVDR holders can obtain similar financial benefits
to that of stock holders (i.e. dividends, rights, and warrants), except NVDR holders
are not eligible to vote (Thai NVDR, 2010). Moreover, government agencies such as
the BOI and Ministry of Commerce (especially the Department of Business
Development (DBD)) can play an important role in promoting foreign participation
in Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. For instance, tax-based and non-tax
incentives which are approved by the BOI for promoted projects, can also attract
foreign investment.
The BOI, therefore, can promote foreign investors through benefits that they
would receive if their promoted projects are successfully approved. In addition, the
Department of Business Development (DBD) can promote foreign investment, since
all foreign business operations in Thailand must be approved by the DBD. Therefore,
effective procedures for obtaining foreign business operations as well as providing
accurate and prompt information for foreign investors can be promoted to boost the
confidence of foreign investors. These can help increase the number of listed
enterprises owned by foreign investors for Thai listed manufacturing firms in the
future.
7.7.2

Family ownership
To promote family ownership of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises,

potential manufacturing firms owned by family members can be promoted for listing
on the SET. More specifically, 99 percent of business establishments in Thailand are
small and medium sized enterprises (Ministry of Industry, 2009). They might be
considered as a potentially targeted group, since they are also mostly operated by
family members. The SET can provide all information with respect to benefits that
they would receive when their securities are listed in the SET (e.g., long-term source
of capital, positive public image, attracting foreign investment, tax privileges on
dividends, and shareholder protection), since many Thai SMEs may perceive that

122

NVDRs are newly listed securities issued by Thai NVDR Company Limited (Thai NVDR), which
is wholly owned by the SET.
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their control will disappear if they become listed companies. In addition, Thai SMEs
might not be interested in being listed in the SET or the Market for Alternative
Investment (MAI), due to criteria and procedures for listing (e.g., management
criteria, financial criteria, distribution of minority shareholders) as well as the rules
and regulations that they must follow after becoming listed firms. In other words,
they may lack transparency in their financial dealings.
Providing all information regarding how they can benefit from being listed in
the SET and what procedures and criteria they should follow are very important. As
previously discussed in Chapter 2, family ownership, however, can cause agency
problems since this has the potential to expropriate the interests of minority
shareholders. In other words, policies may be implemented which benefit the family
owners but which may adversely affect the overall performance of the firm (Porta et
al., 1999). Therefore, training courses with respect to the SET’s rules and
regulations 123 should be provided to educate newly listed manufacturing firms owned
by family members, as this can protect minority shareholders and enhance the
corporate governance of listed manufacturing firms. Moreover, the promotion of
family-owned firms, especially for Thai listed enterprises, may lead to crony
capitalism, and therefore may not promote competition in the market as referred to
by Doner and Ramsay (2000) and Rock (2002). Good corporate governance practices
in Thailand must be continuously enhanced to be in line with international standards
as suggested by the World Bank (2005) (see Section 2.6, Chapter 2). Enhancing
strong enforcement of violation of laws is also important to promote Thailand’s good
corporate governance practices 124 .

123

The SET’s rules and regulations are as follows: (i) disclosure due to significant events, (ii)
increasing capital, (iii) connected transactions, (iv) acquisition or disposition of assets, (v) maintaining
the status of a listed company, (vi) roles and responsibilities of board of directors and audit
committees, (vii) distribution of minority shareholders, and (viii) preparing financial statements and
reports (The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2009).
124
Good corporate governance practices refer to (i) enhancing rights of shareholders, (ii) improving
disclosure and transparency, and (iii) increasing the accountability of directors and management (see
Section 2.6, Chapter 2).
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7.8

Exporting (Hypothesis 8)

7.8.1 Learning-by-exporting hypothesis
The empirical evidence for the first part of hypothesis 8 indicates strong
evidence from both estimation approaches that exporting has a significant and
positive association with the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises (see Chapter 6). This result shows that the learning by exporting
hypothesis exists for the case of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, implying that
exporting by firms is likely to enhance their technical efficiency due to a learning-byexporting experience.
As a result, listed manufacturing enterprises can be encouraged to participate
more in foreign markets since this can help enhance their technical efficiency. This is
because they can gain benefits from their learning-by-exporting experience and by
developing new product designs and upgrading production technology. In practice,
the government can play an important role in promoting exporting for Thai listed
manufacturing firms, as well as other non-listed manufacturing firms. ESCAP (2001)
suggested that government policies (e.g., foreign trade policy, national development
plans, monetary policy, fiscal policy, production and price controls, private
investment regimes, and foreign exchange policy) are one of the key factors for a
country’s national export promotion to be successful.
There are two main policies which can impact a country’s foreign trade, such
as (i) foreign trade policies which refer to policies and practices directly affecting
and regulating import and export operations (e.g., trade promotion policy 125 , trade
development infrastructure policy, and international trade relations policy), and (ii)
other policies which regulate other economic activities which has an impact on
foreign trade performance (e.g., national development plans, monetary policy, fiscal
policy, production and price controls, private investment regimes, and foreign
exchange policy). Moreover, foreign trade policy can be sub divided into three trade
channels (see Figure 7.1).

125

A “trade promotion policy” consists of programmes and measures that help promote and develop
trade with other countries (ESCAP, 2001, p15).
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Figure 7.1: Aspects of foreign trade policy
Foreign trade policy
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promotion
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development
infrastructure

Export
promotion
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Import
regulation
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Trade
enterprises

International
trade relations
Bilateral relations
International trade
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Source: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) (2001, p17)

According to export promotion, as indicated in Figure 7.1, a trade promotion
organization (TPO) plays an important role in carrying out export promotion
activities to help facilitate a country’s products, and increase the volume of its export
sales (ESCAP, 2001). There are a number of export promotion measures that can be
implemented in order to promote exporting for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises,
such as (i) searching and providing new foreign markets, (ii) promoting the trade
logistics system, and (iii) promoting product competitiveness (e.g., quality and
design improvement). In the case of Thailand the Department of Export Promotion
(DEP) also acts as the TPO.
In 2010 the DEP, including government agencies and the private sector,
promoted exporting for Thai enterprises, such as (i) promoting Thailand’s trade
logistics system through a number of activities (e.g., organizing the Thailand
International Logistic Fair, providing training programs on how to reduce logistic
costs for Thai exporters, developing distribution channels for Thai exports (e.g.,
establishing worldwide distribution centres), and (ii) expanding new export markets
by initiating a number of exhibition projects (e.g., the International Production
Exhibition, Thailand Exhibition and Outlet, and the New Markets for Exporters
(NME)) (Department of Export Promotion, 2010).
276

One export promotion policy benefit is to provide tax and non-tax
privileges 126 for Thai exporting manufacturers, since this can increase their exporting
motivation in competing with foreign competitors due to the reduction in their
production costs. Therefore, the BOI can help provide tax and non-tax privileges.
One of the BOI investment policies is to enhance the competitiveness of domestic
products in the world market. As a result the BOI provides high priority to exportoriented investment products (Akrasanee et al., 1989). Every promoted project must
receive the International Standard for Organization (ISO) 9000 certification or
similar international certification (The Board of Investment, 2010a).
Under trade promotion policy, strict import regulations, such as imposing
tariffs and non-tariffs barriers on foreign importers, also play an important role in
protecting a country’s local industries, especially infant industries. The term,
technical barriers to trade 127 , which is one of the non-tariff barriers to trade, has
become an important trade instrument in protecting a country’s local industries. The
government, therefore, should provide necessary information for Thai listed
manufacturing firms as well as Thai non-listed manufacturing firms to be able to
meet exporting countries’ technical rules. This will help promote the competitiveness
of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises’ exports as well as that of other non-listed
manufacturing firms. Focusing on Thai listed manufacturing firms, newly listed
companies in the SET and MAI can apply to receive corporate income tax exemption
if their projects are eligible for investment promotion announced by the BOI. In
addition, their existing projects, which have been approved by the BOI before being
listed in the SET and MAI, can obtain additional rights and benefits (see The Board
of Investment, 2009c).

126

Tax incentives include corporate income tax exemptions, or exemptions or reductions of import
duties on machinery and raw materials. Non-tax privileges include permission to employ foreign
workers, own land, and take or remit foreign currency abroad (The Board of Investment, 2010b).
127
Technical barriers to trade can be divided into two terms: (i) product standards and (ii) regulations
(Thilmany and Barrett, 1997). This normally refers to when countries impose their technical rules
such as packaging, product definitions, labelling on foreign importers to protect their local producers.
However, technical barriers violate the provisions of WTO which require countries to have fair
treatment between imported and local products. This conflicting issue can be solved by bilateral and
multinational trade negotiations (Sumner, 2011).
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From Figure 7.1 the development of trade infrastructure is also one of the
important factors used to promote exporting for Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises, which can be classified into (i) trade facilitation regulation, (ii) trade
finance, and (iii) trade enterprises. Trade facilitation regulation should be transparent
and be backed by a strong legal framework. In other words, the process and
application procedures for imports and exports should be transparent and follow
international practices. It may be difficult for new exporters to acquire sufficient
loans from financial institutions. Therefore, financial assistance is also an important
factor in facilitating and promoting Thai listed manufacturing exporters. To promote
exporting for Thai listed manufacturing firms the government should promote the
importance of specialized financial institutions, such as the Export and Import Bank
of Thailand (EXIM Bank) 128 and export insurance agencies 129 . Finally, international
trade relations are also one of the important factors that can promote the export
performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises through bilateral trade
relations, international trade forums, and regional trade.
7.8.2

Self-selection hypothesis
The empirical evidence for the second part of hypothesis 8 indicates that a

firm’s technical efficiency, as predicted by the SFA approach, has a significant and
positive effect on its export participation for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
The positive effect of a firm’s technical efficiency predicted by the DEA approach on
its export participation is also found for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, but it
is not statistically significant.
As a result the self-selection hypothesis appears to exist for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, indicating that only efficient firms are able to participate
128

The EXIM Bank provides a number of specialized financial facilitation services for importers and
exporters in domestic and foreign markets, such as (i) working capital loans, (ii) term loans (e.g., a
term loan for business expansion and long-term credit for export of capital goods), (iii) financing for
overseas projects, (iv) export credit insurance, (v) buyer and bank risk assessment reports (BRA),
buyer’s credit, and (vi) export financing services with free export credit insurance service, especially
for exports destined for ASEAN+6 (ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New
Zealand markets) (Export-Import Bank of Thailand, 2010).
129
Trading enterprises can assist local manufacturers to sell their products to foreign markets at
minimum transaction costs and risks, since trading enterprises have (i) strong foreign networks, (ii)
expertise in dealing with future international market opportunities and developments, (iii) strong
knowledge regarding necessary export and import procedures (e.g., shipping, warehousing, insurance,
and trade financing) (ESCAP, 2001).
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in the export market since they can compete with foreign enterprises. The
government, therefore, can promote Thai listed manufacturing firms to become more
technically efficient. A number of firm-specific and business environment factors,
which have been found to have a significant and positive impact on the technical
efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing firms, can be promoted, such as (i) increase
firm size, (ii) more concentrated (controlling) and managerial ownership, (iii) more
foreign and family ownership participation, (iv) attractive executive remuneration,
and (v) exporting. For example, the SET and the government, via the SEC, can
promote an increase in the consolidated size of Thai listed manufacturing firms,
which can be promoted by fundraising which will be used for productive investment
(e.g., upgrading production technology).
Other policy implications and recommendations related to other firm-specific
and business environment factors should also be focused upon for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, such as (i) strengthening good corporate governance
among Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, (ii) providing information for minority
shareholders with respect to their roles and voting rights, and (iii) improving
production technology.
7.9

Other factors

Firm size
There is strong evidence that a firm’s size has a significant and positive effect
on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. In addition, large
firms can also participate in foreign markets, since they can cover sunk costs
necessary to enter into export markets (Greenaway et al., 2007). In other words, they
can earn sufficient revenue to cover their sunk costs incurred during exporting
(Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon, 2008) (see Chapter 6). The SET and SEC, therefore,
might promote an increase in the consolidated size of Thai listed manufacturing
firms including all manufacturing sub-sectors, since large Thai listed manufacturing
firms tend to have higher technical efficiency, and they are also likely to participate
in foreign markets. For Thai listed enterprises an increase in firm size can be
promoted through fundraising (or increasing capital), and, therefore, the SET and
SEC may promote and facilitate their fundraising which will be used for productive
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investment (e.g., upgrading production technology), which can generate their future
and sustainable revenues. Financial institutions can also promote an increase in the
size of Thai listed manufacturing firms by providing funds (loans) for commercially
viable projects. Moreover, potential manufacturing firms which are listed in the MAI
can be promoted to be listed in the SET 130 . This policy can help increase the size of
Thai listed manufacturing firms, and therefore improve the technical efficiency of
Thai listed manufacturing firms.
Firm age
The empirical results from both estimation approaches reveal that firm age is
positively related with technical efficiency for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises,
but only the empirical evidence from the SFA reveals a significant result.
Furthermore, firm age has a significant and positive effect on its export decision
since old firms can compete with foreign companies due to their accumulative
experience, business networks and reputation (see Chapter 6).
Therefore, the SET and SEC can help facilitate the listing of long established
manufacturing firms in the SET. More importantly, long established small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which have been operated by family entrepreneurs
and foreigners, might be targeted as newly potential listed manufacturing firms if
they meet the SET’s listing criteria. From the empirical evidence, older Thai listed
manufacturing firms are likely to have a higher level of technical efficiency
compared with younger ones. Therefore, policies which focus on how to help young
listed manufacturing firms to increase their technical efficiency and participate in
foreign markets are also necessary (e.g., promoting cross-learning between young
firms and old firms, promoting networking, providing business training and tax
holiday to young established firms, and attracting foreign direct investment). The
reasons are that young listed manufacturing firms may lack (i) sufficient experience
in operating their businesses, (ii) financial resources in upgrading new production

130

Firms which are willing to be listed in the SET must have paid-up capital valued at 200 million
baht (after initial public offering), and have been in operation for at least three years with the same
company management for at least 1 year. In addition, they must obtain at least 50 million baht
combined minimum net profits from operations over the past two or three years, and at least 30
million baht net profits from operations for the latest full year (The Stock Exchange of Thailand,
2009).

280

technology and enhancing human capital, (iii) domestic and international business
networks, and (iv) reputation (brand name).
Government Assistance
Inconclusive results are obtained for the effect of government assistance on a
firm’s technical efficiency for Thai manufacturing firms, including Consumer
Products and Other Sectors sub-sectors. A negative finding is found for the Agro and
Food Industry and Industrials sub-sectors. According to the Ministry of Industry
(2009), Thai manufacturing firms’ productivity has been low due to the lack of their
innovation readiness. In other words, they lack the creation of high value-added
products, new technology, skilled labour, and know-how in developing the quality of
their products (Ministry of Industry, 2009). This implies that government assistance
should focus on how to improve the innovation of SET manufacturing enterprises,
including those firms in the Consumer Products and Other Sectors sub-sectors
besides providing financial support. Innovation can be classified into two
dimensions, which are product innovation through the novelty of new products or
product improvement, and process innovation through the novelty of technology and
technological improvement.
All of the policy implications and recommendations previously identified are
summarized and provided in Table 7.5.
Table 7.5: Summary of policy implications and recommendations
Hypothesis

Policy implications and recommendations
• To improve the technical efficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises,
they should concentrate on upgrading their production technology and participating in higher
value - added production activities.
- The government, via the BOI, can promote the enhancement of their production technology,
and higher value-adding production participation through BOI financial and non-financial
privileges.
- The SET and SEC can promote and facilitate fundraising which will be used for their productive
investments, such as upgrading their production technology and improving their value-adding
production.
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Table 7.5: Summary of policy implications and recommendations
Hypothesis
•
H1
•
(Leverage and
liquidity) -

Policy implications and recommendations
Promote the effective control of input costs and financial resources.
Promote only productive investment.
The SET can help attract foreign and local investors to invest in the securities of Thai listed
manufacturing firms which focus on productive investment.
The government, via the BOI, can promote the BOI privileged participation of Thai listed
manufacturing firms which are interested in launching new products, and upgrading their
production technology.

• Internal financing transactions should be fully disclosed to avoid an agency problem.
• Information regarding minority shareholders’ roles and rights should be promoted, since they
have a voting right to monitor connected transactions (e.g., providing loans for related firms).
• External financing equity instruments (e.g., share issuance to investors) are also alternative
funding sources besides debt instruments (e.g., debentures, loans from financial institutions).
- A dividend payment is the cost of equity instruments, but provides more flexibility than
a loan repayment.
H2
- The SET and the government, via the SEC, may support targeted equity financing which will
(Internal
be used for productive investments (e.g., upgrading new technology or producing new
and
products), and avoid equity financing support which aims to roll over the existing
external
debts of Thai listed manufacturing firms.
financing) - All information regarding the purpose of the use of equity financing should be fully disclosed
to investors.
• Financial analysts should play an import role in providing adequate comments on financial
activities (e.g., the use of external and internal financing) of Thai listed manufacturing firms.
- Training courses for certified financial analysts related to updated regulations of the SET
and SEC can be promoted.
- Strong and prompt penalties to those financial analysts, including Thai listed manufacturing
firms, which are fraudulent should be strengthened.

H3
(R&D)

• The government, including the SET, should monitor Thai listed manufacturing firms’
R&D and employee training activities very closely.
- R&D evaluation reports should be required and submitted to the government
(e.g., the Revenue Department of Thailand) instead of providing R&D billing expenses to
claim the reduction in corporate income tax (CIT).
- R&D evaluation reports should also be submitted to the SET. The SET may conduct
an annual R&D report of Thai listed manufacturing firms, which provides the ranking of
their R&D development and the recognition for those which have successfully achieved their
R&D activities.
• The government, via the BOI, can play an important role in promoting R&D activities of Thai
listed manufacturing firms through the BOI privileges for those which focus on serious R&D
activities (e.g., developing new production technology and new products, and engaging in
employee training and development).
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Table 7.5: Summary of policy implications and recommendations (continued)
Hypothesis
•

H4
(Controlling
ownership)

•
•

•

H5
(Managerial
ownership)

Policy implications and recommendations
Providing information with respect to minority shareholders’ roles and voting rights should
be promoted for a checks and balances mechanism.
- For example, Section 108 of the Public Limited Company Act (2535) provides the right for
shareholders to request the court to order cancellation or suspended resolution of that
shareholder’s meeting if they find that the company did not follow the rules and regulations
as stated in its articles of association (see Section 7.4 of this chapter).
- Section 129 of the Public Limited Company Act (2535) provides the right for shareholders
to request the registrar to appoint an inspector(s) to investigate the company’s operations
and financial status (see Section 7.4 of this chapter).
The SET, SEC, and Thai Investors Association (TIA) should continuously provide training
or necessary updated information regarding investor’s roles and rights.
The SET should keep monitoring Thai listed manufacturing enterprises to meet sufficient
minority shareholders (the free float requirement).
- The name of those listed manufacturing firms which cannot meet a free float requirement should
be disclosed very promptly.
The government, via the SEC, can help protect minority shareholders by strengthening its rules
and regulations to be in line with international corporate governance standards.

• The “Employee Stock Option Program (ESOP)” can be used to promote managerial ownership
- The SET and the government, via the SEC, should monitor the ESOP very closely so that Thai
listed manufacturing firms fully disclose their information (e.g., exercise price and time of
securities, groups of persons who receive securities from the ESOP) necessary for shareholders
to make the correct approval.
• Knowledge regarding minority shareholders’ roles and controlling rights over Thai listed
manufacturing firms should be promoted.
- For example, according to the notification of the SEC, Thor-Chor 32/255, if any listed company
specifies the exercise price of its securities lower than ten percent of its share’s current market
price, or it issues securities to executives and employees that are more than five percent of total
voting shares, they must obtain the approval from at least two-thirds of current shareholders
who attend the meeting and have a voting right.
- Not more than 5 percent of shareholders who attend the meeting and have a voting
right can veto the ESOP initiated by any listed company.
•

Performance based incentives can be promoted for Thai listed manufacturing firms.
- The compensation committee should be promoted, and compensation committee members
should be independent or non-executive directors.
- Available director compensation surveys or hiring a consulting firm are also necessary for
H6
the compensation committee in proposing an appropriate remuneration package to the company.
(Executive
- Training courses regarding the roles of compensation committee members should be promoted,
remuneration)
since this can help them to propose transparent and appropriate compensation policies for
executives based on their firms’ performance.
• Providing knowledge for minority shareholders regarding their roles and voting rights over
Thai listed manufacturing firms should be emphasised, since executive remuneration must be
finally approved by shareholders, and, therefore, minority shareholders can examine this
proposed agenda in the shareholders’ meeting.

283

Table 7.5: Summary of policy implications and recommendations (continued)
Hypothesis

H7

Policy implications and recommendations
• Good corporate governance should be continually promoted to be in line with international
standard, and closely monitored by the SET and SEC. The following are part of corporate
governance which should be continuously promoted for Thai listed manufacturing firms:
- Reliable and transparent disclosure of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises’ information
- The institutional framework for best accounting and auditing practices
- Adequate rules and responsibilities of board of directors
- Prompt and strong punishment for illegal activities caused by Thai listed manufacturing firms

(Types of
- Reliable corporate governance reporting of Thai listed companies
owned firms: • The government, via the BOI, can promote foreign direct investment through BOI privileges, as
foreign and
foreign shareholding can be allowed up to 100 percent for unrestricted businesses.
family
In addition, the government, via the DBD, can promote foreign investment by strengthening
ownership)
procedures for obtaining foreign business operations as well as providing accurate and prompt
information for foreign investors.
• Non-Voting Depository Receipts (NVDRs) are also useful to avoid the foreign shareholding
limit in cases where listed manufacturing firms are not eligible to obtain BOI privileges
• To promote family ownership, Thai SMEs can be a potentially targeted group, since they are
mostly operated by family members. The following measures should also be promoted:
- Providing all information regarding the listing benefits for Thai SMEs
- Providing training courses with respect to the SET’s rules and regulations for newly listed
manufacturing firms owned by family members
• For the learning-by-exporting hypothesis the government can play an important role in
promoting exporting for Thai listed manufacturing firms.
- Besides other policies, foreign trade policy can promote exporting of Thai listed manufacturing
firms, which can be sub divided into three trade channels ,such as (i) trade promotion, (ii) trade
development infrastructure, and (iii) international trade relations. These trade areas can be
promoted as follows:
- Focusing on trade promotion the government, via the DEP, can help promote exporting of Thai
listed manufacturing firms, such as (i) promoting the trade logistics system and (ii) expanding
H8
new export markets, (iii) promoting product competitiveness (e.g., quality and design
improvement). In addition, the government, via the BOI, can help promote their exporting by
(Exporting:
providing BOI privileges for those which focus on export-oriented investment.
Learning-by
- Focusing on trade development infrastructure, trade facility regulation should be transparent
-exporting
and backed by a strong legal framework. Trade finance can help facilitate and promote Thai
and selfmanufacturing exporters, and, therefore, specialized financial institutions for exporting should
selection
be promoted, such as the EXIM bank and export insurance agencies.
hypotheses)
- International trade relations (e.g., bilateral trade relations, international trade forums, and
regional trade) can also help promote exporting by Thai listed manufacturing firms.
• For the self-selection hypothesis the government can promote Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises to become more technically efficient. A number of firm-specific and business
environment variables have been found to have a significant and positive impact on technical
efficiency and which should be promoted, such as (i) increase firm size, (ii) more concentrated
(controlling) and managerial ownership, (iii) more foreign and family ownership participation,
and (iv) attractive executive remuneration. Moreover, strengthening good corporate governance,
knowledge for minority shareholders, and improving production technology should be
focused upon for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
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Table 7.5: Summary of policy implications and recommendations (continued)
Other factors

Firm size

Firm age

Policy implications and recommendations
• The SET and the government, via the SEC, can promote an increase in the consolidated size
of Thai listed manufacturing firms, which can be promoted by fundraising (increasing capital).
- The SET and SEC may promote and facilitate their fundraising which will be used for
productive investment (e.g., upgrading production technology).
- Financial institutions can be a key driver to promote an increase in the size of Thai listed
manufacturing firms, by supporting funds (loans) for commercially sustainable projects.
- Potential manufacturing firms which are listed in the MAI can be promoted to be listed in
the SET if they meet the SET’s listing criteria.
• The SET and the government, via the SEC, can facilitate the listing of long established
manufacturing firms in the SET.
- Long established SMEs, which have been operated by family entrepreneurs and foreigners,
can be targeted as newly potential listed manufacturing firms.
• Policies which focus on how to help young listed manufacturing firms to increase their technical
efficiency and participate in foreign markets can be promoted, such as (i) promoting crosslearning between young firms and old firms, (ii) promoting networking and FDI, (iii) providing
business training to young listed manufacturing firms, and (iv) providing tax holiday for young
firms.

• The government should provide the assistance to improve the innovation for the SET’s
manufacturing enterprises.
Government
- Product innovation which is the novelty of new products or product improvement should
assistance
be promoted for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
- Process innovation which is the novelty of technology and technical improvement should
be promoted for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
Source: Author

7.10

Conclusions
This chapter has provided policy implications and recommendations based on

empirical evidence obtained for hypotheses 1 to 8, as well as other selected firm
specific factors (e.g., firm size and firm age) that significantly affect the technical
efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
From earlier discussions the SET and the government, via a number of
government agencies (e.g., the Office of Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the Board of Investment of Thailand (BOI), the Department of Export
Promotion (DEP), the Revenue Department (RD), the Department of Business
Development (DBD), and the Export and Import Bank of Thailand (EXIM bank)),
can play an important role in promoting the technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing

firms

through

a

number

of

policy

implementations

and
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recommendations (see Table 7.5). Focusing on the roles of the SET and SEC, good
corporate governance among Thai listed manufacturing enterprises should be
continuously promoted so as to be in line with international corporate governance
standards, through (i) reliable and transparent disclosure of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises’ information, (ii) adoption of the institutional framework for best
accounting and auditing practices, (iii) adequate rules and responsibilities of board of
directors, and (iv) prompt and strong punishment for illegal activities caused by Thai
listed manufacturing firms including other related parties (e.g., financial analysts).
In addition, the SET and SEC should (i) monitor Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises’ transactions very closely so as to ensure compliance with their rules and
regulations as well as international corporate governance standards, (ii) provide
training courses related to updated rules and regulations for newly and existing listed
manufacturing enterprises, including related parties, and (iii) facilitate fundraising for
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises to be used for productive investment (e.g.,
upgrading production technology and developing new products). These policy
implications and recommendations, therefore, are crucial in enhancing the
performance of Thai listed manufacturing firms, as suggested for almost all the
hypotheses (see Table 7.5).
More importantly, providing knowledge for minority shareholders regarding
their roles and voting rights is very important for a checks and balances mechanism,
to avoid an agency problem, since transactions of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises, which directly affect companies and shareholders’ benefits, must be
approved by shareholders. Thus, minority shareholders can play an important role in
monitoring any proposed agenda, and appointing an inspector(s) to investigate the
company’s operations and financial status. This is also used for the recommendation
of hypothesis 4 (controlling ownership), hypothesis 5 (managerial ownership), and
hypothesis 6 (executive remuneration). Other government agencies, especially the
BOI, also play an important role in promoting (i) the performance of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, (ii) foreign investment participation, (iii) exporting of
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, and (iv) serious R&D participation of Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises.
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The government can encourage those Thai listed manufacturing enterprises as
well as foreign companies to participate in their production and product improvement
as well as productive investment, for example, by providing BOI financial and nonfinancial privileges. Other useful policy implications and recommendations which
are not mentioned in this part are also summarized and provided in Table 7.5. In the
next chapter (Chapter 8) the major conclusions from this thesis, limitations of this
thesis and areas for further research will be discussed.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS

8.1

Introduction
The main research objectives of this thesis have been to: (i) measure the

technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises; (ii) identify and
measure firm-specific and business environment factors which significantly affect
the inefficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing firms; and (iii) provide
evidence based policy implications and recommendations to enhance the efficiency
and competitiveness of listed manufacturing enterprises. The following main
research questions have been addressed according to the above objectives, (i) How
do Thai listed manufacturing enterprises perform in terms of technical efficiency?;
(ii) What are the important factors which significantly contribute to the technical
efficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprise?; and (iii) How can
the overall technical efficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises
be enhanced? (see Chapter 1).
To address these research objectives and questions, this thesis has conducted
a comprehensive literature review focusing on different measurements of a firm’s
performance, as well as the literature regarding the effects of firm-specific and
business environment variables on a firm’s performance, including technical
efficiency, such as (i) financial factors (e.g., financial constraints (leverage) and
sources of finance), (ii) ownership structure (e.g., types of ownership, controlling
ownership, and managerial ownership), (iii) research and development (R&D), and
(iv) executive remuneration. Other firm-specific and business environment factors
that affect a firm’s performance have also been discussed. The two-way relationship
(the self-selection and learning-by-exporting hypotheses) between a firm’s
performance and its export participation has also been reviewed in Chapter 3.
To measure the technical efficiency performance and factors affecting the
technical inefficiency of 178 Thai listed manufacturing enterprises over the period
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2000 to 2008, this thesis has applied both the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
based on the Battese and Coelli (1995) model and the two-stage Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) approach in Chapter 4. The main reason for doing so is to increase
the degree of confidence when conducting the empirical analysis in Chapter 6, since
it cannot be concluded which estimation approach is more preferable due to their
advantages and disadvantages as discussed in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4. Before
conducting the empirical analysis in Chapter 6 eight unique hypotheses were
developed in Chapter 5 from a review of the literature in Chapter 3 (see Chapter 5).
This thesis has made a significant contribution to the existing finance and
economics literature in terms of (i) measuring the technical efficiency performance
of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, and (ii) identifying and examining eight
unique hypotheses which have not been empirically examined before for the case of
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. More importantly, most hypotheses 131 have
also made a significant contribution to the study of listed manufacturing enterprises
in other countries.
This is also the first study to apply both parametric (Stochastic Frontier
Analysis (SFA) and non-parametric (two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA))
approaches in the context of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, aimed at
increasing the confidence of the empirical analysis and for robustness checking. A
firm-level dataset, used for the empirical analysis of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises, has been compiled by the author due to the unavailability of existing firm
level survey data. The raw data (electronic reports) were obtained from the SET
covering the period 2000 to 2008, utilising (i) consolidated financial reports, (ii)
annual reports (Form 56-1), and (iii) the list of board of directors and major
shareholders. This dataset ensures the uniqueness of the thesis. This thesis has made
a significant contribution by providing empirically based policy implications and
recommendations to enhance the efficiency performance and competitiveness of Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises, of particular importance to both policy-makers and
entrepreneurs of listed manufacturing enterprises.

131

See hypotheses 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 in Chapter 5 for more details.
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A summary of key empirical results which have been reported and discussed
in Chapter 6 will be provided in Section 8.2. This section reports the empirical
findings relating to three main research questions, including 11 sub-research
questions (see Section 1.2, Chapter 1). Finally, limitations of this study and
suggestions for further studies are provided in Section 8.3.
8.2

Major research findings

8.2.1 Conclusions for the main research questions
This thesis has attempted to empirically explore three main research
questions and 11 sub-research questions. The three main research questions focus on
measuring the technical efficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises, examining the significant factors contributing to their technical
efficiency performance, as well as enhancing their technical efficiency performance
through evidence based policy implications and recommendations. These are as
follows:
(i)

How do Thai listed manufacturing enterprises perform in terms of
technical efficiency?
The first research question aimed to evaluate the technical efficiency

performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. In measuring the technical
efficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises both the SFA and
DEA approaches were used. The average technical efficiency scores of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises obtained from the SFA and DEA approaches were found
to be quite consistent, given by 0.812 and 0.887, respectively. According to the mean
technical efficiency scores predicted by both estimation approaches, Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises operated at a high level of technical efficiency, indicating
that the mean technical efficiency for the SFA approach is 81.20 percent of the best
practice frontier and 88.70 percent of the best practice frontier for the DEA approach
(see Table 6.14, Chapter 6). However, empirical evidence from both estimation
approaches revealed that Thai listed manufacturing enterprises operated under
decreasing returns to scale over the period 2000 to 2008. For the SFA approach the
production returns to scale, given by 0.9187, indicated the existence of decreasing
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returns to scale for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises (see Table 6.9, Chapter 6).
Similarly, the DEA approach suggested that approximately 86 percent of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, on average, operated under decreasing returns to scale.
For the SFA approach the output elasticities with respect to capital input,
labour input, and intermediate inputs (or the elasticities of substitution), calculated
from the estimated coefficients of the stochastic production function as indicated in
Table 6.9, revealed that the production of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises is
mainly contributed by intermediate inputs and labour input, with capital found to be
the least important input. Similarly, empirical evidence from an estimated Translog
production function, as shown in Table 6.7, confirmed the existence of labour-using
and capital-saving technical progress for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises,
indicating that the technical progress of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises relied
on labour input over the period 2000 to 2008. Moreover, the rate of technical
progress is found to be 0.0205 for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, indicating
that the rate of technical change only increased by 2.05 percent per year (see Table
6.9, Chapter 6). Therefore, the above findings indicate that even though their
technical efficiency performance is high, they have relied on labour-intensive or low
value added production activities and, therefore, they must move up to a higher
production frontier to enhance their future technical efficiency performance. In other
words, they should concentrate on upgrading their production technology or
participating in higher value-adding production activities.
(ii)

Which factors significantly contribute to the technical efficiency
performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises?
This second research question was aimed at examining firm-specific and

business environment factors which significantly influence the technical efficiency
performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. The significant findings from
this research question are also useful in the conduct of policy analysis and
recommendations to enhance the efficiency and competitiveness of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises. The thesis reviewed the literature regarding the important
factors which significantly affect firm performance, including the technical
efficiency of listed companies in Chapter 3. The methodology used to empirically
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examine this second research question was developed in Chapter 4. Two estimation
methods were employed to empirically examine the significant factors affecting the
technical efficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. For the
SFA approach the Battese and Coelli (1995) model is applied, in which the stochastic
Translog production function and the inefficiency effects model are estimated
simultaneously. In addition, the two-stage DEA model is applied for the DEA
approach. First, the output orientated model is applied assuming fixed input amounts
and maximized output production, and variable returns to scale (VRS) linear
programming is used to predict technical efficiency scores. Second, technical
inefficiency scores are regressed against firm-specific and business environment
variables using the maximum-likelihood Tobit model.
To answer this second main research question, sub-research questions relating
to a number of firm-specific and business environment variables, which are crucial to
improve the efficiency and competiveness of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises,
are specifically addressed as follows:
(1)

How do “financial constraints (leverage) and liquidity” impact on the
technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises?
According to the first sub-research question, hypothesis 1 is developed from a

review of the literature in Chapter 3 as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Financial constraints (leverage) have a significant and positive
relationship with the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
Vice versa, the more liquidity the lower is the technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises.
From Chapter 6 both estimation approaches revealed strong evidence that
financial constraints (leverage) have a significant and positive association with the
technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, and this evidence is
also consistent with the findings of Sena (2006) and Mok et al. (2007). This suggests
that financially constrained firms are likely to improve their technical efficiency
through the effective control of input costs and financial resources. In addition, it is
possible that Thai listed manufacturing enterprises which are found to have high
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leverage might be investing in capital intensive projects, since they expect to enhance
their current and future production process or extend their production capacity (e.g.,
building new plant, acquiring new machinery and equipment). These capital
intensive projects, however, require large funding (e.g., long-term loans received
from financial institutions, or issuance of debentures). Therefore, they might be
technically efficient but their leverage might be high due to new technology
investment used for enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of their current and
future production. Vice versa, the empirical results from both estimation approaches
also reveal that liquidity has a negative effect on the technical efficiency of Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises, as suggested by Goldar et al. (2003), indicating that
financially healthy firms are likely to neglect enhancing their technical efficiency due
to an excess of financial liquidity. It is also possible that Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises which have high liquidity might appear to be less technically efficient,
since they might be stuck with old machinery and equipment and prefer not to invest
in new technology.
(2)

Which types of “source of finance” (internal or external financing)
significantly affect the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises?
In response to the second sub-research question, hypothesis 2 is developed

from a review of the literature in Chapter 3 as follows:
Hypothesis 2: External financing has a significant and positive relationship with a
firm’s technical efficiency for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. Vice versa,
internal financing has a significant and negative effect on a firm’s technical
efficiency for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
The empirical results from the SFA approach suggest that external financing
has a significant and negative association with the technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, which is opposite to the statement of this hypothesis.
Negative evidence is also found from the DEA approach, but it is not statistically
significant. This negative finding is different from Kim (2003), but does not exert a
significant impact on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises, since the magnitude of the estimated “external financing” coefficient is
very small (close to zero). This negative result implies that Thai listed manufacturing
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firms which obtain external financing, are obligated to pay different interest
payments subject to the amount of their loans and current economic conditions (e.g.,
financial institutions normally prefer to provide a floating interest rate which can be
altered according to (i) interest rates announced by the Bank of Thailand and (ii)
financial costs of each financial institution). More importantly, they are obligated to
pay principle and interest to creditors on time, but might not be able to pay their
loans and interest regularly due to unexpected incidences (e.g., Thai political unrest,
global financial crisis, unexpected interest rate hike, and Thai currency appreciation).
Therefore, interest payments known as the cost of external financing 132 may reduce
the efficiency and competitiveness of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
On the other hand the empirical evidence from the SFA approach reveals that
internal financing has a significant and negative impact on the technical efficiency of
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, suggesting that managers tend to utilize
internal funds ineffectively due to a lack of external monitoring. This implies that the
agency problem exists for the use of internal funds, since managers do not appear to
maximize shareholders’ interests or have strong incentives to abuse internal funds as
suggested by Jensen (1986). Kim (2003, p134) also emphasized that this normally
exists in several underdeveloped countries where firms’ managerial skills are not
fully strengthened and firm operation information is not fully disclosed to investors,
and, therefore, managers may take every opportunity to maximize their benefits
rather than the firm’s value. A negative result is also found from the DEA approach,
but it is not statistically significant.
(3)

How does “research and development” (R&D) affect the technical
efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises?
With respect to the third sub-research question, hypothesis 3 is developed

from the literature review in Chapter 3 as follows:

132

The use of external and internal financing refers to the capital structure in the finance literature,
which is the mix of concentrated debt and equity used by a firm (Beal et al., 2008). High cost of debt
which can be captured by interest payments might lead to a firm’s probability of bankruptcy due to the
effects from (i) a decrease in the company’s sales due to the deterioration of customers’ confidence in
the firm, (ii) a decrease in the company’s productivity of workers and managers due to their concern
for new job search, and (iii) a deterioration of creditors’ confidence in the firm.
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Hypothesis 3: Research and development (R&D) has a significant and positive
relationship with the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
The empirical results from both estimation approaches reveal that research
and development (R&D) has a significant and negative association with the technical
efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. This result is different from the
expected positive result for this hypothesis. Such a negative finding, however,
suggests that most listed manufacturing firms might misleadingly report their R&D
activities in their annual report, since they prefer to keep a good public image and to
use this for the purpose of corporate income tax reduction without seriously
implementing these R&D activities.
(4)

How does “controlling ownership” (concentrated ownership) influence
the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises?
Focusing on the fourth sub-research question, hypothesis 4 is developed from

the literature review in Chapter 3 as follows:
Hypothesis 4: Controlling ownership has a significant and positive effect on the
technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
From Chapter 6 the empirical evidence from the SFA approach reveals that
controlling ownership has a significant and positive impact on the technical
efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. This supports the agency theory
that controlling shareholders are likely to perform better than dispersed shareholders,
since a high level of ownership concentration is likely to alleviate the free rider
problem of monitoring a firm’s management and, therefore, reduce agency costs. A
positive result is also found from the DEA approach, but it is not statistically
significant. This positive result is also consistent with the empirical results of
Yammeesri and Lodh (2003) and Wiwattanakantang (2001) for the case of Thai
listed companies, except their results regarding the measurement of a firm’s
performance is based upon profitability and financial ratios.
(5)

How does “managerial ownership” impact on the technical efficiency of
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises?
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To answer the fifth sub-research question hypothesis 5 is addressed with
respect to a review of the literature in Chapter 3 as follows:
Hypothesis 5: Managerial ownership has a significant and positive effect on the
technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
There is strong evidence from the SFA and DEA estimation approaches that
managerial ownership has a significant and positive association with the technical
efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, and this result is consistent with
the finding of Liao et al. (2010). This indicates managerial ownership can help align
the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers, and, therefore, the
agency problem is reduced as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976). In other
words, this result implies that managers, who receive direct benefits from the firm
through dividends relative to the level of their cash flow or voting rights, are likely to
monitor the firm carefully and effectively. On the other hand, managers who do not
hold any ownership over a firm’s cash flow or voting stocks lack the incentive to
monitor the firm effectively, since they do not participate in profit sharing in the
form of dividends.
(6)

What is the impact of “executive remuneration” on the technical
efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises?
Hypothesis 6 is developed from a review of the literature in Chapter 3 so as

to answer the sixth sub-research question as follows:
Hypothesis 6: Executive remuneration has a significant and positive effect on the
technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
The empirical results from both estimation approaches reveal that executive
remuneration has a significant and positive effect on the technical efficiency of Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises. This result indicates that listed manufacturing firms
with higher levels of executive remuneration tend to be more technically efficient,
since the amount of bonuses or increased salaries that executives (e.g., board of
directors and managers) will receive is based upon the firm’s annual performance
(e.g., net profits). In some listed firms the amount of executive remuneration (e.g.,
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bonuses) is based on the percentage of the firm’s annual net profits. Therefore, there
is a strong incentive for them to control input costs and maximize the firm’s net
profit. This finding is also consistent with the empirical results of Baek and Pagán
(2002), and other empirical studies based on profitability and financial ratios as the
measurement of a firm’s performance (see Section 3.7, Chapter 3).
(7)

Which “types of owned firms” (types of ownership) are more technically
efficient ?
Hypothesis 7 is also developed from a review of the literature to answer the

seventh sub research question as follows:
Hypothesis 7: Foreign and family ownership have a significant and positive effect
on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises; foreign-owned
firms perform best in terms of technical efficiency relative to other ownership types
for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
There is strong evidence from both estimation approaches that foreign and
family ownership exerts a significant and positive impact on the technical efficiency
of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. The reasons are that foreign ownership has
superior technology, managerial expertise, good corporate governance and a strong
foreign-market network (Kimura and Kiyota, 2007). Family ownership normally
provides good monitoring over the firm since the close relationship among family
members within the firm can reduce the agency problem as suggested by Fama and
Jensen (1983). With respect to the magnitude of the estimated coefficients for each
type of owned-firm, there is strong evidence from both estimation approaches that
foreign-owned firms perform the best for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises,
followed by family-owned firms, hybrid-owned firms and domestic-owned firms,
given joint-owned firms as the base category. Focusing on foreign ownership the
empirical evidence from hypothesis 7 is also consistent with many of the empirical
studies (see Section 3.5.2, Chapter 3). For family ownership the empirical evidence
is also similar with the empirical results of Yammeesri and Lodh (2003) and
Wiwattanakantang (2001), except they measured a firm’s performance based on
profitability and financial ratios.
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(8)

How does “exporting” influence the technical efficiency performance of
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises?

(9)

What is the impact of “technical efficiency” on the export participation of
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises?
The eighth and ninth sub-research questions aim to empirically explore the

existence of the learning-by-exporting hypothesis and the self-selection hypothesis
for the case of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. According to a review of the
literature in Chapter 3, hypothesis 8 is set up in order to empirically test the
outcomes from these sub research questions.
Hypothesis 8: A firm’s exports have a significant and positive association with its
technical efficiency (the learning-by-exporting hypothesis exists); A firm’s technical
efficiency has a significant and positive effect on the export participation (the self
selection hypothesis exists) of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
There is strong evidence from both estimation approaches that exporting has
a significant and positive association with the technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises. This result reveals the existence of a learning-byexporting hypothesis, indicating that exporting firms are also likely to improve their
technical efficiency due to their learning-by-exporting experience (i.e., new product
designs and production methods). This evidence is also consistent with a number of
empirical studies, as summarized and provided in Table 3.3 (see Section 3.8, Chapter
3). Vice versa, there is evidence that a firm’s technical efficiency predicted by the
SFA approach has a significant and positive effect on its export participation for Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises. In other words the self-selection hypothesis exists
for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. This implies that only efficient firms can
participate in foreign markets, since they can cover sunk start-up costs which are
additional costs when exporting to foreign markets (e.g., transportation costs,
marketing costs, or production costs in developing existing products) and compete
with foreign enterprises. The positive effect of a firm’s technical efficiency predicted
by the DEA approach on its export participation is also found for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, but it is not statistically significant. The positive evidence
from the self-selection hypothesis is also consistent with other empirical studies as
shown in Table 3.3 of Chapter 3 (see Section 3.8, Chapter 3).
298

(10)

How do other firm-specific variables such as (i) government assistance,
(ii) firm size, (iii) firm age, and (iv) foreign cooperation influence the
technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises?
Besides the sub research questions 1 to 9, including hypotheses 1 to 8

mentioned above, the tenth sub-research question focussing on other firm specific
and business environment factors is also developed from a review of the literature
review in Chapter 3. They include (i) firm size, (ii) firm age, (iii) government
assistance, and (iv) foreign cooperation. The empirical results from Chapter 6 reveal
the effects of these factors on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises as follows.
(i) Firm size: There is strong evidence from both estimation approaches that
firm size has a significant and positive effect on the technical efficiency of Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises.
(ii) Firm age: The empirical results from both estimation approaches reveal
that firm age has a positive impact upon the technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, but only the empirical evidence from the SFA reveals a
significant result. This positive result implies that a firm’s technical efficiency is
enhanced through a learning-by-doing experience.
(iii) Government assistance: The association between government assistance
and technical efficiency for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises is found to be
inconclusive, since both estimation approaches indicate significant results but their
coefficients have opposite signs (positive for the SFA and negative for the DEA).
(iv) Foreign cooperation: The empirical results from both estimation
approaches indicate that foreign cooperation has a negative impact on the technical
efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, but only the empirical result
obtained from the SFA approach is statistically significant.
(iii)

How can the overall technical efficiency performance of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises be enhanced?
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The third main research question aims to provide suggestions on how to
enhance the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. The
empirical results for all of the three main research questions, including sub-research
questions as previously mentioned, can be adopted for the conduct of evidence-based
policy implications and recommendations to answer this third main research
question. Moreover, the eleventh sub research question is addressed in order to
provide more supporting information for the third main research question as follows:
(11)

How can policies initiated by the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) and
the government, directly or via other government agencies, be made to
improve the efficiency and competitiveness of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises?
This thesis has provided policy implications and recommendations based on

the empirical evidence obtained for the first and second main research questions,
including hypotheses 1 to 8, as well as other selected firm specific factors (e.g., firm
size and firm age) which significantly affect the technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises (see Chapter 7).
With respect to the empirical evidence obtained for the first main question,
although the efficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises is high
they have relied on labour-intensive or low value adding production activities. These
results also support the recommendations of World Bank-Thailand (2008) that
measures to enhance productivity and competitiveness over the long term in all
sectors (agriculture, industry, and services) are urgently needed. Therefore, Thai
listed manufacturing firms are required to move up to a higher production frontier to
enhance their future technical efficiency performance. The government, via the BOI,
can play an important role in promoting productive investments for Thai listed
manufacturing firms, such as upgrading their production technology and
participating in higher value-adding production activities. In practice, the BOI
introduced measures after 4th March 2009 to encourage investors to improve their
production along with an increase in their revenues and the maintenance of their
employment (The Board of Investment, 2010a). The BOI can, therefore, promote the
privileged participation of Thai listed manufacturing firms which are interested in
launching new products and upgrading their production technology. The SET can
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also assist the productive investments of Thai listed manufacturing firms, by
facilitating fundraising which is to be specifically used for their productive
investments.
Focusing on the empirical results for the second main research question based
on hypothesis 1, listed manufacturing firms which have high leverage are likely to
have high technical efficiency. This can imply that they control input costs and use
financial resources effectively. Moreover, it is possible that listed manufacturing
firms which have high leverage might be investing in capital intensive projects which
require a large capital investment. Vice versa, listed manufacturing firms which have
more liquidity, tend to have low technical efficiency. Therefore, the SET can help
promote productive investments for Thai listed manufacturing firms by facilitating
fundraising for their productive investments (see hypothesis 2, Section 7.2). The SET
can help promote foreign and local investment in Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises which prefer to invest in productive investment projects. The
government, via the BOI, can help promote productive investments for Thai listed
manufacturing firms. It is a good opportunity for Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises to participate in BOI financial and non-financial privileges.
The empirical evidence for hypothesis 2 indicates that internal financing has a
significant and positive effect on the technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, while external financing does not exert an important
impact on technical efficiency due to a small estimated coefficient (close to zero).
More importantly, it is not possible for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises to use
only external or internal financing. Therefore, internal financing transactions should
be fully disclosed to avoid an agency problem, as managers may use internal funds
for their own interests or they may fail to maximize shareholders’ benefits. Focusing
on external financing, the reason why the use of external financing has a significant
and negative impact on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises is that they are obligated to pay different interest payments relative to the
amount of their loans and current economic conditions (e.g., financial institutions
normally prefer to provide a floating interest rate which can be altered according to
(i) interest rates announced by the Bank of Thailand and (ii) financial costs of each
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financial institution). Thus, the fluctuation of interest rates charged by financial
institutions also directly impacts the cost of production of firms (or the input cost in
firm production) and, therefore, may adversely affect the competitiveness and
efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing firms. The use of external financing through
loans also causes the obligation for Thai listed manufacturing firms to pay principle
and interest to debtors on time. Furthermore, there is the possibility that Thai listed
manufacturing firms may face financial difficulties, but they are forced to pay
principle and interest to creditors. In this regard, they might not be able to use limited
financial resources for their daily working capital. As a result this may also reduce
the technical efficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing firms. However,
this negative effect is very small due to the very small magnitude of the estimated
external financing coefficient (close to zero).
The use of equity instruments can also be useful in obtaining external
financing, which can be conducted by issuing new shares to (i) existing shareholders
(rights offering), (ii) a specific group of strategic investors (private placement), and
(iii) the public (public offering). This is because listed manufacturing firms only pay
dividends to shareholders when they gain profits, and therefore this provides more
flexibility compared with a loan repayment. More importantly, providing information
for minority shareholders with respect to their roles and voting rights is very
important to establish a checks and balances mechanism which can reduce the
agency problem. In practice, an independent financial analyst is required to provide a
third party comment on their financial activities which directly affect shareholders’
benefits (e.g., issuing debentures or shares). The government, via the SEC, therefore,
can play an important role in promoting the reliability of these financial analysts.
Strong and prompt penalties on those financial analysts, including listed
manufacturing firms, who are fraudulent, should be strengthened to ensure
compatibility with international standards.
The empirical evidence suggests a significant and negative association
between research and development (R&D) and technical efficiency for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises. This indicates that Thai listed manufacturing firms
misleadingly report R&D activities in their annual reports (see hypothesis 3 in
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Chapter 6). There are two reasons why most listed manufacturing firms are likely to
report R&D activities as follows: (i) R&D and job training expenses, including
expenditure on the provision of equipment for the disabled, are allowed to increase at
200 percent from actual expenses for the purpose of corporate income tax reduction;
(ii) They aim to maintain a good public image. However, they lack serious
implementation of these activities. As a result the government, including the SET,
should monitor their R&D and training activities very closely, as the R&D section
has not been required to be disclosed in the annual report (Form 56-1) since 2008.
The empirical evidence for hypotheses 4 and 5 suggests that both controlling
and managerial ownership are found to have a significant and positive effect on the
technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing firms. To avoid possible agency
problems caused by controlling and managerial ownership, the SET should promote
a good corporate governance system. Focusing on managerial ownership the
“Employee Stock Option Program (ESOP)” should be promoted, as this can promote
the participation of managerial ownership However, the ESOP may cause control
and price dilutions for existing shareholders. Minority shareholders play an important
role in the monitoring of listed manufacturing firms’ operations, and therefore
knowledge of the roles and voting rights of minority shareholders should be
promoted as this can establish a checks and balances mechanism between listed
manufacturing firms’ management and shareholders (see minority shareholders’
voting rights in Section 7.5, Chapter 7).
The empirical evidence for hypothesis 6 indicates that executive
remuneration has a significant and positive impact on the technical efficiency of Thai
listed manufacturing firms. As a result, attractive executive remunerations based on
the firm’s performance should be promoted. Executive remuneration can be provided
in a number of ways such as (i) salary, (ii) employee benefits and perquisites, and
(iii) short-term incentives (e.g., bonus), and (iv) long-term incentives (e.g., stock
options) (Ellig, 2002, p5). For any listed manufacturing enterprise a compensation
committee should be established, and the members of the compensation committee
should be completely independent from management. In addition, executive
remuneration should be based on a listed manufacturing firm’s financial
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performance. Available director compensation surveys or comments from a
consulting firm should be considered as the benchmark, as these can help protect
unreasonable executive compensation for Thai listed manufacturing firms. Finally,
providing information for minority shareholders with respect to their roles and voting
rights over Thai listed manufacturing enterprises is also very important, since
executive remuneration must ultimately be approved by Thai listed manufacturing
firms’ shareholders.
The empirical evidence for hypothesis 7 indicates that foreign-owned firms
perform the best, followed by family-owned firms and other types of firm ownership
Therefore, foreign and family ownership should be promoted for Thai listed
manufacturing firms. Foreign shareholding limits can be relaxed up to 100 percent if
Thai listed and non-listed manufacturing firms are not in any of the three lists of
prohibited businesses, and have been approved by the BOI. To legally increase the
foreign ownership of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, the BOI’s privileges
should be promoted. Alternatively, Non-Voting Depository Receipts (NVDRs) can
be useful to avoid the foreign shareholding limit in the case where Thai listed
manufacturing firms are not eligible to receive BOI privileges.
The most difficult task, however, is how to promote the confidence of foreign
investors to invest in securities of Thai listed manufacturing firms. Hence, good
corporate governance among Thai listed manufacturing enterprises should be
strengthened. Accounting and auditing best practices, including rules and
responsibilities of boards of directors, should be continuously strengthened to be in
line with international standards. To promote family ownership Thai small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) can be a potentially targeted group, since they are
mostly operated by family members. They, however, prefer not to be listed in the
SET, since they are afraid of losing their control and following SET and SEC rules
and regulations. All information regarding how they can benefit from being listed in
the SET and required procedures and criteria, should be fully disclosed. Family
owned firms, however, may cause an agency problem, since they may implement
policies which are beneficial to themselves (see Section 3.5.2, Chapter 3). Good
corporate governance among family owned firms should be strengthened to avoid an
agency problem as previously discussed.
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The empirical evidence for hypothesis 8 (learning-by-exporting and selfselection hypotheses) indicates the existence of learning-by-exporting, implying that
exporting helps improve the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises. Therefore, the government should play an important role in promoting
exporting for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises as well as other non-listed
manufacturing firms, by implementing adequate policies, such as foreign trade policy
as well as other policies (e.g., national development plans, monetary policy, fiscal
policy, production and price controls, private investment regimes, and foreign
exchange policy). More specifically, foreign trade policy which includes (i) trade
promotion (e.g., export promotion and import regulation), (ii) trade development
infrastructure (e.g., trade facilitation regulation, trade finance, and trade enterprises),
and (iii) international trade relations (e.g., bilateral relations, international trade
forums, and regional trade) as summarized in Figure 7.1 of Chapter 7 should be
strengthened (see ESCAP, 2001).
A number of government agencies such as the Department of Export
Promotion (DEP), the Board of Investment (BOI), Export and Import Bank of
Thailand (EXIM Bank) also play a crucial role in promoting the government’s
foreign trade policy. With respect to the existence of the self-selection hypothesis,
only efficient listed manufacturing firms are likely to participate in foreign markets
due to high sunk costs arising from exporting and high competition in foreign
markets. The efficiency and competitiveness of Thai listed manufacturing firms,
therefore, should be strengthened. A number of firm-specific and business
environment factors, which have been found to have a significant and positive impact
on the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing firms, can be promoted, such
as (i) an increase in firm size, (ii) more controlling and managerial ownership, (iii)
more foreign and family ownership participation, and (iv) attractive executive
remuneration. Furthermore, strengthening good corporate governance, providing
knowledge for minority shareholders, and improving the production technology
should be focused upon for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
Besides the empirical evidence for hypotheses 1 to 8, increased firm size and
firm age can improve the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing firms and
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assist their participation in foreign markets. Therefore, the SET and SEC can
promote an increase in firm size for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. For
example, fundraising used for productive investments (e.g., upgrading their
production technology or participating in higher value-adding production activities)
should be promoted and facilitated. In addition, listed manufacturing firms in the
MAI can be encouraged to be listed in the SET if they meet the SET’s listing criteria.
Focusing on firm age, the SET and SEC can encourage long established
manufacturing firms to be listed in the SET, but they need to be selective based on
their ongoing operating performance. In addition, young listed manufacturing firms
may lack sufficient operational experience, financial resources, networking, and
product reputation (brand name). As a result, policies which aim to help young listed
manufacturing firms to enhance their technical efficiency and participate in foreign
markets are also necessary, such as (i) promoting cross-learning between young
firms and old firms, (ii) providing business training for young firms, (iii) providing
tax holiday 133 for young firms, and (iv) attracting foreign direct investment.
In conclusion, the SET and the government, via a number of government
agencies (e.g., the Office of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Board
of Investment of Thailand (BOI), the Department of Export Promotion (DEP), the
Revenue Department (RD), the Department of Business Development (DBD), and
the Export and Import Bank of Thailand (EXIM bank)), can play an important role in
enhancing the technical efficiency of Thai listed manufacturing firms through a
number of policy implementations and recommendations as summarized in Table 7.5
of Chapter 7. The SET and SEC should continuously promote good corporate
governance among Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, in line with international
corporate governance standards, through (i) reliable and transparent disclosure of
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises’ information, (ii) adoption of the institutional
framework for best accounting and auditing practices, (iii) adequate rules and
responsibilities of board of directors, and (iv) prompt and strong punishment for
illegal activities caused by Thai listed manufacturing firms including other related
parties (e.g., financial analysts).

133

In Thailand, tax holiday currently refers to tax privileges that firms obtained from the Board of
Investment (BOI).
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Moreover, the SET and SEC should (i) pay close attention to Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises’ transactions affecting the firm’s shareholders so as to
ensure compliance with their rules and regulations as well as international corporate
governance standards, (ii) provide training courses related to updated rules and
regulations for newly and existing listed manufacturing enterprises, including related
parties, and (iii) facilitate fundraising of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises to be
used for productive investment (e.g., upgrading production technology and
developing new products). These policy implications and recommendations,
therefore, are important in improving the technical efficiency performance of Thai
listed manufacturing firms. More importantly, providing information for minority
shareholders regarding their roles and voting rights is very important for a checks
and balances mechanism, to avoid an agency problem, since Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises’ transactions, which directly affect companies and
shareholders’ benefits, must be approved by shareholders in the shareholders’
meeting.
Minority shareholders, therefore, can play an important role in closely
monitoring any agenda proposed by the company’s management, and appointing an
inspector(s) to investigate the company’s operations and financial status. Other
government agencies, especially the BOI, can also play an important role in
promoting (i) the performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, (ii) foreign
investment participation, (iii) exporting of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, and
(iv) serious R&D participation of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. The
government can encourage Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, as well as foreign
companies, to participate in production and product improvement as well as
productive investment, for example, by providing BOI financial and non-financial
privileges. They can be useful for the recommendation of hypothesis 1 (leverage and
liquidity), hypothesis 3 (R&D), hypothesis 7 (foreign and family ownership), and
hypothesis 8 (exporting). All of the policy implications and recommendations have
been summarized and provided in Table 7.5 of Chapter 7. All of the main research
questions, sub-research questions, hypotheses and major conclusions are summarized
in Table 8.1.
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Table 8.1: Summary of main research and sub-research questions, hypotheses,
and conclusions
Main research and subresearch questions
(i) How do Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises
perform in terms of technical
efficiency?

Hypotheses / Conclusions

• The mean Technical efficiency (TE) scores obtained from the SFA and DEA
are 0.812 and 0.877, respectively (see Table 6.14, Chapter 6).
• Thai listed manufacturing firms operated under decreasing returns to scale
(DRS).
- For the SFA approach the production returns to scale is
0.9187, indicating DRS (see Table 6.9, Chapter 6).
- The DEA approach also suggests that approximately 86 percent
of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, on average, operated
under decreasing returns to scale (see Table 6.15, Chapter 6).
• The technical progress of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises had relied on
labour input, over the period 2000 to 2008 (see Table 6.7, Chapter 6).
• The rate of technical progress was 0.0205, indicating that it increased at 2.05
percent per year (see Table 6.9, Chapter 6).
• The above findings are consistent in concluding that Thai listed
manufacturing firms have relied on labour-intensive or low value added
production activities, and, therefore, are required to move up to a higher
production frontier.

(ii) Which factors
significantly contribute
to the technical efficiency
performance of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises?
Sub research questions
for question (ii):
(1) How do “financial
constraints (leverage) and
liquidity” impact on the
technical efficiency of Thai
listed manufacturing
enterprises?

Hypothesis 1: Financial
constraints (leverage) have a
significant and positive relationship
with the technical efficiency of Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises.
Vice versa, the more liquidity the
lower is the technical efficiency of
Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises.

• Both the SFA and DEA approaches
reveal that financial constraints
(leverage) has a significant and
positive association with the
technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises. Vice
versa, the empirical evidence from
both estimations also reveal that
liquidity has a significant and
negative effect on the technical
efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises (see
Tables 6.11, 6.13, 6.17, Chapter 6).

(2) Which types of “source
of finance (internal or
external financing)”
significantly affect the
technical efficiency of Thai
listed manufacturing
enterprises?

Hypothesis 2: External financing
has a significant and positive
relationship with a firm’s technical
efficiency for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises. Vice
versa, internal financing has a
significant and negative effect on a
firm’s technical efficiency for Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises.

• The empirical evidence from the
SFA approach suggests that external
financing has a significant and
negative association with the
technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, which is
opposite to the statement of this
hypothesis. A negative relationship is
also found from the DEA approach,
but it is not statistically significant
(see Tables 6.11, 6.13, 6.17,
Chapter 6).
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Main research and subresearch questions

Hypotheses / Conclusions
• This negative finding, however, does
not exert a significant impact on the
technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, since the
magnitude of the estimated “external
financing” coefficient is very small
(close to zero) (see Tables 6.11, 6.13,
6.17, Chapter 6).

(3) How does “research and
development (R&D)” affect
the technical efficiency of
Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises?

Hypothesis 3: Research and
development (R&D) has a
significant and positive relationship
with the technical efficiency of Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises.

• The empirical results from both
estimation approaches reveal that
research and development (R&D)
has a significant and negative
association with the technical
efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises. This
result is different from the expected
positive result for this hypothesis
(see Tables 6.11, 6.13, 6.17,
Chapter 6).

(4) How does “controlling
ownership (concentrated
ownership)” influence the
technical efficiency of Thai
listed manufacturing
enterprises?

Hypothesis 4: Controlling
ownership has a significant and
positive effect on the technical
efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises.

• The empirical evidence from the
SFA approach obtained from
Chapter 6 reveals that controlling
ownership has a significant and
positive impact on the technical
efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing firms. A positive
result is also found from the DEA
approach, but it is not statistically
significant (see Tables 6.11, 6.13,
6.17, Chapter 6).

(5) How does “managerial
ownership” impact on the
technical efficiency of Thai
listed manufacturing
enterprises?

Hypothesis 5: Managerial
ownership has a significant and
positive effect on the technical
efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises.

• There is strong evidence from the
SFA and DEA estimation approaches
that managerial ownership has a
significant and positive association
with the technical efficiency of Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises (see
Tables 6.11, 6.13, 6.17, Chapter 6).

(6) What is the impact of
“executive remuneration” on
the technical efficiency of
Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises?

Hypothesis 6: Executive
remuneration has a significant and
positive effect on the technical
efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises.

• The empirical results from both
estimation approaches reveal that
executive remuneration has a
significant and positive effect on the
technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises (see
Tables 6.11, 6.13, 6.17, Chapter 6).

(7) Which “types of owned
firms (types of ownership)”
are more technically
efficient?

Hypothesis 7: Foreign and family
ownership have a significant and
positive effect on the technical
efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises; foreignowned firms perform best in terms
of technical efficiency relative to
other ownership types for Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises.

• There is strong evidence from both
estimation approaches that foreign
and family ownership exerts a
significant and positive impact on the
technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises.
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Main research and subresearch questions

Hypotheses / Conclusions

• With respect to the magnitude of the
estimated coefficients for each type
of owned-firm, there is strong
evidence from both estimation
approaches that foreign-owned firms
perform the best, followed by
family-owned firms, hybrid-owned
firms and domestic-owned firms,
given joint-owned firms as the base
category (see Tables 6.11, 6.13, 6.17,
Chapter 6).
(8) How does “exporting”
influence the technical
efficiency performance of
Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises?
(9) What is the impact of
“technical efficiency” on the
exporting participation of
Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises?

(10) How do other firmspecific variables such as (i)
government assistance, (ii)
firm size, (iii) firm age, and
(iv) foreign cooperation
influence the technical
efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises

Hypothesis 8: A firm’s exports
have a significant and positive
association with its technical
efficiency (the learning by
exporting hypothesis exists); A
firm’s technical efficiency has a
significant and positive effect on its
export participation (the self
selection hypothesis exists) for Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises.

• There is strong evidence from both
estimation approaches that exporting
has a significant and positive
association with the technical
efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises.
• Vice versa, there is evidence that a
firm’s technical efficiency predicted
by the SFA approach has a
significant and positive effect on its
export participation for Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises (see
Tables 6.11, 6.13, 6.17, Chapter 6).
• Firm size: There is strong evidence
from both estimation approaches that
firm size has a significant and
positive effect on the technical
efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises (see
Tables 6.11, 6.13, 6.17, Chapter 6).
• Firm age: The empirical results from
both estimation approaches reveal
that firm age has a positive impact on
the technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, but only
the empirical evidence from the SFA
reveals a significant result. (see
Tables 6.11, 6.13, 6.17, Chapter 6).
• Government assistance: The
association between government
assistance and technical efficiency
for Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises is found to be
inconclusive, since both estimation
approaches reveal significant results
but their coefficients are opposite
(positive for the SFA and negative
for the DEA) (see Tables 6.11, 6.13,
6.17, Chapter 6).
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Main research and subresearch questions

Hypotheses / Conclusions
• Foreign cooperation: The empirical
results from both estimation
approaches indicate that foreign
cooperation has a negative impact on
the technical efficiency of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises, but only
the empirical result obtained from
the SFA approach is statistically
significant (see Tables 6.11, 6.13,
6.17, Chapter 6).

(iii) How can the overall
technical efficiency
performance of Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises be
enhanced?
Sub research question for
(iii):
(11) How can policies
initiated by the Stock
Exchange of Thailand (SET)
and the government, directly
or via other government
agencies, be made to
improve the efficiency and
competitiveness of Thai
listed manufacturing
enterprise?

• The SET and the government, via a number of government agencies (e.g.,
the Office of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Board of
Investment of Thailand (BOI), the Department of Export Promotion
(DEP), the Revenue Department (RD), the Department of Business
Development (DBD), and the Export and Import Bank of Thailand (EXIM
bank)), can play an important role in enhancing the technical efficiency of
Thai listed manufacturing firms through a number of policy
implementations and recommendations, as summarized in Table 7.5 of
Chapter 7.
• The SET and SEC should continuously promote good corporate
governance among Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, in line with
international corporate governance standards, through (i) reliable and
transparent disclosure of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises’
information, (ii) adoption of the institutional framework for best
accounting and auditing practices, (iii) adequate rules and responsibilities
of board of directors, and (iv) prompt and strong punishment for illegal
activities caused by Thai listed manufacturing firms including other
related parties (e.g., financial analysts).
• Moreover, the SET and SEC should (i) pay close attention to Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises’ transactions affecting the firm’s shareholders,
so as to ensure compliance with their rules and regulations as well as
international corporate governance standards, (ii) provide training courses
related to updated rules and regulations for newly and existing listed
manufacturing enterprises, including related parties, and (iii) facilitate the
fundraising of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises, to be used for
productive investment (e.g., upgrading production technology and
developing new products).
• More importantly, provide information for minority shareholders
regarding their roles and voting rights is very important for a checks and
balances mechanism, to avoid an agency problem, since Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises’ transactions, which directly affect companies
and shareholders’ benefits must be approved by shareholders in the
shareholders’ meeting.
• Other government agencies, especially the BOI, also play an important
role in promoting (i) the performance of Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises, (ii) foreign investment participation, (iii) exporting of Thai
listed manufacturing enterprises, and (iv) serious R&D participation of
Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. The government can encourage
those Thai listed manufacturing enterprises as well as foreign companies
to participate in their production and product improvement as well as
productive investment, for example, by providing BOI financial and nonfinancial privileges.
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8.3

Limitations and further studies
This thesis has provided an analysis of the technical efficiency performance of

Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. This thesis, however, has research limitations
which need to be addressed in future research. The empirical analysis of this thesis is
also limited to the post Asian financial crisis period, between 2000 and 2008. It
would be more interesting if this study compared the technical efficiency
performance between the pre and post Asian financial crisis. However, data before
1996 is not available, since listed companies have only been required to submit their
annual reports since 1996. Even though the listed companies’ annual reports have
been available since 1996, the structure of their annual reports during 1999 to 2000
were not consistent. The reports do not provide enough information to conduct the
empirical analysis conducted in this thesis, which covers all important firm-specific
and business environment factors necessary for evaluation of the technical efficiency
improvement of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.
This study is unique as it is the first to examine the technical efficiency
performance of Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. A sample of 178 Thai listed
manufacturing enterprises covering the period 2000 to 2008 was used to compile a
unique database for these firms. For future research it is also interesting to examine
the technical efficiency performance of Thai non-listed manufacturing enterprises as
well as Thai manufacturing small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which were
not included in the study, as these are beyond the scope of the study.
Data availability is also a further limitation of this study, as this affects the
choice of different proxies for the variables used to conduct the empirical analysis of
this thesis. For example, the use of R&D expenditure is much more appropriate that a
dummy R&D variable, since it can capture the level of R&D concentration for each
Thai listed manufacturing enterprise. Most Thai listed manufacturing enterprises do
not report their R&D expenditure, as they only describe their R&D activities with the
objective of generating a good public image. Therefore, a dummy for R&D was used
instead to conduct the empirical analysis for hypothesis 3.
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With respect to the evidence of rent-seeking in Thailand the connection
between large family-owned firms and politicians has been documented in a number
of articles. Doner and Ramsay (2002, p187) stated that “Systematic government
policy bias favouring large firms and a few entrepreneurs is also evident in
industrial policy”.
Doner and Ramsay (2002, p158) also stated that “Several families who
established leading textile firms between 1946 and 1960 were still among the major
textile groups in the late 1970s. Their early political connections gave them
advantages which they parlayed into joint ventures with Japanese companies (e.g.
the Adireksan, Bhotiranankun, Sinpatanasakul, and Assakul families)”.
Rock (2002, p188) also mentioned that “As in the banking sector, the effect of
this bias has been the domination of Thai industry by large firms combined into a
small number of family-centred conglomerates. By the early 1980s, large firms
constituted a mere 1.6 percent of all industrial establishments, but owned 54 percent
of all industrial assets and accounted for 41 percent of industrial employment. These
large firms were overwhelmingly controlled by a small number of family-owned
conglomerates”.
Phongpaichit and Baker (2001, p229) also pointed out that “Corruption of
this sort was not new. But the boom economy made the sums larger. And the shift of
power from bureaucracy to business changed the beneficiaries. For many
Bangkokians, both businessman and bureaucrat, the provincial politicians seemed
greedy upstarts. They had been pulled into politics as an extension of their business
interests”.
A study on how large family-owned firms gain advantages from their
political connections which then affect their business performance is worth further
examination. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis due to the limitation of
data sources.
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Focusing on productivity and efficiency techniques the “bootstrap” technique
is also of interest, such as the two-stage double-bootstrap Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) as developed by Simar and Wilson (2007). This could be considered
for future research. Focusing on the SFA approach, a meta-frontier production
function model introduced by Battese et al. (2004) could also be considered for
future research since the metafrontier model can be used to calculate comparable
technical efficiencies for firms with different production technologies. However, this
technique does not allow for the effects of business environment and firm-specific
factors on a firm’s technical efficiency.
In addition, the analysis of international comparative technical efficiency
performance should be also conducted for further research. In conclusion, all of these
recent research studies are worthy of being considered but they are beyond the scope
of this thesis, and, therefore, have been left for future research.
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Appendix 1.1: The characteristics of selected firm-specific factors for the top 10 best
manufacturing firms in 2008
Selected Firm-Specific Factors
Security

Company Name

Sub-

Name

TE

Sector Score

All Manufacturing
TCCC
Thai Central Chemical Plc.
AMC
Asia Metal Plc.
GC
Global Connections Plc.
CTW
Charoong Thai Wire & Cable Plc.
IRP
Indorama Polymers Plc.
LHK
Lohakit Metal Plc.
TCB
Thai Carbon Black Plc.
SSSC
Siam Steel Service Center Plc.
SPG
The Siam Pan Group Plc.
PERM
Permsin Steel Works Plc.

3.5
3.2
3.5
3.2
3.5
3.2
3.5
3.2
3.1
3.2

Average
(1) Agro & Food Industry
STA
Sri Trang Argo-Industry Plc.
TUF
Thai Union Frozen Products Plc.
PPC
Pak Food Plc.
SSC
Serm Suk Plc.
ASIAN
Asian Seafoods Coldstorage Plc.
CPF
Charoen Pokphand Foods Plc.
SSF
Surapoon Foods Plc.
CHOTI
Kiang Huat Sea Gull Trading Plc.
GFPT
GFPT Plc.
RANCH * Bangkok Ranch Plc.

0.955
0.948
0.945
0.938
0.935
0.931
0.930
0.927
0.925
0.920

Ownership Executive
Type

Foreign
Family
Hybrid
Foreign
Foreign
Family
Foreign
Hybrid
Family
Family

0.935

1.1
1.2
1.1
1.2
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1

Average

0.908
0.907
0.903
0.896
0.894
0.891
0.888
0.884
0.882
0.880

Family
Family
Family
Foreign
Family
Family
Family
Family
Family
Foreign

0.893

Control.

Managerial

D/A Current Export

FDI

Pay (%)

Own. (%)

Own. (%)

Ratio

Ratio

(%)

(%)

7.71
15.45
50.25
13.83
10.56
23.49
12.05
6.64
22.83
37.33

89.91
58.82
63.42
61.27
82.61
72.17
55.19
65.84
74.98
64.39

0.00
37.82
71.79
2.53
0.06
11.26
0.37
4.29
50.74
54.91

0.70
0.33
0.55
0.44
0.75
0.54
0.15
0.69
0.09
0.54

1.15
1.83
1.48
1.71
0.85
1.47
2.86
1.06
9.10
1.24

4.56
5.00
2.00
15.24
94.00
6.00
46.00
0.00
48.68
0.00

46.08
0.00
0.00
45.62
22.98
0.00
43.29
45.36
18.00
0.00

20.01

68.86

23.38

0.48

2.28

22.15

22.13

7.40
1.26
2.74
4.98
2.73
1.13
4.03
3.06
2.34
8.59

54.25
32.19
63.56
59.41
66.51
48.58
68.34
62.68
57.12
97.25

42.56
32.87
80.76
7.04
56.22
0.71
63.70
36.76
52.16
0.80

0.64
0.59
0.76
0.33
0.69
0.58
0.25
0.22
0.50
0.58

0.92
1.78
0.90
1.81
0.94
0.01
2.08
3.54
0.83
1.21

79.30
90.77
95.00
0.00
81.00
32.67
91.19
98.54
24.57
45.00

5.06
34.43
0.00
18.59
0.00
17.83
3.49
19.40
3.32
48.25

3.83

60.99

37.36

0.51

1.40

63.80

15.04

(2) Consumer Products
SIAM
Siam Steel International Plc.
DSGT
DSG International (Thailand) Plc.
SUC
Saha-Union Plc.
SABINA Sabina Plc.
PRANDA Pranda Jewellery Plc.
PAF
Pan Asian Footwear Plc.
OGC
Ocean Glass Plc.
BATA*
Bata (Thailand) Plc.
S&J
S&J International Enterprises Plc.
SITHAI
Srithai Superware Plc.
Average

2.2
2.3
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.2
2.1
2.3
2.2

0.878
0.870
0.865
0.860
0.851
0.845
0.843
0.837
0.829
0.827
0.851

Joint
Foreign
Family
Family
Family
Family
Family
Foreign
Family
Hybrid

5.53
15.09
1.75
7.54
3.08
0.87
14.38
9.98
6.79
4.78
6.98

77.86
85.69
32.54
87.28
43.26
55.27
60.09
90.55
56.70
33.65
62.29

33.90
4.60
3.68
74.60
26.83
3.81
7.82
0.64
11.38
26.67
19.39

0.26
0.41
0.26
0.29
0.34
0.65
0.46
0.44
0.36
0.32
0.38

2.32
1.71
1.74
2.58
2.74
0.80
2.11
1.49
1.10
1.49
1.81

25.47
46.15
45.61
49.09
50.74
80.44
74.82
3.80
33.36
3.58
41.31

16.66
73.30
2.40
0.00
24.51
1.84
6.37
85.70
0.77
14.62
22.62

(3) Industries
TCCC
Thai Central Chemical Plc.
AMC
Asia Metal Plc.
GC
Global Connections Plc.
CTW
Charoong Thai Wire & Cable Plc.
IRP*
Indorama Polymers Plc.
LHK
Lohakit Metal Plc.
TCB
Thai Carbon Black Plc.
SSSC
Siam Steel Service Center Plc.
SPG
The Siam Pan Group Plc.
PERM
Permsin Steel Works Plc.
Average

3.5
3.2
3.5
3.2
3.5
3.2
3.5
3.2
3.1
3.2

0.955
0.948
0.945
0.938
0.935
0.931
0.930
0.927
0.925
0.920
0.935

Foreign
Family
Hybrid
Foreign
Foreign
Family
Foreign
Hybrid
Family
Family

7.71
15.45
50.25
13.83
10.56
23.49
12.05
6.64
22.83
37.33
20.01

89.91
58.82
63.42
61.27
82.61
72.17
55.19
65.84
74.98
64.39
68.86

0.00
37.82
71.79
2.53
0.06
11.26
0.37
4.29
50.74
54.91
23.38

0.70
0.33
0.55
0.44
0.75
0.54
0.15
0.69
0.09
0.54
0.48

1.15
1.83
1.48
1.71
0.85
1.47
2.86
1.06
9.10
1.24
2.28

4.56
5.00
2.00
15.24
94.00
6.00
46.00
0.00
48.68
0.00
22.15

46.08
0.00
0.00
45.62
22.98
0.00
43.29
45.36
18.00
0.00
22.13

(4) Other Sectors
CCET
Cal-Comp Electronics (Thailand)
DELTA
Delta Electronics (Thailand) Plc.
VNG
Vanachai Group Plc.
SVI
SVI Plc.
METCO
Muramoto Electron (Thailand) Plc.
APRINT
Amarin Printing and Publishing Plc.
HANA
HANA Microelectronics Plc.
TYM
Thai Yuan Metal Plc.
TSTH
Tata Steel (Thailand) Plc.
PAP
Pacific Pipe Plc.
Average

6
6
5
6
6
4
6
5
5
5

0.915
0.905
0.884
0.883
0.882
0.871
0.870
0.862
0.861
0.856
0.879

Foreign
Foreign
Family
Foreign
Foreign
Family
Foreign
Family
Foreign
Family

1.49
0.34
6.31
8.99
1.23
14.57
1.09
22.08
9.82
23.18
8.91

76.45
75.60
55.99
72.67
75.33
62.31
44.47
56.75
77.36
66.06
66.30

2.22
2.60
18.99
3.36
2.54
47.61
15.44
49.25
0.02
23.65
16.57

0.75
0.37
0.63
0.33
0.36
0.18
0.13
0.46
0.29
0.30
0.38

1.13
2.31
2.48
2.63
1.95
2.95
4.40
1.89
4.35
1.78
2.59

95.41
35.01
60.50
95.60
54.08
0.00
53.44
0.00
8.50
7.00
40.95

2.96
0.87
3.36
0.97
0.91
9.26
2.01
0.00
76.16
0.00
9.65

Source: Author’s estimates
Note: * These companies decided not to be delisted from the SET after 2008; TE scores are predicted by the SFA approach.
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Appendix 1.2: The characteristics of selected firm-specific factors for the top 10 least
manufacturing firms in 2008
Selected Firm-Specific Factors
Security

Company Name

Name

Sub-

TE

Sector Score

All manufacturing
TTL
TTL Industries Plc.
TONHUA Tong Hua Communications Plc.
FANCY
Fancy Wood Industries Plc.
TPP
Thai Packaging & Printing Plc.
EIC
Electronics Industry Plc.
TBSP
Thai British Security Printing Plc.
BNC
The Bangkok Nylon Plc.
CM
Chiangmai Frozen Foods Plc.
DISTAR** Distar Electric Corporation Plc.
SAWANG Sawang Export Plc.

2.1
4
2.2
3.3
6
4
2.1
1.1
3.1
2.1

0.026
0.342
0.367
0.38
0.538
0.541
0.581
0.583
0.584
0.596

Ownership Executive
Type

Joint
Family
Family
Hybrid
Family
Domestic
Hybrid
Joint
Family
Family

Average
(1) Agro & Food Industry
CM
Chiangmai Frozen Foods Plc.
APURE
Agripure Holdings Plc.
TRS
Trang Seafood Products Plc.
TLUXE
Thailuxe Enterprises Plc.
PR
President Rice Products Plc.
TWFP
Thai Wah Food Products Plc.
S&P
S&P Syndicate Plc.
SORKON S. Khonkaen Foods Plc.
PRG
Patum Rice Mill and Granary Plc,
PM
Premier Marketing Plc.

1.1
1.2
1.1
1.1
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.1
1.2

Average

0.583
0.75
0.762
0.767
0.784
0.804
0.816
0.816
0.819
0.831

Joint
Hybrid
Family
Hybrid
Hybrid
Foreign
Family
Family
Domestic
Family

0.773

Control.

Managerial

D/A

Pay (%)

Own. (%)

Own. (%)

Ratio

Current Export
Ratio

(%)

FDI

12.81
17.95
6.02
15.32
20.95
8.55
11.92
20.03
17.8
24.38

61.61
65.08
54.06
45.74
69.18
84.39
51.12
46.38
49.38
78.06

7.77
44.59
42.12
0.08
4.35
1.08
14.95
11.01
16.13
25.99

0.09
0.04
0.01
0.05
0.02
0.15
0.14
0.06
0.46
0.09

10.44
10.15
46.20
8.63
28.67
3.68
5.00
9.78
1.01
10.20

33.70
0.00
91.18
0.00
90.63
0.00
43.03
81.70
0.00
84.59

25.00
0.00
25.35
21.81
3.11
0.00
8.20
26.24
9.19
0.00

15.57

60.50

16.81

0.11

13.38

42.48

11.89

20.03
10.41
17.94
20.37
17.43
14.51
2.09
5.54
13.08
8.64

46.38
18.52
50.83
32.34
55.22
65.78
47.55
74.76
94.11
70.97

11.01
0
46.4
13.25
23.65
15.4
21.88
41.31
0
0

0.06
0.70
0.86
0.17
0.10
0.23
0.22
0.77
0.33
0.45

9.78
0.71
0.38
2.91
1.35
1.68
2.19
0.64
0.93
1.01

81.70
88.00
89.60
5.93
33.49
16.00
15.25
0.00
14.57
35.58

26.24
1.08
0.00
13.39
5.89
15.80
4.67
0.00
0.00
1.54

13.00

55.65

17.29

0.39

2.16

38.01

6.86

(%)

(2) Consumer Products
TTL
TTL Industries Plc.
FANCY
Fancy Wood Industries Plc.
BNC
The Bangkok Nylon Plc.
SAWANG Sawang Export Plc.
CEI
Compass East Industry (Thailand) Plc.
TTI
Thai Textile Industry Plc.
JCT
Jack Chia Industries Plc.
PG
People’s Garment Plc.
WACOAL Thai Wacoal Plc.
TOG
Thai Optical Group Plc.
Average

2.1
2.2
2.1
2.1
2.2
2.1
2.3
2.1
2.1
2.3

0.026
0.367
0.581
0.596
0.652
0.696
0.731
0.735
0.738
0.742
0.586

Joint
Family
Hybrid
Family
Foreign
Joint
Family
Family
Joint
Family

12.81
6.02
11.92
24.38
35.75
3.76
22.79
9.93
5.79
9.94
14.31

61.61
54.06
51.12
78.06
71.46
34.02
59.61
55.10
70.95
42.39
57.84

7.77
42.12
14.95
25.99
1.89
34.66
22.89
5.48
3.31
19.51
17.86

0.09
0.01
0.14
0.09
0.12
0.44
0.08
0.12
0.11
0.11
0.13

10.44
46.20
5.00
10.20
8.08
1.08
6.83
5.76
5.38
6.25
10.52

33.70
91.18
43.03
84.59
68.80
31.64
0.34
12.28
26.33
93.48
48.54

25.00
25.35
8.20
0.00
62.05
10.08
0.00
0.59
35.82
16.09
18.32

(3) Industries
TPP
Thai Packaging & Printing Plc.
DISTAR**
AMAC
TNPC
Thai Nam Plastic Plc.
YCI
Yong Thai Plc.
NIPPON
Nippon Pack (Thailand) Plc.
TCJ
T.C.J. Asia Plc.
NEP
NEP Realty and Industry Plc.
CITY
City Steel Plc.
UP
Union Plastic Plc.
Average

3.3
3.1
3.2
3.1
3.5
3.3
3.2
3.3
3.2
3.5

0.380
0.584
0.673
0.707
0.747
0.772
0.798
0.802
0.808
0.830
0.710

Hybrid
Family
Hybrid
Domestic
Foreign
Family
Family
Domestic
Family
Family

15.32
17.80
7.16
10.02
55.45
44.21
10.48
30.17
15.35
5.53
21.15

45.74
49.38
50.45
37.15
45.54
73.81
59.04
58.00
65.66
71.90
55.67

0.08
16.13
41.02
4.94
38.30
49.21
0.19
0.78
52.86
0.03
20.35

0.05
0.46
0.55
0.56
0.45
0.13
0.46
0.28
0.05
0.24
0.32

8.63
1.01
1.50
1.68
1.30
4.41
1.22
0.39
11.16
2.18
3.35

0.00
0.00
24.32
4.05
0.00
0.00
0.40
0.00
1.64
0.00
3.04

21.81
9.19
8.36
0.50
15.41
2.64
0.00
6.87
0.00
0.00
6.48

4
6
4
5
6
6
4
5
5
6

0.342
0.538
0.541
0.622
0.642
0.667
0.669
0.684
0.69
0.728
0.612

Family
Family
Domestic
Joint
Hybrid
Hybrid
Hybrid
Hybrid
Family
Family

17.95
20.95
8.55
9.1
0
2.74
14.3
17.92
13.44
11.83
11.68

65.08
69.18
84.39
62.25
35.56
25.63
54.87
33.77
53.05
60.3
54.41

44.59
4.35
1.08
31.51
16.23
3.98
0.17
4.84
45.52
1.4
15.37

0.03
0.02
0.15
0.35
0.61
0.75
0.13
0.39
0.50
0.38
0.33

10.15
28.67
3.68
1.66
1.20
0.48
6.31
1.53
0.77
1.12
5.56

0.00
90.63
0.00
52.33
5.90
99.35
0.00
0.00
1.51
0.00
24.97

0.00
3.11
0.00
27.16
1.53
3.15
14.81
0.00
0.00
0.89
5.06

(4) Other Sectors
TONHUA Tong Hua Communications Plc.
EIC
Electronics Industry Plc.
TBSP
Thai British Security Printing Plc.
TCMC
Thailand Carpet Manufacturing Plc.
AKR
Ekarat Engineering Plc.
KCE
KCE Electronics Plc.
EPCO
Eastern Printing Plc.
GEN
General Engineering Plc.
SUPER
Superblock Plc.
SPPT
Single point Parts Plc.
Average

Source: Author’s estimates
Note: * These companies decided not to be delisted from the SET after 2008; *AMAC has changed its name to Max Metal
Corporation Plc. (MAX) on 27th May 2010; ** DISTAR has changed its name to Karmarts Plc. (KAMART) on 10th May 2011
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Appendix 2: Spearman rank-order correlation test
All Thai listed manufacturing firms
Spearman’s rho

SFA

SFA

DEA VRS

1.000

0.562**

.

0.000

1309

1309

0.562**

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

0.000

.

N

1309

1309

SFA

DEA VRS

1.000

0.613**

.

.

323

323

Correlation Coefficient

0.613*

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

0.000

.

323

323

SFA

DEA VRS

1.000

0.504**

.

0.000

252

252

0.504**

1.000

0.000

.

252

252

SFA

DEA VRS

1.000

0.477**

.

0.000

397

397

0.477**

1.000

0.000

.

397

397

SFA

DEA VRS

1.000

0.428**

.

0

337

337

0.428**

1.000

0.000

.

337

337

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

DEA VRS

Correlation Coefficient

(5) Agro & Food Industry sub-sector
Spearman’s rho

SFA

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

DEA VRS

N
(6) Consumer Products sub-sector
Spearman’s rho

SFA

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

DEA VRS

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

(7) Industrials sub-sector
Spearman’s rho

SFA

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

DEA VRS

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

(8) Other Sectors sub-sector
Spearman’s rho

SFA

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

DEA VRS

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Source: Author’s estimates
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); See footnote 93 for the reason in
conducting Spearman rank-order correlation test as shown in Appendix 2.
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Appendix 3.1: The list of top 10 best and least Thai listed manufacturing firms in 2008
Name

Sub- TE
S
Sector Score

Own.

Major Shareholders

Type

1st

%

2nd

%

3rd

%

4th

%

5th

%

The Top 10 Best Performers

TCCC

3.5

0.955 Foreign Sojitz Corporation

43.92 ISTS (Thailand) Co., Ltd.

39.53 Thailand Securities Depository Co., Ltd.

3.03 Bangkok Steel Industry Plc.

2.28 Central Glass Co., Ltd.

2.16

AMC

3.2

0.948 Family Yongvongphaiboon Family

33.82 Lady Patama Leeswadtrakul

16.67 Mr. Win Suteerachai

8.33 Mr. Chanatip Triwut

4.17 Miss. Orawan Phongthanyalak

2.19

GC

3.5

0.945 Hybrid Mr. Somchai Kulimakin

23.25 Mr. Aikachai Sirijuntanan

14.21 Mr. Sumruay Tichachol

13.56 Mr. Bhija Jriyasetapong

13.06 Mr. Siri Thirawattanawong

7.71

CTW

3.2

0.938 Foreign Pacific Electric Wires & Cable

43.21 Italian-Thai Development Plc.

14.39 Mellon Bank ,N.A.

8.80 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

7.92 Bangkok Insurance Plc.

6.61

IRP

3.5

0.935 Foreign Indorama Ventures Limited

42.81 Indorama Holdings Limtied

26.48 Indorama Synthetics (India) Limited

6.55 Somers (U.K.) Ltd.

6.16 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

4.01

LHK

3.2

0.931 Family Akarapongpisak Family

67.50 Mr. Nucha Watnopas

7.50 Seamico Securities Plc.

3.75 Mrs. Titima Eiampikul

1.34 Mrs. Athaya Chaikulngamdee

1.27

TCB

3.5

0.930 Foreign Thai Rayon Pcl.

24.98 Everlon International Holding

12.56 Mr.Veeraphan Theepsuwan

8.34 PT Indo Bharat Rayon

7.77 Mirapa Limited

4.67

SSSC

3.2

0.927 Hybrid Okuya & Co., Ltd.

28.00 Siam steel International Pcl.*

21.01 Kunanantakul Family*

8.47 Metal One Corporation

7.00 Northtrust Nominees Co., Ltd.

5.51

SPG

3.1

0.925 Family Rotrakarn Family

50.74 Jittivanich Family

16.26 Banc of America Securities

12.78 Banc Boston Investment Inc.

5.22 Miss. Pornsri Tantanachai

4.42

PERM

3.2

0.920 Family Yongvongpaibul Family

35.31 Sutreerachai Family

23.84 Sereedeelert Family

19.27 Batsomboon Family

3.77 Ngaowisitkul Family

2.33

The Top 10 Least Performers

TTL

2.1

TONHUA 4

25.34 Prominent Apparel Limited

25.00 Krungthai Panich Insurance Co., Ltd.

4.44 Mr. Sombat Panichewa

3.52 Sri Peenong Co., Ltd.

3.31

0.342 Family Kyavatanakij Family

0.026

Joint

Thai T C Co., Ltd.

43.24 Sakorn and Son Co., Ltd.

5.00

0.85 Mr. Tawat Tantimedh

0.58 Mr. Suchart Akharaputtiporn

0.52

10.81 Chase Nominees Limited 42

7.52 Mrs. Portip Chupinijsak

6.85

8.00 TS Life Capital Co., Ltd.

6.86

5.00 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

4.94 Mr.s Tippawan Chakphet

3.83

Mrs. Somruthai Jitpukdeebodintra

FANCY

2.2

0.367 Family Leelaprad Family

31.44 Credit Agricole (Suisse) SA

11.81 Mr. Piti Tanpatanarat

TPP

3.3

0.380 Hybrid Sangthong International Co., Ltd.

16.00 Quam Securities Nominee

8.41 Bangkok Commercial Asset Management 8.20 Predential TS Life Assurance Plc.

EIC

6

0.538 Family Mr. Sarawuth Jinwuth

51.00 Mr. Witthaya Chakpet

TBSP

4

0.541 Domestic GCG Paper Plc.

49.79 T.K.S. Technology Plc.

19.89 Toungsombat Family

7.12 Mrs. Nunthiya Santikarn

4.93 Mr. Sukit Thong-anan

4.93

BNC

2.1

0.581 Hybrid Sahathai Pattanapan Co., Ltd.

16.08 Mitsiam International Co., Ltd.

14.44 Saha Pathana-Inter Holding Plc.

11.11 Inter System Co., Ltd.

7.59 Mr. Samreang Manoonphon

7.55

CM

1.1

0.583

17.51 Itochu Corporation

13.23 Itochu (Thailand) Co., Ltd.

6.77 Mr. Suppachai Saharattanachaiwong

4.78 Mr. Lan Mu Chiu

4.59

DISTAR

3.1

0.584 Family Teekakirikul Family*

24.93 My Bus Co., Ltd.*

4.18 Phillip Securities PTE Ltd.

8.01 Mrs. Chalaw Wattanasombat

6.09 Mrs. Wanida Sae-Jiw

0.596 Family Maneepairot Family

76.88 Mr.Kamonporn Mekworawut

4.24 Mr. Watanasak Laomanutsak

4.17 Mrs. Chanpen Sorakraikitikul

3.30 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

(Singapore) PTE Ltd.

SAWANG 2.1

Joint

Northern Agricultural Co., Ltd.

Co., Ltd.
5.75 Mr. Sa-Nga Wanasinchai

5.47
1.15

Source: Author
Note: * indicates that they are family related; Italic font indicates foreign shareholders; The name of Thai shareholders was originally in Thai, and was translated by the author by using other
sources (e.g., Facebook, Google, the SET’s website, companies’ website).
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Appendix 3.2: The list of top 10 best and least Thai listed manufacturing firms of the Agro & Food Industry sub-sector in 2008
Name

Sub-

TE

Sector Score

Major Shareholders

Own.
Type

1st

%

2nd

%

3rd

%

4th

%

5th

%

The Top 10 Best Performers

STA

1.1

0.908 Family Sri Trang Holding Co., Ltd.*

24.48 Sincharoenkul Family*

25.05 Mr. Aram Sirisuwat

3.42 Mr. Prasit Panichkul

1.20 Mr. Poung cheadkeatkamjay

0.92
3.27

TUF

1.2

0.907 Family Chansiri Family

26.07 Niruttinanon Family

8.19 Chase Nominees Limited 42

7.63 BNY Mellon

4.35 Thai NVDR Co.Ltd.

PPC

1.1

0.903 Family Areecharoenlert Family

68.73 Kankwatanawan Family

19.93 Bangkok Insurance Plc.

0.88 Mr. Somchai Meansuk

0.57 -

SSC

1.2

0.896 Foreign Pepsi-Cola (Thai) Trading

24.98 Seven-Up Netherland, B.U.

16.63 Mr. Nithi Osathanugrah

8.84 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

4.92 Bangkok Reinvest Co., Ltd.

4.04

ASIAN

1.1

0.894 Family Amornrattanachaikul Family

63.84 Capital Rice Co., Ltd.

15.32 Mr. Chan Amarest

3.28 Miss Sirirat Tantichalermsin

2.39 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

2.10

CPF

1.1

0.891 Family Charoen Pokphand Group

41.16 Mellon Bank, N.A.

SSF

1.1

0.888 Family Mr. Surapon Vongvadhanaroj

39.05 Thai Securities Depository

CHOTI

1.1

0.884 Family Laoteppitaks Family*

26.49 Chotiwat Holding Co., Ltd.*

26.00 H’ng Kim Chang & Son .SDN.BHD

GFPT

1.1

0.882 Family Sirimongkolkasem Family

56.16 นายอนุชา กิจธนามงคลชัย

4.38 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

3.06 Albouys Nominees Limited

RANCH

1.1

0.880 Foreign London 8 Co., Ltd.

46.90 Thongchai Co., Ltd.

31.10 Middle Village Co., Ltd.

15.90 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd

2.60 Citibank Nominees Singapore

4.72 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.
23.32 Mr. Sithichai Kraisithisirin

-

3.58 Nortrust Nominees LTD.-NTGS

3.46 Nortrust Nominees LTD.

1.55

13.12 Mr. Chokchai Jiengwareewong

11.34 Thai Securities Depository

2.67

Co., Ltd for Depositor (Thai)

Co., Ltd for Depositor (Foreign)
13.31 Mr. H’ng Cheow Teik

6.09 Mr. Watshira Tayanaraporn
2.72

Mr. Somkiet Limsong

5.00
1.90
0.70

The Top 10 Least Performers

CM

1.1

0.583

17.51 Itochu Corporation

13.23 Itochu (Thailand) Co., Ltd.

6.77 Mr. Suppachai Saharattanachaiwong

4.78 Mr. Lan Mu Chiou

4.59

APURE

1.2

0.750 Hybrid Miss Suchitra Thamtikanon

Joint

Northern Agricultural Co., Ltd.

4.35 Mr. Taweesak Watchara-

3.43 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

2.44 Mr. Somkiet Thanaporn-

1.79 Mr. Chatchalerm Chalerm-

1.36

TRS

1.1

0.762 Family Hoontrakul Family

25.61 Hoonpongsimanon Family

26.86 Mr. Teaktin Sae-Jiw

4.38 Mr. Ekachai Satranuwat

3.91 Mr. Damrong Booncharoen

rakkawong

sangsut

chaiwat
3.80

TLUXE

1.1

0.767 Hybrid Seneepakornkai Family

18.47 Group of Mr. Wu Yu Thing

14.56 Jetanalin Family

10.92 Symtel International Investment Corp

6.99 Group of Mr. Ying Fu Chang

3.77

PR

1.2

0.784 Hybrid President Holding Co., Ltd.*

32.52 Paniangvait Family*

14.94 Poonsakudomsin Family*

7.19 Tatiyakkavee Family *

6.77 Tanayongpibul Family

3.66

TWFP

1.2

0.804 Foreign Universal Starch Plc.*

42.08 Ho Family*

16.53 Chang Fung Co., Ltd.*

7.1

5.23 Kim Eng Securities PTE.LTD.

3.47

S&P

1.2

0.816 Family Siraoon & Riwa Family

36.27 Minor International Plc.

20.84 Social Investment Fund

9.55 Credit Suisse Securities (Europe)

3.93 Mrs. Supapan Pichainaron-

3.31

SORKO

1.2

0.816 Family Rujirasopn Family

41.18 SKK Food Co., Ltd.

20.57 Metro Agro Industry Co., Ltd.

13.01 Mahachai Food Processing.

4.86 Thai Food Industry Co., Ltd.

4.75

PRG

1.1

0.819 Domestic MBK Plc.

74.52 Thanachart Capital Plc.

9.79 Thanachart Plc.

4.4

3.27 Thanachart Insurance Co., Ltd.

2.13

PM

1.2

0.831 Family Premier Fission Capital Co., Ltd.*

65.38 Bangkok Insurance Plc.

1.62 TAIB-JAIC Asian Balanced Private

1.54 Premier Pet Products Co., Ltd.*

1.54 Thai Capital Fund

0.89

UBS AG Hong Kong Branch

songkham

Thanachart Life Assurance Co., Ltd.

Equity Fund
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Appendix 3.3: The list of top 10 best and least Thai listed manufacturing firms of the Consumer-Products sub-sector in 2008
Name

Sub-

TE

Own

Score

Type

Major Shareholders
1st

%

2nd

%

3rd

%

4th

%

13.66 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

2.33

5th

%

The Top 10 Best Performers
f
SIAM

2.2

0.878

Joint

Kunanatakul Family

34.58 Mr. Pongsak Pongpandecha

30.11 Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc.

Lehman Brothers International

2.24

(Europe)

DSGT

2.3

0.870 Foreign DSG International Limited

65.74 Somers( U.K.) Limited

5.18 Anuwongnukroh Family

9.20 DSG International (Thailand)

3.14 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

2.05

SUC

2.1

0.865

Family Darakananda Family

39.22 Bangkok Bank Plc.

4.11

Mr. Karmton Punsak-Udomsin

2.72 Sinbualuang Leasing Co., Ltd.

2.72

South Eastern Life Insurance

1.95

SABINA

2.1

0.860

Family Thanalongkorn Family

74.59 Mrs. Wannee Thonglak

4.03

Mr. Anurak Tangkaravakun

3.68 Mrs. Rachanee Wiwatchaiyabanbundit 3.02

Mr. Soras Eimamornpan

3.02

PRANDA

2.1

0.851

Family Tiasuwan Family

28.03 AG London Branch-NRB

6.64

Fortis Global Custody Services, N.V.

6.36 Mellon Bank, N.A.

4.03

Norbax Inc.

3.41

PAF

2.1

0.845

Family PA Capital Co., Ltd.*

18.90 Bangkok Rubber Plc.*

18.90 International Curity Footware Co., Ltd.

7.20 Footware Tech 1530 Co., Ltd.

5.80

SAHA Patthana Inter-Holding
Plc. (Chokwatana Family)*

OGC

2.2

0.843

Family Ocean Holding Co., Ltd. *

BATA

2.1

0.837 Foreign Bafin (Nederland) B.V.

32.82 Assakul Family*

27.10 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

6.13 Mrs. Nutsara Banyatpiyaphod*

5.81

Toko-Sasaki Glass Co., Ltd.

2.96

85.70 Sawatyanon Family

4.12 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

2.07 Bangkok Insurance Co., Ltd.

1.09

Mr. Sirat Thumrongrat

0.62

10.41 Wittanasit Co., Ltd.
*

S&J

2.3

0.829

Family SAHA Pattana Inter-Holding Plc*.

15.57 I.C.C. International Co., Ltd.*

14.81 I.D.F. Co., Ltd. *

11.00 Chokwatana Family*

SITHAI

2.2

0.827

Hybrid Lertsumitkul Family

24.40 Angubolkul Family

13.48 Mrs. Mayuree Siriwajanakul

5.43

Sri Thai Superwear Plc.

5.15 Pershing LLC-Customers

8.82

4.77

Keeping
The Top 10 Least Performers

TTL

2.1

0.026

Joint

Thai T C Co., Ltd.

25.34 Prominent Apparel Limited

25.00 Krungthai Panich Insurance Co., Ltd.

4.44 Mr. Sombat Panichewa

3.52 Sri Peenong Co., Ltd.

3.31

FANCY

2.2

0.367

Family Leelaprad Family

31.44 Credit Agricole (Suisse) SA

11.81 Mr. Piti Tanpatanarat

10.81 Chase Nominees Limited 42

7.52 Mrs. Portip Chupinijsak

6.85

BNC

2.1

0.581

Hybrid Sahathai Pattanapan Co., Ltd.

16.08 Mitsiam International Co., Ltd.

14.44 Saha Pathana-Inter Holding Plc.

11.11 Inter System Co., Ltd.

7.59 Mr. Samreang Manoonphon

7.55

Family Maneepairot Family

SAWANG

2.1

0.596

76.88 Mr.Kamonporn Mekworawut

4.24 Mr. Watanasak Laomanutsak

4.17 Mrs. Chanpen Sorakraikitikul

3.30 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

1.15

CEI

2.2

0.652 Foreign Summax Investment Limited

51.00 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

9.24 Credit Suisse Singapore Branch

6.16 Mr. Thanit Labpanichpoonpon

2.71 Miss Yuhua Yan

2.35

TTI

2.1

0.696

15.71 Boonnamsap Family

9.89

8.11 Gold Mine Garment Co., Ltd.

4.00

4.00

Joint

Chuenchoochit Family

Thai Textile International Co., Ltd.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith

JCT

2.3

0.731

Family Aroonvatanaporn Family*

54.82 Chairapruk Family*

26.34 Pharma Care Co., Ltd.*

4.92 Mrs. Chantira Chotinantaset

1.59

Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

1.35

PG

2.1

0.735

Family Thanulux Plc.

14.05 Saha Pathana Inter-Holding Plc.*

12.75 Mr. Somleang Manoonpol

11.91 Saha Pathanapibul Plc.*

8.82 Chokwatana Family*

7.83

WACOAL

2.1

0.738

33.61 Saha Pathana Inter-Holding Plc.*

21.26 Saha Pathanapibul Plc.*

7.57

4.77 I.D.F Co., Ltd.

3.74

TOG

2.3

0.742

61.68 Specsavers Asia Pacific Holding

12.50 The Body of Person Sasas-Ketnapa

1.38 Sin Kwang Optical Pte Ltd

1.25

Joint

Wacoal Corporation m

Family Pracharktum Family

I.C.C. International Plc.*

1.74 Mrs. Wilai Chaiamnouy
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Appendix 3.4: The list of top 10 best and least Thai listed manufacturing firms of the Industries sub-sector in 200

Name

Sub- TE
S
Sector Score

Major Shareholders

Own.
Type

1st

%

2nd

%

3rd

%

4th

%

5th

%

The Top 10 Best Performers

TCCC

3.5

0.955 Foreign Sojitz Corporation

43.92 ISTS (Thailand) Co., Ltd.

39.53 Thailand Securities Depository Co., Ltd.

AMC

3.2

0.948

GC

3.5

0.945

CTW

3.2

IRP

3.5

Family Yongvongphaiboon Family

33.82 Lady Patama Leeswadtrakul

16.67 Mr. Win Suteerachai

8.33 Mr. Chanatip Triwut

4.17 Miss. Orawan Phongthanyalak

2.19

Hybrid Mr. Somchai Kulimakin

23.25 Mr. Aikachai Sirijuntanan

14.21 Mr. Sumruay Tichachol

13.56 Mr. Bhija Jriyasetapong

13.06 Mr. Siri Thirawattanawong

7.71

0.938 Foreign Pacific Electric Wires & Cable

43.21 Italian-Thai Development Plc.

14.39 Mellon Bank ,N.A.

8.80 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

7.92 Bangkok Insurance Plc.

6.61

0.935 Foreign Indorama Ventures Limited

42.81 Indorama Holdings Limtied

26.48 Indorama Synthetics (India) Limited

6.55 Somers (U.K.) Ltd.

6.16 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

4.01

Family Akarapongpisak Family

3.03 Bangkok Steel Industry Plc.

2.28 Central Glass Co., Ltd.

2.16

LHK

3.2

0.931

67.50 Mr. Nucha Watnopas

7.50 Seamico Securities Plc.

3.75 Mrs. Titima Eiampikul

1.34 Mrs. Athaya Chaikulngamdee

1.27

TCB

3.5

0.930 Foreign Thai Rayon Pcl.

24.98 Everlon International Holding

12.56 Mr.Veeraphan Theepsuwan

8.34 PT Indo Bharat Rayon

7.77 Mirapa Limited

4.67

SSSC

3.2

0.927

Hybrid Okuya & Co., Ltd.

28.00 Siam steel International Pcl.*

21.01 Kunanantakul Family*

8.47 Metal One Corporation

7.00 Northtrust Nominees Co., Ltd.

5.51

SPG

3.1

0.925

Family Rotrakarn Family

50.74 Jittivanich Family

16.26 Banc of America Securities

12.78 Banc Boston Investment Inc.

5.22 Miss. Pornsri Tantanachai

4.42

PERM

3.2

0.920

Family Yongvongpaibul Family

35.31 Sutreerachai Family

23.84 Sereedeelert Family

19.27 Batsomboon Family

3.77 Ngaowisitkul Family

2.33

8.41 Bangkok Commercial Asset Management 8.20 Predential TS Life Assurance Plc.

8.00 TS Life Capital Co., Ltd.

6.86

6.09 Mrs. Wanida Sae-Jiw

5.47

The Top 10 Least Performers

TPP

3.3

0.380

Hybrid Sangthong International Co., Ltd.

16.00 Quam Securities Nominee

DISTAR

3.1

0.584

Family Teekakirikul Family*

24.93 My Bus Co., Ltd.*

4.18 Phillip Securities PTE Ltd.

8.01 Mrs. Chalaw Wattanasombat

AMAC

3.2

0.673

Hybrid Mr. Chamni Janchai

12.12 Mr. Suthisak Losawat

9.69 KTB Network Co., Ltd.

7.27 ASAM Investment Advisory

4.85 Mr. Wisut Katchamaporn

4.36

TNPC

3.1

0.707 Domestic Siam City Bank Plc.

9.85 Bangkok Bank Plc.

9.81 Krung Thai Bank Plc.

9.81 TMB Bank Plc.

5.75 Mr. Ponpum Sawangwan

5.08

(Singapore) PTE Ltd.

Co., Ltd.

YCI

3.5

0.747 Foreign Mr. Prasertsak Suwanpotipra

12.72 Mr. La Chi Anh*

12.57 Mr. La Stephane*

8.68 Mr. Apichai Jwatcharanukul

7.19 Mr. La Chi Dinh*

5.60

NIPPON

3.3

0.772

Family Chaisathaporn Family

49.24 Kiatnakin Bank Plc.

11.01 Patee Co, Ltd.

6.56 Thana Thai Securities Plc.

4.15 North Star Plc.

4.10

Family Chatjuthamard Family

TCJ

3.2

0.798

54.63 Mr. Vichien Srimuninnimit

4.97 Miss Voramas Raksriakson

3.59 Mr. Phirat Imchokchai

2.70 Mr. Vinai Klongprakij

2.12

NEP

3.3

0.802 Domestic Miss Narueporn Kanchanajaree

24.22 Ministry of Finance

21.79 HSBC Private Bank (SUISSE) SA

4.99 Mrs. Phatrasamon Pachaiyanan

4.06 Miss Chawee Siwarpex

2.94

CITY

3.2

0.808

Family Phongratanadechachai Family

72.19 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

3.68 Mrs. Jaruwan Thaveechoksapsin

1.96 Mr. Bundit Pongratanadachachai

1.70 Miss Phonsri Wongketnak

1.51

UP

3.5

0.830

Family Saha-Union Plc.*

49.52 Srithai Superware Plc.

9.60 Bangkok Insurance Plc.

8.32 Thongthai Family

6.15 Mr. Sumet Darakananda*

1.58
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Appendix 3.5: The list of top 10 best and least Thai listed manufacturing firms of the Other Sectors sub-sector in 2008
Name

Sub-

TE

Own

Score

Type

Major Shareholders
1st

%

2nd

%

3rd

%

4th

%

5th

%

The Top 10 Best Performers

CCET

6

0.915 Foreign Kinpo Electronics Inc.

39.56 Far Eastern International Bank

19.43 Case Nominees Limited 42

7.07 Campal Electronics Inc.

6.47 Kingbolt International

DELTA

6

0.905 Foreign Citibank Nominees Singapore

27.67 Citibank Nominees Singapore

19.43 Citibank Nominees Singapore

15.39 Delta Electronics Inc.

5.54 State Street Bank and Trust

6.15

Singapore PTE. LTD.

(for Deltron Holding Ltd.)
Family Vanachai Group*

Ltd Pte-S.A. PBG Clients SG

(for Detlta International Holding lnc.)

VNG

5

0.884

44.69 Sahawat Family*

12.64 Jaroennawarat Family*

SVI

6

0.883 Foreign DBS Vickers Securities Singapore

59.34 UBS AG Singapore, Branch

5.77 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

METCO

6

0.882 Foreign Muramoto Industry Co., Ltd.

62.64 TSD Co., Ltd.

19.75 TSD Co., Ltd.

APRINT

4

0.871

55.17 Street Bank and Trust Company

for Depositor (Thai investors)

Family Utakapan Family

3.73

Company For London
4.21 Sinnsupawee Assets Management
3.3mot Mr. Pongsak Lothongkam

3.29 Goldman Sachs International

2.70

2.85 Hankaivilai Family

2.03

9.46 Mr. Keisuke Maramoto

2.25 Mr. Kohei Muramoto

1.38

4.21 Juldis Development Plc.

2.93 Chase Nominees Limited 1

2.63 Aberteen Growth Fund

2.36

10.54 HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA

3.41 BNP Paraibas Securities

3.29 Fortis Global Custody

2.95

for Depositor (Foreign investors)

For London

HANA

6

0.870 Foreign OMAC (HK) Limited

30.52 Street Bank and Trust Company
For London

Family Jirapongtrakul Family*

8.00 Mr. Panu Jarupirut*

Services N.V.

TYM

5

0.862

7.50 Mr. Karu Kanavuttakul

4.00 Mr. Nirun Ngamchamnanrit

TSTH

5

0.861 Foreign NatSteel Asia PTE. LTD.

42.12 Tata Steel Ltd.

24.99 Sukhumvit Assets Management Co.,Ltd.

5.64 Bangkok Bank Plc.

3.52 Petchburi Assets Management

2.27

PAP

5

0.856

39.05 Lekapojpanich Family *

36.83 Mrs. Pranee Kuwuttayakorn

2.81

1.38 Mr. Reangkiet Chantaravareerat

1/04

43.24 Sakorn and Son Co., Ltd.

5.00 Mrs. Somruthai Jitpukdeebodintra

0.85 Mr. Tawat Tantimedh

0.58 Mr. Suchart Akharaputtiporn

0.52
3.83

Family Tang Mong Seng Holding *

45.00 Mr. Booncherd Santudpanich*

Services Lxembourg

Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

3.39

The Top 10 Least Performers

TONHUA

4

0.342

Family Kyavatanakij Family
Family Mr. Sarawuth Jinwuth

EIC

6

0.538

51.00 Mr. Witthaya Chakpet

5.75 Mr. Sa-Nga Wanasinchai

5.00 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

4.94 Mr.s Tippawan Chakphet

TBSP

4

0.541 Domestic GCG Paper Plc.

49.79 T.K.S. Technology Plc.

19.89 Toungsombat Family

7.12 Mrs. Nunthiya Santikarn

4.93 Mr. Sukit Thong-anan

4.93

TCMC

5

0.622

32.99 Depa Interiors LLC

25.98 Teepsuwan Family*

11.81 Mr. Thamrong Issariyametikul

6.78 Miss Waree Kitbumrung

4.05

AKR

6

0.642

Hybrid KV Asset Co., Ltd.

12.66 Mr. Manus Kamneadngam

10.78 Mr. Jullajit Boonyaket

7.83 Miss Podjanalai Boonkan

4.10 Mr Suwan Panyapas

3.96

KCE

6

0.667

Hybrid Ongkosit Family*

6.43 Mr. Jessada Lertnantapanya

5.41 Mr. Panya Senadisai

5.41 Mrs. Siripan Santanapan*

1.15 Mr. Kriangkrai Akarawong

0.81

EPCO

4

0.669

Hybrid S. Pack & Print Plc.

24.94 Asia Special Situation MT

14.81 Chinsupakul Family

10.39 Miss Sarinthip Pibulchinda

3.85 Mrs Marisa Na Nakorn

3.16

7.68 Thai NVDR Co., Ltd.

3.41 Mr. Dejkachorn Jeravijaranayankul

Joint

Srivikorn Family*

GEN

5

0.684

Hybrid Sunshine Corporation Plc.

11.61 Mida Asset Plc.

SUPER

5

0.690

Family Mrs. Daranee Attanandana*

22.46 Lochaya Family*

SPPT

6

0.728

Family Polpipattanapong Family

46.39 Mr. Paritas Suthasatitchai

8.51 Distars Chain Co., Ltd.
28.67 Miss Panisara Thengtam*
8.00 Mr. Thanongchay Chartpanit

2.56

11.10 Advance Asset Management Service * 6.60 Weerawan Family*

4.01

7.98 Mrs. Ariya Kriangkraikul

5.02

7.44 Mr. Suebtrakul Bintep
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Appendix 4.1: Maximum-likelihood Probit estimates for export participation of
listed manufacturing firms (using SFA technical inefficiency scores)
Dependent variable:
Export Participation

All
Agro & Food Consumer Industrials Other
Manufacturing
Industry
Products
Sectorsa

Observation with Dependent variable = 0
Observation with Dependent variable = 1
Total observations
Independent variables:
Constant
Firm Size
Firm Age
Technical Inefficiency (SFA)
Leverage
Foreign Investment

McFadden R-squared
LR statistic
Probability (LR statistic)

281
1028
1309

46
277
323

2
250
252

96
301
397

137
200
337

-1.235**
(0.683)
0.193*
(0.038)
-0.225*
(0.092)
-1.285*
(0.341)
0.064*
(0.023)
0.010*
(0.002)

-1.443
(1.742)
0.183*
(0.087)
-0.057
(0.304)
0.378
(1.502)
-0.110
(0.201)
0.001
(0.007)

-185.511*
(67.111)
14.693*
(5.209)
4.117*
(1.893)
-54.888*
(16.124)
-7.063*
(2.413)
1.617*
(0.528)

-1.117
(1.324)
0.231*
(0.070)
-0.449*
(0.161)
-3.030*
(0.648)
0.664*
(0.241)
0.001
(0.005)

-3.088*
(0.895)
0.378*
(0.059)
-0.693*
(0.147)
-1.230
(0.860)
-0.228
(0.209)
0.016*
(0.003)

0.082
111.04
0.000

0.016
4.259
0.513

0.757
17.653
0.003

0.191
83.696
0.000

0.251
114.076
0.000

Source: Author’s estimates
Note: Huber/White Robust Standard Errors (S.E.) are in parentheses; * and ** indicate that the
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% and the 10 % levels, respectively; a includes
Publishing, Construction Materials, and Technology (Electronic components).
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Appendix 4.2: Maximum-likelihood Probit estimates for export participation of
listed manufacturing firms (using DEA technical inefficiency scores)
Dependent variable:

All

Agro & Food Consumer Industrials Other
Products
Sectorsa
Manufacturing Industry

Export Participation

281
1028
1309

46
277
323

2
250
252

96
301
397

137
200
337

-1.868*
(0.725)
0.222*
(0.042)
-0.226*
(0.095)
-0.281
(0.779)
0.045*
(0.022)
0.010*
(0.002)

2.278
(1.558)
-0.045
(0.095)
0.037
(0.312)
-5.751*
(2.099)
-0.014
(0.188)
0.002
(0.006)

8.336
(8.689)
0.169
(0.372)
-2.036
(1.373)
-4.797
(4.631)
-2.740*
(1.206)
0.934
(0.611)

-3.180*
(1.241)
0.312*
(0.072)
-0.211
(0.153)
-3.760*
(1.191)
0.605*
(0.276)
0.000
(0.004)

-5.042*
(1.136)
0.482*
(0.070)
-0.754*
(0.148)
2.765
(1.723)
-0.274
(0.229)
0.016*
(0.003)

0.069
94.284
0.000

0.037
9.704
0.084

0.492
11.471
0.043

0.147
64.672
0.000

0.252
114.883
0.000

Observation with Dependent variable = 0
Observation with Dependent variable = 1
Total observations
Constant
Firm Size
Firm Age
Technical Inefficiency (DEA)
Leverage
Foreign Investment

McFadden R-squared
LR statistic
Prob (LR statistic)

Source: Author’s estimates
Note: Huber/White Robust Standard Errors (S.E.) are in parentheses; * and ** indicate that the
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% and the 10 % levels, respectively; a includes
Publishing, Construction Materials, and Technology (Electronic components).

Appendix 4.3: Comparison of the results of maximum-likelihood estimates for
parameters between SFA technical inefficiency scores and DEA technical
inefficiency scores
Dependent variable:
Technical inefficiency

All
Agro & Food Consumer
Manufacturing Industry
Products
SFA

DEA

SFA DEA

SFA DEA

Industrials

Other
Sectors a

SFA DEA SFA DEA

Independent variables :
Constant

-**

-*

-

+

-*

+

-

-*

-*

-*

Firm Size
Firm Age

+*
-*

+*
-*

+*
-

+

+*
+*

+
-

+*
-*

+*
-

+*
-*

+*
-*

Technical Inefficiency
Leverage

-*
+*

+*

+
-

-*
-

-*
-*

-*

-*
+*

-*
+*

-

+
-

Foreign Investment

+*

+*

+

+

+*

+

+

+

+*

+*

Source: Author’s estimates
Note: * and ** indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% and the 10 % levels,
respectively; a includes Publishing, Construction Materials, and Technology (Electronic components).
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